Chapter XIX
RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR
the investigation of invisible things. Truly, in this the outer person assists the inner person in the course of his investigation. For that purpose he represents to him an image of invisible things by means of the imagination of visible things. And while he completes the duty of his leadership, he leads the inner person by means of the stony path of similitudes to that place which he dares not enter. So servants often go before their lords in the way as far as the royal palace gates, and yet while the lords hasten within to the interior of the palace, the servants remain outside. Thus
I think it is evident, as we have already said above, how we ought to understand that this kind of contemplation exists in reason and according to imagination, because there are invisible things that we perceive mentally and yet we form them in us out of a similitude of visible things. For what shall I call the form of visible things except a kind of picture of invisible things, as it were? Should there be anyone who says that he has never seen a lion and yet longs to see one, if the image of a lion, portrayed suitable in some picture, is shown to him, certainly the sort of thing he ought to conceive in the mind is suggested immediately from that which he sees. Thereupon, he considers according to the features that have been portrayed on a surface, and he forms in the mind the solid members and the living animal itself.
Now think how much difference there is between that which we see externally and this which it shapes internally for him in his thinking. So certainly in this kind of contemplation the invisible things that we engage in the mind differ greatly from those things which we perceive by means of imagination, and yet we draw upon the similitude of the latter, in order to portray the former. We have now declared how we were able to give a reason why this kind of contemplation seems to be in reason and according to imagination.
Chapter XIX How whatever a ray of contemplation illumines pertains to the permission or working of God The order of reason requires that some things be said briefly in this place concerning the rings and the poles, so that the same order may be followed in exposition as the author wished to follow in
THE MYSTICAL ARK
description. First we must consider what the sides of the ark represent, so that in a suitable manner we may know which circles we ought to place on which side. As we have already said above, by the ark we understand the grace of contemplation. Therefore, since the ray of contemplation already radiates from on high and enlarges itself in every direction because of the elevated capacity of the mind, all things that are able to be subject to contemplation clearly show themselves to pertain to this ark.
It is one consideration when we pay attention daily to which of the things are either just or unjust.
It is quite another consideration when we perceive in human custom that one thing is proper while another is improper.
Thus in our ark they build two sides mutually opposite to each other, the one being "fairness," the other, "iniquity." No less do they make two other sides, mutually facing each other in direct opposition, one being "success," the other, "misfortune." However, it ought greatly to be wondered at and is worthy of great wonder how, when God moderates and disposes all things justly, either a good will or a bad will of whatever sort is now driven away by adversity on this side, now bound by prosperity on that side, so that neither the one nor the other increases continually nor exceeds the manner of divine disposition. Think now, in what manner the walls in our ark, while they extend themselves along the length and measure the width, cut off two other walls running transversely and limit them to a specified length. In any case, according to this similitude, at one time divine dispensation serves diverse wills as it wishes, so that they may discover how they may extend themselves; at another time it opposes them so that they may not exceed the manner of the previously established design. For, lest we escape, we are bound in the one by the chains of cupidity and impeded in the other by the restraint of necessity. Often we let go of many things lest we lose what we long for; no less often do we let go of many things lest we run upon what we hate. Thus where adversity and perversity come into mutual contact they form, in a certain manner, a corner in our ark. Where prosperity and perversity mutually meet, they make another corner. The meeting of fairness and prosperity constitutes the third. The striking together of fairness and adversity constitutes the fourth. At the first corner evil persons are reproved; at the fourth, good persons are reformed.