Chapter VIII
THE MYSTICAL ARK
Chapter VIII That the fifth kind of contemplation permits the rational principle of similitudes; but the sixth completely exceeds the particular nature of all similitude I think that it ought neither to be neglected nor to be passed over without careful consideration that one is advised by the voice of the Lord concerning these two cherubim, when it is said: "Let one cherub be on one side, and the other on the other" (Exod.
25:19). And so they should be set up on both sides of the oracle, covering both sides of the propitiatory. Of course, we understand the same thing by the oracle as we do by the propitiatory.
Therefore let us inquire what these two sides of our propitiatory are, so that as a consequence we may discover why one of the cherubim must stand on one side, and the other on the other. As we have already shown satisfactorily above, we understand by the propitiatory that kind of contemplation which is concerned with rational spirits. However, we believe that the rational creatures— both angelic and human—have been created according to the image and similitude of God.
It has been written about humans: "God created a human according to His image and similitude, according to the image of God He created him" (Gen.
1:27).
Concerning angelic nature, we think of a passage that we read elsewhere: "You were a seal of similitude, full of wisdom and elegant in the delights of the paradise of God" (Ezech.
28:12-13).
Behold, the angelic nature has been called a seal of similitude, even for that part which stood not in truth. On the other hand, the prophet David openly proclaims and says: "There is none similar to you among the gods,
O Lord"
(Ps.
85:8), and Isaiah clearly declares:
"Whereas all peoples are before him as if they do not exist, and they are counted as if nothing and worthless" (Isa. 40:17). How are they "as if nothing and worthless" if they have some similarity to the divine?
Perhaps what one says, the other contradicts? Absolutely not! For behold, I read in the writings of David: "God, who will be similar to you?" (Ps.
82:2). But again, I find in the writings of the same person: "Lord, the light of your face has been sealed upon us" (Ps.
4:7). Therefore, what else can we gather from such diverse state-
RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR
ments except that truly and without doubt on account of one thing we manifest simiHarities to our Creator and on account of another thing, dissimiharities.
Indeed, how is a person not dissimilar to Him in many ways, for concerning him it has been truly written:
"Whereas every person living is totally vanity" (Ps.
38:6). Behold how dissimilar. "And yet a person passes through in an image" (Ps.
38:7). Behold how similar. For what is a person that he can conform to the King his Maker? But in any case an angel in heaven does not emulate perfectly that similitude of its Creator. "Who is like you among the strong O Lord; who is like you, magnificent in holiness, terrible and praiseworthy, and doing marvelous things?" (Exod.
15:11). See, therefore: Is it not probable that those things in which we are similar pertain to one side and those things in which we are dissimilar pertain equally to the other side? And so, if you will, let one side of our propitiatory be called "divine similitude in rational substances," and let the other be called "many-sided dissimilitude with the same essences of supreme Divinity." Therefore, let us see how one of the cherubim stands on one side and the other on the other side, and which ought to stand on which side. We have already said above that the contemplation of those things which are above reason but not beyond reason pertains to one cherub. To the other cherub pertains the contemplation of those things which are above reason and seem to go beyond reason. However, it is evident that the first one mentioned is much easier than the second. For this reason it ought to be and is accustomed to be first in our use. The more difficult the other is, the later it ought to be. And so let the first of these contemplations be called the first cherub.
Let the second of them be called the second cherub. Therefore, a cherub of one sort ought to stand on one side, and of another on the other.
Surely a cherub seems to stand on one side when the ray of contemplation is fixed on those things, for the investigation and confirmation of which any adaptation of a similitude is easily accommodated. A cherub stands on the other side, as it were, when human understanding raises itself to that contemplation to which no adumbration of similitude fully joins itself. For consideration of similitude pertains to one side, as has been said, just as consideration of dissimilitude pertains to the other. However, it is evident that those things which allow themselves to be joined to some