: that it is God, if there were nothing yet higher. Ac-
Do you think then that this truth, which we have 34. been discussing at such length, and in which, single though it be, we have discerned so many things, is more excellent than our minds, or equal to them, or is it even inferior?
But if it were inferior we would judge not according to it, but concerning it; just as we judge of bodies because they are below us, and say commonly not only that they are so or not so, but that they ought to be so or not so. So too of our minds we know not only that the mind is so, but frequently also that it should be so. And of bodies to be sure we judge thus when we say: this is not as white as it should be, or not as square, and many similar things. But of minds: it is less apt than it should be, or less gentle, or less vehement, according as the manner of our character shows itself. And we judge of these things according to those inner rules of truth that we discern in common, but no one judges in any way of the rules themselves. For when anyone says that eternal things are better than temporal, or that seven and three are ten, no one says that it ought to be so, but knowing that it is so, he does not correct it as an examiner, but Tejoices in it as a discoverer.
If again the truth were equal to our minds, it would be also mutable. For our minds perceive it sometimes more and sometimes less, and thereby acknowledge themselves mutable, while it, continuing in itself, is neither enhanced when we see it more, nor diminished when we see it less, but whole and uncorrupted it makes glad those who turn to it, and punishes with blindness those who turn away. But what then, if also we judge of those same minds according to that truth, while we can in no way judge of it? For we say of our mind: it understands less than it should or it understands as much as it should. But a mind should understand in the measure that it is able to draw near to and cleave to immutable truth. Wherefore, if that truth be neither inferior nor equal Hs our minds, it remains that it is higher and more excel-
CDS ..\6
You conceded, however, that if I should show you 39. something higher than our minds, you would confess: that it is God, if there were nothing yet higher. Accepting this concession of yours, I said that it would be enough if I should prove this. For if there is something yet more excellent than truth, that rather is God; but if not, then truth itself is God. Whether therefore there is this more
APPROACHING GOD THROUGH UNDERSTANDING 125 excellent thing, or whether there is not, you cannot deny that God is, which was the question set for our discussion and treatment. For if you are disturbed by what we have received in faith from the sacred teaching of Christ, that God is the Father of Wisdom, remember that we have also accepted in faith that equal to the eternal Father is the Wisdom begotten of Him. Wherefore nothing more need be asked, but only held with steadfast faith. For God is; and He is truly and supremely. This, I think, we not only hold now undoubted by faith, but know also by a sure, albeit still rather tenuous form of knowledge, which for the question in hand is enough to explain the other things that pertain to the matter. Unless, that is, you have something to say in objection. E. Nay, I accept these things, and am completely filled with an incredible joy, which I cannot express in words, and I cry out that they are most sure. I cry out moreover with an inner voice, by which I wish to be heard by truth itself, and to cleave to it, because I concede it to be not only good but the supreme good and the maker of happiness. A. Rightly so; and I too rejoice greatly. But I would ask whether we are now wise and happy, or whether we as yet only incline that way, so that it may come forth and be ours? E. I think rather that we incline to it. A. Whence then do you understand these things, at whose certainty and truth you cried out that you Tejoiced? And do you grant that they pertain to wisdom? Or is any fool able to know wisdom? E. So long as he is a fool he cannot. A. You then are wise, or else you do not know wisdom. E. I am certainly not yet wise, but neither would I call myself a fool in so far as I know wisdom, since these things which I know are certain, and I cannot deny that they pertain to wisdom. A, Tell me, pray, will you not admit that he who is not just is unjust, and he who is not prudent is imprudent, and he who is not temperate is intemperate? Can there be any doubt as to this? E. I admit that when a man is not just he is unjust and would give the same reply as to the prudent and temperate man. A. Why, then, when he is not wise, is he not foolish? E. I admit that too; when one is not wise, he is a fool. A. Well then, which of these are you? E. Whichever you call me; I should not dare to call myself