Chapter VIII
THE MYSTICAL ARK
is accustomed to run here and there without any function of reason.
However, in the second, a rational principle is sought and assigned to those things which are engaged in the mind by imagination, and that which is already known to us in a familiar way is led into wonder. The second and third have this in common but uniquely so in comparison with the others: that equally in both, imagination seems to be mixed with reason and reason with imagination. However, they differ in this: that in the second a rational principle is sought for and adapted to visible things, as has been said; while in the third, a rational principle is drawn from visible things for the investigation of invisible things, and in the latter we are often instructed concerning invisible things by visible things and we are clearly shown some things by other things. In this we advance from the examination of visible things to knowledge of invisible things.
The third and fourth have in common that they direct attention, as is agreed, toward invisible and intelligible things, but they especially differ in this, that in the third, reason is mixed with imagination, while in the fourth pure understanding is mixed with reason.
In the fourth and fifth, reason and understanding come together in unity, and in this they especially agree in harmony. But in the fourth, understanding advances by means of reason. But in the fifth, reason does not go before understanding at all, but it follows or at the most accompanies it. For what is first recognized by means of divine inspiration is afterward affirmed by the testimony of reason.
It happens jointly in the fifth and sixth that both of them pursue intellectible things. In the fifth, human reason seems sufficiently to concur. But in the sixth, all human reason seems to be contrary, unless it is supported by a mixture of faith.
Chapter VIII What the character of each is, individually It is characteristic of the first contemplation to cling to the wonder of visible things simply and without any reasoning.
It is
RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR
characteristic of the second to pursue the rational principle of visible things by reasoning. It is characteristic of the third, by reasoning, to rise by visible things to invisible things. It is characteristic of the fourth to gather invisible things from visible things by reasoning and to advance to the knowledge of unknown things by the understanding of things experienced.
It is characteristic of the fifth to allow reason admission into the understanding of intellectible things.
It is characteristic of the sixth to transcend and tread under foot, as it were, all human reasoning in the understanding of intellectible things.
Although contemplation cannot exist without imagination in the first three kinds taken together, in the first, imagination subsists below reason, as it were; in the second, imagination receives reason; in the third, imagination rises to reason.
Again: Although the three highest taken together cannot exist without pure understanding, in the first of these (that is, in the fourth) understanding inclines itself to reason; in the fifth, understanding raises reason to itself; in the sixth, understanding transcends reason and, as it were, abandons everything below itself.
Again: Although in the middle there are four taken together that cannot exist without reasoning, in the second kind of contemplation, reason stoops to imagination, as it were to the lowest things; in the third, it draws imagination with it, as it were, to higher things; in the fourth it receives and conducts understanding, which descends, as it were, below itself; in the fifth, reason rises above itself, as it were, to understanding and alludes to it in its sublime things.
In the first kind of contemplation, imagination rests in itself.
In the sixth, understanding gathers itself to itself and subsists in itself.
In the second, reason descends below itself.
In the fifth, reason rises above itself. In the third, imagination rises above itself.
In the fourth, understanding descends below itself.
In the first kind of contemplation, imagination occupies the lowest and solitary place.
In the second, reason descends to the lowest place it can. In the third, imagination rises to the highest place it can. In the fourth, understanding descends to the lowest place it can. In the fifth, reason rises to the highest place it can. In the sixth, understanding occupies the highest and solitary place.
THE MYSTICAL ARK
Chapter IX In what proportion they relate to each other and are accustomed to mix together by turns Indeed, it should be noted that just as the last two kinds of contemplation rise above reason, so the middle two rise above imagination. As the higher of the last two usually admits no human reason at all, so the higher of the middle two ought to exclude all imagination from itself. As the lower of the last and supreme two is above reason yet not beyond reason, so the lower of the middle two rises above imagination, although it is not yet beyond imagination.
As the two middle ones descend below pure and simple understanding, so the first and lowest two descend below reasoning.
I call "simple understanding" that which exists without the function of reason, while "pure understanding" is that which exists without imagination's coming into view. But, as the higher of the two middle ones descends below simple understanding, yet it does not subsist below simple understanding because of those things in which it is engaged; some it comprehends by simple understanding while it gathers others by reasoning; so also the higher of the two lowest seems to descend below thinking, yet it does not subsist below that because it usually represents some things by means of imagination and gathers other things by reasoning. And again: As the lower of the two middle ones usually descends and subsists below simple understanding, so the lower of the two lowest usually exists near to reason.
For the former one also directs attention toward only those things which the mind has gathered from the imagination by means of reasoning, and the latter one directs attention toward only those things which the mind impresses on the imagination by means of the senses. Although this first and lowest kind of contemplation is said because of that to subsist below reason—or rather below reasoning—surely it should not seem irrational, as it were, and wholly contrary to reason, since an agreement with reason through attention and even through disposition can easily be shown. But as has been said, in as far as it concerns its proper nature, nothing is gathered by reasoning.
Nevertheless, these kinds of contemplations that we have separated are accus-