CHAPTER XVII
ALL THINGS ARE DIRECTED TO GOD
cause the will, which is the appetite of a previously known end, does not tend towards a thing except under {he aspect of good, which is its object. Therefore those things also that do not know the end are directed to a good as their end.
Therefore the end of all is a good.
CHAPTER XVII
THAT ALL THINGS ARE DIRECTED TO ONE END, WHICH
IS GOD From the foregoing it is clear that all things are directed to one good as their last end.
For if nothing tends to something as' its end, except in so far as this is good, it follows that good, as such, is an end.
Consequently that which is the supreme good is supremely the end of all. Now there is but one supreme good, namely God, as we have shown in the First Book.^ Therefore all things are directed to the highest good, namely God, as their end.
Again. That which is supreme in any genus is the cause of everything in that genus? Thus fire which is supremely hot is the cause of heat in other bodies. Therefore the supreme good, namely God, is the cause of goodness in all things good.
Therefore He is the cause of every end being an end, since whatever is an end is such in so far as it is good. Now the cause that a thing is so is itself more so? Therefore God is supremely the end of all th^pgs.
Further. In every genus of causes, the first cause is more a cause than the second cause, since the second cause is not a cause save through the first. Therefore that which is the first cause in the order of final causes must needs be more the final cause of each thing than the proximate final cause. Now God is the first cause in the order of final causes, for He is supreme in the order of good things. Therefore He is the end of each thing more even than any proximate end.
Moreover. In all ordered ends the last must needs be the end of each preceding end. Thus if a potion be mixed to be given to a sick man, and is given to him that he may be purged, and he be purged that he may be lowered, and low-
^ C. G., I, 42.
''Aristotle, Metaph., lo, i (993b 22).
^Aristotle, Post. Anal., I,
(72a 28).
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
ered that he may be healed, it follows that health is the end of the lowering, and of the purging, and of those that precede. Now all things are ordered in various degrees of goodness to the one supreme good, which is the cause of all goodness; and so, since good has the nature of an end, all things are ordered under God as preceding ends under the last end.
Therefore God must be the end of all.
Furthermore. The particular good is directed to the common good as its end, for the being of the part is for the sake of the being of the whole.^ So it is that the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man.^ Now the supreme good, namely God, is the common good, since the good of all things depends on Him; and the good, whereby each thing is good, is the particular good of that thing, and of those that depend thereon. Therefore all things are directed to one good, namely God, as their end.
Again.
Order among ends is consequent on the order among agents. For just as the supreme agent moves all second agents, so all the ends of second agents must be directed to the end of the supreme agent, since whatever the supreme agent does, it does for its own end. Now the supreme agent is the active principle of the actions of all inferior agents, by moving all to their actions, and consequently to their ends.
Hence it follows that all the ends of second agents are ordered by the first agent to its own end. Now the first agent in all things is God, as we proved in the Second Book.^ And His will has no other end but His own goodness, which is Himself, as we showed in the First Book."^ Therefore all things, whether they were made by Him immediately, or by means of secondary causes, are ordered to God as their end.
But this applies to all things, for, as we proved in the Second Book,^ there can be nothing that has not its being from Him.
Therefore all things are ordered to God as their end.
Moreover. The last end of every maker, as such, is himself, for what we make we use for our own sake
; and if at any time a man make a thing for the sake of something else, it is referred to his own good, whether his use, his pleasure, or his virtue. Now God is the producing cause of all things
: of some immediately, of others by means of other causes, as we have explained above.^ Therefore He is the end of all things.
* Aristotle, Polit., I, 4 (i2S4a 9).
^Aristotle, Eih., I, 2 (1094b 9).
•C. G., II, 15.
'C. G., I, 74.
'C. G., II, IS.
""Ibid.
GOD IS THE END OF THINGS
And again. The end holds the primary place among causes, and it is from it that all other causes derive their actual causality; since the agent does not act except for the end, as was proved.^^ Now it is due to the agent that the matter is brought to the actuality of the form, and therefore the matter is made actually the matter, and the form is made the form, of this particular thing, through the agent's action, and consequently through the end. The later end also is the cause that the preceding end is intended as an end; for a thing is not moved towards a proximate end except for the sake of the last end. Therefore the last end is the first cause of all. Now it must necessarily befit the First Being, namely God, to be the first cause of all, as we proved above.^^ Therefore God is the last end of all.
Hence it is written (Prov. xvi. 4) : The Lord hath made all things for himself; and (Apoc, xxii.
13), / am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last.
^«Ch. 2.
"C. G., II, 15.
CHAPTER XVIII
HOW GOD
IS THE END OF THINGS
It remains to ask how God is the end of all things. This will be made clear from what has been said.
For He is the end of all things, yet so as to precede all in being. ^ Now there is an end which, though it holds the first place in causing in so far as it is in the intention, is nevertheless last in execution. This applies to any end which the agent establishes by his action. Thus the physician by his action establishes health in the sick man, which is nevertheless his end. There is also an end which, just as it precedes in causing, so also does it precede in being. Thus, that which one intends to acquire by one's motion or action is said to be one's end.
For instance, fire seeks to reach a higher place by its movement, and the king seeks to take a city by fighting. Accordingly, God is the end of things as something to be obtained by each thing in its own way.
Again. God is at once the last end of things and the first agent, as we have shown.^ Now the end effected by the agent's action cannot be the first agent, but rather is it the ^C.
G., I, 13.
'Ch.
17.
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
agent's effect. God, therefore, cannot be the end of things as though He were something effected, but only as something already existing and to be acquired.
Further. If a thing act for the sake of something already in existence, and if by its action some result ensue, then something through the agent's action must accrue to the thing for the sake of which it acts ; and thus soldiers fight for the cause of their captain, to whom victory accrues, which the soldiers bring about by their actions. Now nothing can accrue to God from the action of anything whatever, since His goodness is perfect in every way, as we proved in the First Book.^ It follows, then, that God is the end of things, not as something made or effected by them, nor as though He obtained something from things, but in this way alone, that He is obtained by them.
Moreover. The effect must tend to the end in the same way as the agent acts for the end. Now God, who is the first agent of all things, does not act as though He gained something by His action, but as bestowing something thereby; since He is not in potentiality so that He can acquire something, but solely in perfect actuality, whereby He is able to bestow.
Things therefore are not ordered to God as to an end to which something will be added ; ^hey are ordered to Him to obtain God Himself from Him according to their measure, since He is their end.
•C.G:.,I,37ff.
CHAPTER XIX
THAT ALL THINGS TEND TO BE LIKE UNTO GOD
From the fact that they acquire the divine goodness, creatures are made like unto God. Therefore, if all things tend to God as their last end, so as to acquire His goodness,^ it follows that the last end of things is to become like unto God.
Moreover. The agent is said to be the end of the effect in so far as the effect tends to be like the agent
; and hence it is that the form of the generator is the end of the act of generation? Now God is the end of things in such wise as to be also their first producing cause. Therefore all things tend to a likeness to God, as their last end.
*Ch. i8.
= Aristotle, Phys., II, 7 (198a 26).