CHAPTER XL
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
desired of anything knowable.
Such, however, is not the knowledge which the philosophers were able to have about God by the way of demonstration; because even when we have this knowledge, we still desire to know other things things that we do not yet know by means of this knowledge.
Therefore happiness does not consist in such a knowledge of God.
Furthermore. The end of everything that exists in potentiality is that it be brought to actuality; for to this does it tend by means of the movement with which it is moved to its end. Now every potential being tends to becoming actualized as far as possible. For there are things in potentiality whose whole potentiality is reducible to act: the end of such things is that they be wholly actualized. Thus, a heavy body that is outside its medium is in potentiality to its proper place.
There are also things whose potentiality cannot be actualized all at once,—for instance primary matter: so that by its movement it seeks actualization by various forms in succession, which cannot be in the matter at the same time because of their diversity. Furthermore, our intellect is in potentiality to all intelligibles, as was stated in the Second Book.^ Now it is possible for two intelligible objects to be in the possible intellect at the same time according to the first act which is science, although perhaps not in respect of the second act which is consideration. Accordingly, it is clear that the whole potentiality of the possible intellect can be actualized at one time; and consequently this is required for its ultimate end, which is happiness. But the aforesaid knowledge, which can be acquired about God by the way of demonstration, does not accomplish this, since when we have it we still are ignorant of many things. Therefore such a knowledge of God does not suffice for ultimate happiness.
" C. G., II, 47.
CHAPTER XL
THAT man's happiness DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD BY FAITH
There is yet another knowledge of God, in one respect superior to the knowledge we have been discussing, namely, that
HAPPINESS AND TEE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
whereby God is known by men through faith. Now this knowledge surpasses the knowledge of God through demonstration in this respect, namely, that by faith we know certain things about God which are so sublime that reason cannot reach them by means of demonstration, as we have stated at the beginning of this work.^ But not even in this knowledge of God can man's ultimate happiness consist.
For happiness is the intellect's perfect operation, as was already declared.^ But in knowledge by faith, the operation of the intellect is found to be most imperfect as regards the contribution of the intellect, although it is most perfect on the part of the object; for the intellect in believing does not grasp the object of its assent. Therefore neither does man's happiness consist in this knov/ledge of God.
Again. It has been shown that ultimate happiness does not consist chiefly in an act of the will.^ Now in knowledge by faith, the will has the leading place ; for the intellect assents by faith to things proposed to it, because it so wills, and not through being constrained by the evidence of their truth.
Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in this knowledge.
Besides. A believer assents to things proposed to him by another, but not seen by himself; so that the knowledge of faith resembles hearing rather than seeing. Now a man would not believe in what is unseen by him, and proposed to him by another, unless he thought this other to have a more perfect knowledge of the things proposed than he himself has who sees not. Either therefore the judgment of the believer is wrong, or the proposer must have more perfect knowledge of the things proposed. And if the latter also knows these things only through hearing them from another, we cannot proceed thus indefinitely, for then the assent of faith would be without foundation or certitude, since we should not come to some first principle certain in itself, to give certitude to the faith of believers. Now, in reality, it is not possible that the assent of faith be false and without foundation, as is clear from what we have said at the beginning of this work;^ and yet if it were false and baseless, happiness could not consist in such knowledge. There is therefore some knowledge of God that is higher than the knowledge of faith, whether he who
^ C. G., I, 5.
^ Ch. 25.
' Ch. 26.
* C. G., I,