Chapter XVIII
BOOK THREE OF THE TRINITY
Chapter XVIII How the consummation oftrue and supreme goodness does not seem to be able to subsist without the completion of the Trinity
Let it disturb no one, let no one be indignant if we speak in a human manner to provide a clearer understanding of the truth of divine and supermundane things. We adopt this manner of speaking at the point of our necessity all the more confidently, the more frequently we discover it in sacred Scripture.
The supreme level of goodness seems to exist there, when supreme love is given and nothing is obtained in return for the fullness of its own happiness. But, as is most evident from what we have already said, this level of supreme perfection cannot be found between only two persons who mutually love. For indeed, in this case, each of those who love gives love, and from this each undoubtedly draws those delights of love, flowing with honey. If each were alone and lived like a hermit he would not have anyone from whom he could draw this. And so a great accumulation of joy and pleasure builds up for anyone who gives and receives love in fellowship with another. From this, therefore, we clearly gather that the supreme level of that generosity would have no place in Divinity if a third person were lacking in that plurality of persons. Certainly in only a pair of persons there would be no one with whom either of the two could share the excellent delights of His pleasure. For this reason it is given to be understood that the consummation of true and supreme goodness cannot subsist without completion of the Trinity.
Chapter XIX How a trace of the Trinity can be grasped by examining only the particular nature of shared love What has been proved by the manifold witness of reason concerning the affirmation of the Trinity can be confirmed by a sufficiently brief and very evident consideration. Let us ponder with
RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR
careful consideration the virtue and particular nature of shared love and we shall quickly discover what we seek. When one person gives love to another and he alone loves only the other, there certainly is love, but it is not a shared love. When two love each other mutually and give to each other the affection of supreme longing; when the affection of the first goes out to the second and the affection of the second goes out to the first and tends as it were in diverse ways— in this case there certainly is love on both sides, but it is not shared love. Shared love is properly said to exist when a third person is loved by two persons harmoniously and in community, and the affection of the two persons is fused into one affection by the flame of love for the third. From these things it is evident that shared love would have no place in Divinity itself if a third person were lacking to the other two persons. Here we are not speaking of just any shared love but of supreme shared love— a shared love of a sort such that a creature would never merit from the Creator and for which it would never be found worthy.
Who, I ask, should be able to explicate fitly how great is the virtue of supreme and totally perfect benevolence? Who, I ask, would suffice to estimate fitly what or how great is the worth of intimate and supreme harmony? If there is so much worth for each person in these two virtues on account of the virtue itself, what virtue, what worth, I ask, will there be where each is fashioned on account of the other, where one is greatly praised on account of the other, where one is brought to consummation on account of the other? However, what is intimate and supreme shared love, other than the mutual coming together of intimate benevolence and supreme harmony? Just as a virtue of so much worth and supereminent excellence cannot be lacking in the supreme and altogether perfect good, so it is not able to subsist without a Trinity of persons.
BOOK THREE OF THE TRINITY
Chapter XX Thatfrom sharedfellowship with a thirdperson in that Trinity it is argued that concordant charity and consocial love are neverfound anywhere in an individual Consider now how union with a third person estabHshes concordant affection everywhere and brings about consocial love through all and in all. If you direct your attention to any one among these three persons, you will see that the other two love the third concordantly. If you turn your attention to the second, there in like manner you will find that the remaining pair unite with equal desire in love for him. If you bring the third of these into consideration, without doubt you will see that the affection of the others flows in equal harmony to the third. If creation is considered, there the cord of love is tripled so that where suspicion concerning a defect of love could arise more easily, certitude is made more firm by greater confederation. Behold how from shared fellowship with a third person in that Trinity it is argued that concordant charity and consocial love are never found anywhere in an isolated individual. Behold in the affirmation of the Trinity, so great, so firm a witness to truth occurs everywhere that a person for whom so much assurance is insufficient seems to be mad.
Chapter XXI That there is supreme equality in that Trinity in which it is necessaryfor all to be equally perfect What has been shown above concerning two can be inferred with equal reasoning also about the three, namely each one loving supremely and being loved supremely by each, because each is supremely perfect. The fullness of supreme happiness requires fullness of supreme pleasure. The fullness of supreme pleasure requires fullness of supreme charity. The fullness of supreme charity demands fullness of supreme perfection. And so where all must be equally perfect, it is necessary that all coincide in supreme equal-
RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR
ity. In all of them there will be equal wisdom, equal power, undifferentiated glory, uniform goodness, and eternal happiness, so that we may truly establish what the daily profession of Christian instruction teaches equally concerning the three: "the Divinity is one, glory equal, and majesty coeternal."* There no one is greater than another, no one is less than another; there no one is before another; no one is after another. And so it is established that in that Trinity all persons are coequal and coeternal together. For if they were not coeternal, for that reason they would not be coequal.
Chapter XXII That there is supreme simplicity in each person, true and supreme unity in all together, and marvelous identity everywhere In that supreme and totally perfect equality of persons, that supreme and supremely simple being is common to all. Thus it is the same for each one to exist as to live, to live as to understand, to understand as to be able.
There wisdom does not differ from power, nor power from essence, and in this manner one comes to a similar conclusion in similar things. Thus you see that each thing is totally the same although it is in each person. But if supreme perfection is in that equality and supreme equality is in that perfection, will supreme fullness of wisdom be simultaneously in each individually and in all, and will supreme fullness of power be simultaneously in each individually and in all? But what is supreme and full power except omnipotence? However we know that omnipotence is called such because it is able to do everything. But if it is agreed that omnipotence is truly able to do everything, it will be able to carry out with ease what any other power would not be able to do. For this reason it is clear that only one omnipotence can exist.
But it was proved above that omnipotence is the same as divine essence.
Therefore, if it is common for all the persons to have omnipotence together—no, rather to be omnipotent, because there
^Athanasian Creed.
BOOK THREE OF THE TRINITY
to be is not different from to have— it will also be common for all to be one and the same essence. For, like omnipotence, there can be only one divine essence. Not only is what each person is completely the same; but each one is what each other is. And so, supreme simplicity is in each; true and supreme unity is in all together; and marvelous identity is everywhere if you pay attention well.
Chapter XXIII How the aforementioned equality ought to be understood in these persons where there is so much unity and such identity We are able to understand in both a good way and a bad way what has been said concerning the equality of persons. Indeed, in so much simplicity and unity of persons there seems to be more identity than equality. We are able and accustomed to say that three golden statues are equal if they have the same purity and weight and the same similitude in everything. But such an equality is very different from that which exists in the Trinity of divine persons. For in that equality of statues the mass of gold in one statue is one thing and the mass of gold in another statue is another thing. According to this, one of the statues is one thing and the other is another thing. However, concerning that true and supreme
Trinity we ought not to think that in it there are things that are different but equal among themselves. As has been shown already, whatever is in any one person of the Trinity, the same is also completely in any other person.
We do not unworthily say that three rational spirits are equal if they have the same power, the same wisdom, the same purity and goodness. But in this trinity of spirits, just as there are three persons, so it is evident that there are three substances. However, the supreme Trinity exists with unity of substance. And so, in that first trinity one thing and another thing, both equal, are found; but such equality is very different from the divine Trinity. But we say that persons are equal in that supreme Trinity for this reason: because that supreme and supremely simple being which belongs to one