Lord, that I know that I am saying these things
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 237
So since the movement of a body is one thing and that whereby we measure its duration is another, who could not judge which of these should preferably be called time? Indeed, if a body moves sometimes at different speeds and sometimes stands still, we measure not only its movement but also its condition of rest by means of time. We say: "It stood still just as long as it moved," or: "It stood still twice or thrice as long as it moved," and whatever else our act of measuring grasped accurately or, as the common saying is, roughly estimated.
Therefore, time is not the motion of a body.
And I confess to Thee, O Lord, that I still do not 32. know what time is; again, I confess to Thee, O Lord, that I know that I am saying these things in time, and that I have spoken at length now about time, and that this length cannot be long without the extent of time. How then do I know this when I do not know what time is? Perhaps I do not know how to say what I do know? Alas, I do not even know what I do not know! Behold, O my God, it is evident to Thee that I do not lie; I speak just as I feel in my heart. Thou wilt light up my lamp, O Lord my God, thou wilt enlighten my darknesses.
Surely my soul is confessing truthfully to Thee 33. _ that I do measure periods of time? Yes, O Lord my God, I do measure, but I do not know what I am measuring. I measure the movement of a body in time. But time itself, do I not measure it? Could I really measure the movement of a body, how long it is, and how long it takes to go from here to there, unless I also measure the time in which it is moved?
On what basis, then, do I measure time itself? Do we measure a longer time by means of a shorter time, as the length of a beam is measured by the length of a cubit? Thus we see that the length of a long syllable is measured by the length of a short syllable, and say that it is twice the other. In this way we measure the length of poems by the lengths of the verses, and the lengths of the verses by the lengths of the feet, and the lengths of the feet by the lengths of the syllables, and the lengths of the longs by the lengths of the shorts—not as written on tablets (for in that way we measure space, not time), but while the spoken words are going on. Thus we say: "This poem is long, for it is made up of so many verses; the verses are long, for they consist of so many feet; the feet are long, for they stretch over so many syllables; the syllable is long, for it is double a short one."
But a definite measure of time is not grasped in that way, since 'it is possible for a short verse to sound over a greater length of time if it be pronounced slowly, than a longer verse spoken hurriedly. The same is true of a poem, of a foot, of a syllable. : ; From this it appeared to me that time is nothing but extension, but I do not know of what. It is amazing if it is not of the mind itself. I beseech Thee, O my God, what do I measure when I either say, indefinitely: "This time is longer than that," or, definitely: "This is twice that"? I measure time I know. But I do not measure the future, because it does not exist yet; I do not measure the present, for it does not extend over any length; I do not measure the past, for it does not now exist. What then do I measure? Is it periods of time as they go by, but not in the past? So in fact have I said.
Keep on, O mind of mine, and firmly direct thy 34, attention. "God is our Helper," "He made us, and not we ourselves." Mark where truth brightens to the dawn.
See, for instance, how a bodily voice begins to sound, and it sounds and still sounds, and then stops; now there is silence: that voice is past, and voice there is no more. It was in the future before it sounded, and could not be measured for it was not yet existing—and now it cannot be because it is already out of existence. The time, then, when it could be measured was when it was sounding, for then there existed something that could be measured. But even then, it did not stand still, it went on and passed by. Was it for this reason more capable of measurement? For while passing by, it extended itself into some space of time by which it could be measured, since the present possesses no extent.
And so, if it was capable of it then, consider another example of a second voice beginning to sound and still sounding in continuous duration without any interruption. Let us measure it while it is sounding for, when it will have ceased its sounding, it will then be past and will not be anything that can be measured. Let us measure it then and say how long it is. But it is still sounding and cannot be measured, except from its start when it began to sound, until its end when it ceases. For what we measure is the very interval from some starting point up to some ending. For this reason, the voice