Chapter XVII
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crave concerning the intimate pleasantness of truth.
Therefore those who are beloved, eat; but those who are most beloved, drink.
This is because the mode of manifestation is ordered according to the measure of love. However, inebriation accomplishes alienation of mind and the infusion of a supernal showing carries away into ecstasy of mind only those who are most beloved. The Prophet wanted to indicate such inebriation when he said: "They shall be inebriated by the richness of your house, and you shall cause them to drink from the torrent of your pleasure" (Ps.
35:9). Therefore, if we crave to overflow with this inebriation, and to make frequent use of this contemplative ecstasy of mind, we must endeavor to love our God intimately and supremely and cling at all hours with supreme longing to the joy of divine contemplation. This will mean that our cherubim have spread-out wings. Behold, with how much labor we have already sweated; behold how much circumlocution we have used in the same matter, so that our cherubim might spread out their wings sufficiently and cover over our propitiatory with whatever kind of obscuring is necessary.
Chapter XVII Concerning those things pertaining especially to the fifth kind of contemplation Now it remains for us to inquire why the aforementioned cherubim ought to look mutually at each other, and in looking turn faces to the propitiatory: "Let them look mutually at each other after turning faces to the propitiatory" (Exod. 25:20). However, we said above that those things which are above reason yet nevertheless not beyond reason pertain to the first cherub; and that those things which are above reason and seem to be beyond reason pertain to the second cherub. And so, according to this distinction, you see that not by chance do those things which are considered concerning the unity of that supreme and simple divine essence pertain especially to the first cherub; to the second cherub, however, pertain those things which are considered concerning the Trinity of persons. For there are many things that are believed, asserted and proved by the
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authority of Scripture concerning the Trinity of persons that seem wholly opposed to nature and contrary to all human reason. And so all things of the sort that concern the Trinity are rightly said to pertain to the second cherub, by which those things that oppose human reason are led into contemplation.
Let us see how those things which are considered concerning the unity of Divinity in one simple nature exceed the mode of human understanding, and yet they are no less fit for reason. For that reason they especially pertain to the first cherub, that is to the first kind of contemplation.
Certainly, we believe that the principal and supreme One of all is truly simple and supremely one; and in that one simple good, all good exists. As far as essence is concerned, nothing is more simple than that One. As far as efficacy is concerned nothing is more manifold. As far as essence is concerned, what is more simple than that which is truly and supremely one? As far as efficacy is concerned, what is more manifold than that which is truly and without doubt able to do everything? See how difficult it is to comprehend by means of human reason everything that exists; then you will understand how incomprehensible that good is in which every good exists.
It is above reason to comprehend how that good is truly simple and supremely one, and how that good is every good.
Nevertheless human reason easily acquiesces in this assertion and refers to it by its testimony, when it considers, affirms and truly bears witness that if in that supreme and sempiternal good anything of good were lacking, it would not be full and perfect and wholly sufficient. Therefore, how can that which is boundless and infinite be comprehended? ''Great is the Lord, and praiseworthy beyond measure; and of his greatness there is no end" (Ps.
144:3). But what sense is able to grasp, and what reason is able to comprehend, how at one and the same time He can be both truly simple if He is boundless and supremely one if He is infinite? Nevertheless reason bears witness by reasoning that that which is not truly composite is truly simple, because everything that is composite can be divided naturally, and that which is naturally divisible is also changeable according to something. Therefore reason agrees that He is truly simple, since He must be unchangeable, because He is agreed to be the best of all and supreme: "With him there is no change, nor any shadow of change" (James 1:17). Therefore, if it is good that He is
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unchangeable, in like manner it will be good that He is a simple being. Therefore, it follows that He is supremely simple because He is supremely good. Therefore, if nothing is more simple than that, then nothing is more subtle than that; and that of which nothing is more subtle, nothing is deeper than that; and nothing is more inscrutable than the deepest thing, and it follows that nothing is more incomprehensible. Yet let us see what may happen as the result of the mutual collocation of simplicity and boundlessness, unity and everything.
If every good is there. He is the supreme good and everything is there; therefore He is the supreme power, the supreme wisdom, the supreme goodness, the supreme happiness. But where supreme simplicity is, everything that is there is one and the same thing. And so it is one and the same thing for Him to exist, to live, to understand, and to be able to be good and blessed. See how incomprehensible this is. There is not one who is powerful, another who is wise, another who is good and another who is blessed. Think therefore, what that power is for which it is the same to do as it is to wish to be doing. Pay attention to what that wisdom is for which it is the same to be able to do as to know. Give thought to what that goodness is for which whatever is pleasing to it, for this reason it is fitting that it be pleasing, and whatever is displeasing to it, for this reason it is fitting that it be displeasing.
Consider what that life is, for which it is the same to be as to be blessed. Again, pay attention to this: that if He is truly omnipotent,
He is also able to be everywhere.
Therefore, He is potentially everywhere, both the place where He is and the place where He is not. But if He is there potentially. He is also there essentially, because His power is not one thing and His essence, another.
Therefore, essentially He is within all things and outside all things, below all things and above all things.
If He is within all things, nothing is more secret than He is. If He is outside all things, nothing is farther away than He is. If He is below all things, nothing is more obscure than He is.
If He is above all things, nothing is more sublime than He is. What is more incomprehensible than that than which nothing is more secret, nothing farther away, nothing more obscure, nothing more sublime? Again, if He is in every place, nothing is more present than He is.
If He is outside every place, nothing is more absent than He is. But is anything more absent
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than that very One who is the most present of all, and is anything more present than that very One who is the most absent of all, who does not have to be one thing and another in order to be everything that exists? But if nothing is more present than the most absent and if nothing is more absent than the most present, what is more marvelous than this, what is more incomprehensible? Again, if His power is not one thing and His happiness another, wherever supreme power is, there supreme happiness is also. Therefore, supreme happiness is everywhere. How can there be a place of supreme misery in the inferno or how can any place be miserable in which supreme happiness is nowhere absent or never lacking? All these things are marvelous and truly incomprehensible.
Reason approves many things— nay, almost an infinite number of things—concerning the unity of Divinity and the consideration of true unity, and yet it does not comprehend them. And so, all things of this sort are above reason but not beyond reason, and for this very reason, according to the conclusion mentioned above, they show themselves to pertain to the first cherub.
Chapter XVHI Concerning those things which pertain especially to the sixth kind of contemplation Concerning the Trinity of persons, however, and speculation about the Trinity, how many things are firmly believed and truly asserted that nevertheless seem to be not only above reason but even against reason? We believe in one God— Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit: the Father from nothing, the Son from the Father only, the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son; the Son by having been begotten, the Holy Spirit by having proceeded. And so we believe in one and the same God, triune in persons and one in substance. For which reason the Father is one person, the Son is another, and the Holy Spirit is another. Nevertheless the Father is not other than the Son, nor are the Father and the Son other than the Spirit of both. For the person of the Father is one; the person of the Son, another; the person of the Holy Spirit, another; yet they
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all have one substance, the same essence, and a single nature. We believe all these things; we confess all these things openly, and they are agreed truly to be. Yet in all these things if they are considered according to human opinion, human reason seems to oppose them strongly. If the Father is unbegotten and the Son is only-begotten, will not the substance of the Father be unbegotten and that of the Son be begotten? And since both have one and the same substance, will not the same substance be begotten and unbegotten, that is begotten and not begotten? Can the same substance beget itself and be born from itself? Can the same substance be born and not be born; can it experience birth and not experience birth? If we say that the Son is born, what shall we say concerning His birth?
Will not His birth be eternal "with whom there is no changing nor any shadow of change" (James 1:17)?
If at some time His birth was not, how is He coeternal and coequal with the Father? And if His birth will cease to exist at some time, how will that nature be unchangeable in which something passes away? If He always was, how does He who never began to be and without whom the Father never would be able to exist as Father receive being from another? And how is His birth complete, if it is still future? Or perhaps it is repeated continually, so that it can exist always? Therefore, in this case will it not be multiple and infinite rather than one, as much as it will be necessary to repeat it into infinity? But whatever is said concerning the birth of the Son, see to it lest perchance we are able to seek out by reasoning the same thing about the procession of the Holy Spirit. Behold these things; if they are considered according to human opinion these things seem to oppose human reason.
If the Holy Spirit is of the same power with the Father, does it not have itself the same power that the Father has? Can it beget such a Son as the Father is able to do?
Or perhaps it does not have the power to beget the Son— a Son of the sort who is omnipotent? Or perhaps it does not wish to do so, although it is able? Therefore, how will the Spirit possess with the Father similitude of will and fullness of the similitude? Concerning the Trinity of persons, you will find many things of this sort—they are almost innumerable—which you will discover are not only incomprehensible but even discordant to human reason. You will find many such things, I say, concerning the Trinity of persons and
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many such things concerning the union of substances in the incarnation of the Word.
What, I ask, is it in which humanity and Divinity are united so that they can be one person? Is it something that is of man, something that is of God, or something that is of both? But if it is not of both, how are they able to be united in that which is alien to one or the other of them? If it is something that is of man, therefore it is a creature. If it is something that is of God, it is above a creature, and is no longer a creature. If it is something that is of God and of man, how can it be both and not be both, that is, a creature and not a creature? But this question is very much a secret and to such an extent, as far as I am concerned, it is not debatable and hence may perhaps be more rightly suppressed. But what can we say concerning the soul of Christ inasmuch as we dare not deny that He has received complete fullness of grace? For whatever the Father has from nature, Christ receives from grace. For in Christ complete fullness of Divinity dwells corporeally (Col.
2:9).
If He receives complete fullness of grace, therefore He also receives fullness of wisdom, and fullness of power. Therefore, if He possesses equal wisdom and equal power with the Father (which cannot be denied), how can He be equal to the Father and a creature be coequal with the Creator, a thing that is not to be confessed? But if without any doubt He possesses equal power and equal wisdom, how is He not capable of being completely coequal with Him? But why do we say this concerning the soul of Christ, when concerning His body we believe and hold many things according to the affirmation of faith that reason opposes and judges impossible? When Christ distributed His body to His disciples, did he carry Himself in His hands?
Again: Was it He Himself who carried and was carried? Again:
Was He the same one who was given? When He was taken by the disciples and was ground by their teeth, was He injured? Or perhaps in that which was given. He was incapable of suffering, just as He was also invisible, although according to that which He gave, it was not only visible but also capable of suffering. Therefore, was one and the same body at one and the same time both visible and invisible, capable of suffering and incapable of suffering? See how incomprehensible this is and how impossible it seems to be. See in how many places the same body of Christ is conse-