The Essential Augustine
mated, vitalized, energized by man's soul; as a body, it has no power of its own. All human activities, then, are ultimately of 9 psychic character—even walking, talking, and similar actions. No body is an efficient cause.
Many of Augustine's views on the bodily world have lost their original significance. Certainly, much of modern science represents a departure from his whole point of view. He was not a "naturalist" in any sense of the term. Yet the themes touched on in this chapter are typically Augustinian and have a place in the history of man's efforts to understand his environment.
ALL BODILY NATURES ARE GOOD*
But it is ridiculous to condemn the faults of beasts 4. and trees, and other such mortal and mutable things as are void of intelligence, sensation, or life, even though these faults should destroy their corruptible nature; for these creatures received, at their Creator's will, an existence fitting them, by passing away and giving place to others, to secure that lowest form of beauty, the beauty of seasons, which in its' own place is a requisite part of this world. For things earthly were neither to be made equal to things heavenly, nor were they, though inferior, to be quite omitted from the universe. Since, then, in those situations where such things are appropriate, some perish to make way for others that are born in their room, and the less succumb to the greater, and the things that are overcome are transformed into the quality of those that have the mastery, this is the appointed order of things transitory. Of this order the beauty does not strike us, because by our mortal frailty we are so involved in a part of it, that we cannot perceive the whole, in which these fragments that offend us are harmonized with the most accurate fitness and beauty. And therefore, where we are not so well able to perceive the wisdom of the Creator, Wwe are very properly enjoined to believe it, lest in the vanity of human rashness we presume to find any fault with the work of so great an Artificer. At the same time, if we attentively consider even these faults of earthly things, which are neither voluntary nor penal, they seem to illustrate the excellence of the natures themselves, which are all originated
* City of God, XII, 4; trans. Dods.
THE WORLD OF BODIES
and created by God; for it is that which pleases us in this nature which we are displeased to see removed by the fault —unless even the natures themselves displease men, as often happens when they become hurtful to them, and then men estimate them not by their nature, but by their utility; as in the case of those animals whose swarms scourged the pride of the Egyptians. But in this way of estimating, they may find fault with the sun itself; for certain criminals or debtors are sentenced by the judges to be set in the sun. Therefore it is not with respect to our convenience or discomfort, but with respect to their own nature, that the creatures are glorifying to their Artificer. Thus even the nature of the eternal fire, penal though it be to the condemned sinners, is most assuredly worthy of praise. For what is more beautiful than fire flaming, blazing, and shining? What more useful than fire for warming, restoring, cooking, though nothing is more destructive than fire burning and consuming? The same thing, then, when applied in one way, is destructive, but when applied suitably, is most beneficial. For who can find words to tell its uses throughout the whole world? We must not listen, then, to those who praise the light of fire but find fault with its heat, judging it not by its nature, but by their convenience or discomfort. For they wish to see, but not to be burnt. But they forget that this very light, which is so pleasant to them, disagrees with and hurts weak eyes; and in that heat which is disagreeable to them, some animals find the most suitable conditions of a healthy life.
All natures, then, inasmuch as they are, and have therefore a rank and species of their own, and a kind of internal harmony, are certainly good. And when they are in the places assigned to them by the order of their nature, they preserve such being as they have received. And those things which have not received everlasting being, are altered for better or for worse, so as to suit the wants and motions of those things to which the Creator's law has made them subservient: and thus they tend in the divine providence to that end which is embraced in the general scheme of the government of the universe. So that, though the corruption of transitory and perishable things brings them to utter destruction, it does not prevent their producing that which was designed to be their result. And this being so, God, who supremely is, and who therefore created every being which has not supreme existence (for that which was made of nothing could not be equal to Him, and indeed could not be at all had He not made it), is not to be found fault with on account of the creature's faults, but is to be praised in view of the natures He has made.
INVISIBLE SEEDS IN THE ELEMENTS*
Yet it is not on this account to be thought that the 8.13. matter of visible things is subservient to the bidding of those wicked angels; but rather to that of God, by whom this power is given, just so far as He, who is unchangeable, determines in His lofty and spiritual abode to give it. For water and fire and earth are subservient even to wicked men, who are condemned to the mines, in order that they may do therewith what they will, but only so far as is permitted. Nor in truth are those evil angels to be called creators, because by their means the magicians, withstanding the servant of God, made frogs and serpents; for it was not they who created them. But in truth some hidden seeds of all things that are born corporeally and visibly are concealed in the corporeal elements of this world. For those seeds that are visible at once to our eyes from fruits and living things, are quite distinct from the hidden seeds of those former seeds; whence, at the bidding of the Creator, the water produced the first swimming creatures and fowl, and the earth the first buds after their kind, and the first living creatures after their kind. For neither at that time were those seeds so drawn forth into products of these several kinds, as that the power of production was exhausted in those products; but for the most part, suitable combinations of circumstances are wanting, whereby they may be enabled to burst forth and complete their species. For consider, the very least shoot is a seed; for, if fitly consigned to the earth, it produces a tree. But of this shoot there is a yet more subtle seed in some grain of the same species, and this so far visible to us. But of this grain also there is further still a seed, which, although we are unable to see with our eyes, yet we can conjecture its existence from our reason; because, except there were some such power in those elements, there would not so generally be produced from the earth things which had not been sown there; nor yet so many animals, without any previous commixture of male and female, whether on the land, or in the water, which yet grow, and by commingling bring forth
* On the Trinity, Ill, 8.13; trans. Dods.
others, while themselves sprang up without any union of parents. And certainly bees do not conceive the seeds of their young by commixture, but gather them as they lie scattered over the earth with their mouth. For the Creator of these invisible seeds is the Creator of all things Himself: since whatever comes forth to our sight by being born, receives the first beginnings of its course from hidden seeds, and takes the successive increments of its proper size and its distinctive forms from these as it were original rules.
THE ELEMENTS CONTAIN SEMINAL REASONS*
The elements of this bodily world have their own 17.32. precise force and quality, what each of them can or cannot do, what can be made from what, or cannot. From these elements, as the original principles of things, all things that are generated take their origin and development, each in its proper time; and they receive their terminations and decreases, each according to its kind. Hence it comes about that a bean does not grow from a grain of wheat, or wheat from a bean, or a man from a beast, or a beast from a man. Above this natural change and course of things, the power of the Creator keeps to Himself the ability to make out of all these things something other than what their seminal reasons, as it were, contain—but not something that He did not place in them, so that He might produce it out of them or accomplish it by His own power. For He is omnipotent, not by virtue of thoughtless power but by virtue of His wisdom.
MEASURE, NUMBER, AND WEIGHT 7
For this reason, when we read that He completed all 3.7. things in six days and we think over the number six, we discover that it is perfect, and moreover, that the orderly course of creation ran in such a way that there was evidently a sort of step-by-step distinction of the parts of creation whereby this number was perfected. So the thought came to mind of the statement in another place in Scripture,
Literal Commentary on Genesis, IX, 17.32; trans. V.J.B. } Literal Commentary on Genesis, IV, 3.7; trans. V.J.B.
'He hath arranged all things according to measure, number and weight." [Wisd. 11:21] And thus may the soul think as well as it can, having asked the help of God Who both provides and energizes its powers, whether these three items, measure, number, and weight, according to which it was written that God arranged all things, were anywhere in existence before the whole of creation was made, or whether these three were themselves created, or, if they existed previously, where were they?
Indeed, before creation there was nothing other than the Creator. So they were in Him. But how? In fact, we also read that the things that were created were in Him: now, were these three identical with Him, while the other things were present in Him by Whom they are ruled and governed? Then, how were they identical with Him? For God is neither measure nor number nor weight, nor is He all these together. Is it according to what we know as measure in the things that We measure, and as number in the things that we number, and as weight in the things that we weigh—but surely God is not these? Or is it according to that original standard that provides a measure for everything, and the number that Offers a species to everything, and the weight that draws everything to rest and stability—He is identical with these three, originally, truly, and especially, for He limits all, He shapes all, and He orders all? Through the heart and tongue of man, how was there any other way of understanding the statement that Thou hast arranged all things according to measure, number, and weight, than that Thou hast arranged all things within Thyself? : It is a great feat, granted to few, to rise above all things that can be measured, in order to see the measure that is without measure; to go beyond all that may be numbered, to see number without number; to surpass all that can be weighed, to see weight without weight. For this meaning cannot be thought in terms of these as observed in stones only, and in pieces of wood and bulky things like that, or in bodily things of whatever size, either on earth or in the heavens. Measure is some sort of principle of action, to prevent an unalterable and unregulated process; number pertains to the dispositions and powers of the soul, whereby it is properly gathered in from the deformity of unwisdom to the form of wisdom; and weight applies to will and love, when it becomes evident how much and what weight is to be given to feelings of desire or dislike, or of preference or rejection. But this measure of the soul and mind is determined by another measure, and this number is formed by another number, and this weight is balanced by another weight. Now, the measure without measure is that one to which its derivatives are compared, but which has itself no other origin; number without number is that whereby all things are formed, but it is not itself formed; weight without weight is that whereby those beings whose rest is pure joy are carried to their rest, but it is not itself carried toward any other being.
Of course, whoever knows these terms, measure, number, and weight, only in the visible sphere has but a servile knowledge. So, let him rise above everything that is so known, or if he is not yet able, let him not stick to these meanings which can only be thought in a base sense. To the extent that these principles are dear to a man on the level of higher things, they are less dear to him on the level of lower things. And if a person does not care to transfer those terms that he learned from lower and less worthy things to those sublime entities through whose contemplation he strives to order his mind, then he should not be pressed to do so. As long as the point is understood that needs to be understood, it is not of much concern how it is expressed.
Yet one should recognize that there is such a likeness between lower things and higher ones; for it is not different for reason to have a right inclination on one level or another, and it does tend upward.
CONCERNING FORMLESS MATTER*
Now, certainly, this "earth was invisible and un3.3. organized," [Gen. 1:2, Old Latin] some sort of deep abyss above which there was no light, because no visible appearance belonged to it. For this reason Thou didst command it to be written, "that darknesses were upon the deep" [Gen. 1:2]: what else is this than the absence of light? For where would light be, if it existed, unless it were above, in the sense of dominating and enlightening? So, where the light did not yet exist, what else did it mean by darknesses being present than that light was absent? And so, darknesses were there above, because light was not there; just as where sound is not, there is silence. And what does it mean that silence is there, except that sound is not there?
Hast not Thou taught this soul which is confessing to
* Confessions, XII, 3.3-9.9; trans. V.J.B.
Thee? Hast not Thou taught me that, before Thou didst form and distinguish into different kinds this unformed matter, there was not any definite thing, neither color, nor shape, nor body, nor spirit? Yet it is not that there was absolutely nothing: it was a certain formlessness without any species.
Now, what should one call this, so that some meaning 4.4, may be conveyed even to those of slower perceptions, unless one use some familiar term? In fact, what can be found, in all the regions of the world, that is nearer to absolute formlessness than earth and abyss? For these are less formed in beauty, because of their low level, than the higher things which are translucent and all-resplendent. Why, ; then, may I not take the formlessness of matter, which Thou hadst made without beauty of form, and from which Thou mightest make the beautifully formed world, as being thus suitably expressed for men, when it is called "the earth invisible and unorganized"?
Thus, when cogitation seeks to find what meaning 5.5. may be attached to it, and says to itself: "It is not an intelligible form, such as life or such as justice, for it is the material of bodies; nor is it a sensible form because what may be seen and perceived in sensation is not present in the invisible and unorganized"—while human cogitation says this to itself, it is trying either to know it by means of ignorance or to ignore it by means of knowledge.
Indeed, O Lord, if I may confess to 'Thee, with my 6.6. mouth and pen, all that Thou hast taught me concerning matter in this sense, when formerly I heard its name and did not understand it—and those who told me about these things did not understand, either—I was thinking of it, in cogitation, as having innumerable and diverse species, and so I was not really thinking about it. My mind used to roll up foul and frightening forms into confused arrangements, but they were forms, nevertheless. So I called formless not something that lacked form, but something that had form of such a kind that, were it to become perceptible, my power of perception would turn away, as from something unaccustomed and unsuitable, and my human frailty would have been thrown into confusion.
But in truth what I used to consider in cogitation was formless, not through the privation of all form, but by comparison with more beautifully formed things. Then true reasoning suggested that I should remove altogether the last vestiges of any form whatsoever, if I desired to cogitate the genuinely formless. This I could not do. For I should more easily have agreed that it did not exist at-all, a thing deprived of every form, than think of something in between form and nothing, something neither formed nor nothing, an unformed thing which is almost nothing.
My mind stopped questioning my imaginative spirit thereafter, for it was full of images of formed bodies, and it changed and varied these as it wished. And I directed my attention to bodies themselves, working more deeply into their mutability; by means of it, they cease to be what they were and start to be what they were not. I suspected that this transition from form to form was accomplished by means of some unformed thing and not by means of complete nothingness.
But I wanted to know, not merely to suspect; and if my voice and writing were to confess to Thee all that Thou hast opened up for me concerning this question, who among my readers would stay with it long enough to grasp it? Yet my heart shall not cease despite this to give honor to Thee "and to sing Thy praises concerning these things which it is unable to put into words.
The mutability, then, of mutable things is itself capable of receiving all the forms into which mutable things are changed. And what is this? Is it mind? Is it body? Is it a species of mind or of body? If one could say: "nothing— thing" and "is—is not," I should say it thus; yet it would have to have some kind of being, in order to be able to receive these visible and organized forms.
Whatever it is, where did it come from but from 7.7. Thee, from whom all things are, in so far as they are? But the more distant a thing is from Thee, the more it is unlike Thee; nor does this have reference to place....
Indeed, Thou, O Lord, didst make the world from 8.8. formless matter, and this Thou didst make almost nothing and out of nothing, that Thou mightest make great things from it, at which we, the sons of men, wonder.... Now, this earth which Thou hadst made was formless material, because it was invisible and unorganized, and the darknesses were above the abyss. From this invisible and unorganized earth, from this formlessness, from this almost-nothing, Thou wert to make all things by which this mutable world subsists—yet it does not really subsist—in which that mutability is evident that enables periods of time to be perceived and distinguished by: measurement. For periods of time come into being by means of the changes of things, as the forms, whose material is the aforementioned invisible earth, are diversified and altered.
Therefore the Spirit, the Teacher of Thy servant, is 9.9. silent concerning periods of time, and says nothing about days when He mentions that Thou didst make heaven and earth in the beginning. Of course, the heaven of heaven which Thou madest in the beginning is some intellectual creature, which, though in no way coeternal with Thee, the Trinity, is nonetheless a participant in Thy eternity. By virtue of the sweetness of the most happy contemplation of Thee, it restrains its own mutability; and, without falling once since first it was made, it transcends every variable vicissitude of time by adhering closely to Thee.
Nor, in fact, is this formlessness—the invisible and unorganized earth—itself numbered by means of days. For where there is no form, no order, nothing whatever comes or passes away; and where this does not occur, there are certainly no days, no alteration of temporal durations,
PLACE, TIME, AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD*
Next we must see what reply can be made to those X1.5. who agree that God is the Creator of the world, but have difficulties about the time of its creation, and what reply also they can make to difficulties we might raise about the place of its creation. For, as they demand why the world was created then and no sooner, we may ask why it was created just here where it is, and not elsewhere.... While these, then, neither confine in any place, nor limit, nor distribute the divine substance, but, as is worthy of God, own it to be wholly though spiritually present everywhere, will they perchance say that this substance is absent from such immense spaces outside the world, and is occupied in one only (and that a very little one compared with the infinity beyond), the one, namely, in which is the world? I think they will not proceed to this absurdity. Since they maintain that there is but one world, of vast material bulk,
* City of God, XI, 5-6; trans. Dods.