The Essential Augustine (continued)
MAN'S SOUL 715 not escape the notice of the soul). This perception is called pain or labor. But when that which is brought in or lies close, agrees, the soul easily brings the whole of it, or of it as much as it needs, into the journeyings of its working. And this action by which it joins its body extrinsically to a suitable object is not hidden, since the action is carried on more attentively on account of some adventitious circumstance and, moreover, on account of the suitability it is sensed with pleasure. But when those things by which it restores the losses of the body are absent, extreme want follows. When by that difficulty of action it becomes more attentive, and when such an operation of it does not lie hidden from the soul, it is called hunger or thirst or something similar. When, however, what has been eaten is above measure, and difficulty of working is born from the weight of the food, neither does this happen without attention. Further, when such an action is not hidden, sluggishness is felt. It even functions attentively when it ejects the superfluity—if gently, with delight; if roughly, with pain. The soul attentively acts in the morbid disturbance of the body, seeking to aid the body as it slips and disintegrates. Again, when this action is not hidden, the soul is said to feel illness and disease.
And lest I make it too long, it seems to me that the 10. soul, when it feels in the body, is not affected in anything from it but acts more attentively in its affections, and then these actions are either easy, on account of the agreeableness, or difficult on account of the disagreeableness, and they do not escape the soul. This is all that is called sensation. But that sense which, even when we do not sense still is present, is an instrument of the body, which is such a disposition that the soul be in it more prepared to direct the passions of the body with attention, so that it joins like things to like and repels what is harmful. Furthermore, as I think, it directs—in the eyes, something akin to light; in the ears, breezes, the most gentle and mobile; in the nose, something misty; in the mouth, moist; and in the touch, earthy and muddy. But whether by this or by some other distribution, these things are united—the soul acts quietly, when those inner components of its integrated health occur in some sort of intimate state of agreement. But when those are used which affect the body with some change, if I may speak thus, the soul then brings out more attentive actions as suited to the proper place and instrument. In that instance it is said to hear, or to smell, or to taste, or to sense by touching, and by these actions it gladly associates _the compatible things, with difficulty resists the incompatible. These operations the soul puts over against the passions of the body when it senses and itself does not receive the same feelings.
MEMORY, UNDERSTANDING, AND WILL*
Putting aside, then, for a little while all other things 11.17. of which the mind is certain concerning itself, let us especially consider and discuss these three—memory, understanding, will. For we may commonly discern in these three the character of the abilities of the young also, since the more tenaciously and easily a boy remembers, and the more acutely he understands, and the more ardently he studies, the more praiseworthy is he in point of ability. But when the question is about anyone's learning, then we ask not how solidly and easily he remembers, or how shrewdly he understands, but what it is that he remembers, and what it is that he understands, And because the mind is regarded as praiseworthy, not only as being learned, but also as being good, one gives heed not only to what he remembers and what he understands, but also to what he wishes; not how ardently he wishes, but first what it is he wishes, and then how greatly he wishes it. For the mind that' loves eagerly is then to be praised, when it loves that which ought to be loved eagerly. Since then we speak of these three—ability, knowledge, use—the first of these is to be considered under the three heads, of what a man can do in memory, and understanding, and will. The second of them is to be considered in regard to that which any one has in his memory | and in his understanding, whither he has attained by a studious will. But the third, viz. use, lies in the will, which handles those things that are contained in the memory and understanding, whether it refer them to anything further, or rest satisfied with them as an end. For to use is to take up something into the power of the will; and to enjoy is to use With joy, not any longer of hope, but of the actual thing. Accordingly, every one who enjoys, uses; for he takes up something into the power of the will, wherein he also is
* On the Trinity, X, 11.17-18; trans. Dods.