Chapter 6 of 13

American Adolescent Religion in Social Context

American Adolescent Religion in Social Context

B) American Adolescent Religion in Social Context VERY HUMAN PERSON is a distinct individual with a unique story.

But, as we have already suggested, all people also live within larger cultural and institutional contexts that profoundly shape their lives and stories.

If we want to understand the experiences of individuals, it is necessary to understand these larger social contexts in which people's lives unfold and by which they are shaped. Only by appreciating the power of these social forces that define and influence people's lives can we adequately make sense of their individual hopes, problems, commitments, actions, and experiences. This chapter continues our analysis of the religious and spiritual lives of American teenagers by stepping back and observing some important cultural and institutional features of the world in which they live that we believe influence the character of their religious and spiritual lives. The previous chapter described the what of teens' religious and spiritual lives. This chapter attempts to help explain why.

THERAPEUTIC INDIVIDUALISM

The cultural ocean in which American adolescents swim saturates them in the ethos of therapeutic individualism.! Therapeutic individualism is not so much a consciously and intentionally held ideology, but rather a taken-forgranted set of assumptions and commitments about the human self, society, and life's purpose that powerfully defines everyday moral and relational codes and boundaries in the contemporary United States. The evidence of previous

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chapters suggests that therapeutic individualism is having a significant influence in shaping American youth's religious and spiritual practices and experiences.

Therapeutic individualism defines the individual self as the source and standard of authentic moral knowledge and authority, and individual selffulfillment as the preoccupying purpose of life. Subjective, personal experience is the touchstone of all that is authentic, right, and true. By contrast, this ethos views the "external" traditions, obligations, and institutions of society as inauthentic and often illegitimate constraints on morality and behavior from which individuals must be emancipated. James Nolan observes,

"Where once the self was to be brought into conformity with the standards of externally derived authorities and social institutions, it now is compelled to look within. ..

. No longer is society something a self must adjust to; it is now something the self must be liberated from. ... Where once the self was to be surrendered, denied, sacrificed, and died to, now the self is to be esteemed, actualized, affirmed, and unfettered."? In a society governed by therapeutic individualism, the traditional authority and functions of priests, pastors, parents, and lawmakers are largely displaced by a new authoritative class of professional and popular psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and other therapeutic counselors, authors, talk show hosts, and advice givers.

In the process, many activities and behaviors once defined as moral failures— alcoholism, drug abuse, financial debt, domestic violence, gambling, family neglect, obesity, sexual promiscuity—are redefined as either perfectly legitimate "lifestyles" or as psychological and medical dysfunctions, diseases, syndromes, codependencies, or pathologies. The latter are then, for better or for worse, treated with therapy, medications, self-help seminars, support groups, and rehabilitation programs. Meanwhile, the self increasingly comes to be viewed as the victim of abusive or oppressive personal pasts and current social experiences that violate the self's right to personal health and fulfillment.

Members of therapeutic individualist cultures are encouraged in various ways to "get in touch with their honest feelings" and to "find" their "true selves" — presuming that they have essential, self-originating emotions and selves that are distinct from any social formation and lost or hidden from everyday awareness. Moreover, moral duties, pain, and suffering are not seen, as they traditionally often were, as an inevitable part of life to be endured or perhaps through which one should grow in personal character and spiritual depth.

Rather, these are largely avoidable displeasures to be escaped in order to realize a pleasurable life of happiness and positive self-esteem.

Moral decision making in therapeutic individualism is always profoundly individually self-referencing. Right and wrong are determined not by external moralities derived from religious teachings, natural law, cultural tradition, or the requisites of collective social functioning. Rather, clearly unaware that feeling itself is profoundly socially formed, individual subjective feeling establishes for individuals what is good and bad, right and wrong, just and unjust. In general, therapeutic individualism significantly displaces substantive reason and rational analysis with personal sentiments and emotions as

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the grounds of knowledge and morality. In a therapeutically individualistic culture, the reasoned arguments, assertions, and professions implicit in the phrases "I think that..." and "I believe that . . ." are increasingly supplanted by the personal expression "I feel that..." Therapeutic individualists come to feel, for example, that murder is wrong, that the Bible teaches the deity of Jesus Christ, that a particular tax policy will stimulate the economy. Moreover, people shaped by this ethos are loath to claim that their own beliefs and morals necessarily apply to anyone else, for other people may have different feelings about matters, and no one person has the right to violate any other person's subjective sentiments, which are, after all, what determine what is truly authentic and real for each individual. In the end, the most assertive of moral arguments are expressed as "Poverty sucks," "For me, it is wrong when... ," and "I'm not trying to impose this on anyone, but that's how I personally feel about it."

Therapeutic individualism did not drop out of the sky, nor is it the spontaneous creation of its individual advocates and adherents. Ironically, given its emphasis on individual autonomy, subjectivity, and self-creation, therapeutic individualism is the collective cultural product of a historical complex of social and institutional forces that generated and sustain its ethos. At one level, therapeutic individualism is a reaction against the impersonal, bureaucratic, rationalized, instrumentally utilitarian institutions of modern public life. Its ethos provides a way for moderns to rescue some sense of individual uniqueness, spontaneity, and meaningful emotion in the face of a massive, proceduralistic, mechanistic, and alienating public sphere. At another level, therapeutic individualism's ethos perfectly serves the needs and interests of U.S. mass-consumer capitalist economy by constituting people as selffulfillment—oriented consumers subject to advertising's influence on their subjective feelings, a point elaborated in the following section. In yet another way, the rise of therapeutic individualism corresponds to the secularization of the U.S. public sphere as the decline of the authority of religious traditions over the institutions of public life.* Publicly irrelevant pastors and priests are, for good or ill, displaced by their functional equivalents, therapists and psychologists, who are taken to be very relevant and authoritative. Then again, therapeutic individualism is also a by-product of modernity's cultural pluralism, in which increased frequency of routine interaction with "the other," who may be quite different from oneself, may problematize objectively maintained shared epistemological and moral orders.4 What then becomes collectively shared is a much thinner ethos of personal subjectivity, feeling, and self-fulfillment.

Whatever its social and institutional sources, therapeutic individualism is, for better or worse, now pervasive in American culture and society, both in many people's personal lives and increasingly in public institutions themselves. Its assumptions and commitments infuse every level of the educational system; practices of courtship, marriage, family life, and divorce; some public social programs; key cultural elements of the economy, such as the advertising industry and mass media, entertainment, and recreation; the health care sec-

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tor and public health system; very many elements of religion; and, increasingly, the justice system and the government itself.* Most every youth growing up in the United States today, perhaps Amish youth excepted, will receive some significant exposure to therapeutic individualism. Many will receive very heavy and consistent doses of socialization into its assumptions, precepts, and ethos, even as its social pervasiveness renders it natural, intuitive, and invisible to most people being inducted into its worldview. Therapeutic individualism thus seems to be the obvious way things are.

All of this appears to have had important influences on the character of the religious and spiritual lives of American adolescents. As therapeutic individualism has institutionalized itself as a natural dominant framework not only for much of social life around religion, but in American religion itself, we expect youth's assumptions about religious teachings, faith, church, and spiritual development and experiences to be transformed. Religion as an external authority or tradition that people encounter and that makes authoritative claims to form their believing, thinking, feeling, desires, and living becomes increasingly inconceivable. Therapeutic individualists instead seek out religious and spiritual practices, feelings, and experiences that satisfy their own subjectively defined needs and wants. Faith and spirituality become centered less around a God believed in and God's claims on lives, and more around the believing (or perhaps even unbelieving) self and its personal realization and happiness. The very idea and language of "spirituality," originally grounded in the self-disciplining faith practices of religious believers, including ascetics and monks, then becomes detached from its moorings in historical religious traditions and is redefined in terms of subjective selffulfillment. For example, during the writing of this chapter, our secular state university's Training and Development Department posted on its Web page an offering for an employees' education class on "Spirituality at Work," taught by a university "Health Education Specialist," described as follows:

"Work, home, family, friends—so many different hats in life! And each one requires different pieces of our self to shine through: employee, family member, confidant. Learning to integrate who we are both at home and work can lead to a greater sense of self and feelings of purpose and well-being. Come explore practical tips for integrating various facets of life in a healthy and holistic way as we strive to balance who we are both on and off the job."

Spirituality is thus renarrated for all comers as personal integration, subjective feeling, and self-improvement toward individual health and personal wellbeing—and no longer has anything to do with, for example, religious faith and self-discipline toward holiness or obedience.

Sociologists of religion and other scholars have already observed the influence of therapeutic individualism on American religion, although their studies have usually focused on religious young adults or the middle-aged or on religious subcultures or organizations.° This book helps to reveal the extent to which the therapeutic individualist ethos appears to be forming the religion and spirituality of contemporary American youth and with what possible effects.

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MASS-CONSUMER CAPITALISM

People normally think of the economy and religion as two separate spheres of life that affect each other very little. In fact, however, American religion and spirituality, including teenagers' involvement in them, may be profoundly shaped by American mass-consumer capitalism. Capitalism is not merely a system for the efficient production and distribution of goods and services; it also incarnates and promotes a particular moral order, an institutionalized normative worldview comprising and fostering particular assumptions, narratives, commitments, beliefs, values, and goals." Capitalism not only puts food on the table, it also powerfully defines for those who live in it in elemental terms both what is and what should be, however taken for granted those definitions ordinarily may be.

Consider, for example, how mass-consumer capitalism fundamentally constitutes the human self. There are many ways to conceive of what the human person is and should be: a fundamentally morally responsible agent, an illusion of individuality destined to dissolve into cosmic unity, a sinner being divinely redeemed and sanctified, and more. As an institution with a specific historical and social location, mass-consumer capitalism constitutes the human self in a very particular way: as an individual, autonomous, rational, self-seeking, cost-benefit-calculating consumer. This, of course, is not what human selves have always been, nor what they inevitably must be. This is also not the definition of the human self that most American religious historical traditions have sought to constitute in their adherents. But it is the human self that the moral order of mass-consumer capitalism constitutes, that its institutions and practices very powerfully bring into being, promote, and reinforce. Note that we are not simply talking here about particular ethical problems that the capitalist market may pose for religious teenagers, such as whether or not to buy and smoke cigarettes, but fundamental, taken-forgranted presuppositions about what is real about the world and ourselves, which, once established, are difficult to recognize, much less resist.

One of the possible consequences of this capitalist constitution of the human self is the way it can reshape the character of religion itself over time.

The more American people and institutions are redefined by mass-consumer capitalism's moral order, the more American religion is also remade in its image. Religion becomes one product among many others existing to satisfy people's subjectively defined needs, tastes, and wants. Religious adherents thus become spiritual consumers uniquely authorized as autonomous individuals to pick and choose in the religious market whatever products they may find satisfying or fulfilling at the moment. And the larger purpose of life comes to be defined as optimally satiating one's self-defined felt needs and desires, as opposed to, say, attaining salvation, learning obedience to God, following the Ten Commandments, achieving enlightenment, dying to oneself and serving others, or any other traditional religious purpose. Where does this profound shift, this novel approach to religion originate? Not from the individuals who end up espousing it, for they are themselves profoundly

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formed by larger historical transformations and social structures. It comes instead in good measure from the life-defining power of the pervasive and deeply rooted moral order and institutions of mass-consumer capitalism.

One way to describe this process is as a shift, which happened concurrently with the historical expansion of mass-consumer capitalism, from tradition-centered to individual-centered religion. The central question here is: In what does religious authority reside? Who or what has authority to define religious truth, to adjudicate religious differences and conflicts? In a mass-consumer capitalist-shaped society, authority increasingly resides not in the church nor in millennia of tradition, the prayer book, theological experts, or the scriptures. Rather, authority resides in the individual human self. Religious knowledge and authority thus become increasingly privatized, subjectivized, customized, and therapeutically psychologized around the controlling authority of individual selves, and not religious communities, traditions, and institutions.* The historical, dynamic tension in living religions between the received traditions and interpretations and the ongoing human collective experience living and interpreting those traditions in new times and contexts increasingly collapses into mere one-dimensional subjective individualism.

People then less frequently say, "I do not fully understand it or naturally agree with it, but because my religious tradition teaches thus-and-such, I embrace it and try to better understand it." Rather, people shaped in the image of capitalism's moral order and into the human self it constitutes personally decide on and define for themselves what they are willing and able (and not willing or able) to believe and practice religiously—based on what feels comfortable to them, what resonates with their personal subjective experience, what meets their personally felt needs. Although this is a relatively new situation historically, for some readers this version of religion may be so pervasive that it is hard even to recognize as other than entirely obvious and natural. (The irony in all of this apparently nonconformist, strong individualistic, selective acceptance of religious traditions' teachings and practices in order to suit one's own preferences, tastes, comforts, and subjective moral judgments is that it in fact is a major act of conformity to the larger moral authority of mass-consumer capitalism—whether any of its subjects realize that as such or not.) In this way, the religious assumptions and options available to American adolescents are shaped by the larger context of the reigning economic order.

Another way of understanding mass-consumer capitalism's influence on American adolescents and the religious and spiritual terrain they inhabit is by examining the morally charged appeals that its most obvious promotional arm, the advertising industry, persistently and pervasively advances. Many

Americans complain about "the culture," "the media," "television," and "Hollywood" for the evident roles they play in generating teenage problems.

But if we think systemically, we see that these are for the most part euphemisms for mass-consumer capitalism. For what drives television, the media, and Hollywood? What are they really about? They are often both commodities for sale themselves and the means of gathering and organizing buying

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audiences of consumers to whom to sell other products. Commercial television, for instance, is not ultimately about entertainment, but about delivering segmented purchasing audiences to advertisers who want to sell products.

There was once a time in earlier days of market capitalism—up until the early twentieth century—when increasing production was more important than increasing consumption. But eventually, increased production required increased mass consumption to move the new masses of more efficiently produced goods. The inherent, internal logic of mass-consumer capitalism is the drive of an impersonal profit motive and perpetual capital accumulation.

Capitalism as a system must ever grow or it will die. The intrinsic problem in capitalism's logic, however, is that actual human needs are somewhat limited and modest: it takes only so many goods and services to sustain a healthy, potentially satisfying human life. For mass-consumer capitalism to forever grow, therefore, it must constitute masses of people as consumer selves who misrecognize new wants as essential needs, whose basic sense of necessity always expands. Consumer demand thus must always escalate if capitalism is to succeed. And because this does not necessarily happen naturally or automatically, it must be actively and intentionally promoted. This is the job of the $240 billion-a-year American advertising industry.'

What is evident about the advertising industry's efforts when it targets youth is that to accomplish its goals it often appeals to what has always and pervasively been understood to be some of the worst of human potentials: insecurity, envy, vanity, impulsiveness, pride, surface images and appearances, the sexual objectification of others, emotional impulses habitually trumping rational thought, short-term gratification, and so on. How many successful youth ad campaigns appeal to, say, contentment, self-control, humility, rationality, inner character, selflessness, or any other traditional virtue? Playing to the darker side of human nature seems to be, for whatever reason, often easier and more successful in selling products than appealing to humanity's brighter side.!° All of this becomes tremendously important for our purposes when understood in light of American adolescents' immense purchasing power, which makes them a prime advertising target. Industry experts estimate that American teenagers spend about $170 billion of their own dollars annually and influence upwards of $500 billion of their parents' spending."! American teenagers thus have an immense amount of money to spend in the market. In addition, they are both highly brand-sensitive and brand-flexible. This means that, while they will spend extra money to purchase a particular product brand that is in fashion, their brand preferences are often not firmly established. Brand loyalties become firm later in life.' In an effort to line up potential lifetime consumers behind allegiances to particular product brands while they are still open to switching, therefore, advertisers especially target youth with massive promotions campaigns. Thus, a massive and powerful advertising industry expends immense amounts of resources on very sophisticated efforts that shape the basic assumptions, feelings, desires, and commitments of American youth.' This is not because they care a hoot about

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re the well-being of teenagers, but because they want the dollars that are burning holes in teenagers' pockets. In short, the consciousness of American adolescents is being powerfully formed by expert agents with enormous resources motivated not to achieve youth's good but rather to acquire youth's money.

And what it often takes for them to acquire that money turns out to be not very good for youth, at least from most historical religious perspectives.

For all of the good things that modern capitalism has clearly achieved, which cannot be ignored, we would also be remiss not to see, again, massconsumer capitalism's relevance for understanding the religious and spiritual lives of American youth. If we conceive of the culture as distinct moral orders competing for the attention and allegiance of its members, and if the elemental assumptions and moral commitments of traditional religions and massconsumer capitalism are often at odds, as described above, then American religious communities are in fact up against overwhelming competitors in their efforts to shape the lives of youth. The average American teenager watches 21 hours of television per week and views 360,000 television advertisements before graduating from high school; furthermore, 65 percent of 8to 18-year-olds have television sets in their bedrooms.'* That kind of exposure dwarfs the exposure to religious influences that even the most religiously active American teenager might encounter. Aside from this simple volume of exposure, the elementary assumptions and expectations shaped by massconsumer capitalism that youth bring to religion, as described above, also affect their interests in and responses to religion. And in America's religious economy, these consumer "preferences" over time shape the available religious "products" on the market, for American religions tend to some degree to accommodate the transformed definitions of self, faith, and purpose to avoid becoming culturally outmoded.

Exactly how different religious traditions, denominations, and congregations negotiate this process inevitably shapes both the larger character of American religion and ways that different kinds of youth engage religious beliefs and practices. Some of the outcomes we have already seen in the previous chapter.

THE DIGITAL COMMUNICATION REVOLUTION

Critical in working out the dynamics described above (and some below) and in shaping the religion and spirituality of American teenagers are recent, profound transformations in technologies of communication. Radio revolution- 'zed mass communication in the 1930s, and television in the 1950s and 1960s. But the emergence of digital communication technologies—computers, the Internet, e-mail, digital video recording, cellular telephones, and so on—have dramatically transformed the character of human communication in recent years. Predigital communication technologies tended toward centralization, the authority of gatekeepers, and fixity of location. Television programming was provided by a handful of networks, well-capitalized record labels controlled most music distribution, and telephones were attached to kitchen walls. The digital revolution, by contrast, has not only vastly ex-

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panded the amount of available information and imagery, but also diffused access to media production and consumption, promoted the mobility of individual communicators, replaced centralized channels with dispersed networks of communication, and integrated technological links between different media forms.' Many American youth now talk on their own cell phones day and night, e-mail and instant-message any number of friends and strangers at any time, download hundreds of music CDs onto portable hard-disk jukeboxes, and access a world of unregulated information and images with a few keystrokes.'® Many theorists of these new technologies suggest that they bring with them important social psychological and cultural consequences.'" For one thing, the digital communication revolution, especially its visual side, accelerates the trend begun with the advent of television away from typographicbased, linear, rational thought and discourse and toward noncognitive, imagebased, entertainment-centered public discourse.'® The new communication technologies also seem to produce a world of information and images that is more disjointed and fragmented, that does not hang together as an organized whole. Anyone can, for instance, post for global consumption almost whatever content on the Internet, unregulated by traditional standards gatekeepers, without having to account for its relation to everything else on the Internet. Stated differently, the new technologies open up greater opportunities for unfettered authorship, for more reciprocal flows of information, and for multiple horizontal connections through hyperlink structures instead of the more linear and hierarchical structures of traditional texts and producers.

Authority over standards of knowledge thus becomes radically democratized and decentralized, filling the open market with a congestion of ideas and information that have not been reviewed, judged, and sorted by evaluating authorities. Thus, Internet searches on any subject—on the nature of God, for example—produce many thousands of hits with no built-in means to sort through which information among those hits is more valid, reliable, or authorized by the institutions that once controlled that knowledge. Discernment is left up to the individual. All of this not only increases the amount of information publicly available, but more important, embodies for and promotes among its users a new epistemology—a novel definition of human knowledge and interaction per se—that represents an alternative model of what the very world itself is and how the world itself works. The new world of knowledge, and perhaps the human consciousness that flows from it, is, for better or worse, increasingly visual, decentralized, unclassified, disjointed, unregulated, fragmented, and unevaluated. Alien to it, therefore, are many of the continuities and organizing principles of historical tradition, canon, authority, rules of order, systematic doctrine, and many other features that have historically defined American religions. Youth socialized into the new digital order may therefore find the substance of historical religious traditions difficult to assimilate—as, indeed, prior chapters suggest they do.

On the other hand, American youth now have easy access to masses of information about an endless array of religious systems and spiritual practices

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that might broaden their religious horizons and kindle new spiritual interests.

Furthermore, many traditional American religious communities are capitalizing on the novel communication technologies to reach new audiences, increase communication efficiency within and between congregations, raise funds, experiment with new worship styles and visuals, enhance religious education programs, train ministers from a distance, and much more. Not all

American religious groups are behind the curve on social and cultural change, for good or ill. There are many conceivable ways that the communication revolution can and does serve the purposes of American religious communities. Finally, historically rooted religious traditions may provide a grounded counterbalance to what may feel lacking or unsettling in the new digital age, making religion more attractive to youth. What matters for our purposes in all of this are the multiple consequences of the digital revolution at various levels on the youth who do and do not engage religion and spirituality, and on the texture and character of the religious ideas and organizations they may engage.

RESIDUAL POSITIVISM AND EMPIRICISM

Ironically, at the same time that American teenagers are confronting the consequences of major contemporary technological revolutions in communication technologies, many of them also continue to assume popular but antiquated cultural mentalities about science and knowledge rooted in nineteenthand early twentieth-century thought: logical positivism and naive empiricism. These schools of thought claimed, in short, that there are only two sources of real knowledge, logical reasoning and empirical experience, and that statements are meaningful only if they can be positively proven true by logic or experience—making traditional, metaphysically oriented philosophy and theology simply meaningless and useless. Although logical positivism and naive empiricism have been discredited in the academy for decades as philosophically untenable—their claims cannot be supported, after all, by their own criteria of knowledge and meaning''—residual, taken-for-granted forms of them remain fast in popular culture, including among American youth. The popular, residual version of these old doctrines automatically assumes that no idea should be embraced or commitment made for which there is no irrefutable material or logical evidence providing positive verification.

The naive assumption, which hardly anyone ever actually thinks about, is that everything we legitimately hold to has beneath it an indubitable and universally accessible foundation of knowledge that provides a means to identify positive knowledge of the truth. Normally, this means of identifying truth is thought to involve sensory observation of the material world. Because most religions and spiritualities reference superempirical realities, this taken-forgranted residual positivism and empiricism often have a corrosive effect on religious faith and practice. Thus, while writing this chapter, we received the following e-mail from a worried father who had accessed our project's Web site in search of help with his teenage son: "I would appreciate your help to

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refer me to resources to talk to my soon-to-be 15-year-old son on religion.

He has recently expressed his non-belief in God. We are a regular church attending (Catholic) family. His point of view is there is no proof for the existence of God. Thank you for any help you can offer." It is unreasonable to expect most teenagers, who are merely operating with widespread cultural assumptions, to be current on contemporary views in epistemology and the philosophy of science. But clearly, what most informed intellectuals now think about the character and limits of all human knowledge has not trickled down to American youth at the grassroots nor, apparently, to their high school teachers and parents. Many contemporary American youth thus approach religion and spirituality unconsciously assuming certainty and proof in knowledge and belief that are more than a century old and now largely philosophically discredited. But taken-for-granted cultural beliefs, however intellectually lacking, are still powerful, and so many American adolescents engage religion with the old framework in the back of their minds that pitches faith against fact, positive knowledge against personal belief, verified truth against subjective opinion. For some youth, this framework poses few problems for their religious and spiritual faith and practice. "That's just the way

I was raised," we have seen, is good enough for them. For others, while it does not destroy their religious faith, it diminishes religion's reliability and importance in their minds. For yet other youth (such as Steve in chapter 3), this assumed framework helps to undermine the very possibility of religious belief and commitment. Thus, American 14-year-olds with cell phones, instant messaging, and Internet access can lose their religious faith in part under the influence of lingering cultural residues of intellectual doctrines that exhilarated science and philosophy in the 1880s and 1930s but that are now untenable. Whatever the exact effect on specific youth, residual positivism and empiricism continue in American popular culture as influential, takenfor-granted presuppositions. They envelop people's intellectual imaginations and often have real consequences for their religious and spiritual lives, even though few people are even aware of the real philosophical issues involved.

STRUCTURAL DISCONNECT FROM THE ADULT WORLD

Throughout most of human history in most societies, the lives of youth were closely integrated into the world of adults.2° One need not hold a romanticized view of "traditional society" to see that, in premodern social settings lacking modernity's radical splits between public and private, production and consumption, and education and work, at relatively early ages youth typically were important contributors to the tasks of survival and economic production. They participated in herding, gathering foods, planting, irrigating, and harvesting, hunting, fishing, fending off predators, running errands, transporting and selling goods, assisting in crafts, caring for animals, and much more. Children and youth were also tightly integrated into the workings of the domestic life of families, clans, tribes, villages. Early on in life they took on such responsibilities as tending fires, food preparation and cooking, spin-

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ning and weaving, child care, the construction of shelter, and the disposal of wastes. As recently as 175 years ago, for better or worse, many American boys at the age of 12 were sent away from their families to become apprentices working long days under the eyes of craft masters in whose homes they lived out their teenage years. The days of most American girls at that age, if not younger, consisted of helping older women accomplish household chores and perhaps, in certain times and places, taking in some home-based book learning. Young people in many cultures have often carved out for themselves some minimal degree of distance from the adult world and sometimes developed in those spaces something somewhat like what we think of as youth culture. But the much more striking reality is that the lives of most youth in all but the most recent generations have generally been closely involved in the productive activities of and supervised by the watchful eyes of adults.

All of that was profoundly changed by the industrial revolution and the rapid technological and social transformations that followed in its wake.

America's nineteenth-century industrial revolution separated work from home, production from consumption, and public from private life. In larger, related processes, domestic nurture was differentiated from national economic advance, and the education of youth was increasingly formalized and detached from household life. In the early industrial revolution, many children and teenage boys and girls worked long hours in the factory under the foreman's discipline. In due time, however, economic production by youth increasingly came to be viewed, often rightly, as pernicious and exploitative child labor, which was gradually suppressed by social reforms. Throughout, childhood and adolescence were being culturally redefined as particular developmental phases of life profoundly different from adulthood.

Further social changes in the twentieth century accelerated the structural disconnection of youth's lives from the adult world. The invention of the automobile provided teenagers with a mobility and privacy they had never before known. Commercial movie theaters, dance halls, and other centers of entertainment had similar effects. Most important of all, however, was the near complete institutionalization of universal public education. In fact, it was not until the 1930s that the majority of American youth of high school age became school students. Comprehensive national child labor laws were finally put into effect in 1934, and state and local governments made major efforts to get youth into schools. This new state crackdown on truancy was fueled in part by the need prompted by the Great Depression to remove youth from the labor force so they would not compete with adult men for scarce jobs. With little work to be done, mandatory schooling for teenagers became a means to keep youth off the streets and from being drawn into "hobo jungles" and other worrisome places and activities.

A mere 70 years ago, then, the majority of teenagers were for the first time in history gathered up together for most of the day, for most days of the week, in single buildings with masses of other boys and girls of their same age, with relatively few adults around to supervise and intervene into the details of their lives. Mass schooling was the perfect incubator for a new,

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distinctive youth culture, which blossomed in the following decades. The word "teen-ager" (its first spelling) was coined during World War IL, and by 1945 "teenager" had become a widely used label naming a cultural reality newly come into being. Postwar prosperity, a widespread perceived "return" to the traditional nuclear family, and the desire of Depressionand war-weary parents to provide their children all the good things they had never enjoyed provided the resources and attitudes further enhancing adolescents' free time, mobility, and privacy—in short, autonomy from adults. Peer groups now became significant new and powerful sources of knowledge and influence in the lives of youth, competing with parents and other adults in teenagers' socialization. The postwar GI Bill also helped rapidly to expand American higher education, further postponing entry into the adult world for millions of young college students and further fostering the evolution of a distinct

American youth subculture. By the 1960s, the civil rights, student, free speech, and anti-Vietnam War movements—in all of which youth played major roles—signified new levels of youth independence from the control of the adult world. The trend continued. Macroeconomic changes after 1970 accelerated the entry of women, including mothers of adolescents, into the paid labor force. The no-fault divorce revolution of the 1970s and other social forces significantly increased the number of single-parent households in which teenagers lived and live.21 These and other related factors left youth increasingly on their own, both alone and with other youth, for growing numbers of hours of the day and night. This high degree of youth autonomy has become the normalized reality for very many adolescents among working poor, middle-class, and upper-middle-class families alike.

Interacting with this structural disconnect is our society's cultural construction of adolescence as an Incredibly Long Wait for full participation in genuine adulthood." In American culture adolescence can begin at age 10,

11, or 12; at the latest, official teenage status begins at age 13. On the other end, many youth do not pass the symbolic cultural markers of full adulthood—school graduation, full-time work, financial independence, marriage— until the age of 18, 22, 25, or, for some, even their late 20s and early 30s.

Thus, American youth live for between five and 20 years in a kind of socially constructed developmental limbo, ever waiting, delaying, anticipating, preparing for the day when they will take on and enjoy the freedoms and responsibilities of being real grown-ups. The cultural message to youth is that they are not mature or prepared enough to enter the adult world and so must continue for years to wait, even as other powerful, contradictory messages implore them to act fully responsibly, be self-directed, and make very good choices as independent decision makers. Furthermore, even as improved nutrition (and perhaps the increased use of hormones in some farm products) lowered the age of the onset of puberty by about three years during the twentieth century, extended educational expectations, career startup requirements, and increasing lifestyle consumption expectations postponed the ayerage age of marriage for young men and women from the years 1950 and 2000 by an extra four to five years.?? Part of adolescents' Incredibly Long

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Wait, then, involves the tension of being physiologically able and hormonally very interested in activitles that make babies, while normally lacking the emotional, relational, and financial capacity to parent babies. Adult American culture, working through the media, schools, and other institutions, thus sends its youth the conflicting messages that sex is one of the greatest and most important experiences in life, that youth should abstain from sex until marriage, that boys will be boys (and, increasingly, girls will be girls) and cannot be expected as teens not to party wildly, that youth should practice

"safe" and "responsible sex," and so on.?* The wait is therefore not only incredibly long but often very confusing.*' The larger situation this can create for many youth is a widespread gnawing restlessness and frustration, underlying tension with parents over continually renegotiating boundaries of freedom and responsibility, and sometimes a feeling of uselessness and inertia.

Teenagers are forever waiting, continually preparing, perpetually coming of age, and are meanwhile for the most part socially superfluous. Thus, they experience a disconnect from the adult world not only in the structures of their routine activities and schedules, but also through the many years of limbo through which they must hang in suspension before passing into fullfledged adulthood.

The degree to which specific, individual adolescents today are connected to or disconnected from the adult world is of course highly variable. Some

American teens do have dlose ties to many adults. But viewed in broad historical perspective, contemnporary teenage autonomy from adults is unprecedented and astounding. Significant numbers of teens today live their lives with little but the most distant adult direction and oversight. They spend the greater part of most weekdays in schools surrounded almost exclusively by their peers. Their parents are working and otherwise busy. Members of their extended family live in distant cities. Their teachers are largely preoccupied with discipline, classroom instruction, and grading. Their neighbors tend to stay out of each others' business. These teens may have their own cars, cell phones, spending money, and televisions in their bedrooms. Or they may simply spend all their free time hanging out with friends and associates at the mall, on the streets, at friends' houses, or other places away from home.

In any case, when school lets out, it may be hours before a parent gets home from work. If the teen works, his or her coworkers are mostly other teenagers who are also flipping burgers or working cash registers; their supervisors may be adults, but few teens have significant relationships with them beyond taking orders and collecting paychecks.

This structural disconnection of many contemporary American adolescents from the world of adults has potential important ramifications for the character of their religious and spiritual lives. If a teenager defines serious religion as mostly an adult affair, as many do, then religion comes automatically to feel distant to them, as something that they may "get into" someday when they are older, but not now; this feeds into the age-appropriate life course scripts mentioned in the previous chapter. Furthermore, when teenagers have little daily experience socializing with adults generally, they likely

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find it more difficult to form meaningful relational ties with members of their congregations who are not their peers. Some youth may demand religious expressions and experiences that resonate with the symbols, images, language, and practices of popular youth culture. This may, in turn, shape the religious programming that religious institutions offer to youth, potentially altering the texture of the religious tradition itself. In addition, our culture's structural disconnect between youth and adults has fostered among some religious adults an insecurity about their ability to "relate to" youth, a lack of confidence in their capacity to teach and train youth well in matters of faith, a reluctance to speak to teenagers about spiritual or theological issues with direction and authority for fear of coming across as square, boring, or irrelevant to teenagers' real lives, in which many adults are not very involved.

In such cases, religious adults may back away from adolescents and so fail to provide them with the kind of nurture, instruction, and direction in the faith that they might actually need or want.

At the same time, the structural disconnect of youth from adults may generate in at least some youth a hunger for meaningful relationships with mature adults, for many youth do in fact desire the boundaries, teaching, direction, wisdom, and caring that adults can offer. In some cases, this can create opportunities for religious adults effectively to reach out to youth, to satisfy this need, and to use such relationships to foster religious conversions and deeper commitments to faith among youth. For good or ill, many religious institutions have also mirrored society's separate and parallel worlds of youth and adults by creating youth-only religious groups, worship services, and service projects that may, given the culture, recruit teenagers into religious organizations more effectively than mixed-age religious meetings and activities. For these and other possible reasons, the significant contemporary structural disconnection between youth and adults and its possible consequences is a fact we must bear in mind as we seek generally to understand the religious and spiritual lives of American teenagers and specifically to make sense of the survey and interview findings in the previous and following chapters.

ADULTS WITH PROBLEMS

Despite their daily routines being structurally disconnected from the adult world, most American adolescents still also have to negotiate their lives dealing with specific adults—parents, teachers, coaches, family members, friends—who may have their own personal problems. Many adults truly love and care for the teenagers in their lives. Yet adults are also often far from perfect. They sometimes have their own haunting emotional and psychological problems and unmet needs. Adults can be selfish, neglectful, abusive, manipulative, distant, or smothering in subtle or obvious ways. Adults have bad conflicts. They get divorced. They have midlife crises. They lose their jobs. They spiral into depressions. They can be too busy with their own concerns and so substitute "guilt money" for time with and attention to their

AMERICAN ADOLESCENT RELIGION IN SOCIAL CONTEXT

teens. Adults can burden youth with the emotional pressure to meet their own needs or make them happy through achievement, success, and goodness.

Adults can lack parenting skills and appropriate judgment. Sometimes adults, even some parents, simply do not care much about the teenagers in their lives. Adults can be too poor, too rich, mentally ill, in and out of prison, or consumed by their careers in ways that hurt teens. However loving and selfless adults may profess themselves to be and may in fact be, there is also often a shadow side in humanity that can be self-centered, lazy, dishonest to self, or oblivious to the needs of others. It is not that many adults are particularly wicked. Adults are simply human. And adults, like teens, live in larger social and cultural contexts that both enable and constrain, in which they make choices, sometimes bad choices. But for whatever complex of reasons, adult humans have problems, both large and small, which can often make trouble for the teenagers in their lives.

Nevertheless, it is common for adult talk about teenagers in the United States to focus on teenagers' problems, on their possible or actual bad attitudes, rebellion, offensive music, materialism, drinking, smoking, drugs, gangs, delinquency, obesity, pornography, sex, pregnancy, STDs, abortions, violence, school shootings, suicide, and more. Parents are often concerned about these issues in their kids' lives, and often rightly so. The media always headline crimes committed by teens. Bookstore shelves are lined with myriad advice books telling parents not how to enjoy, but how to survive the teenage years. One can readily get the impression from all of this not only that adolescents sometimes have problems, but that teenagers are a problem, that adolescence itself is a social problem.

But this viewpoint is ultimately deceiving and self-deceived. The truth is, first, that American adults have as many or more of most of the problems with which youth struggle. Compared to teenagers, American adults consume more alcohol, cigarettes, and drugs, commit more crimes and violence, contract more STDs, have more abortions, and more often become obese, drive drunk, commit suicide, and engage in a host of other problems that worry adults about youth."

Second, every teenage problem is finally rooted in and perpetuated by the adult world problems. In their often very real troubles, American youth are normally only acting out problems ingrained in the grown-up world into which they are being socialized. It is precisely adults, at least some adults, and not teens who are the primary inventors, suppliers, promoters, and beneficiaries of most "teenage problems." Where do adolescents get the Marlboros they smoke and Budweisers they drink, and the very idea that smoking and drinking are cool? Who or what supplies and promotes the expensive sneakers, jeans, and myriad other commodities that adults then complain represent shallow teen materialism? Who develops and makes the money from pornographic videos and Web sites? Where do teens, especially girls, get the idea that body weight and outward physical appearance are paramount in defining and projecting one's self-identity? From where do teens learn that sex is an individual right of self-expression and the pinnacle of all

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human experiences? From where have youth learned that they should be autonomous individuals wary of authority? Who transports the drugs from South America to New Jersey? Who develops, records, sells, and promotes offensive and degrading music? Who has taught teens that making a lot of money is a paramount goal of life? From whom have youth learned that problems are rightly solved with force and guns? Where does all this come from? Not primarily from 13and 16-year-olds, assuredly, but from 33and 55-year-olds. From business entrepreneurs, multinational corporations, shopping malls, Hollywood, Madison Avenue, Wall Street, American history textbooks, U.S. political parties and interest groups, the Pentagon, sometimes the White House, and sometimes even teenagers' baby boomer parents themselves—which is to say: from the institutions of mainstream adult American society. Few teen problems in fact are invented or promoted by teenagers.

Most are prevalent in and developed, modeled, and handed down to teens by the adult world. Adolescents are often less sophisticated than adults in how they act out their problems and less able to cover up their negative consequences. But in the end, teens are simply learning through socialization how to live in the problematic world they are inheriting from adults.

At the very least, then, adults' obsessions with adolescents' problems represents a double standard. It may also be worse, however, in representing a collective adult process of what psychologists call "transference": the projection of one's own problems onto other people or situations in order through denial and blaming of others to avoid having to confront one's own responsibilities, problems, and failures. When teenagers become the cultural lightning rod for deep concerns about what are actually adult personal and social problems, it helps relieve adults of the discomfort of the fact that teenage troubles merely reflect back to adults problems of their own adult world.

Adults may not consciously intend to engage in such transference, denial, self-deception, or scapegoating, but we also know that these kinds of psychological and cultural processes are rarely conscious and intentional. At the very least, these are possibilities meriting consideration.

If all of this sounds judgmental, all we can say is that through our research interviews around the country, we came across more parents and other adults with problems than one might ever want to know, just some of whom we have seen in this book—parents and other adults oblivious to their children's multiple suicide attempts, who buy drugs and hard liquor for their teenagers and their friends, who communicate with their kids only by yelling, who ignore obvious evidence of their kids' breaking major family rules and even the law, and much more. The more truth telling we can do about adults' problems, we think, the better position we may be in to understand adolescents' lives.

All of this is relevant for understanding teenagers' religious and spiritual lives. First, adolescents often associate faith and religion with adults. When adults in teenagers' lives have problems that injure them, religion can become negatively associated with those problems. Youth can view religion as a source of hypocrisy when adults fail to live up to the standards professed by

AMERICAN ADOLESCENT RELIGION IN SOCIAL CONTEXT

religion. In this and other ways, religion can become for some youth a symbolic field of resistance or rebellion on which to work out their anger or hurt over the adult problems that bother or injure them. Thus, adult problems imposing on the lives of teens may create subjective dissonances with religion, causing some youth to drift from their congregations and discard their beliefs.

Recall the lives of Raymond and Joy, for example. On the other hand, religion can provide youth with resources to help them deal with problems adults may pose in their lives. Faith can become a sanctuary from pain and struggle, a spring of strength and hope. Fellow believers, both adults and peers, can be to youth sources of support, encouragement, counsel, and direction. Consider, for instance, the lives of Kristen and Alyssa. Thus, adult problems can cut both ways in the religious and spiritual lives of youth, helping to explain both defection from and commitment to the institutions and practices of American religion.

OTHER RELEVANT CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS

In no culture do all expectations, ideals, and lived practices add up. All cultures contain some contradictions, loose ends, and discrepancies between what is said and what is done. This is true of American culture in many ways that we might expect to create tensions and confusion in the lives of American adolescents, even if teens are not always consciously aware of and articulate about them. We have already alluded to some of these contradictions. Adults fear and condemn teen violence, for instance, yet we are a nation birthed by a violent revolution we celebrate annually; our right to own and bear guns is constitutionally protected; graphic violence in the media is defined by an "R" rating that defines violence as appropriate to enjoy when one is grown up enough; and the ready use of violence to achieve goals is integral to U.S. foreign policy. The point here is not whether any of these things are good or bad per se, but rather that our culture is actually ambivalent and multivocal about violence, sending mixed messages to those being socialized into the culture.

We might observe many other American cultural contradictions that may affect teenagers. Adults often impress on adolescents that what really counts is the personal character of one's inner self. And yet, in many other ways,

American culture sends the clear message that what really counts is outward appearance and good looks. Which are teens supposed to believe? Adults often tell teenagers that they must learn to respect authority, yet most sacred of all American values is the inviolability of the individual conscience, derived from liberal individualism,2" embedded in widespread American distrust of the government and other institutions of authority, and incessantly depicted in television and movies, particularly those aimed at youth. Is it any wonder that American teens sometimes disrespect or rebel against parents, teachers, school principals, and other authorities? Adults say they want kids to learn to be financially responsible, but, except among the poorest Americans, teenagers with jobs are freed from the responsibility of helping to support their

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household, so nearly all of their income is used for discretionary consumer spending on themselves. Moreover, the U.S. economy itself has become dependent on high levels of consumer debt.?* Adults often complain about how stupid television is and how much of it teenagers watch, but American adults actually watch just as much (stupid) television as teenagers do."? Adults constantly preach to adolescents about sexual responsibility, yet many adults engage in extramarital sex and have unwanted pregnancies; the world portrayed by adult-produced media is one of relatively free sex without negative consequences; and all manner of pornographic sex (much of which can hardly be called "responsible") our society labels "adult," implying that, though kids should not view pornography, it is a perfectly appropriate pastime for grownups to enjoy. Should we be surprised that teens, who are itching to enjoy the freedoms of grown-up life, act out their sexuality in ways not always responsible? Much American public discourse is spent agonizing about improving the health of youth yet we structure the lives of youth in ways that obviously undermine their health: we schedule early school hours and overbearing homework requirements, for example, so as to virtually guarantee that teenagers routinely get less sleep than their bodies need—and then wonder why teens are surly, lazy, and complain about being hassled. Our culture wakes up adolescents at 5:30 and 6:00 in the morning, not because it is healthy for their bodies and spirits to do so—we know scientifically that it is not—but so their parents can get to work for the corporation on time.

Thus, although many Americans talk about what a pro-family, youthloving society ours is, it is not entirely clear that many of our actual practices and institutions support those claims. Most of the structures and routines of American life actually pull families apart regularly and effectively. American work and education practices separate family members for most daytime hours of every weekday. Day care centers and preschools remove children from their parents at a very young age. After school, many parents, middleclass parents particularly, schedule their children's lives with so many programmed activities that they find themselves with very little unstructured time simply to spend together as families.

A minority of American families with teenagers eat most of their dinner meals together.*° And our legal systems and cultural practices around divorce make clear that keeping families together is not a particularly high societal priority. Contrary to our culture's pro-family rhetoric, an alien anthropologist might have good reason to conclude that members of American families actually have little interest in spending time together. To be clear, the point here is not that individual parents and other adults are rotten people who do not love their children. These, rather, are largely matters of routine cultural practices and institutional structures from which it is very difficult to deviate. But they do send messages to and have consequences for the youth of our society.

In these and other ways, many of the messages and practices of American culture do not add up. We often say one thing but do something else. Whether or not American teenagers have the perspective to be able to recognize and articulate such cultural contradictions, they may intuitively feel them in their

AMERICAN ADOLESCENT RELIGION IN SOCIAL CONTEXT

lives and react to them in various ways. As with the other big-picture factors described above, these cultural contradictions can thus have significant effects on the religious and spiritual perspectives and experiences of American teenagers. They may provide the occasion for youth to feel frustrated, angry, guilty, overburdened, or confused, which, in certain cases, may be projected onto religious experiences and organizations in ways that influence their religious beliefs and commitments. Religion, as one high-profile institutional representative of mainstream adult society, may become the focusing point of more generalized frustrations with double standards and unfairness. Then again, in other cases, religious people, programs, organizations, and experiences may become for youth sources of integration in or resolution to an otherwise disjointed life experience. Religious faith and religious communities may provide a shelter from what some youth may perceive to be a crazy, mixed-up world.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to understand adequately the religious and spiritual lives of American adolescents without considering their lives within the framework of the larger cultural and institutional influences described above. Exploring the faith of youth with this big-picture context in mind can thus yield valuable insights about the condition of contemporary American teenage religion and spirituality. One of the benefits that attention to the larger social context of teenage life makes possible is helping us to realize both how thoroughly shaped by and reflective of their social and cultural order American youth are and how much they actually have in common with adults. Teenagers are often spoken of in popular culture as alien creatures, strange beings from another planet, unpredictable animals driven by mysterious forces and motives, to whom parents and other adults have little chance of relating or understanding. In fact, however—their lack of maturity and emotional volatility notwithstanding—American youth actually share much more in common with adults than they do not share, and most American youth faithfully mirror the aspirations, lifestyles, practices, and problems of the adult world into which they are being socialized. In these ways, adolescents may actually serve as a very accurate barometer of the condition of the culture and institutions of our larger society. Far from being alien creatures from another planet, American teenagers actually well reflect back to us the best and worst of our own adult condition and culture. This approach, we believe, proves to be a much more helpful perspective for making sense of adolescent life today than the more typical alien-creatures framing of American teenagers.

We seek to understand the religion and spirituality of contemporary American adolescents. To adequately do so, we must frame that understanding in the larger social and institutional contexts of therapeutic individualism, mass-consumer capitalism, the digital communication revolution, residual positivism and empiricism, the structural disconnect of teenagers from the world of adults, the problems of adults, and other relevant cultural contra-

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dictions that may affect the religious and spiritual lives of contemporary youth. This is not because youth are normally consciously aware of or articulate about these big-picture social influences, but 'because these larger contexts are objective, structural, institutional, and cultural realities that powerfully form youth's lives. Making these kinds of connections between larger social contexts and the unique stories of particular individuals by examining the "intersection of history and biography" is one of the important contributions to social understanding that the sociological imagination has to offer.3

In the next chapter, we shift our focus back to religious teenagers more specifically by zeroing in on youth in the major religious tradition of U.S.

Catholicism. Chapter 6 is a kind of case study seeking to help better explain the apparent relative religious laxity of Catholic teens. There we shift from examining statistics across religious traditions and interpreting teen interviews to trying to make sense of a pattern of findings specifically in terms of Catholic religious history, socioeconomic mobility, and other organizational factors. Had space allowed, we might have written similar chapters on, for instance, U.S. teens in mainline Protestantism and Judaism. However, space constraints focus our attention on Catholic teenagers. It is to try to explain their relative religious laxity that we now turn.

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