The Essential Augustine (continued)
E. Even that I do not hold by reason, but by steadfast faith. A. If then one of those fools of whom it is written: The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God, [Ps. 13:1] should say this to you, and not be willing to believe what you believe, but want to know whether you were believing the truth; would you leave the man, or would you think that in some way he should be persuaded of what you so firmly believe; especially if he had the will not to oppose it obstinately, but wished eagerly to know? E. What you said last advises me well enough as to how I should answer him. For however unreasonable he might be, he would admit that nothing whatever, and least of all so great a matter, should be argued about insincerely or with obstinacy. This granted, he would first try to convince me that he was asking in good faith, and that he had no hidden guile or obstinacy about the matter.
Then I should show (as I think anyone could easily do) that since he himself was Cemanding that matters hidden in his own mind be believed by another who did not know them, that it would be only reasonable for him to believe that God exists, from the books of those great men who have left written testimony that they lived with the Son of God, and who have written also of things seen by them which could not possibly be if there were no God: and he would be a simple fellow indeed to criticize me for believing those men when he wanted me to believe him. But that which he could not rightly object to he could in no wise make an excuse for his unwillingness to imitate. ; A. If then, as to whether God exists, it is enough for you that it should not seem unreasonable to believe those great men, why, pray, do you not think we should likewise take on the authority of those same men all those other things which we subjected to inquiry as if they were unsure and not clearly known? We should then have to trouble no further to examine them. E. But that which we believe, we desire also to know and understand.
A, You remember rightly; we cannot go back on the 6. position we took at the beginning of our former discussion. For believing is one thing, and understanding another; and we must first believe whatever great and divine matter we desire to understand. Else would the Prophet have said in error, Except ye believe, ye shall not understand. [Isa. 7:9, Septuagint] Then too our Lord himself, both by
FAITH AND REASON 25
His words and His acts, exhorted those whom He called to salvation to first believe. But afterward, when He spoke of the gift itself that was to be given to believers, He did not say, "This moreover is eternal life, that ye believe," but This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent. [John 17:3] Again, He says to believers, Seek and ye shall find. (Matt. 7:7] But one cannot speak of that being found which is believed without knowledge, nor does anyone become prepared to find God who does not first believe that which he is afterward to know. Wherefore, following our Lord's precepts, let us seek earnestly. For what He himself encourages us to seek, that same shall we find by His showing, so far as such things may be found in this life, and by such as we. For it is to be believed that these things are seen more clearly and known more perfectly by those better than we, even while they live on earth, and certainly by the good and pious after this life. And so we must hope it will be with us, and despising things earthly and mortal must love and desire these things in every way.
AUTHORITY AND REASON*
.-.- And now—that you may grasp my whole mean20.43. ing in a few words—whatever may be the nature of human wisdom, I see that I have not yet understood it. Nevertheless, although I am now in the thirty-third year of my life, I do not think that I ought to despair of understanding it some day, for I have resolved to disregard all the other things which mortals consider good, and to devote myself to an investigation of it. And, whereas the reasonings of the Academics used to deter me greatly from such an undertaking, I believe that through this disputation I am now sufficiently protected against those reasonings. Certainly, no one doubts that we are impelled toward knowledge by a twofold force: the force of authority and the force of reason. And I am resolved never to deviate in the least from the authority of Christ, for I find none more powerful. But, as to what is attainable by acute and accurate reasoning, such is my state of mind that I am impatient to grasp what truth is —to grasp it not only by belief, but also by comprehension.
* Against the Academics, Il, 20.43; trans. FOC 1 (1948) 220.
Meanwhile, I am confident that I shall find among the Platonists what is not in opposition.to our Sacred Scriptures.
IWO WAYS TO KNOWLEDGE*
It remains for me to declare how instruction is to be 9.26. imparted to the studious youths who have resolved to live after the manner described above. Likewise, with regard to the acquiring of knowledge, we are of necessity led in a twofold manner: by authority and by reason. In point of time, authority is first; in the order of reality, reason is prior. What takes precedence in operation is one thing; what is more highly prized as an object of desire is something else. Consequently, although the authority of upright men seems to be the safer guide for the uninstructed multitude, reason is better adapted for the educated. Furthermore, since no one becomes learned except by ceasing to be unlearned, and since no unlearned person knows in what quality he ought to present himself to instructors or by what manner of life he may become docile, it happens that for those who seek to learn great and hidden truths authority alone opens the door. But, after one has entered, then without any hesitation he begins to follow the precepts of the perfect life. When he has become docile through these precepts, then at length he will come to know: (a) how much wisdom is embodied in those very precepts that he has been observing before understanding; (b) what reason itself is, which he—now strong and capable after the cradle of authority—follows and comprehends; (c) what intellect is, in which all things are, or rather, which is itself the sum total of all things; (d) and what, beyond all things, is the source of all things. To this knowledge, few are able to arrive in this life; even after this life, no one can exceed it.
As to those who are content to follow authority alone and who apply themselves constantly to right living and holy desires, while they make no account of the liberal and fine arts, or are incapable of being instructed in them—I know not how I could call them happy as long as they live among men. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that, upon leaving the body, they will be liberated with greater facility or difficulty according as they have lived the more virtuously or otherwise.
* On Order, II, 9.26-27; trans. FOC 1 (1948) 303-305.