The Essential Augustine
MAN'S SOUL 73 that life which we call the interior sense, and which is sue aoe to the bodily senses, or something else?
. No. A. You know at least that these things can be defined only by reason; and that reason cannot do this unless they are presented to it for examination. E. That is true. A. Whatever, therefore, that other thing is, by means of which we perceive everything that we know, it is in the service of reason, to which it presents and reports whatever it touches, so that the things perceived may be distinguished by their properties, and grasped not merely for perception, but for knowledge as well. . E. That is so. A. Well, how about this reason, which distinguishes from one another its servants and the things they bring before it, and likewise recognizes the difference between itself and these things, and assures itself of its superiority to them? Does it comprehend itself by means of anything other than itself, that is, reason? Or would you know that you had reason if you did not perceive it by reason? E. Most true. A. So then, when we perceive a color we do not likewise by the sense itself perceive that we perceive; nor when we hear a sound do we also hear our hearing; nor when we smell a rose has the smelling fragrance too; nor tasting something does the tasting itself have flavor in the mouth; nor touching a thing can we also touch the sense of touch. Therefore it is clear that those five senses cannot be perceived by any one sense among them, although by them all corporeal things are perceived. E. That is clear.
A, I think it is clear that the interior sense perceives 10. not only the things referred to it by the five senses, but also the sensations themselves. For otherwise an animal would not stir, either to pursue or to run away from anything, if it did not perceive that it had the sensation— not as knowledge, for that is reason's province, but only in order to move—which it certainly does not perceive by any one of those five. If this is still not clear, it will become clear by considering some one sense, say sight. For one could not open his eyes, or turn his gaze upon what he seeks to see, unless when his eyes were closed, or not turned toward it, he perceived that he did not see. But if, not seeing, he perceives that he does not see, he must also perceive that he sees when he does see; for the fact that when he sees a thing he does not move his eyes in search of it shows that he perceives both.
But whether this life that perceives that it perceives corporeal things perceives itself too, is not so clear; except that anyone who looks within himself finds that every living thing flees death. But since death is the opposite of life, it must be that life perceives itself, since it flees its own opposite. But if this be still not clear, let us pass it over, so that we may move on toward our goal only by evidence that is certain and manifest. For this much is clear: we perceive corporeal things by our bodily senses, but we cannot by the sense itself perceive a sense. By the interior sense we perceive both that we are perceiving corporeal things through the bodily sense, and also the bodily sense itself. But by reason all those other things and also reasor itself become known and are held together in knowledge. Is this clear to you? E. Perfectly clear.
SENSATION AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SOUL*
Master: Immediately I shall say what I think. But 5.9. you—you either follow or even precede, if you are able, when you notice me delay and hesitate. Now, I do not think that this body is animated by the soul unless by the intention of its Maker. Nor do I think that the soul suffers anything from the body, but acts with the body and in it, subjected divinely to its domination. Nevertheless, I think that the soul operates sometimes with ease, sometimes with difficulty, in so far as corporeal nature gives way, more or less, to it in accordance with its merits. Therefore, whatever corporeal things are put into or taken out of this body from without, produce something, not in the soul but in the body, which either is opposed to its work or agrees with it. And so, when the soul strives against the reluctant body and with difficulty molds the matter subjected to it for the ways of its working, it becomes more attentive to the activity on account of the difficulty—and this difficulty is called sensation on account of the attention (since it does viens pee vi PG aoe. T. P. Maher, The De Musica
- Augustine (St. Louis University Master's Thesi pp81-84. Used with permission. Hs ara