Chapter IV
RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR
without contradiction he will discover that just as nothing is better than charity, so nothing is more pleasing than charity.
Nature herself teaches us this; many experiences do the very same. Therefore, just as that than which nothing is better cannot be lacking in the fullness of true goodness, so also that than which nothing is more pleasing cannot be lacking in the fullness of supreme happiness.* Therefore, in supreme happiness it is necessary that charity not be lacking. However, so that charity may be in the supreme good, it is impossible that there be lacking either one who can show charity or one to whom charity can be shown. However it is a characteristic of love, and one without which it cannot possibly exist, to wish to be loved much by the one whom you love much. Therefore, love cannot be pleasing if it is not also mutual. Therefore, in that true and supreme happiness, just as pleasing love cannot be lacking, so mutual love cannot be lacking. However, in mutual love it is absolutely necessary that there be both one who gives love and one who returns love. Therefore one will be the offerer of love and the other the returner of love. Now, where the one and the other are clearly shown to exist, true plurality is discovered.
In that fullness of true happiness, a plurality of persons cannot be lacking.
However it is agreed that supreme happiness is nothing other than Divinity itself. Therefore, the showing of love freely given and the repayment of love that is due prove without any doubt that in true
Divinity a plurality of persons cannot be lacking.
Chapter IV That what is asserted in the above-mentioned two witnesses concerning the plurality ofpersons is confirmed by considering the fullness of divine glory
Certainly if we say that in that true Divinity there exists only one person, just as there is only one substance, then without doubt according to this He will not have anyone with whom He could share that infinite abundance of His fullness. But, how can this be,
I ask? Would it be because even though He wished to. He could not * Richard is reflecting the complex formula of Anselm's designation of God in the ontological argument; cf. Proslogion, 1-5.
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have one who would share with Him? Or is it because He would not wish to, even if He could? But He who is undoubtedly omnipotent cannot be excused on the grounds of impossibility. But could not that which is not due to a defect of power be due to a defect of benevolence alone? But if He would be absolutely unwilling to have one to share with Him when He really could if He wanted, then observe, I ask you, what a defect of benevolence this would be in a divine person and how great it would be.
Certainly, as has been said, nothing is sweeter than charity; nothing more pleasing than charity. The life of reason experiences nothing sweeter than the delights of charity; enjoys no pleasure more pleasing than this. He would lack these delights in eternity if He remains all alone on the throne of majesty because He lacks fellowship.
And so from these points we can realize what kind and how great the defect of such benevolence would be if He should prefer to keep for Himself alone in a miserly fashion the abundance of His fullness, which if He wished. He could communicate to another with such an accumulation of joy and such an increase of pleasure.
If He were like this. He should quite rightly hide from the gaze of angels and of everyone. If such a great defect of benevolence were in Him, quite rightly He should blush with shame to be seen or to be recognized. But this is not proper!
It is not proper that there be something in that supreme majesty in which He could not glory, for which He should not be glorified.
Yet where will fullness of glory be? For no fullness can be lacking there, as was proven above. However, what is more glorious, what is truly more magnificent than to have nothing that one does not want to share? And so it is evident that in that unfailing good and supremely wise counsel there can be no miserly holding back just as there can be no inordinate squandering. Behold, you plainly know, as you can see, that in that supreme and most exalted height, the fullness of glory requires that a sharer of glory be not lacking.
RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR
Chapter V That the above-mentioned assertion of divine plurality is confirmed by a triple testimony Behold, concerning the pluraUty of divine persons, we have presented our teaching with such transparent reasoning that whoever wishes to oppose such a clear confirmation would seem to suffer from the disease of folly. For who, except someone suffering from the disease of madness, would say that there is lacking in the supreme goodness that than which nothing is more perfect, and nothing better? Who, I ask, except someone weak in mind, would deny that there is in the supreme happiness that than which nothing is more joyful and nothing sweeter? Who,
I say, except someone devoid of reason, would think that there could be lacking in the fullness of glory that than which nothing is more glorious and nothing more magnificent? Certainly nothing is better, nothing is more joyful, nothing is any more magnificent than true, sincere and supreme charity, which he knows does not exist without a plurality of persons.
And so the assertion of this plurality is confirmed by a triple testimony.
For what supreme goodness and supreme happiness harmoniously declare concerning this matter, fullness of glory applauds by confirming and confirms by applauding. Behold concerning this article of our faith we have a triple testimony: the most supernal concerning supreme things; divine concerning divine things; the deepest concerning profound things; and the most open concerning hidden things. Ai^d we know that "in the mouth of two or three witness every word is established" (Matt. 18:16). Behold "a triple cord" that "is difficult to break" (Eccles. 4:12). Through the gift of the Trinity's wisdom, this cord firmly binds any frenzied attackers of our faith.
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Chapter VI It is utterly necessary that divine persons exist coeternally As we can gather clearly from the above, see how the perfection of one person requires fellowship with another. We have discovered that nothing is more glorious, more magnificent than to wish to have nothing that you do not wish to share. And so a person who was supremely good would not wish to be without a sharer of His majesty. However, without doubt, whatever that One whose will was omnipotent willed to exist must exist; whatever that One whose will was unchangeable once willed. He always willed.
Therefore, it is necessary that an eternal person have a coeternal person, for one is not able to precede the other nor is one able to follow the other. For just as nothing in that eternal and unchangeable Divinity is able to regress to an earlier condition, so nothing is able to come to a new condition. And so it is utterly impossible for divine persons not to be coeternal. For where there is true Divinity, there supreme goodness and full happiness exist. However, as has been said, supreme goodness cannot exist without perfect charity, nor can perfect charity exist without a plurality of persons. Indeed, full happiness cannot exist without true unchangeability, nor can true unchangeability exist without eternity. True charity demands a plurality of persons; true unchangeability demands a coeternity of persons.
Chapter VII That in that plurality ofpersons both supreme equality and supreme similitude must exist Surely it ought to be noted that as true charity demands a plurality of persons, so supreme charity demands equality of persons. Now supreme charity is not yet clearly shown to exist where the beloved is not truly loved supremely. But love is not discerning where one is loved supremely who should not be loved supremely.
But in supremely wise goodness, just as the flame of love does not