Chapter VI
THE MYSTICAL ARK
Chapter VI How many and what the kinds of contemplation are There are six kinds of contemplations in themselves, and within each there are many divisions. The first is in imagination and according to imagination only. The second is in imagination and according to reason. The third is in reason and according to imagination. The fourth is in reason and according to reason. The fifth is above but not beyond reason. The sixth is above reason and seems to be beyond reason. And so, there are two in imagination, two in reason and two in understanding.
Without doubt, our contemplation is engaged in imagination when the form and image of those visible things are brought into consideration and we, being amazed, give attention, and in giving attention are amazed how many, how great, how diverse, how beautiful and joyful are these corporeal things that we imbibe by means of corporeal sense. Marveling we venerate and venerating we marvel at the power, wisdom and generosity of that superessential creatrix. However our contemplation is engaged in imagination and is formed according to imagination only when we seek nothing by means of argumentation and investigate nothing by means of reasoning, but rather our mind runs freely here and there, wherever wonder carries it away in this kind of manifestation.
The second kind of contemplation is that which is in imagination, but yet is formed by and proceeds according to reason, since it comes about when we seek and find a rational principle for those things which we engage in imagination and which belong, as we have already said, to the first kind of contemplation. Indeed, with wonder we bring discovery and knowledge into consideration. In the first kind of contemplation we look at, examine and marvel at things themselves; in the second kind we do the same with the reason, order and disposition of these things, and the cause, mode and benefit of any one thing. And so this contemplation is in imagination but according to reason, because it proceeds by means of reasoning about those things which are engaged in the imagination.
And although this contemplation in which the rational principle of visible things is sought seems to be in reason according to some-
RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR
thing, nevertheless it is rightly said to be in the imagination because whatever we seek or find in it by means of reasoning, we undoubtedly accommodate to those things which we engage in imagination when we apply ourselves to those things by reasoning about them.
We have said that the third kind of contemplation is that which is formed in reason according to imagination. We truly use this kind of contemplation when by means of the similitude of visible things we are raised up to speculation of invisible things. This speculation is in reason, because it applies only to those things which go beyond imagination by means of attention and investigation, since it directs attention toward invisible things only, toward those only which it grasps by reason. But it is said to be formed according to imagination because in this speculation a similitude is drawn from an image of visible things, and the soul is assisted by this similitude in the investigation of invisible things. And indeed, although it is advanced by reasoning, this contemplation is rightly said to be in reason but according to imagination, because all its reasoning and argumentation begin with a foundation and acquire support in imagination, and it draws the reason for its investigation and assertion from the particular nature of things that are imaginable.
The fourth kind of contemplation is that which is formed in reason and according to reason: because it is when, far removed from every function of imagination, the rational soul directs its attention toward only those things which the imagination does not know but which the mind gathers from reasoning or understands by means of reason. We apply ourselves to speculation of this kind when we bring into consideration the invisible things of ourselves which we know through experience and acquire from understanding; and we rise up from consideration of these things to contemplation of celestial souls and highest goods. However, this contemplation is in reason because it gives its attention only to things of the understanding that are far removed from things of sense. And indeed, this contemplation seems to take a beginning and to acquire a foundation especially from those invisible things of ourselves which it is agreed that the human soul knows by experience and understands by means of common understanding. But in this case alone, this contemplation is also rightly said to be in reason, because these invisible things of ourselves are understood by reason, and in this.
THE MYSTICAL ARK
the mode of reasoning is not surpassed in the least. This contemplation, therefore, advances according to reason alone because it gathers some things from invisible things that are known by experience, and other things that it does not know from experience it gathers by reasoning. In this contemplation the human soul makes use for the first time of pure understanding, and since it is far removed from every function of imagination, our understanding itself seems in this activity to understand itself by means of itself for the first time. Although the understanding seems not to be absent in those previous kinds of contemplation, yet it is almost nowhere present, except where reason or even imagination meditates. In the previous kinds of contemplation reason uses, as it were, an instrument and gazes, for example, into a mirror. In the present kind of contemplation it operates by means of itself and gazes, as it were, by means of sight. Accordingly, here it inclines itself to the lowest part, as it were, since it does not have anything by which it might descend lower by itself.
We have said that the fifth kind of contemplation is that which is above reason yet not beyond reason. However, we rise up into this watchtower of contemplation by the raising up of the mind, when by means of a divine showing we know things that we are not capable of sufficiently grasping fully by any human reason or investigating fully by any of our reasoning. Such things are those which we believe and prove by the authority of divine Scripture concerning the nature of Divinity and that simple essence. Thus our contemplation truly rises above reason when, by means of the raising up of the mind, the rational soul perceives that which transcends the limits of human capacity. It ought to be held to be above reason yet not beyond reason, when human reason is not able to oppose that which is perceived by the fine point of the understanding, but rather, it more easily gives assent and alludes to the attestation of such.
The sixth kind of contemplation is that which is engaged with those things which are above reason and seem to be beyond or even against reason. In this highest and most worthy watchtower of all contemplations, the rational soul especially rejoices and dances when from the irradiation of divine light it learns and considers those things against which all human reason cries out. Such things
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are almost all the things that we are told to believe concerning the Trinity of persons. When human reason is consulted concerning these, it seems to do nothing other than to oppose them.
Chapter VII What things are common to them And so two of these are in the imagination, because they direct attention toward sensible things only. Two are in reason, because they apply themselves to intelligible things only. Two subsist in understanding, because they direct attention toward intellectible things only.
I call "sensible" whatever is visible and perceptible by corporeal sense. However, I call "intelligible" those invisible things which can nevertheless be understood by reason. In this place,
I call ^'intellectible" those invisible things which cannot be understood by human reason. Thus, among these six kinds of contemplation, the lower four are engaged especially with created things while the two highest are engaged with uncreated and divine things. Again: Among the first four, the two higher are engaged concerning invisible things; the two lower, concerning visible and corporeal things. Without doubt the lowest two are engaged with visible and created things. However, the highest two are especially engaged with invisible and uncreated things. The middle two are engaged especially with invisible and created things.
I have said "especially" for the reason that there are some things concerning invisible and created things that cannot be grasped in any way by human reason. According to this they go with the number of intellectible things and show themselves to pertain more to the two highest kinds of contemplations. Similarly, concerning the highest and uncreated things, it seems that some are accessible to human reason, and according to this ought to be counted among intelligible things and to be adapted especially to those two middle kinds of contemplations. And so it seems that the first two have this in common, that both are engaged about visible things. Yet they seem to differ especially in this, that the first, being impelled by wonder,