CHAPTER LXI
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
The fourth argument is solved thus. The vision of the divine substance surpasses all natural power, as was shown.
Consequently the light whereby the created intellect is perfected in order to see the divine substance must needs be supernatural.
Nor can the fact that God is infinite be an obstacle to the vision of the divine substance, as the fijth objection argued.
For He is not said to be infinite by way of privation, as is quantity. The infinite of this kind is quite logically unknown, because it is like matter devoid of form, which is the principle of knowledge. But God is said to be infinite negatively, as a per se subsistent form that is not limited by being received into matter. Therefore, that v/hich is infinite in this way is in itself most knowable.
There is, furthermore, a proportion between the created intellect and understanding God, a proportion not of a common measure, but of a relation of one thing to another, such as of matter to form, or cause to effect. In this way there is no reason against there being in the creature a proportion to God, consisting in the relation of the one understanding to the thing understood, as well as of an effect to its cause.
Therefore the solution of the sixth objection is clear.
CHAPTER LXI
THAT BY SEEING GOD A MAN
IS MADE A PARTAKER OF
ETERNAL LIFE
It follows that by the aforesaid vision the created intellect is made a partaker of eternal life.
For eternity differs from time in that the latter has its being in a kind of succession, whereas the former is all simultaneously.^ Now it has already been proved that there "is no succession inthe vision in question,^ and that whatsoever is seen in it, is seen at once and at a glance. Therefore this vision takes place in a kind of participation of eternity.
Moreover this vision is a kind of life, because the act of the intellect is a kind of life.^ Therefore by that vision the created intellect becomes a partaker of eternal life.
^Cf.
Boethius, De Consol, V, prose 6 (PL 63, 858).
^Ch.
60.
""Eth., IX, 9 (1170a 18).
GOD'S ESSENCE CAN BE SEEN
Again. Actions take their species from their objects. Now the object of the aforesaid vision is the divine substance in its very being, and not in some created Hkeness, as we have shown.^ But the being of the divine substance is in eternity, or rather is eternity itself. Therefore the aforesaid vision consists in a participation of eternity.
Besides. If an action takes place in time, this is either because the principle of the action is in time
(for instance, the actions of natural things are temporal), or because of the term of the action (for instance, the actions which spiritual substances, which are above time, exercise on things subject to time). Now the vision in question is not subject to time on the part of the thing seen, since this is an eternal substance; nor on the part of the medium of vision, which is also the eternal substance; nor on the part of the seer, namely the intellect, whose being is independent of time because it is incorruptible, as we have proved.^ Therefore this vision is according to a participation of eternity, as altogether transcending time.
Further. The intellectual soul is created on the border line between eternity and time, as is stated in the Book of Causes,^ and was explained above,"^ because it is the last in order among intellects, and yet its substance stands above corporeal matter, and is independent thereof. On the other hand, its action, in respect of which it comes into conjunction with lower and temporal things, is itself temporal. Consequently, its action, by reason of which it comes into conjunction with higher things that are above time, partakes of eternity. Especially does this apply to the vision in which it sees the divine substance. Therefore by this vision it enters into a participation of eternity; and for the same reason, so too does any other created intellect that sees God.
For this reason our Lord says {Jo. xvii. 3) : This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God.
*Ch. so.
^C.
G., II, 55, 79.
«Z>e Causis, II (p.
162).
'C. G., II, 68.
HUMAN ACTS
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART
Question VI
ON THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY
{In Eight Articles) Since therefore happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we must as a consequence consider human acts in order to know by what acts we may obtain happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it. But because operations and acts are concerned with what is singular, consequently, all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of things in the particular. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider, first, what is universal; and, secondly, what pertains to the particular.^
In treating of what is universal in human acts, the points that offer themselves for our consideration are (i) human acts themselves; (2) their principles.^ Now of human acts some are proper to man, while others are common to man and animals. And since happiness is man's proper good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with happiness than have those which are common to man and the other animals.
First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man ; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are called passions of the soul.^ The first of these points offers a twofold consideration:
(i) What makes a human act?
(2) What distin guishes human acts? ^ ^5. r., II-II.
'Q.
49.
'Q.
22.
*Q.
18.
Q. 6. Art. i
VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY
And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man, we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.
First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general ; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately ; ^ thirdly, those acts which are voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers.^ Furthermore, because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider the voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances of those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary.'^ Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(i) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?
(2) Whether in irrational animals?
(3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any act?
(4) Whether violence can be done to the will?
(5) Whether violence causes involuntariness?
(6) Whether fear causes involuntariness?
(7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?
(8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?
First Article WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING
VOLUNTARY
IN HUMAN ACTS?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection
. It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human acts. For that is voluntary which has its principle within itself, as Gregory of Nyssa,^ Damascene^ and Aristotle^^ declare. But the principle of human acts is not in man iimself , but outside him, since man's appetite is moved to act by the appetible object which is outside him, and which is as a mover unmoved}'^ Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
Obj.
2 . Further, the Philosopher proves that in animals no ''Q.
*Q.
17.
'Q.
7- "Cf.
Nemesius, De Nat.
Horn., XXXII (PG 40, 728).
""De Fide Orth., II,
(PG 94, 953)- ''''Eth., Ill, I (iiiia 23).
^Aristotle, De An., Ill, 10 (433b 11).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 6. Art. i new movement arises that is not preceded by another and exterior motion.^^ But all human acts are new, since none is eternal. Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from outside man, and therefore there is nothing voluntary in them.
Obj. 3. Further, he that acts voluntarily can act of himself.
But this is not true of man, for it is written {Jo. xv.
5):
Without Me you can do nothing. Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
On the contrary, Damascene says that the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation.^^ Now such are human acts. Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.
/ answer that, There must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of some acts is within the agent, or in that which is moved ; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone; whereas, when it is moved downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every agent or thing moved acts or is moved for an end, as was stated above,^^ those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of movement for an end. Now in order that a thing be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is so moved by an intrinsic principle that it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end.
On the other hand, if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless, the principle of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on it.
Therefore such things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end. And, consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, i.e., that they act and that they act for "^Phys., Vin, 2 (253a II).
"^De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953).
"Q.
I, a.
Q. 6. Art. I
VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY
an end, the movements and acts of such things are said to be voluntary; for the term voluntary' signifies that their movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle,^^ Gregory of Nyssa^^ and Damascene,^"^ the voluntary is defined not only as having a principle within the agent, but also as implying knowledge. Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.
Reply Obj. i. Not every principle is a first principle.
Therefore, although it is of the nature of the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, nevertheless, it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by an extrinsic principle
; for it is not of the nature of the voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first principle.—Nevertheless, it must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to be first in a genus, but not first absolutely. Thus, in the genus of things subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration is the body of the heavens, which nevertheless is not the first mover absolutely, but is moved locally by a higher mover.
And so the intrinsic principle of the voluntary act, i.e,, the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first principle in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is moved by an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement.
Reply Obj.
. New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a motion from without; and this in two respects.
First, in so far as by means of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with something sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite. Thus a lion, on seeing the approach of the stag through its movement, begins to be moved towards the stag.—Secondly, in so far as some extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body, for example, through cold or heat ; and when the body is thus affected by the motion of an exterior body, the sensitive appetite likewise, which is the power of a bodily organ, is moved accidentally. Thus, it happens that through some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to the desire of something. But this is not contrary to the nature of volun- "^Eth., m, I (una 23).
=^« Cf. Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXII
(PG 40, 728).
^'De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 6. Art. 2 tariness, as was stated above, for such movements caused by an extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement.
Reply Obj.
3. God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself ; for every movement both of the will and of nature proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not incompatible with nature that the movement of nature be from God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God moving it, so it is not contrary to the character of a voluntary act that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless, both natural and voluntary movements have this in common, that it belongs to the nature of both that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.
Second Article
WHETHER THERE
IS ANYTHING VOLUNTARY IN
IRRATIONAL ANIMALS?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection
. It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in irrational animals. For voluntary is so called from voluntas
[will] . Now since the will is in the reason,^^ it cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything voluntary in them.
Obj.
2. Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is said to be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not masters of their actions ; for they act not, but rather are they acted upon, as Damascene says.^^ Therefore there is no voluntary act in irrational animals.
Obj. 3. Further, Damascene says that voluntary acts lead to praise and blame.^^ But neither praise nor blame befits the acts of irrational animals. Therefore such acts are not voluntary.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says that both children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary?''^ The same is said by Gregory of Nyssa^^ and Damascene.^^
"Aristotle, De An., Ill, 9 (432b s).
"^ De Fide Orth., II, 27 (PC94, 960).
"^Op. cit.,
II, 24 (PG
94, 953).
'^Eth., Ill,
(iiiib 8).
° Cf. Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXII (PG 40, 729).
"" De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 956).
Q. 6. Art. 2
VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY
/ answer that, As was stated above, it is of the nature of a voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with some knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold, perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And such a knowledge of the end belongs to none but the rational nature.—But imperfect knovdedge of the end consists in a mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such a knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals, through their senses and their natural estimative power.
Consequently, perfect knowledge of the end is accompanied by the voluntary in its perfect nature, inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end.—But imperfect knowledge of the end is accompanied by the voluntary in its imperfect nature, inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Therefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature, whereas the imperfect voluntary belongs also to irrational animals.
Reply Obj. i. The will is the name of the rational appetite, and consequently it cannot be in beings devoid of reason. But the term voluntary is derived from voluntas
{will] , and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some kind of knowledge.
Reply Obj. 2
. The fact that man is master of his actions is due to his being able to deliberate about them
; for since the deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposites, the will can proceed to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness is in irrational animals, as was stated above.
Reply Obj. 3. Praise and blame attach to the voluntary act according to the perfect notion of the voluntary, which is not to be found in irrational animals.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 6. Art. 3
Third Article
WHETHER THERE CAN BE VOLUNTARINESS WITHOUT
ANY ACT?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of the will itself. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act.
Obj.
2. Further, just as one is said to will by an act of the will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to will.
But not to will causes involuntariness, which is contrary to voluntariness.
Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of the will ceases.
Obj. 3. Further, loiowledge is part of the nature of the voluntary, as was stated above. But knowledge involves an act.
Therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act.
On the contrary, The term voluntary is applied to that of which we are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act, to will and not to will. Therefore, just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will.
/ answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the will.
Now one thing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly, in which sense something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts: e.g., heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly, in which sense something proceeds from another through the fact that this other does not act. Thus the sinking of a ship is attributed to the helmsman, from his having ceased to steer.—But we must take note that the cause of what follows from the failure to act is not always the agent as not acting, but only when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to steer the ship, or if the ship's helm were not entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship would not be attributed to him, although it might be due to his absence from the helm.
Since, then, by willing and acting, the will is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting, this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to the will as though proceeding from it. And thus it is that we can have the vol-
Q. 6. Art. 4
VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY
untary without an act, and this sometimes without an outward act, but with an interior act, for instance, when one wills not to act, and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does not will to act.
Reply Obj.
1. We apply the term voluntary not only to that which proceeds from the will directly, as from its agent, but also to that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its non-agent.
Reply Obj, 2. Not to will is said in two senses. First, as though it were one word, and the infinitive of I-do-notwill. Consequently, just as when I say / do not will to read, the sense is, / will not to read, so not to will to read is the same as to will not to read; and in this sense not to will causes involuntariness.—Secondly it is taken as a sentence, and then no act of the will is affirmed. And in this sense not to will does not cause involuntariness.
Reply Obj. 3. Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will, namely, in order that it be in one's power to consider, to will and to act. And then, just as not to will and not to act, when it is time to will and to act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider.
Fourth Article
WHETHER VIOLENCE CAN BE DONE TO THE WILL?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will. Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.
Obj.
2. Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive power, for it is a moved mover.^"^ Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems that it is sometimes compelled.
Obj. 3. Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature, as is clear of the will's movement to sin, ** Aristotle, De An., Ill, 10 (433a 9; b 16).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 6. Art. 4 which is contrary to nature, as Damascene says.^^ Therefore the movement of the will can be compelled.
On the contrary, Augustine says that what is done voluntarily is not done of necessity.-^ Now whatever is done under compulsion is done of necessity, and consequently what is done by the will cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to act.
/ answer that. The act of the will is twofold : one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, to will] the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power: e.g., to walk and to speak J which are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the power of locomotion.
As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will.
The reason for this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from an interior knowing principle, just as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an interior principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle.
Consequently, it is contrary to the nature of the will's own act that it should be subject to compulsion or violence; just as it is also contrary to the nature of the natural inclination or the movement of a stone to be moved upwards. For a stone may have an upward movement from violence, but that this violent movement be from its natural inclination is impossible. In lilce manner, a man may be dragged by force, but it is contrarj^ to the very notion of violence that he be thus dragged of his own will.
Reply Obj. i. God, Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, according to Prov. xxi. i : The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever
He will He shall turn it. But if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will.
Reply Obj.
2. It is not always a violent movement when a passive subject is moved by its active principle, but only then when this is done against the interior inclination of the "^De Fide Orth., IV, 20 (PG 94, 1196).
"^ De Civil. Dei, V,
(PL 41, 152).
Q. 6. Art. 5
VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY
passive subject. Otherwise, every alteration and generation of simple bodies would be unnatural and violent; whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposition. In like manner, when the will is moved, according to its own inclination, by the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary.
Reply Obj. 3. That to which the will tends by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, is nevertheless apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious habit.
Fifth Article
WHETHER VIOLENCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:— Objection
. It would seem that violence does not cause involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in terms of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as was shown above. Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness.
Obj.
2. Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with grief, as Damascene^^ and the Philosopher^^ say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.
Obj. 3. Further, what i^ from the will cannot be involuntary. But some violent actions proceed from the will, for instance, when a man with a heavy body goes upwards, or when a man contorts his members in a way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.
On the contrary J The Philosopher^^ and Damascene^^ say that things done under compulsion are involuntary.
I answer that, Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in common, that both are from an intrinsic principle, whereas the violent is from an extrinsic principle.
And for this reason, just as in things devoid of knowledge ""De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953)- "^ Eth., Ill, i (iiiia 20).
"^Ibid. (1109b 35).
^De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 6. Art. s violence effects something against nature, so in things endowed with knowledge it effects something against the will.
Now that which is against nature is said to be unnatural^ and, in like manner, that which is against the will is said to be involuntary. Therefore violence causes involuntariness.
Reply Obj. i . The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary.
Now it has been said that not only the act which proceeds immediately from the will is called voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will. Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as was stated above. But as to the commanded act, the will can suffer violence, and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness.
Reply Obj.
2. Just as that is said to be natural which is according to the inclination of nature, so that is said to be voluntary which is according to the inclination of the will.
Now a thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, because it is from nature as from an active principle: e.g., it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly, according to a passive principle, because, namely, there is in nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle. Thus, the movement of the heavens is said to be natural by reason of the natural aptitude in the body of the heavens to receive such movement, although the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner, an act is said to be voluntary in two ways.
First, in regard to action, for instance, when one wills to act ; secondly, in regard to passion, as when one wills to receive an action from another. Hence, when action is inflicted by an extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that action remains in the passive subject, this is not violent absolutely; for although the patient does nothing by way of action, he does something by being willing to suffer.
Consequently this cannot be called involuntary.
Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says,^^ the movement of an animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the natural inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is nevertheless in a way natural to the animal, to which it is natural to be moved according to its appetite.
Accordingly this is violent, not absolutely, but relatively.
The same remark applies in the case of one who contorts his «^PAy5., VIII, 4 (2S4b 14).
Q. 6. Art. 6
VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY
members in a way that is contrary to their natural disposition. Por this is violent relatively, i.e., as to that particular member; but not absolutely, i.e., as to the man himself.
Sixth Article
WHETHER FEAR CAUSES WHAT IS INVOLUNTARY ABSOLUTELY?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that fear causes what is involuntary absolutely. For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will in the present, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. But violence causes what is involuntary absolutely. Therefore fear too causes what is involuntary absolutely.
Obj. 2. Further, that which is of itself such, remains such, whatever be added to it. Thus what is of itself hot, as long as it remains, is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done through fear is involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with the addition of fear it is involuntary.
Obj. 3. Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is such in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any condition, is such absolutely. Thus, what is necessary, subject to a condition, is necessary in some respect, but what is necessary without qualification is necessary absolutely. But that which is done through fear is involuntary absolutely; and it is not voluntary, save under a condition, namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided. Therefore that which is done through fear is involuntary absolutely.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa^^ and the Philosopher^^ say that such things as are done through fear are voluntary rather than involuntary, I answer that, As the Philosopher says,^* and likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book On Man,^^ such things as are done through fear are of a mixed character, being partly voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.
''Cf. Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXX (PG 40, 721).
'^ Eth., Ill, I (iiioa 12).
"^Ibid.
'^Ci.
Nemesius, De Nat.
Horn., XXX
(PG 40, 721).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 6. Art. 6
But if the matter be considered rightly, such things are voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary absolutely, but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be absolutely according as it is in act
; but according as it is only in the apprehension, it is not so absolutely, but in a certain respect. Now that which is done through fear is in act in so far as it is done. For, since acts are concerned with singulars, and since the singular, as such, is here and now, that which is done is in act in so far as it is here and now and under other individuating circumstances. Hence that which is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that is to say, in so far as, under the circumstances, it hinders a greater evil which was feared
; and thus, the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear of danger, and so it is clear that it is voluntary absolutely. And hence it is that what is done out of fear has the nature of what is voluntary, because its principle is within.—But if we consider what is done through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will, this exists only according to our consideration of things; and consequently it is involuntary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of this or that particular case.
Reply Obj. i. Things done through fear and compulsion differ not only according to present and future time, but also in this, that the will does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which is done through compulsion; whereas what is done through fear becomes voluntary because the will is moved towards it, although not for its own sake, but because of something else, that is, in order to avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a voluntary act are satisfied, if it be done because of something else voluntary; since the voluntary is not only what we will for its own sake as an end, but also that we will for the sake of something else as an end. It is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will does nothing inwardly, whereas in what is done through fear, the will does something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa says,^^ in order to exclude things done through fear, a violent action is defined not only as one whose principle is from the outside, but with the addition,
"^Ibid. (PG 40, 720).
Q. 6. Art. 7
VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY
in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all; for the will of him that is in fear does concur somewhat in that which he does through fear.
Reply Obj.
2. Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever be added to them: e.g., a cold thing, or a white thing ; but things that are such relatively vary according as they are compared with different things. For what is big in comparison with one thing is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it were, absolutely; but also for the sake of something else, as it were, relatively. Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing, which was not voluntary in comparison with one thing, from becoming voluntary when compared with another.
Reply Obj. 3. That which is done through fear is voluntary without any condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done; but it is involuntary under a certain condition, that is to say, if such a fear were not threatening. Consequently, this argument proves rather the opposite.
Seventh Article
WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:— Objection 1, It would seem that concupiscence causes involuntariness. For just as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent.
Therefore concupiscence does so too.
Obj.
2. Further, just as the timid man through fear acts counter to that w^hich he proposed, so does the incontinent, through concupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so also.
Obj. 3. Further, knowledge is necessary for voluntariness.
But concupiscence impairs knowledge, for the Philosopher says that delight, or the lust of pleasure, destroys the judgment of prudence.^'^ Therefore concupiscence causes involuntariness.
On the contrary, Damascene says:
The involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence , and is done with regret.^^ But neither of these can be said of that which is done out of "" Eth., VI, 5 (1140b 12).
"^De Fide Orth.,
II, 24 (PG
94, 953).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 6. Art. 7 concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence does not cause involuntariness.
/ answer that. Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but, on the contrary, makes something to be voluntary.
For a thing is said to be voluntary from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than involuntary.
Reply Obj. i. Fear has reference to evil, but concupiscence has reference to good. Now evil of itself is counter to the will, whereas good harmonizes with the will. Therefore fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to cause involuntariness.
Reply Obj, 2. He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the will to that which he does, considered in itself.
But he that acts from concupiscence, e.g., an incontinent man, does not retain his former will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence; rather his will is changed so that he desires that which previously he repudiated. Accordingly, that which is done out of fear is involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done from concupiscence is in no way involuntary. For the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now.
Reply Obj. 3. If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet, properly speaking, it would not make the act involuntary, because in beings bereft of reason there is neither voluntary nor involuntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done from concupiscence, knowledge is not completely destroyed, because the power of knowing is not taken away entirely, but only the actual consideration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless, this itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that which is in the power of the will, for example, not to act or not to will, and in like manner not to consider \ for the will can resist the passion, as we shall state later on.^^
'"Q.
10, a. 3; q.
77, a.
Q. 6. Art. 8
VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY
49S Eighth Article
WHETHER IGNORANCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS?
We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that ignorance does not cause involuntariness. For the involuntary act deserves pardon^ as Damascene says.^^ But sometimes that which is done through ignorance does not deserve pardon, according to i Cor. xiv.
38: // any man know not, he shall not be known. Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntarinesSo
Obj, 2. Further, every sin implies ignorance, according to Prov. xiv. 22: They err, that work evil.
If, therefore, ignorance causes involuntariness, it would follow that every sin is involuntary; which is opposed to the saying of Augustine^ that every sin is voluntary."^^ Obj. 3. Further, involuntariness is not without sadness, as Damascene says.^^ But some things are done out of ignorance, but without sadness. For instance, a man may kill a foe, whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that he is killing a stag. Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
On the contrary, Damascene*^ and the Philosopher^^ say that what is done through ignorance is involuntary.
I answer that, If ignorance cause involuntariness, it is in so far as it deprives one' of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of voluntariness,, as was declared above. But it is not every ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge.
Accordingly, we must take note that ignorance has a threefold relationship to the act of the will: in one way, concomitantly] in another, consequently, in a third way, antecedently. Concomitantly, when there is ignorance of what is done, but so that even if it were known, it would be done.
For then ignorance does not induce one to will this to be done, but it just happens that a thing is at the same time done and not known. Thus, in the example given, a man did indeed will to kill his foe, but killed him in ignorance, thinking to kill a stag. And ignorance of this kind, as the Philosopher states,^^ does not cause involuntariness, since it is *^De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953)- *^ De Vera Relig., XIV (PL 34, 133).
*^De Fide Orth., II, 24 (PG 94, 953), «/Wcf, ""Eth., Ill, I (iiioa i).
*^Ibid. (mob 25).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 6. Art. 8 not the cause of anything that is repugnant to the will; but it causes non-voluntariness, since that which is unknown cannot be actually willed.
Ignorance is consequent to the act of the will, in so far as ignorance itself is voluntary; and this happens in two ways in accordance with the two aforesaid modes of the voluntary.
First, because the act of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance, as when a man wills not to know, that he may have an excuse for sin, or that he may not be withheld from sin, according to Job xxi.
14: We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways. And this is called affected ignorance.—Secondly, ignorance is said to be voluntary, when it regards that which one can and ought to know, for in this sense not to act and not to will are said to be voluntary, as was stated above. And ignorance of this kind happens either when one does not actually consider what one can and ought to consider
(this is called ignorance of evil choice, and arises from some passion or habit), or when one does not take the trouble to acquire the knowledge which one ought to have; in which sense, ignorance of the general principles of law, which one ought to know, is voluntary, as being due to negligence.
Accordingly, if in either of these ways ignorance is voluntary, it cannot cause what is involuntary absolutely. Nevertheless it causes involuntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes the movement of the will towards the act, which movement would not be, if there were knowledge.
Ignorance is antecedent to the act of the will when it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man's willing what he would not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of some circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, with the result that he does that which he would not do if he knew of that circumstance. For instance, a man, after taking proper precaution, may not know that someone is coming along the road, so that he shoots an arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes what is involuntary absolutely.
From this may be gathered the solution of the objections.
For the first objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound to know. The second, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain extent, as was stated above. The third, with that ignorance which is concomitant with the act of the will.
Question VIII
ON THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS
(In Three Articles) We must now consider the different acts of the will, and in the first place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the will.^ Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end. We must therefore consider (i) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the end ; and ( 2 ) those .whereby it is moved to the means .^ And since it seems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end: viz., volition, enjoyment and intention, we must consider (i) volition; (2) enjoyment;^ (3) intention.^—Concerning the first, three things must be considered:
(i) Of what things is the will?
(2) By what is the will moved? ^ (3) How is it moved? ^ Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
( i Whether the will is of good only?
(2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means?
(3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end and to the means by the same movement?
Second Article f
WHETHER VOLITION
IS OF THE END ONLY, OR ALSO OF THE
MEANS?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of the end only. For the Philosopher says that volition is of the end, while choice is of the means?
Obj.
2. Further, For objects differing in genus there are corresponding different powers of the soul.^ Now the end and the means are in different genera of good, because the end, which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus quality, or action, or passion; whereas the good which is useful, and is directed to an end, is in the genus 'Q.
17.
'Q.
13.
'Q.
II.
*Q.
12.
"^Q.
*Q.
10.
^Op. cit., Ill,
(ill lb 26).
^Op. cit., VI, I (1139a 8).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 8. Art. 2 relation.^ Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means.
Obj.
3. Further, habits are proportioned to powers, since they are their perfections. But in those habits which are called practical arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art. Thus the use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the art of the helmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of the end, it is not of the means.
On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same power that a thing passes through the middle ground and arrives at the terminus. But the means are a kind of middle ground through which one arrives at the end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of the means.
/ answer that, The term voluntas [will] sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act
[volition^. Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in which the nature of its object may be found in any way whatever. Thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored. Now the nature of good, which is the object of the power of will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.
If, however, we speak of will in so far as it is properly the name of an act, then, strictly speaking, it is of the end only.
For every act denominated from a power designates the simple act of that power. Thus, to understand designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end.
Therefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Therefore the will is directed to them only in so far as it is directed to the end
; so that what it wills in them, is the end. So, too, to understand is properly directed to things that are known in themselves, i.e., first principles; but we do not speak of understanding with regard to things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things. Now in ""Op. dt., I, 6 (1096a 26).
Q. 8. Art. 2
THE OBJECT OF VOLITION
morals the end is what principles are in speculative matters.^^ Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher is speaking of the will as signifying the simple act of the will, not as signifying the power of the will.^^ Reply Obj.
2. There are different powers for objects that differ in genus and are mutually independent. For instance, sound and color are different genera of sensibles, to which are referred, hearing and sight. But the useful and the righteous are not mutually independent, but are as that which is of itself and that which is in relation to another. Now such objects are always referred to the same power. For instance, the power of sight perceives both color and the light by which color is seen.
Reply Obj. 3. Not everything that diversifies habits diversifies the powers, since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed consider the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art considers the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the end as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every practical art there is an end proper to it and the means that belong properly to that art.
"^"Op. cit., VII, 8 (iisia 16).
"0/>. cit., m, 2 (iiiib 26).
Question IX
ON THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL
{In Six Articles) We must now consider what moves the will, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(i) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?
(3) Whether the will moves itself?
(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?
(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?
(6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle?
First Article
WHETHER THE WILL
IS MOVED BY THE INTELLECT?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect. For Augustine says on Ps. cxviii. 20 {My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications)
The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at all; we know what is good, but deeds delight us not} But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect; for the movement of the movable results from the motion of the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
Obj.
2. Further, the intellect, in presenting the appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will as the imagination in representing the appetible object to the sensitive appetite. But the imagination, in presenting the appetible object, does not move the sensitive appetite; indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at alL^ Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.
Obj. 3. Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing. But the will moves the intellect, for we exercise the intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
On the contrary. The Philosopher says that the appetible is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover moved.^
^ Enarr. in Psalm., super CXVIII, 20, serm. VIII (PL 37, 1552).
^Aristotle, De An., Ill,
(427b 23).
"" Op. cit., Ill,
(433b 10; b 16).
Q. 9. Art. i
WHAT MOVES THE WILL
/ answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things. For that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is found to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus, the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not ; and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black.
It needs therefore a mover in two respects: viz., as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting ; while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.
The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above,^ the principle of this motion lies in the end. Hence it is that the art, which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding.^ Now the good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the ends and the perfections of every other power are included under the object of the will as particular goods; and the art or power, to which the universal end belongs, always moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good i.e., the order of the whole army—by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal being and truth, which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.
Reply Obj. i. The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.
*Q.
I, a.
'^ Aristotle, Phys., H,
(194b 5)..
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 9. Art. 2
Reply Obj.
2. Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness does not move the sensitive appetite, so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirabihty. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect.^ Reply Obj, 3. The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act, since even the true itself, which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will for the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the same respect.
Second Article
WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE SENSITIVE APPETITE?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection i. It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive appetite. For to move and to act is more excellent than to be passive, as Augustine says."^ But the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the intellectual appetite, just as sense is less excellent than intellect. Therefore, the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
Obj. 2. Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore, it cannot cause the movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the universal apprehension of the intellect.
Obj. 3. Further, as is proved in Physics viii., the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal motion.^ But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite obeys the reason.
Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
On the contrary, It is written {Jas. i. 14): Every tnan is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and 'Aristotle, De An., Ill, 9 (432b 26); 10 (433a 17).
"^ De Genesi ad Liu., XII, 16 (PL 34, 467).
* Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 5 (2576 23).
Q. 9. Art. 2
WHAT MOVES THE WILL
SOI allured. But man would not be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the sensitive appetite moves the will.
/ answer that, As we have stated above, that which is apprehended under the nature of what is good and befitting moves the will as an object. Now that a thing appear to be good and fitting happens from two causes, namely, from the condition either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation, and hence it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Therefore as the Philosopher says: According as a man is, such does the end seem to him.^ Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Therefore, according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected ; and thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. It is in this way that the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.
Reply Obj. i. Nothing hinders that which is better absolutely and in itself from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly, the will is absolutely more excellent than the sensitive appetite ; but in respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.
Reply Obj.
2. Men's acts and choices are concerned with singulars. Therefore, from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
Reply Obj.
3. As the Philosopher says,^^ the reason, in which resides the will, moves the irascible and concupiscible powers by its command, not, indeed, by a despotic rule, as a slave is moved by his master, but by a royal and political rule, as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both the irascible
""Eth., Ill, 5 (1114a 32).
^""Polit., I,
(1254b s).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 9. Art. 3 and concupiscible parts can move counter to the will, and, accordingly, nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
Third Article
WHETHER THE WILL MOVES ITSELF?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that the will does not move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act, whereas what is moved is in potentiality; for movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, in so far as it is in potentiality.
^"^ Now the same is not in potentiality and in act in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.
Obj. 2. Further, the movable is moved when the mover is present. But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore it moved itself, it would always be moved, which is clearly false.
Obj, 3. Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as was stated above.
If, therefore, the will moves itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.
On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.
/ answer that, As was stated above, it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object. Now, as we have stated above, the end is in the order of appetibles what a principle is in the order of intelligibles.^^ But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of a principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act as to its knowledge of conclusions; and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.
Reply Obj, i. It is not in the same respect that the will moves itself and is moved, and so neither is it in act and in potentiahty in the same respect. But in so far as it actually
"Aristotle, Phys., Ill, i (201a 10).
"Q.
8, a.
Q. 9. Art. 4
WHAT MOVES THE WILL
wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act concerning the means, so as to will them actually.
Reply Obj.
2. The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, by which it wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself. Accordingly, it does not follow that it is always moving itself.
Reply Obj. 3. The will is moved in the same way by the intellect and by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object, whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end.
Fourth Article
WHETHER THE WILL
IS MOVED BY AN EXTERIOR
PRINCIPLE?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that the will is not moved by anything exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary.
But it is of the nature of the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it is of the nature of the natural act. Therefore the movement of the will is not from anything exterior.
Obj.
Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above.^^ But the violent act is one the principle of which is outside the agent.^^ Therefore the will cannot be moved by anything exterior.
Obj.
3. Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.
On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as was stated above. But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.
/ answer that, As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is moved in the exercise of its act, we must likewise hold it to be moved by some exterior principle. For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at an- "Q.
6, a. 4.
"Aristotle, Eth., HI, i (iiioa i).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 9. Art. 4
Other time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, which previously it did not will. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as was stated above, in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means.
Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel. For when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician; and this he wills. But since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Therefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics}^
Reply Obj. i. It is of the nature of the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent ; but it is not necessary that this inward principle be a first principle unmoved by another.
Therefore, though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless, its first principle is from the outside.
Thus, too, the first principle of natural movement, namely, that which moves nature, is from the outside.
Reply Obj.
2. For an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add, without the concurrence of him that suffers violence. This does not happen when the will is moved by an exterior principle ; for it is the will that wills, though moved by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to the movement of the will; which in the present case is impossible, since then the will would will and not will the same thing.
Reply Obj. 3. The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say, as a proximate agent ; but it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Therefore it needs to be moved by another as first mover.
^Eth. Eudem., VII, 14 (1248a 14).
Q. 9. Art. 5
WHAT MOVES THE WILL
Fifth Article
WHETHER THE WILL
IS MOVED BY A HEAVENLY
BODY?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved by Physics viii.^^
But human movements are various and multiform, since they begin to be, when previously they were not. Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is uniform according to its nature.
Obj.
2. Further, according to Augustine the lower bodies are moved by the higher}^ But the movements of the human body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.
Obj. 3. Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the will. But this would not be so if the heavenly bodies could not move man's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body.
On the contrary, Damascene says that the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts}^ But they would be, if the will, which is the principle 'of human acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly bodies.
/ answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its exterior object, that is to say, in so far as exterior bodies, which move the will through being offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers, are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence directly on the human will, in the same way as "Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 9 (26sa 27) ; cf. op. cit., IV, 14 (223b 18).
^'Z)e Trin., Ill, 4 (PL 42, 873).
^ De Fide Orth., II, 7 (PG 94, 893).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 9. Art. 5 some exterior agent moves the will, as to the exercise of its act.^^ But this is impossible. For the will, as is stated in De Anima iii., is in the reason?^ Now the reason is a power of the soul not bound to a bodily organ, and so it follows that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the reverse; for things incorporeal and immaterial have a power that is more formal and more universal than any corporeal things. Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or the will. For this reason Aristotle ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from the sense,^^ the theory that such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on^^ (referring to Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally by the heavenly bodies i.e., when those bodies are moved, whose acts they are.
But since it has been stated that the intellectual appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will, in so far, namely, as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite.
Reply Obj, i. The multiform movements of the human will are reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of the will to be reduced to the movement of the heavens as to its cause.
Reply Obj.
2. The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the disposition suitable to a particular movement is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies;—also, in so far as the sensitive appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies;—and again, in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to will something: e.g., when the body is chilled, we ^Cf. H. Denifle, Chariularium, no. 432, error 4
(I, 487).
'"Aristotle, De An., Ill,
(432b s).
^ E.g., Empedocles: cf.
Aristotle, De An., Ill,
(427a 21).
^ Ibid.
(427a 25).—Homer, Odyss.,
XVIII, 136.
Q. 9. Art. 6
Vv^HAT MOVES THE WILL
begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the object offered from the outside, not on the part of an inward instigation.
Reply Obj. 3. As was stated above, the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ.^^ Therefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural temperament. Now the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of the heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says, the wise man governs the stars ^"^ as though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will, which is free and in no way subject to the movement of the heavens, to such effects of the heavenly bodies.
Or, as Augustine says: We must confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the lying spirits/^^
Sixth Article
WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY GOD ALONE, AS EXTERIOR
PRINCIPLE?
We proceed thus to the Si^cth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by its superior; and thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But there is something which is higher than the will of man and below God, namely, the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel also, as exterior principle.
Obj.
2. Further, the act of the will follows the act of the intellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but also by the angel who illumines it, as Dionysius ^ S. T., I, q. 84, a. 6 and 7.
^ Centiloquium, verba 4-8.—Cf . also St. Albert, In II Sent., d. xv, a. 4 (XXVII, 276).
"^ De Genesi ad Liu., II,
17 (PL 34, 278).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 9. Art. 6 says.^^ For the same reason, therefore, the will is moved by an angel.
Obj.
Further, God is not cause of other than good things, according to Gen. i. 31: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. If, therefore, man's will were moved by God alone, it would never be moved to evil ; and yet it is the will by which we sin and by which we do the right, as Augustine says.^^ On the contrary, It is written {Phil. ii. 13) : It is God Who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish.
I answer that, The movement of the will is from within, as is also natural movement. Now although it is possible for something to move a natural thing, without being the cause of the nature of the thing moved, yet that alone which is in some way the cause of a thing's nature can cause a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man, who is not the cause of the stone's nature, but this movement is not natural to the stone ; but the natural movement of the stone is caused by none other than the cause of its nature. Therefore it is said in Physics viii. that the generator moves locally heavy and light things .^^ Accordingly, man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle which is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
But the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons.
First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone through creation, as was stated in the First Part.^^ Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Therefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good, while every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good; and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence, neither can primary matter, which is in potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.
Reply Obj. i. An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the ^'De Cael. Hier., IV, 2 (PG 3, 180).
""Retract., I, 9 (PL 32, 596).
^Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 4 (2555 35).
"^ S. T.,
I, q. 90, a. 2 and 3.
Q. 9. Art. 6
WHAT MOVES THE WILL
causes of natural forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.
Reply Obj.
2. Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to man's knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a creature from the outside, as was stated above.
Reply Obj.
3. God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is the good.
And without this universal motion man cannot will anything.
But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is a true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on.^^
**Q. 109, a.
Question XII
ON INTENTION
{In Five Articles) We must now consider intention, concerning which there are five points of inquiry:
(i) Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will? (2) Whether it is only of the last end?
(3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?
(4) Whether the intention of the end is the same act as the voHtion of the means to the end?
(5) Whether intention befits irrational animals?
First Article
WHETHER INTENTION
IS AN ACT OF THE INTELLECT
OR OF THE WILL?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection
. It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect, and not of the will. For it is written {Matt. vi. 22)
// thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome^ where, according to Augustine, the eye signifies intention.^ But since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive power. Therefore intention is not an act of the appetitive power, but of the apprehensive power.
Obj, 2. Further, Augustine says that Our Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said {Matt. vi.
23):
// the light that is in thee be darkness, etc.^ But light pertains to knowledge. Therefore intention does too.
Obj. 3. Further, intention signifies a kind of ordaining to an end. But to ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention belongs, not to the will, but to the reason.
Obj. 4. Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the means. But the act of the will in respect of the end is called volition, or enjoyment, and with regard to the means, it is called choice. Intention is distinct from these. Therefore it is not an act of the will.
On the contrary, Augustine says that the intention of the will unites the sight to the seen body; and likewise it unite!
^De Serm. Dom., II, 13 (PL 34, 1289).
^ Ibid.
Q. 1 2 . Art. i
INTENTION
5 1 an image existing in the memory to the gaze of the soul thinking within itself.^ Therefore intention is an act of the will.
/ answer that, Intention, as the very term denotes, signifies, to tend to something. Now both the action of the mover and the movement of the thing moved tend to something.
But that the movement of the thing moved tends to anything is due to the action of the mover. Consequently, intention belongs first and principally to that which moves to the end; and so we say that an architect, or anyone who is in authority, moves others by his command to that which he intends. Now it is the will that moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as was shown above.^ Therefore it is evident that intention, properly speaking, is an act of the will.
Reply Obj. i. The eye designates intention figuratively, not because intention has reference to knowledge, but because it presupposes knowledge, which proposes to the will the end to which the latter moves.
So, too, we see ahead with the eye whither we should tend with our bodies.
Reply Obj. 2. Intention is called a light because it is manifest to him who intends. Therefore works are called darkness because a man knows what he intends, but knows not what the result may be, as Augustine expounds in the same reference.
Reply Obj. 3. The will does not ordain, but tends to something according to the order of reason. Consequently, this term intention indicates an act of the will, presupposing the act by which the reason orders something to the end.
Reply Obj. 4. Intention is an act of the will in relation to the end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end.
First, absolutely, and thus we have volition, by which we will absolutely to have health and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end as its place of rest, and thus enjoyment regards the end. Thirdly, it considers the end as the term towards which something is ordained; and thus intention regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only that we will to have it, but that we will to reach it by means of something else.
^De Trin., XI, 4;
8; 9 (PL 42, 990; 994; 996).
*Q.
9, a. i.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 12. .\rt. 2
Second Article
WHETHER INTENTION
IS ONLY OF THE LAST END?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection 1.
It would seem that intention is only of the last end. For it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences:
The intention of the heart is a cry to God.^ But God is the last end of the human heart. Therefore intention always regards the last end.
Obj.
2. Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as was stated above. But a terminus is something last. Therefore intention always regards the last end.
Obj. 3. Further, just as intention regards the end, so does enjo\Tnent. But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore intention is too.
On the contrary, There is but one last end of human volition, viz., happiness, as was stated above.^
If, therefore, intentions were only of the last end, men would not have different intentions; which is evidetitly false.
/ answer that, As we have stated above, intention regards the end as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of movement may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus, when the movement comes to a stop; and this is the terminus of the whole movement. Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one part of the movement and the end or terminus of the other. Thus, in the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a terminus, but not the last. And intention can be of both. Consequently, though intention is always of the end, it need not always be of the last end.
Reply Obj.
1. The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not because God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our intention.—Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which intention has the force of a cr3^ Reply Obj.
2. A terminus is something last, not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.
Reply Obj. 3. EnjovTnent signifies rest in the end; and this belongs to the last end alone. But intention signifies movement towards an end, not rest. Therefore the comparison does not hold.
^Prosper of Aquitaine, Sent. C (PL 51, 441).
"Q. i, a.
Question XIII
ON CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL
IN RELATION TO THE MEANS TO THE END
{In Six Articles) We must now consider the acts of the will which are related to the means to the end. There are three of them: to choose, to consent and to use. Now choice is preceded by counsel.
First of all, then, we must consider choice; secondly, counsel ; ^ thirdly, consent ; ^ fourthly, use.^ Concerning choice there are six points of inquiry:
(i) Of what power is it the act, whether of the will or of the reason?
(2) Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?
(3) Whether choice is only of the means to the end, or sometimes also of the end?
(4) Whether choice is only of things that we do ourselves?
(5) Whether choice is only of possible things?
(6) Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?
First Article
WHETHER CHOICE
IS AN ACT OF THE WILL OR OF THE
REASON ?
Objection i.
It would seem that choice is an act, not of the will, but of the reason. For choice expresses a certain comparison, whereby one thing is preferred to another. But to compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice is an act of reason.
Obj.
2. Further, it belongs to the same power to form a syllogism and to draw the conclusion. But, in practical matters, it is the reason that forms syllogisms. Since, therefore, choice is a kind of conclusion in practical matters, as is stated in Ethics vii.,^ it seems that it is an act of reason.
Obj. 3. Further, ignorance does not belong to the will but to the cognitive power. Now there is an ignorance attending choice, as is stated in Ethics iii.^ Therefore it seems that choice does not belong to the will but to the reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says that choice is the ^Q.
14.
'Q.
IS.
'Q.
16.
*Cf. Aristotle, Eth., Ill, 3 (1113a 4; a 11).
"O/'. cii.. Ill, I (mob 31).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 13. Art. i desire of things which are in our power.^ But desire is an act of will. Therefore choice is too.
/ answer that, The term choice expresses something belonging to the reason or intellect, and something belonging to the will ; for the Philosopher says that choice is either intellect influenced by appetite or appetite influenced by intellect?
Now whenever two things concur to make one, one of them is as a form in relation to the other. Hence Gregory of Nyssa says that choice is neither desire only, nor counsel only, but a combination of the two. For just as we say that an animal is composed of soul and body, and that it is neither only the body, nor only the soid, but both, so is it with choice.^
Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, that an act belonging essentially to some power or habit receives its form or species from a higher power or habit, according as the inferior is ordered by the superior. For if a man were to perform an act of fortitude for the love of God, that act is materially an act of fortitude, but formally, an act of charity.
Now it is evident that, in a sense, reason precedes the will and directs its act, namely, in so far as the will tends to its object according to the order of reason ; for the apprehensive power presents to the appetite its object. Accordingly, that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Now in such matters, the substance of the act is as the matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power. Therefore, choice is substantially, not an act of the reason, but of the will ; for choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen. Consequently, it is evidently an act of the appetitive power.
Reply Obj. i. Choice implies a previous comparison, but not that it consists in the comparison itself.
Reply Obj.
2. It is quite true that it is for the reason to draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism; and it is called a decision or judgment, to be followed by choice. And for this reason the conclusion seems to belong to the act of choice, as to that which results from it.
Reply Obj.
3. In speaking of ignorance attending choice, "Op. cit., Ill, 3 (1113a 9).
'Op. cit., VI,
(1139b 4).
'Cf.
Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., XXXIH (PG 40, 733).
Q. 13. Art. 3
CHOICE SIS we do not mean that choice itself is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of what ought to be chosen.
Third Article
WHETHER CHOICE
IS ONLY OF THE MEANS TO THE END
OR SOMETIMES ALSO OF THE END?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection 1. It would seem that choice is not only of the means to the end. For the Philosopher says that virtue makes us choose rightly; but it is not the part of virtue, but of some other power, to direct rightly those things which are to be done for its sake.^ But that for the sake of which something is done is the end. Therefore choice is of the end.
Obj,
. Further, choice signifies preference of one thing to another. But just as there can be preference of means, so can there be preference of ends. Therefore choice can be of ends, just as it can be of means.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says that volition is of the end, but choice of the means}^ I answer that. As we have already stated, choice follows the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism is the matter of choice. Now in practical things the end stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion, as the Philosopher says.^^ Therefore the end, as such, is not a matter of choice.
But just as in speculative; matters nothing hinders the principle of one demonstration or of one science from being the conclusion of another demonstration or science (although the first indemonstrable principle cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration or science), so, too, that which is the end in one operation may be ordained to something as an end.
And in this way it is a matter of choice. Thus in the work of a physician health is the end, and so it is not a matter of choice for a physician, but a matter of principle. But the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, and, consequently, with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice
; for tne Apostle ""Eth., VI,
(1144a 20).
^*'0/». cit., Ill,
(iiiib 26).
^Phys., II, 9 (200a 20).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 13. Art. 4 says (2 Cor. xii. 10) : For when I am weak, then am I powerful. But the last end is in no way a matter of choice.
Reply Obj.
. The proper ends of the virtues are ordained to happiness as to their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice.
Reply Obj.
2. As was stated above, there is but one last end.^^ Accordingly, wherever there are several ends, they can be the subject of choice, in so far as they are ordained to a further end.
Fourth Article
WHETHER CHOICE
IS OF THOSE THINGS ONLY THAT
AI?E
DONE BY US?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection 1. It would seem that choice is not only in respect of human acts. For choice is of the means. Now, not only acts, but also the organs, are means.^^ Therefore choice is not concerned only with human acts.
Obj.
2. Further, action is distinct from contemplation. But choice has a place even in contemplation, in so far, namely, as one opinion is preferred to another. Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
Obj. 3. Further, men are chosen for certain posts, whether secular or ecclesiastical, by those who exercise no action in their regard. Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says that no man chooses save what he thinks he can do hiritself.^'^ I answer that. Just as intention regards the end, so choice regards the means. Now the end is either an action or a thing.
And Vv^hen the end is a thing, some human action must intervene, and this either in so far as man produces the thing which is the end, as the physician produces health (and sc the production of health is said to be the end of the physician), or in so far as man, in some fashion, uses or enjoys the thing which is the end: e.g., for the miser, money or the possession of money is the end. The same is to be said of the ^Q.
I, a.
"Aristotle, Phys., II, 3 (195a i).
^* Eth., Ill,
(iiiib 25).
Q. 13. Art. 5
CHOICE
means. For the means must needs be either an action, or a thing, with some action intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, or puts it to some use.
And thus it is that choice is always in regard to human acts.
Reply Obj. i. The organs are ordained to the end inasmuch as man makes use of them for the sake of the end.
Reply Obj.
2. In contemplation itself there is the act of the intellect assenting to this or that opinion. It is exterior action that is put in contradistinction to contemplation.
Reply Obj. 3. When a man chooses someone for a bishopric or some high position in the state, he chooses to name that man to that post. Otherwise, if he had no right to act in the appointment of the bishop or prince, he would have no right to choose. Likewise, whenever we speak of one thing being chosen in preference to another, it is in conjunction with some action of the chooser.
Fifth Article
WHETHER CHOICE
IS ONLY OF POSSIBLE THINGS?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:— Objection
. It would seem that choice is not only of possible things. For choice is an act of the will, as was stated above. Now there is a willing of the possible and the impossible.^^ Therefore there is also a choice of them.
Obj.
2. Further, choice is of things done by us, as was stated above. Therefore it matters not, as far as the act of choosing is concerned, whether one choose that which is impossible in itself, or that wliich is impossible to the chooser.
Now it often happens that we are unable to accomplish what we choose, so that this proves to be impossible to us. Therefore choice is of the impossible.
Obj. 3. Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it.
But the Blessed Benedict says that, if the superior command what is impossible, it should be attempted.^^ Therefore choice can be of the impossible.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says that there is no choice of the impossible.
^'^ "^Ibid.
(iiiib 22).
^^Reg. ad Mon., LXVIII (PL 66, 917).
"£t/f., Ill,
(iiiib 20).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 13. Art. 5
I answer that, As was stated above, our choice is always concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us is possible to us. Therefore we must needs say that choice is only of possible things.
Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that we may gain the end through it, or that it conduces to an end. But what is impossible cannot conduce to an end. A sign of this is that when men, in taking counsel together, come to something that is impossible to them, they depart, as being unable to proceed with the business.
Again, this is evident if we examine the preceding process of the reason. For the means, which are the object of choice, are to the end as the conclusion is to the principle. Now it is clear that an impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible principle. Therefore an end cannot be possible unless the means be possible. Now no one is moved to the impossible. Consequently, no one would tend to the end, save for the fact that the means appear to be possible. Therefore the impossible is not the object of choice.
Reply Obj. i . The will stands between the intellect and the external action; for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends something as a universal good; but the term or perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation to the action by which a man tends to the attainment of a thing, for the movement of the will is from the soul to the thing. Consequently, the perfection of the act of the will is in respect of something that is good for one to do.
Now this cannot be something impossible. Therefore, perfect willing is only in respect of what is possible and good for him that wills. But imperfect willing is in respect of the impossible ; and by some it is called velleity, because, namely, one would will [vellet] such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an act of the will already fixed on something to be done by the chooser. And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible.
Reply Obj.
2. Since the object of the will is the apprehended good, we must judge of the object of the will according as it is apprehended. And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something v/hich is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good, so choice is sometimes made of something
Q. I3.ART.S
CHOICE
apprehended as possible to the chooser, and yet impossible to him.
Reply Obj. 3. The reason for this is that the subject should not rely on his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is possible; but in each case should stand by his superior's judgment.
Question XVIII
ON THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF HUMAN
ACTS, IN GENERAL
{In Eleven Articles) We must now consider the goodness and malice of human acts.
First, we must consider how a human act is good or evil; secondly, what results from the goodness or malice of a human act, as merit or demerit, sin and guilt.^
Under the first head there will be a threefold consideration: the first will be of the goodness and malice of human acts, in general; the second, of the goodness and malice of internal acts;^ the third, of the goodness and malice of external acts.^
Concerning the first there are eleven points of inquiry:
(i) Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?
(2) Whether the good or evil of a human act is derived from its object?
(3) Whether it is derived from a circumstance?
(4) Whether it is derived from the end?
(5) Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?
(6) Whether an act has the species of good or evil from its end?
(7) Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?
(8) Whether any act is indifferent in its species? (9) Whether an individual act can be fndifferent?
(10) Whether a circumstance places a moral act in a species of good or evil?
(11) Whether every circumstance that makes an act better or worse places the moral act in a species of good or evil?
First Article
WHETHER EVERY HUMAN ACTION
GOOD, OR ARE THERE
EVIL ACTIONS?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection 1.
It would seem that every human action is good, and that none is evil. For Dionysius says that evil acts not, save by the power of the good.^ But no evil is done by the power of the good. Therefore no action is evil.
*Q. 21.
'Q. 19.
^Q. 20.
^ DeDiv.Nom.,lV, 20 {VGzym)'
Q. i8. Art. i
GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS
Obj.
2, Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according as its potentiality is deprived of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality is perfected by act, it is good, as is stated in Metaph. ix.^ Therefore nothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only according as it is good. Therefore every action is good, and none is evil.
Obj. 3. Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally, as Dionysius declares.^ But every action has some effect which is proper to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every action is good.
On the contrary, Our Lord said {Jo. iii. 20) : Every one that doth evil, hateth the light. Therefore some actions of man are evil.
/ answer that. We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things, because such as everything is, such is the act that it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has being, for good and being are convertible, as was stated in the First Part.'^ But God alone has the whole fullness of His Being in a manner which is one and simple, whereas every other thing has its proper fullness of being in a certain multiplicity. Therefore it happens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fullness of being due to them. Thus the fullness of human being requires a composite of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement ; and so if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the fullness of his being.
Hence, as much as he has of being, so much has he of goodness, while so far as something is lacking in the fullness of its being, so far does this fall short of goodness, and is said to be evil. Thus a blind man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he lives, and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight. That, however, which has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said to be either evil or good. But since this same fullness of being is of the very notion of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fullness of being, it is not said to be good absolutely, but in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is a being; •'Aristotle, Metaph., VIII,
(losia 4; a 29).
"" De Div. Norn.,
IV, 20; 32 (PG
3, 717; 732).
' S.
T., I, q. s, a. i and 3; q.
17, a.
4, ad 2.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. i8. Art. 2 although it can be called a being absolutely, and a non-being in a certain respect, as was stated in the First Part.^
We must therefore say that every action has goodness in so far as it has being, whereas it is lacking in goodness in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fullness of being; and thus it is said to be evil, for instance, if it lacks the measure determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the kind.
Reply Obj. i. Evil acts in the power of a deficient good.
For if there were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor possibility of action. On the other hand, if good were not deficient, there would be no evil.
Consequently, the action done is a deficient good, which is good in a certain respect, but evil absolutely.
Reply Obj.
2. Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain respect, so that it can act, and in a certain respect deficient in act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus, a blind man has actually the power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is deprived of sight, he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks.
Reply Obj. 3. An evil action can have a proper effect, according to the goodness and being that it has. Thus, adultery is the cause of human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.
Second Article
WHETHER THE GOOD OR EVIL OF A MAN's ACTION
DERIVED FROM ITS OBJECT?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that the good or evil of an action is not derived from its object. For the object of any action is a thing. But evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them, as Augustine says.^ Therefore the good or evil of a human action is not derived from its object.
Obj. 2
. Further, the object is compared to the action as its matter. But the goodness of a thing is not from its matter, but rather from the form, which is an act. Therefore good and evil in actions is not derived from their object.
®5. T., I, q.
5, a.
I, ad I.
"" De Doct. Christ., Ill, 12 (PL 34, 73).
Q. i8. Art.2 good and EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS
Ohj. 3. Further, the object of an active power is compared to the action as effect to cause. But the goodness of a cause does not depend on its effect ; rather is it the reverse. Therefore good or evil in actions is not derived from their object.
On the contrary, It is written {Osee ix. 10) : They became abominable as those things which they loved. Now man becomes abominable to God because of the malice of his action.
Therefore the malice of his action is according to the evil objects that man loves. And the same applies to the goodness of his action.
/ answer that, As was stated above, the good or evil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fullness of being or its lack of that fullness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fullness of being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. And just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object, just as does movement from its term. Therefore, just as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable object; and so some call such an action good in its genus,^^ e.g., to make use of what is one's own.
And just as, in natural things, the primary evil is when a generated thing does not realize its specific form (for instance, if instead of a man, something else be generated), so the primary evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance, to take what belongs to another. Furthermore, this action is said to be evil in its genus (genus here stands for species, just as we apply the term mankind [humanum> genus] to the whole hum^n species).
Reply Obj.
1. Although external things are good in themselves, nevertheless, they have not always a due proportion to this or that action. And so, inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such actions, they have not the nature of a good.
Reply Obj.
2. The object is not the matter out of which, but the matter about which, and stands in relation to the act as its form, as it were, through giving it its species.
Reply Obj.
3. The object of human action is not always the object of an active power. For the appetitive power is in a way passive, in so far as it is moved by the appetible ob- '''Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., II, xxxvi, 6
(I, 504).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. i8. Art. 3 ject; and yet it is a principle of human actions.—^Nor again have the objects of the active powers always the nature of an effect, but only when they are already transformed. Thus food, when transformed, is the effect of the nutritive power, whereas food, before being transformed, stands in relation to the nutritive power as the matter about which it exercises its operation. Now since the object is in some way the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and species, since movement derives its species from its terms.—Moreover, although the goodness of an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect. Consequently, the very proportion of an action to its effect is the measure of its goodness.
Third Article WHETHER man's ACTION
IS GOOD OR EVIL FROM A
CIRCUMSTANCE?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a circumstance. For circumstances stand around
[circumstant] an action, as being outside it, as was stated above. ^^ But good and evil are in things themselves, as is stated in Metaph. vi.^^ Therefore an action does not derive goodness or malice from a circumstance.
Obj. 2. Further, the goodness or malice of an action is considered principally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances are accidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of an art, because no art takes notice of what is accidental^ Therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a circumstance.
Obj. 3. Further, that which belongs to a thing through its substance is not attributed to it through an accident. But good and evil belong to an action in its substance, for an action can be good or evil in its genus, as was stated above.
Therefore an action is not good or evil from a circumstance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says that a virtuous man "Q.
7, a.
"Aristotle, Metaph., V, 4 (1027b 25).
^Op. cit., V,
(1026b 4).
Q. i8. Art. 4
GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS
acts as he should, and when he should, and so on, according to the other circumstances.^^ Therefore, on the other hand, the vicious man, in the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or where he should not, and so on with the other circumstances. Therefore human actions are good or evil according to circumstances.
/ answer that, In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole fullness of perfection due to a thing is not from the mere substantial form, that gives it its species, for a thing derives much from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color and the like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result. So it is with action. For the fullness of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents; and such are its due circumstances. Therefore, if something be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance, the action will be evil.
Reply Obj. i. Circumstances are outside an action inasmuch as they are not part of its essence ; but they are in an action as its accidents.
So, too, accidents in natural substances are outside the essence.
Reply Obj. 2. Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for some are proper accidents, and of these every art takes notice. And thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of morals.
Reply Obj. 3. Since good and being are convertible, according as being is predicated substantially and accidentally, so good is predicated of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in respect of its accidental being ; and this, both in natural things and in moral actions.
Fourth Article
WHETHER A HUMAN ACTION
IS GOOD OR EVIL
FROM ITS END?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection
. It would seem that the good and evil in human actions are not from the end. For Dionysius says that nothing acts with a view to evil.^^ If, therefore, an action were good
^*Eth., II, 3 (1104b 26).
^DeDiv. Nom., IV, 19; 31 (PG 3, 716; 732).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. i8. Art. 4 or evil from its end, no action would be evil. Which is clearly false.
Obj.
2. Further, the goodness of an action is something in the action. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore an action is not said to be good or evil according to its end.
Obj. 3. Further, a good action may happen to be ordered to an evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely, an evil action may happen to be ordered to a good end, as a theft committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action is not good or evil from its end.
On the contrary, Boethius says that ij the end is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing also is evil.^^ / answer that, The disposition of things as to goodness is the same as their disposition as to being. But in some things .the being does not depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on something else, and hence concerning them we must consider their being in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as the being of a thing depends on the agent and the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the divine Persons, Whose goodness does not depend on another, the measure of goodness is not taken from the end. But human actions, and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else, have a measure of goodness from the end on which they depend, in addition to that goodness which is in them absolutely.
Accordingly, a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action.
First, that goodness which, as an action, it derives from its genus ; since, as much as it has of action and being, so much has it of goodness, as was stated above. Secondly, it has goodness according to its species, which is derived from its befitting object. Thirdly, it has goodness from its circumstances,—its accidents, as it were. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness.
Reply Obj.
1. The good in view of which one acts is not always a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good. And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view.
Reply Obj. 2. Although the end is an extrinsic cause, never- ^De Differ. Top., II (PL 64, 1189).
Q. i8. Art. 5
GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS
theless, a due proportion to the end and a relation to it are inherent in the action.
Reply Obj.
3. Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the ways mentioned above from lacking goodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an action is not good absolutely, unless it is good in all those ways ; for evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause, as Dionysius says.^"^ Fifth Article
WHETHER A HUMAN ACTION
IS GOOD OR EVIL
ITS SPECIES?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that good and evil in moral actions do not make a difference of species. For the existence of good and evil in actions is in conformity with their existence in things, as was stated above. But good and evil do not make a specific difference in things, for a good man is specifically the same as a bad man. Therefore neither do they make a specific difference in actions.
Obj. 2. Further, since evil is a privation, it is a non-being.
But non-being cannot be a difference, according to the Philosopher.^^ Since, therefore, the difference constitutes the species, it seems that an action is not constituted in a species through being evil. Consequently, good and evil do not diversify the species of human actions.
Obj. 3. Further, acts that differ in species produce, different effects. But the same specific effect results from a good and from an evil action; and thus a man is born of adulterous or of lawful wedlock. Therefore good and evil actions do not differ in species.
Obj. 4. Further, actions are sometimes said to be good or bad from a circumstance, as was stated above. But since a circumstance is an accident, it does not give an action its species. Therefore human actions do not differ in species because of their goodness or malice.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher, like habits "De Div. Norn., IV, 30 (PG 3, 729).
^ Metaph., II, 3 (998b 22).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. i8. Art. s produce like actions}^ But a good and a bad habit differ in species, as liberality and prodigality. Therefore good and evil actions likewise differ in species.
/ answer that, Every action derives its species from its object, as we have stated above. Hence it follows that a difference of object causes a diversity of species in our actions.
Now it must be observed that a difference of objects causes a diversity of species in our actions according as our actions are referred to one active principle, which does not cause a difference in actions, according as they are referred to another active principle. For nothing accidental constitutes a species, but only that which is essential
; and a difference of object may be essential in reference to one active principle, and accidental in reference to another. Thus, to know color and to know sound differ essentially in reference to sense, but not in reference to the intellect.
Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in relation to the reason, because, as Dionysius says, the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, and evil is to be against reason?^ For that is good for a thing which suits it according to its form; and evil, that which is against the order of its form. It is therefore evident that the difference of good and evil, considered in reference to the object, is an essential difference in relation to reason, i.e., according as the object is suitable or unsuitable to reason. Now certain actions are called human or moral inasmuch as they proceed from the reason. Consequently, it is evident that good and evil diversify the species in human actions, since essential differences cause a diversity in species.
Reply Obj. i. Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch as something is according to nature, and something against nature, diversify the natural species ; for a dead body and a living body are not of the same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against reason, diversify the moral species.
Reply Obj. 2. Evil signifies privation, not an absolute one, but one affecting some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in its species, not because it has no object at all, but because it has an object in disaccord with reason, for instance, to appropriate another's property. Therefore, in so ^Eth., II, I (1103b 21).
"^De Div. Norn., IV, 32 (PG 3, 732).
Q. i8. Art. 6
GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS
far as the object is something positive, it can constitute the species of an evil act.
Reply Obj. 3. The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to reason, differ specifically and have effects specifically different; for the one deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and punishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not differ in species, and thus they have one specific effect.
Reply Obj, 4. A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, according as it is related to the reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action from good to evil, for a circumstance would not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.
Sixth Article
WHETHER AN ACT HAS THE SPECIES OF GOOD OR EVIL
FROM ITS END?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of acts. For acts derive their species from the object. But the end is outside the nature of the object. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of an act.
Obj.
2. Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the species, as was stated above. But it is accidental to an act to be ordained to some particular end, for instance, to give alms from vainglory. Therefore acts are not diversified in species, according to the good and evil which are from the end.
Obj. 3. Further, acts that differ in species can be ordained to the same end ; and thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues and vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are taken from the end do not diversify the species of action.
On the contrary, It has been shown above that human acts derive their species from the end.^^ Therefore good and evil in respect of the end diversify the species of acts.
/ answer that, Certain acts are called human inasmuch as ^Q. i,a. 3.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. i8. Art. 7 they are voluntary, as we have stated above.^^ Now, in a voluntary act, there is a twofold act, viz., the interior act of the will, and the external act ; and each of these acts has its object.
The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will, while the object of the external action is that on which the action is brought to bear. Therefore, just as the external act takes its species from the object on which it bears, so the interior act of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper object.
Now that which is on the part of the will is as form in relation to that which is on the part of the external act, because the will uses the members to act as its instruments ; nor have external acts any measure of morality, save in so far as they are voluntary. Consequently, the species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence the Philosopher says that he who steals that he may commit adultery is, strictly speaking, more adulterer than thiej?^
Reply Obj. i . The end also has the nature of an object, as we have stated above.
Reply Obj. 2. Although it is accidental to the external act to be ordered to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior act of the will, which is compared to the external act as form to matter.
Reply Obj.
3. When many acts, differing in species, are ordered to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part of the external acts; but there is a unity of species on the part of the interior act.
Seventh Article
WHETHER THE
SPECIES DERIVED FROM THE END
IS CON-
TAINED UNDER THE SPECIES DERIVED FROM THE OBJECT
AS UNDER ITS GENUS OR CONVERSELY?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:— Objection
. It would seem that the species of goodness derived from the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the object as a species is contained under its genus: e.g., when a man wills to steal in order to give an alms.
For an act takes its species from its object, as was stated ^Q.
I, a.
"^Eth., V,
(1130a 24).
Q. i8. Art. 7
GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS
above. But it is impossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if this species be not contained under the proper species of that thing; for the same thing cannot be contained in different species if there is no subalternation among them. Therefore the species which is taken from the end is contained under the species which is taken from th^ object.
Obj.
2. Further, the last difference always constitutes the lowest species. But the difference derived from the end seems to come after the difference derived from the object, because the end is something last. Therefore the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object as its lowest species.
Obj. 3. Further, the more formal a. difference is, the more specific it is, because difference is compared to genus as form to matter. But the species derived from the end is more formal than that which is derived from the object, as was stated above. Therefore the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object as the lowest species is contained under the subaltern genus.
On the contrary, Each genus has its determinate differences. But an act of one and the same species, on the part of its object, can be ordered to an infinite number of ends: e.g., theft can be ordered to an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the species derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from the object as under its genus.
/ answer that, The object of the external act can stand in a twofold relation to the e!hd of the will: first, as being essentially ordered to it: e.g., to fight well is of itself ordained to victory; secondly, as being ordained to it accidentally: e.g., to take what belongs to another is ordered accidentally to the giving of alms. Now the differences that divide a genus and constitute the species of that genus must, as the Philosopher says, divide that genus essentially.^^ But if they divide it accidentally, the division is incorrect. Such would be the case if one were to say: Animals are dwided into rational and irrational, and the irrational into animals with wings and animals without wings; for winged and wingless are not essential determinations of irrational. But the following division would
^Meiaph., VI, 12 (1038a 9).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. i8. Art. 7 be correct: Some animals have feet, some have no feet, and of those that have feet, some have two feet, some four, some many; for these are essential determinations of the prior difference. Accordingly, when the object is not essentially ordered to the end, the specific difference derived from the object is not an essential determination of the species derived from the end, nor is the reverse the case. Hence one of these species is not under the other; but then the moral action is contained under two species that are disparate, as it were.
Consequently, we say that he that commits theft for the sake of adultery is guilty of a twofold malice in one action.—On the other hand, if the object be essentially ordered to the end, one of these differences is an essential determination of the other. Therefore one of these species will be contained under the other.
It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the other. In order to make this clear, we must first of all observe that the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the more specific is the difference; secondly, that the more universal an agent is, the more universal a form does it cause; thirdly, that the more remote an end is, the more universal the agent to which it corresponds {e.g., victory, which is the last end of the army, is the end intended by the commander in chief, while the right ordering of this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower officers). From all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the end is more general; and that the difference derived from an object which is essentially ordered to that end is a specific difference in relation to the former. For the will, the proper object of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of the soul, the proper objects of which are the objects of their particular acts.
Reply Obj. i. One and the same thing, considered in its substance, cannot be in two species, one of which is not subordinate to the other. But in respect of those things which are superadded to the substance, one thing can be contained under diverse species. Thus, one and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one species, i.e., a white thing; and, as to its odor, under the species of sweet-smelling things. In like manner, an act which, as to its substance, is in one natural species, considered in respect to the moral conditions
Q. i8. Art. 8
GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS
that are added to it can belong to two species, as was stated above.^^ Reply Obj.
2. The end is last in execution, but first in the intention of the reason, according to which moral actions receive their species.
Reply Obj. 3. Difference is compared to genus as form to matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the genus is considered as more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is something 'more absolute and less contracted. So, too, the parts of a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated in the Physics?^ And in this sense the genus is the formal cause of the species; and so much the more formal, as it is more universal.
Eighth Article
WHETHER ANY ACT
IS INDIFFERENT IN
ITS SPECIES?
We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:— Objection 1. It would seem that no action is indifferent in its species. For evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine.^^ But privation and habit are immediate contraries, according to the Philosopher.^^ Therefore, there is no such thing as an action that is indifferent in its species, as though it were between good and evil.
Obj. 2. Further, human acts derive their species from their end or object, as was stated above.^^ But every end and every object is either good or evil. Therefore every human act is good or evil according to its, species. None, therefore, is indifferent in its species.
Obj. 3. Further, as was stated above, an act is said to be good when it has its due complement of goodness, and evil, when it lacks that complement, But every act must needs either have the entire fullness of its goodness, or lack it in some respect. Therefore every act must needs be either good or evil in its species, and none is indifferent.
On the contrary, Augustine says that there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be done with a good or evil
"^Q.
I, a.
3, ad 3.
^Aristotle, Phys., II, 3 (194b 26).
^ Enchir., XI (PL 40, 236).
"^ Cat., X (12a 2; b 27).
=®A.
6; q.
I, a. 3.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. i8. Art. 8 mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment.^^ Therefore some acts are indifferent according to their species.
/ answer that, As we have stated above, every act takes its species from its object, and the human act, which is called the moral act, takes its species from the object as related to the principle of human acts, which is the reason. Therefore, if the object of an act includes something in accord with the order of reason, it will be a good act according to its species (for instance, to give alms to a person in want)
. On the other hand, if it includes something repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to its species (for instance, to steal, which is to appropriate what belongs to another). But it may happen that the object of an act does not include something pertaining to the order of reason
(for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the j5elds, and the like), and such acts are indifferent according to their species.
Reply Obj. i. Privation is twofold. One is privation as a result [privatum esse], and this leaves nothing, but takes all away: e.g., blindness takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death, life. Between this privation and the contrary habit, there can be no medium in respect of the proper subject.—The other is privation in process [privari] : e.g., sickness is privation of health; not that it takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road to the entire loss of health, brought about by death. And since this sort of privation leaves something, it is not always the immediate contrary of the opposite habit.
It is in this way that evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the Categories ;^^ for it does not take away all good, but leaves some.
Consequently, there can be something intermediate between good and evil.
Reply Obj.
2. Every object or end has some goodness or mahce, at least that of its nature; but an object or an end does not always imply moral goodness or malice, which is considered in relation to the reason, as we have stated above.
And it is of this that we are here treating.
Reply Obj. 3. Not everything belonging to an act belongs also to its species. Therefore, although according to the nature of its species an act may not contain all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness, it is not therefore an act "^De Serm. Dom., H, 18 (PL 34, 1296).
"^In Cat., X (p. 388').
Q. i8. Art.9 good and EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS S3S specifically bad; nor is it specifically good. Thus, man, according to his species, is neither virtuous nor vicious.
Ninth Article
V^HETHER AN INDIVIDUAL ACT CAN BE INDIFFERENT?
We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:— Objection i.
It seems that an individual act can be indifferent. For there is no species that does not, or cannot, contain an individual. But an act can be indifferent in its species, as was stated above. Therefore an individual act can be indifferent.
Obj.
Further, individual acts are the causes of like habits, as is stated in Ethics ii.^^ But a habit can be indifferent, for the Philosopher says that those who are of an even temper and prodigal disposition are not evil
; ^^ and yet it is evident that they are not good, since they depart from virtue.
And thus, they are indifferent in respect of a habit. Therefore some individual acts are indifferent.
Obj. 3. Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain a specifically indifferent act to a vicious or virtuous end. Therefore an individual act may happen to be indifferent.
On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily: An idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive of just necessity or pious utility.^'^ But an idle word is an evil, because men .
. jshall render an account of it in the day of judgment {Matt. xii. 36) ; while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious utility, it is good.
Therefore every word is either good or evil. For the same reason, every other act is either good or evil. Therefore no individual act is indifferent.
/ answer that, It sometimes happens that an act is indifferent in its species, which yet is good or evil, considered in the individual. And the reason for this is because a moral act, as we have stated above, derives its goodness not only from the object which specifies it, but also from the circumstances, which are its accidents, as it were. So, too, something belongs
^Aristotle, Eth., II, i (1103b 21).
"^Op. cit., IV, i (1121a 26).
^In Evang., I, hom. 6 (PL 76, 1098).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. i8. Art. 9 to a man by reason of his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of his species. And every individual act must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or evil, at least in respect of the intention of the end.
For since it belongs to the reason to direct, if an act that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with the order of reason, and hence it has the character of good. Now it musf needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently, every human act that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or evil.
If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot, such an act, properly speaking, is not moral or human, since an act has the character of being moral or human from the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as standing outside the genus of moral acts.
Reply Obj. i. For an act to be indifferent in its species can happen in several ways. First, in such a way that its species demands that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds on this line. But no act can be specifically indifferent thus, since no object of a human act is such that it cannot be directed to good or evil, either through its end or through a circumstance.—Secondly, the specific indifference of an act may be due to the fact that, as far as its species is concerned, it is neither good nor evil. Therefore it can be made good or evil by something else. In the same way, man, as far as his species is concerned, is neither white nor black, nor is it a condition of his species that he should not be black or white; but blackness or whiteness can be superadded to man by other principles than those of his species.
Reply Obj.
2. The Philosopher states that a man is evil, properly speaking, if he is injurious to others.^^ Accordingly, he says that the prodigal is not evil, because he injures none save himself.^^ And the same applies to all others who are not injurious to other men. But here we are calling evil, in general, all that is repugnant to right reason. And in this sense every individual act is either good or evil, as we have stated above.
"^Eth., IV, I (ii2ia 29).
*/6frf. (ii2ia 26).
Q. i8. Art. io
GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS
Reply Obj. 3. Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason, it belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some vice. Thus, if a man's act is directed to the support or repose of his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided he direct his body itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to other acts.
Tenth Article
WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE PLACES A MORAL ACT IN
A SPECIES OF GOOD OR EVIL?
We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:— Objection 1.
It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral act in a species of good or evil. For the species of an act is taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object. Therefore circumstances do not give an act its species.
Obj.
2. Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the moral act, as was stated above.^"^ But an accident does not constitute a species. Therefore a circumstance does not constitute a species of good or evil.
Obj. 3. Further, one thing is not in several species. But one act has several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not place a moral act in a species of good or evil.
On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral act to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance places a moral act in some species of good or evil.
/ answer that, Just as the species of natural things are constituted by their natural forms^ so the species of moral acts are constituted by forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said above. But since nature is determined to one course of action, and a process of nature cannot go on to infinity, there must needs be some ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that, in natural things, that which is accidental to a thing cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species. But the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. Consequently that which, in one act, is taken
^'Q.
7, a.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. i8. Art. ii as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the act, can again be taken, by the directing reason, as the principal condition of the object that determines the species of the act.
Thus, to appropriate another's property is specified by the character of being another's, for this is why it is placed in the species of theft; and if we further consider the notion of place or time, then this will be an additional circumstance.
But since the reason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently, to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant to reason. In this way, whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs specify the moral act, whether good or evil.
Reply Obj. i. A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an act, is considered as a condition of the object, as we have stated above, and as being, as it were, a specific difference of the object.
Reply Obj.
2. A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, does not specify an act, since thus it is a mere accident; but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the act.
Reply Obj. 3. It is not every circumstance that places the moral act in a species of good or evil, for not every circumstance impHes accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently, although one act may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in many species. Nevertheless, there is no reason why one act should not be in several, even disparate, moral species, as we have said above.^^ Eleventh Article
WHETHER EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE THAT MAKES AN ACT BET-
TER OR WORSE PLACES A MORAL ACTION IN A SPECIES
OF GOOD OR EVIL?
We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:— Objection 1. It would seem that every circumstance relat- "A.
7, ad i; q. i, a.
3, ad 3.
Q. i8. Art. ii
GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS
ing to good or evil specifies an act. For good and evil are specific differences in moral acts.
Therefore, that which causes a difference in the goodness or malice of a moral act causes a specific difference, which is the same as to make it differ in species. Now that which makes an act better or worse makes it differ in goodness and malice. Therefore it causes it to differ in species. Therefore every circumstance that makes an act better or worse constitutes a species.
Obj.
2. Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself some character of goodness or malice, or it has not.
If not, it cannot make the act better or worse, because what is not good, cannot make a greater good, and what is not evil cannot make a greater evil. But if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this very reason it has a certain species of good or evil. Therefore, every circumstance that makes an action better or worse constitutes a new species of good or evil.
Obj. 3. Further, according to Dionysius, evil is caused by each single dejectP Now every circumstance that increases malice has a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds a new species of sin. And for the same reason, every circumstance that increases goodness seems to add a new species of goodness ; just as every unity added to a number makes a new species of number, for the good consists in number, weight and measure.
On the contrary y More-2Ln^-less does not change a species.
But more-Sind-less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice. Therefore, not every circumstance that makes a moral act better or worse, f)laces it in a species of good or evil.
/ answer that, As we have stated above, a circumstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral act in so far as it refers to a special order of reason. Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not refer to a special order of reason in ^respect of good or evil, except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from which the moral act takes its species of good or evil. Thus, to take something in a large or small quantity does not concern the order of reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other condition be presupposed, from which the act takes its malice or goodness.
Suppose, for instance, that what is taken belongs to another, ^De Div. Norn., IV, 30 (PG 3, 729).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. i8. Art. ii which makes the act to be discordant with reason. Therefore, to take what belongs lo another in a large or small quantity does not change the species of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good acts. Consequently, not every circumstance that makes a moral act better or worse changes its species.
Reply Obj. i . In things which can be more or less intense, the difference of more or less does not change the species.
Thus, by differing in whiteness through being more or less white, a thing is not changed in its species of color. In like manner, that which makes an act to be more or less good or evil does not make the act differ in species.
Reply Obj.
2. A circumstance that aggravates a sin or adds to the goodness of an act sometimes has no goodness or malice in itself, but in relation to some other condition of the act, as was stated above. Consequently, it does not add a new species, but adds to the goodness or malice derived from this other condition of the act.
Reply Obj.
3. A circumstance does not always involve a distinct defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to something else. In like manner, a circumstance does not always add further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, in so far as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice, it does not always change the species of good or evil.
Question XX
ON THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF EXTERNAL
HUMAN ACTS
{In Six Articles) We must next consider goodness and malice as to external acts, under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(i) Whether goodness and malice are first in the act of the will, or in the external act?
(2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external act depends on the goodness of the will? (3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are 'the same as those of the external act?
(4) Whether the external act adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?
(5) Whether the consequences of an external act increase its goodness or malice?
(6) Whether one and the same external act can be both good and evil?
Fourth Article
WHETHER THE EXTERNAL ACT ADDS ANY GOODNESS
OR MALICE TO THAT OF THE INTERIOR ACT?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection 1. It would seem that the external act does not add any goodness or malice to that of the interior act. For Chrysostom says:
It is the will that is rewarded for doing good, or punished for doing, evil} Now works are the witnesses of the will. Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account, in order to know how to judge, but for the sake of others, that all may understand how just He is. But good or evil is to be estimated according to God's judgment rather than according to the judgment of man. Therefore the external act adds no goodness or malice to that of the interior act.
Obj.
2. Further, the goodness and malice of the interior and external acts are one and the same, as was stated above.
But increase is the addition of one thing to another. Therefore the external act does not add to the goodness or malice of the interior act.
*/n Matt., horn. XIX (PG 57, 274).
S41
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 20. Art. 4
Obj. 3. Further, the entire goodness of created things does not add to the divine goodness, because it is entirely derived therefrom. But sometimes the entire goodness of the external act is derived from the goodness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely, as was stated above. Therefore, neither of them adds to the goodness or malice of the other.
On the contrary, Every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil. If, therefore, by the external act no further goodness or malice be added, it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will does a good deed or refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable.
/ answer that, If we speak of the goodness which the external act derives from the will tending to the end, then the external act adds nothing to this goodness, unless it happens that the will in itself is made better in good things, or worse in evil things. This, it seems, may happen in three ways.
First in point of number.
If, for instance, a man wishes to do something with a good or an evil end in view, and does not do it then, but afterwards wills and does it, the act of his will is doubled, and a double good or a double evil is the result.—Secondly, in point of extension.
Suppose, for instance, that a man wishes to do something for a good or an evil end, and is hindered by some obstacle, whereas another man perseveres in the movement of the will until he accomplish it in deed. In such a case, it is evident that the will of the latter is more lasting in good or evil, and, in this respect, is better or worse.—Thirdly, in point of intensity. For there are certain external acts which, in so far as they are pleasurable or painful, are such as naturally to make the will more intense or less so; and it is evident that the more intensely the will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it is.
On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which the external act derives from its matter and due circumstances, thus it stands in relation to the will as its term and end. And in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will, because every inclination or movement is perfected by attaining its end or reaching its term. Therefore the will is not perfect, unless it be such that, given the opportunity, it realizes the operation. But if this prove impossible, as long as the will is perfect, so as to realize the operation if it could, the lack of the perfection derived from the external action is absolutely involuntary. Now just as the involuntary deserves
Q.20.ART.4
THE GOODNESS OF EXTERNAL ACTS
neither punishment nor reward in the accomplishment of good or evil deeds, so neither does it lessen reward or punishment, if a man through absolute involuntariness fail to do good or evil.
Reply Obj. i. Chrysostom is speaking of the case where a man's will is completed and does not refrain from the act save through the impossibility of achievement.
Reply Obj.
This argument applies to that goodness which the external act derives from the will as tending to the end. But the goodness which the external act takes from its matter and circumstances is distinct from that which it derives from the end; but it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act willed, to which it stands in the relation of measure and cause, as was stated above.
From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
HABITS AND VIRTUES
Question XLIX
ON •HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR
SUBSTANCE
{In Four Articles) After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts. And first we must consider intrinsic principles; secondly, the extrinsic principles.^ The intrinsic principle is power and habit, but as we have treated of powers in the First Part,^ it remains for us to consider habits. We shall first consider them in general; in the second place we shall consider virtues and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts.^
Concerning habits in general there are four points to be considered:
First, the substance of habits; second, their subject;^ third, the cause of their generation, increase and corruption;^ fourth, how they are distinguished from one another.^ Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether habit is a quality?
(2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?
(3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?
(4) The necessity of habit.
Fourth Article
WHETHER HABITS ARE NECESSARY?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that habits are not necessary.
For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as was stated above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form, for it is according to its form that a thing is ^Q.90.
^QQ. 77-83.
'Q. 55- *Q.5o.
'Q.51.
'Q-54-
Q. 49. Art. 4
THE ESSENCE OF HABIT
good, even as it is a being. Therefore there is no necessity for habits.
Obj. 2. Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies sufficiently a principle of act, for even the natural powers, without any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits.
Obj.
3. Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit, and as power does not always act, so neither does habit. Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous.
On the contrary, Habits are perfections."^ But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing, since it is in the nature of an end. Therefore it was necessary that there should be habits.
/ answer that, As we have said above, habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three conditions are necessary. The first condition is that that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed, and that it should be related to it as potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, whose substance is its own operation, and which exists for itself, we can find no room in such a thing for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case in God.
The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination in several ways and to various things. Whence, if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, but in regard to that only, we fi.nd no room in such a thing for disposition and habit; for such a subject has of its own nature a proper relation to such an act. Therefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since that matter is not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we said in the First Part,^' there is no need for disposition or habit in relation to form, or even in relation to operation, since the nature of the heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement.
The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one 'Aristotle, Phys., VH,
(246a 11).
^ S.
T., I, q. 66, a.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 49Art. 4 of those things to which it is in potentiality, several things should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways, so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its form or to its operation. Therefore the simple qualities of the elements, which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way, are not called dispositions or habits, but simple qualities. But we call dispositions or habits such things as health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability. For this reason the Philosopher says that habit is a disposition,^ and disposition is the order of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species,^^ as we have said above.
Therefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their relative adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary.
Reply Obj. i. By the form the nature of a thing is per- ; yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form itself by some disposition. But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the end, or a means to fected the end. And if the form is limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as is the soul, it needs to be disposed to its operations by means of habits.
Reply Obj.
2. Power sometimes has a relation to many things, and then it needs to be determined by something else.
But if a power has not a relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we have said. For this reason natural forces do not perform their operations by means of habits, because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation.
Reply Obj.
3. The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on,^^ but the same power has a relation to good and evil. Hence it is that habits are necessary that powers be determined to good.
^Metaph., IV,
(1022b 10).
"^""Op. cit., IV,
(1022b i).
"Q. 54, a. 3.
Question LI
ON THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR
FORMATION
{In Four Articles) We must next consider the cause of habits. And firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase;^ thirdly, as to their diminution and corruption.^ Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether any habit is from nature?
(2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?
(3) Whether a habit can be generated by one act? (4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?
First Article
WHETHER ANY HABIT
IS FROM NATURE?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection i. It would seem that no habit is from nature.
For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. But habit is that which we use when we will, as the Commentator says on De Anima
\\\? Therefore habit is not from nature.
Obj.
2. Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature.
If, therefore, the habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one.
Obj. 3. Further, nature does not fail in the necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above.^ If, therefore, any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits. But this is clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature.
On the contrary, In Ethics vi.^ among other habits place is given to the understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature. Hence, too, first principles are said to be known naturally.^ / answer that, One thing can be natural to another in two
^Q52.
^Q. 53- ^Averroes, In De Anima, III, comm. 18
(VI, 169V).
*Q.
49, a.
^Aristotle, Eth., VI, 6 (1141a 5).
*Cf. a text of St. Albert, Summa de Bono, quoted by O. Lottin, Le droit naturel, p.
117.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 51. Art. i ways. First, in respect of the specific nature, as the ability to laugh is natural to man, and to have an upward tendency is natural to fire. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective temperaments.—Again, in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first, because it is entirely from the nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.
Therefore, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art.
But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as was stated above,"^ may be natural both in respect of the specific nature and in respect of the individual nature:—in respect of the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them
; which does not belong to human nature, as we said in the First Part.8
There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle. They exist in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive
""Q. so, a.
*5.
T., I, q. 55, a. 2; q. 84, a. 3.
Q. 51. Art. I
TKE FORMATION OF HABITS
54 J powers; in another, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself. Thus the understanding of first principles is called a natural habit.
For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part. And the same is the case in like manner with regard to other such instances. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part, this he cannot know except through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms. For this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics shows that the knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses.^^
But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect.
In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the habit; but only as to certain of its principles, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called the seeds of the virtues}'^ The reason for this is because the incHnation to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers.
But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or the like.
Reply Obj. i.
This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man.
Reply Obj.
2. Something may be added even naturally to *For the opinions of Alexander of Hales and John of Rochelle on the "understanding of j5rst principles," cf.
Lottin, "La synderese chez les premiers maitres franciscains de Paris" (Revue neoscolastique de philoSophie, XXIX [1927], pp. 269, 273, 277).
^"^ Post. Anal, II,
(looa 3).
"Cf. the texts of St.
Albert, Summa de Bono, as quoted by O. Lottin, Le droit naturel, p. 117.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 51. Art. 2 the nature of a power, although it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance, with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself to be of itself capable of knowing all things; for thus it would have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Evidently, that by which something is known must needs be the actual likeness of the thing known. Hence, if the power of the angel knew all things by itself, it would follow that it was the likeness and act of all things. Therefore there must needs be added to the angels' intellective power some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood
; for it is by participation in the divine wisdom, and not by their own essence that their intellects can be actually those things which they understand. And so it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power.
Reply Obj. 3. Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits, since some can be caused by nature, and some not, as we have said above. And so it does not follow that, because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural.
Second Article
WHETHER ANY HABIT
IS CAUSED BY ACTS?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection i. It would seem that no habit is caused by acts.
For habit is a quality, as we have said above.^^ Now every quality is caused in a subject according as the subject is receptive of something. Since, then, the agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather gives, it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts.
Obj.
2. Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled; whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If, therefore, habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and passive; which is impossible, as is stated in Physics vii.-^^ Obj. 3. Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its
"Q. 49, a.
=^ Aristotle, Phys., VII, i (241b 24).
Q. SI. Art. 2
THE FORMATION OF HABITS
SSI cause. But a habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit, as is clear from the fact that habit makes an act to be more perfect. Therefore a habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts.^^ / answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only the active priticiple of its act. For instance, in fire there is only the active principle of heating. In such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act
; for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethics \i}^ But there is an agent in which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object; and further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition. Therefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act which is a moved mover. For everything that is passive and moved by another is disposed by the action of the agent ; and therefore if the acts be multiplied, a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit; just as the habits of the moral virtues are caused in the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first propositions^.
Reply Obj. i. The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something from that which moves it; and thus a habit is caused.
Reply Obj.
2. The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics vm}^ Reply Obj. 3. The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle than is the habit caused thereby; just as ^^Eth., II, I (1103a 31).
^^Ibid. (1103a 19).
^® Aristotle, Phys., VIII,
(257a 31).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. s i . Art. 3 the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than the science of conclusions.
Third Article
WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE CAUSED BY ONE ACT?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of one conclusion* is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act.
Obj.
2. Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication, so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by multiplication of acts. So, too, if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit.
Obj. 3. Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill by one act. Therefore one act can cause a habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says: As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring, so neither does one day nor a short time make a man blessed and happy }'^ But happiness is an operation according to a habit of perfect virtue}^
Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act.
/ answer that. As we have said already, habit is caused by act, in so far as a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused in that which is passive, the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire cannot at once overcome the combustible, it does not enkindle it at once, but gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that, by overcoming it entirely, it may impress its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power in one act. For the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things, while the reason judges, in a single act, what should be willed in the light of various conditions and circumstances. Therefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely overcome, so as to "£tA., I, 7 (1098a 18).
^Ibid. (1098a 16) ; 13 (1102a 5).
Q. SI. Art. 4
THE FORMATION OF HABITS
be inclined naturally to the same thing in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many.
But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the possible intellect itself ; the other is the intellect which Aristotle calls passive,^^ and is the particular reason, that is, the cogitative power, with memory and imagination.^^ With regard then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to overcome entirely, by one act, the power of its passive principle. Thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion; but a probable proposition cannot do this. Therefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the possible intellect
; whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far as the possible intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says that meditation strengthens memoryj^^ Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle is of great power. Sometimes, for instance, a powerful medicine restores health at once.
Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.
Fourth Article
WHETHER ANY HABITS ARE INFUSED IN MAN BY GOD?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If, therefore. He infuses habits into some. He would infuse them into all; which is clearly untrue.
Obj.
2. Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature; for it belongs to the divine providence to preserve nature, as Dionysius says.^^ But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have
^De An., Ill,
(430a 24).
«»Cf. 5.
T., I, q.
78, a.
"^ De Mentor., I (451a 12).
^Z)e Div. Norn., IV, 33 (PG 3, 733).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 51. Art. 4 said above. Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.
Obj. 3. Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But jrom those acts a like habit is caused.^^ Consequently, there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now this seems impossible, for two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into man by God.
On the contrary, It is written {Ecclus. xy. 5): God filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding. Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God.
/ answer that, Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons.
The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as was stated above.^^ And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore it is necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, likewise exceed the proportion of human nature. Therefore such habits can never be in man except by divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.
The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes without second causes themselves, as we have said in the First Part.^^ Just as, therefore, in order to show His power, God sometimes causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, though not so perfectly.
Reply Obj. i. God, considered in His nature, is the same to all; but, considered according to the order of His wisdom, for some fixed motive, He gives certain things to some, which He does not give to others.
Reply Obj.
2. That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot
^Aristotle, Eth., II, i (1103b 21).
^Q.
5, a.
^5. T., I, q.
105, a.
Q. SI. Art. 4
THE FORMATION OF HABITS
do ; rather it follows from this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature.
Reply Obj. 3. Acts produced by an infused habit do not cause a habit, but strengthen an already existing habit
; just as the remedies of medicine given to a man who is naturally healthy do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.
Question LIV
ON THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS
{In Four Articles) We have now to consider the distinction of habits. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
( i ) Whether manyhabits can be in one power?
(2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
(3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
(4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?
Second Article
WHETHER HABITS ARE DISTINGUISHED BY THEIR OBJECTS?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of science regards contraries. Thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects specifically distinct.
Obj. 2.
Further, different sciences are different habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences. Thus, both the natural philosopher and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as is stated in Physics \\} Therefore habits are not distinguished by their objects.
Obj, 3.
Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if it be directed to different ends. Thus, to give money to anyone, if it be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of habits does not follow diversity of objects.
On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as was stated above.- But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects.
/ answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary
^Aristotle, Phys., II,
(193b 25).
^Q.
18, a.
Q. 54Art. 2
THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS
way in which forms differ specifically, or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Now forms are distinguished from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to something, and all things that imply order to something are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order: viz., to nature, and to an operation consequent to nature. Accordingly, habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things.
First, in respect of the active principles of such dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows.
Reply Obj. i . In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object, not in its material aspect, but in its formal aspect, which may differ in species or even in genus.
And though the distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction, yet they are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And, consequently, in so far as they concur in the one aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.
Reply Obj. 2. The natural philosopher proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another. For the latter proves this by means of mathematics, e.g., by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort
; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g., by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which is' a syllogism producing science, as is stated in Posterior Analytics i.,^ depends on the means.
And consequently various means are as so many active principles according to which the habits of science are distinguished.
Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says, the end is, in practical matters, what a principle is in demonstrative matters."* Consequently, a diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as a diversity of active principles does.—Moreover, the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been said.^ * Aristotle, Post. Anal., I,
(71b 18).
* Phys., II, 9 (200a 15); Eth., VII, 8 (iisia 16).
"^Q.
18, a. 6; q. 19, a.
2, ad i; q. 34, a. 4.
SS8
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 54. Art. 3
Third Article
WHETHER HABITS ARE DIVIDED INTO GOOD AND BAD?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection 1.
It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards contraries, as was stated above.
Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad.
Obj.
Further, good is convertible with being, so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the Philosopher declares.^ Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being.
Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.
Obj.
Further, there can be different evil habits about one and the same object: for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of concupiscence; and in like manner there can be several good habits: for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the Philosopher clearly states.*^ Therefore, habits are not divided into good and bad.
On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are distinct specifically.
Therefore habits are divided specifically into good and bad habits.
/ answer that, As was stated above, habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in their relation to nature. Now this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit. For a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while a bad habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature.
Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are opposed to human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad.
Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable
^Top., IV, 6 (127a 26).
"^Eth., VII, I (ii4sa 15).
Q. 54. Art. 3
THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS
to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher nature.
Reply Obj. i. The same habit may be about contraries in so far as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen that contrary habits are in one species, since contrariety of habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly, habits are divided into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; but not because one habit is about something good, and another about something bad.
Reply Obj. 2.
It is not the good which is common to every being that is a difference constituting the species of a habit it is rather some determinate good, by reason of a suitability to some determinate, viz., human, nature. In like manner, the evil that constitutes a difference of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate repugnant to a determinate nature.
Reply Obj. 3.
Several good habits about one and the same specific thing are distinguished according to their suitability to various natures, as was stated above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinguished according to their diverse repugnance to that which is in keeping with nature. Thus, various vices about one and the same matter are contrary to one virtue.
Question LV
ON THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE
{In Four Articles) We come now to a particular consideration of habits. And since habits, as we have said, are divided into good and bad,^ we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters connected with them, namely, the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits;^ in the second place, of bad habits, namely, of vices and sins.^ Now five things must be considered about virtues:
(i) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject;^ (3) the division of the virtues;^ (4) the cause of ( 5 ) certain properties of virtueJ Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether human virtue is a habit? (2) Whether it is an opervirtue ; ^ ative habit? (3) Whether it is a good habit? (4) The definition of virtue.
First Article
WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE
IS A HABIT?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection 1.
It would seem that human virtue is not a habit. For virtue is the peak of power.^ But the peak of anything is reducible 'to the genus of that of which it is the peak, as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit.
Obj, 2.
Further, Augustine says that virtue is good use of free choice.^ But use of free choice is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act.
Obj. 3.
Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions, or otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts.
Obj. 4.
Further, Augustine says that virtue is the order of 'Q.54,a.3.
"Q.68.
«Q. 71.
*Q.56.
"Q. 57- 'Q. 63.
'Q.
64.
« Aristotle, De Caelo, I,
(281a 14; a 18).—Cf.
St.
Thomas, In De Caelo, I, lect.
25.
^ De Lib. Arb., 11, 19 (PL 32, 1268) ; Retract., I, 9 (PL 32, 598).
Q. 55. Art. i
VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE
love,^^ and that the ordering which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to useM Now order, or ordering, denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation.
Obj.
Further, just as there are human virtues, so there are natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither therefore are human virtues habits.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says that science and virtue are habits}^ I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in relation to its end. But the end of power is act. Therefore power is said to be perfect according as it is determined to its act.
Now there are some powers which of themselves are determined to their acts, for instance, the active natural powers.
And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determined to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many; but they are determined to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have said above.^^
Therefore human virtues are habits.
Reply Obj. i . Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object or to its act. For instance, we give the name faith to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When therefore we say that virtue is the peak of power, virtue is taken for the object of virtue.
For the highest point to which a power can reach is said to be its virtue: for instance, if a man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue [i.e., his strength] is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the peak of power.
Reply Obj.
2. Good use of free choice is said to be a virtue in the same sense as above, that is to say, because it is that to which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For an act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free choice.
Reply Obj. 3. We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said
'^De Mor. EccL, I,
15 (PL 32, 1322).
^Lib. 83 Quaest., q. 30
(PL 40, 19).
-^Cat., VIII (8b 29).
"'Q. 49, a. 4.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 55. Art. 4 to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the power of locomotion; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits.
Reply Obj.
4. When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered ; because in us love is set in order by virtue.
Reply Obj.
5. Natural powers are of themselves determined to one act ; not so the rational powers. Hence there is no comparison, as we have said.
Fourth Article
WHETHER VIRTUE
IS SUITABLY DEFINED?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that the definition usually given of virtue (namely, Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us without us^'^) is not suitable. For virtue is man's goodness, since it is virtue that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a good quality.
Obj.
Further, no difference is more common than its genus, since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than quality, since it is convertible with being.
Therefore good should not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference of quality.
Obj. 3. Further, as Augustine says: When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field, it is something pertaining to the mind.^^ But there are virtues even of the irrational parts, as the Philosopher says.^^
Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality of the mind.
Obj. 4. Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It is therefore unsuitable to put righteous in the definition of virtue, when it is said that virtue is that by which we live righteously.
Obj.
5. Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in "Cf.
Peter Lombard, Sent., II, xxvii, s (I, 446).
^ De Trin.,
XII, 8 (PL 42, 1005).
^^Etk., Ill, 10 (1117b 23).
Q. 55. Art. 4
VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE
his Rule, that pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them.^'^ It is untrue, therefore, that no one can make bad use of virtue.
Obj. 6. Further, man is justified by viftue. But Augustine, commenting on Jo. xiv. 12 {He shall do greater things than these) says: He who created thee without thee will not justify thee without thee.'^^ It is therefore unsuitable to say that God works virtue in us without us.
On the contrary, We have the authority of Augustine, from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Liber Arbitrio ii.^^ / answer that, This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect nature of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as a good quality ; for quality is the genus of virtue, and the difference, good. To be sure, the definition would be more suitable if for quality we substitute habit, which is the proximate genus.
Now virtue has no matter out of which it is formed, as neither has any other accident ; but it has the matter about which it is concerned, and the matter in which it exists, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for the material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when it is said that virtue is a good quality of the mind.
The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation itself. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as are vicious habits. Others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil. For instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue.
But virtue is a habit which is always referred to good. Hence the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil is expressed in the words by which we live righteously ; and its distinction from those habits which are
^'Epist., CCXI (PL 33, 960).
"^Serm., CLXIX, 11 (PL 38, 923) Tract. LXXII, super loann., XIV,
(PL 35, 1823).
"^ De Lib.
Arb., II, 19 (PL 32, 1268).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 55. Art. 4 sometimes directed to good, and sometimes to evil, is expressed in the words, of which no one makes bad use.
Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this ^definition applies ; and this is expressed in the words which God works in us without us.
If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused.
Reply Obj.
1. That which first falls in the intellect is being, and therefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being. Hence we say that essence is being and one and good', and that oneness is being and one and good; and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health, for everything that we apprehend is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them, so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good.
Reply Obj.
2. The good which is put in the definition of virtue is not the good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says that the good of the soul is to be in accord with reason.^^
Reply Obj.
3. Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason.^^
Therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.
Reply Obj.
4. Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and which are the proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on.^^ But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as was stated above,^^ is common to all virtues.
Reply Obj. 5. One can make bad use of a virtue considered as an object, for instance, by having evil thoughts about it, *De Div.
Norn., IV, 32 (PG 3, 733).
"^ Aristotle, Eth., I,
(1102b 13;
a 3).
'^Q.
60, a.
2; II-II, q.
58, a.
"^Q.
19, a. 4.
Q. 55. Art. 4
VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE
S6S e.g., by hating it, or by being proud of it; but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil.
Reply Obj. 6. Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, which God works in us without us.
As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.
Question LVI
ON THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE
{In Six Articles) We have now to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry:
(i) Whether virtue is in a power of the soul as in a subject?
(2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers? (3) Whether the intellect can be a subject of virtue?
(4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers can be a subject of virtue?
(5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be a subject of virtue?
(6) Whether the will can be a subject of virtue?
First Article
WHETHER VIRTUE
IS IN A POWER OF THE SOUL AS
IN A SUBJECT?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says that virtue is that by which we live righteously} But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not in a power, but in the essence of the soul.
Obj.
2. Further, the Philosopher says that virtue is that which makes its possessor goody and his work good likewise?
But as a work is established by a power, so he that has a virtue is established by the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul.
Obj, 3. Further, power is in the second species of quality.
But virtue is a quality, as we have said above,^ and quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue.
On the contraryy Virtue is the peak of power} But the peak is in that of which it is the peak. Therefore virtue is in a power of the soul.
^De Lib. Arb., II, 19 (PL 32, 1268).
'^ Eth., II,
(iio6a 15).
'Q. 55, a.
* Aristotle, De Caelo, I, 11 (281a 14; a 18).—Cf. St.
Thomas, In De Caelo, I, lect. 25.
Q. s6. Art. i
THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE
/ answer that, It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the very nature of virtue, which implies the perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects.—Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above.^
Now all operation proceeds from the soul through a power.— Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is best; and the best is the end, which is either a being's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the being's power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.
Reply Ob'], i. To live may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very being of the living thing, and thus it belongs to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of being in the living thing. But sometimes to live is taken for the operation of the living thing, and in this sense we live righteously by virtue inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions.
Reply Obj. 2. Good is either the end, or something referred to the end. Therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the work, this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and consequently, to the power.
Reply Obj. 3. One accident is said to be the subject of another, not as though one accident could uphold another, but because one accident inheres in a substance by means of another, as color in a body by means of the surface
; so that surface is said to be the subject of color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue.
'Q. 55, a.
Question LVII
ON THE DISTINCTION OF THE INTELLECTUAL
VIRTUES {In Six Articles) We now have to consider the distinction of the virtues, which are (i) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues;^ (3) the theological virtues.^ Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
(i) Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues? (2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?
(3) Whether the intellectual habit art is a virtue?
(4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art? (5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?
(6) Whether eubulia, synesis and gnome are virtues annexed to prudence?
Second Article
WHETHER THERE ARE ONLY THREE HABITS OF THE SPECULA-
TIVE INTELLECT, VIZ., WISDOM, SCIENCE AND UN-
DERSTANDING?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection i.
It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz., wisdom, science and understanding. For a species should not be co-divided with Hs genus. But wisdom is a science, as is stated in Ethics vi.^
Therefore wisdom should not be co-divided with science among the intellectual virtues.
Obj, 2. Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of these objects, as we have already explained.^ Therefore habits are diversified, not according to their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects.
Now the principle of a demonstration is the cause of having a science of conclusions.
Therefore the understanding of principles should not be set down as a habit o;* virtue distinct from the science of conclusions.
^Q. 58.
*Q. 62.
'Aristotle, Eth., VI, 7 (1141a 19).
*Q. S4. a.
2, ad I ; I, q.
77, a.
Q. 57. Art. 2
THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
Obj. 3. Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational part of the soul. Now even the speculative reason employs the dialectical syllogism in its reasoning, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism.
Therefore, just as science, which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is considered to be an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be.
On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom^ science and understanding.^ I answer that, As has already been stated, the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth; for this is its good work. Now truth is subject to a twofold consideration, namely, as known in itself, and as known through another.
What is known in itself is as a principle , and is at once understood by the intellect ; and that is why the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such truth is called understanding, which is the habit of principles.
On the other hand, a truth which is known through another is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason's inquiry, and is as a term. This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since things that are later knowable in relation to us are knowable first and chiefly in their nature,^ hence it is that that which is last with respect to all human knowledge is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these truths is wisdom, which considers the highest causes, as is stated in Metaph. i7 Therefore it rightly judges and orders all truths, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment except by resolution to first causes.—But in regard to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable truths, it is science that per^ fects the intellect. Therefore, according to the diverse genera of knowable truths, there are diverse habits of the sciences; whereas there is but one wisdom.
Reply Obj.
1. Wisdom is a science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences: viz., to demonstrate conclusions from principles.
But since it has something ^Eth., VI,
(1141a 19);
(1139b 16).
'Aristotle, Phys., I, i (184a 18).
''Aristotle, Metaph., I, i (981b 28); 2 (982b 9).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 57. Art. 2 proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science.
Reply Obj.
2 . When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one and the same act, there is no distinction of habit or power in relation to the formal aspect and the material object. Thus, it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the principles of demonstration can be considered by themselves, without the conclusion being considered at all. They can also be considered together with the conclusions, in so far as the principles are extended to lead to the conclusions. Accordingly, to consider principles in this second way belongs to science, which considers the conclusions also; while to consider principles in themselves belongs to understanding.
Consequently, if we consider the point rightly, these three virtues are not distinguished as being on a par with one another, but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another: e.g., the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul, and the sensitive, than the vegetative soul. For it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree. So, too, both of these depend on wisdom as obtaining the highest place; for it contains beneath itself both understanding and science, as judging both of the conclusions of sciences and of the principles on which they are based.
Reply Obj. 3. As was stated above, a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is in no way referable to evil.^ Now the good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Therefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we express the truth and never a falsehood.
But opinion and surmise can be about both truth and falsehood ; and so, as is stated in Ethics vi.,^ they are not intellectual virtues.
*Q. 55, a. 3 and 4.
* Aristotle, Eth., VI, 3 (1139b 17).
Q. 57. Art. 3
THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
Third Article
WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL HABIT ART IS A VIRTUE?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection i. It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says that no one makes bad use of virtue}^ But one may make bad use of art, for a craftsman can work badly according to the science of his art. Therefore art is not a virtue.
Obj.
2. Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But there is a virtue of art, according to the Philosopher.^^ Therefore art is not a virtue.
Obj. 3. Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts.
But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says that art is a virtue. ^^ However, he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues, which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul.
/ answer that, Art is nothing else but the right reason about certain works to be made. And yet the good of these things depends, not on the disposition of man's appetite, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman as such is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an operative habit. And yet il has something in common with the speculative habits, since the disposition of the things considered by them is a matter of concern to the speculative habits also, although they are not concerned with the disposition of the appetite towards their objects. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his appetite is disposed, whether he be joyful or angry; even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, in so far, namely, as neither art nor a speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of ^**De Lib. Arh., II, 18; 19 (PL 32, 1267; 1268).
^Aristotle, Eth., VI, 5 (1140b 22).
^0/>. cit., VI, 3 (1139b 16); 7 (1141a 19).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 57. Art. 4 the habit, which is distinctive of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as regards the ability to work well.
Reply Obj.
1 . When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of that art; in fact, it is contrary ta the art. In the same way, when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord with what he knows, but contrary thereto.
Therefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as was stated above, so it is with art ; and it is for this reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is requisite, even though there cannot be a good use without the art.
Reply Obj.
2. In order that a man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for this reason the Philosopher says there is a virtue of art, namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.
Reply Obj. 3. Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g., the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such works of the speculative reason are, by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but liberal arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body; for these arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any such work are called sciences absolutely, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them.
Fourth Article
WHETHER PRUDENCE
IS A DISTINCT VIRTUE FROM ART?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is right reason about certain works.
But diversity of works does not make a habit cease to be an
Q. 57Art. 4
THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
art, since there are various arts about works widely different.
Since, therefore, prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned an art.
Obj.
2. Further, prudence has more in common with art that the speculative habits have, for they are both about contingent matters that may be otherwise than they are}'^ Now some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, should prudence be called an art.
Obj. 3. Further, it belongs to prudence to be of good counsel}"^ But counselling takes place in certain arts also, as is stated in Ethics iii.,^^ e.g., in the arts of warfare, of seamanship and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct from art.
On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art.^^ / answer that, Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring ability for a good work ; while some habits are virtues, not only through conferring ability for a good work, but also through conferring the use.^"^ But art confers the mere ability for good work, since it does not regard the appetite, whereas prudence confers not only ability for a good work, but also the use, for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude of the appetite.
The reason for this difference is that art is the right reason of things to be made, whereas prudence is the right reason of things to be done. Now making and doing differ, as is stated in Metaph. ix.,^* in that making is an action passing into external matter, e.g., to build, to saw, and so forth; whereas doing is an action abiding in the agent, e.g., to see, to will, and the like. Accordingly, prudence stands in the same relation to such human actions, consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to external makings; since each is the perfect reason about the things with which it is concerned.
But perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters depend on the principles from which reason argues; just as we have said above that science depends on and presupposes
"Aristotle, Eth., VI, 6 (1140b 35).
"0/>. cit., VI, 5 (1140a 25).
"Oa cit., Ill, 3 (iii2b 3).
"0^ cit., VI, 3 (1139b 16) ; 5 (1140b 2; b 21).
"A.
I ; q.
56, a.
"* Aristotle, Metaph., VIII, 8 (losoa 30).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 57. Art. 4 understanding, which is the habit of principles. Now in human acts ends are what principles are in speculative matters, as is stated in Ethics \\\}^ Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with regard to ends
; and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Therefore, for prudence there is need of moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand, the good of things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good of the artificial things themselves, and hence art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that more praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art.—Accordingly, it is evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.
Reply Obj. i. The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man, and therefore there is no diversification in the nature of virtue. But prudence is right reason about human acts themselves, and hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as was stated above.
Reply Obj. 2. Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter; for they are both in the part of the soul that does not deal with necessary truths, as well as about things that may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, then art has more in common with the speculative habits than with prudence, as is clear from what has been said.
Reply Obj, 3. Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the last end of human life.
But in some arts there is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counsellors in matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not prudent absolutely; for only those are prudent absolutely who give good counsel about what concerns man's entire life.
"AristoUe, Eth., VII, 8 (iisia 16).
Q. 57. Art. 5
THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
Fifth Article
WHETHER PRUDENCE
IS A VIRTUE NECESSARY TO MAN?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary for a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which it is the right reason, so prudence is to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man's Hfe; for prudence is the right reason about these things, as is stated in Ethics vi. ^^ Now art is not necessary in things that are made, save in order that they be made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore, is prudence necessary to man for a good life, after he has become virtuous, but perhaps only in order that he may become virtuous.
Obj. 2 . Further, It is by prudence that we are of good counsel, as is stated in Ethics vi. ^^ But man can act not only from his own good counsel, but also from another's. Therefore a man does not deem prudence for a good life, but it is enough that he follow the counsel of prudent men.
Obj. 3. Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always expresses the truth, and never what is false. But this does not seem to be the case with prudence, for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done, since human actions are about things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written {Wis. ix. 14)
: The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain. Therefore it seems that prudence should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue.
On the contrary, Itis reckoned with other virtues necessary for humain life, when it is written {Wis. viii. 7) of divine Wisdom : She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life.
I answer that, Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it ; in other words, it matters that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion.
Now since choice is about means to the end, rectitude of *0/». cit., VI, 5 (1140b 3).
"""-Ibid. (1140a 25);
(1141b 9).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q.S7.Art.S choice requires two things, namely, the due end, and that which is suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. But to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about means ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason and make it suitably affected towards means ordained to the end and this virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary for a good life.
Reply Obj. i. The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things to be made.
For, since making passes into external matter, it is not a perfection of the maker, but of the thing made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved. Now art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the good of prudence is in the agent himself, whose perfection consists in action itself; for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as was stated above. Consequently, art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good.
Rather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well {e.g., that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. Therefore the craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and an enduring one ; whereas prudence is necessary to man that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may become a good man.
Reply Obj.
2. When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his operation is not yet quite perfect, as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Therefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well absolutely; and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life.
Reply Obj. 3. As is stated in Ethics vi.,^^ truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. For the ^Aristotle, Eth., VI, 2 (1139a 26).
Q.57ART.S
THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
truth of the speculative intellect depends on the conformity of the intellect to the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary things.—On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity has no place in necessary matters, which are not effected by the human will, but only in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be matters of interior action or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz., arty as regards things to be made, and prudence, as regards things to be done.
Question LVIII
ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND
INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
{In Five Articles) We must now consider the moral virtues. We shall speak ( i of the difference between them and the intellectual virtues;
(2) of their distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter;^ (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and the others.^ Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(i) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?
(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?
(3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue?
(4) Whether there can be moral virtue without intellectual virtue? (5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual virtue without moral virtue?
First Article
WHETHER EVERY VIRTUE IS A MORAL VIRTUE?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection 1.
It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. For moral virtue is so called from the Latin mos, i.e., custom. Now, we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.
Obj.
2. Further, the Philosopher says that moral virtue is a habit of choosing this rational mean.^ But every virtue is a habit of choosing, since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following the rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on.^ Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.
Obj. 3. Further, Cicero says that virtue is a habit after the manner of a nature, in accord with reason.^ But since every human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason; for man's good consists in being in accord with reason, as Dionysius states.^ Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.
'Q.
59.
^Q.
61.
""Eth., II,
(iio6b 36).
*Q.
64, a. i,
and 3.
^ De Invent., II, 53 (p.
147'').
^ De Div. Norn., IV, 32 (PG 3, 733).
Q. 58. Art. i
DISTINCTION OF VIRTUES
On the contrary, The Philosopher says: When we speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he is gentle or soberJ Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues; and yet they are virtues, as was stated above.^ Therefore, not every virtue is a moral virtue.
/ answer that. In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word mos, for thus we shall be able to discover what moral virtue is. Now mos has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read {Acts xv. i): Except you be circumcised after the manner
[morem] of Moses, you cannot be saved; sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which sense the word is applied to brute animals. Thus we read (2 Mace. xi.
11) that rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [leonum more], they slew them. The word is used in the same sense in Ps. Ixvii.
7, where we read: Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house. For both these significations there is but one word in Latin; but in Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word ethos, which signifies the same as the Latin mos, is written sometimes with a long e, and is written y], and sometimes with a short e, and is written e.
Now moral virtue is so called from mos in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other meaning of mos, i.e., custom, is akin to this, because custom somehow becomes a nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive pow^, whose function it is to move all the powers to .^-^ Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive power. their acts, as was explained above Reply Obj. i . This argument takes mos in the sense of custom.
Reply Obj. 2. Every act of virtue can be done from choice, but no virtue makes us choose rightly, save that which is in the appetitive part of the soul; for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive part.^^ Therefore a 'Eth., I, 13 (1103a 7).
'Q. 57, a.
"Q.
9, a. i.
'^Q. 13, a. i.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 58. Art. 2 habit of choosing, i.e., a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects the appetitive power ; although the acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice.
Reply Obj. 3. Nature is the principle of movement}'^ Now to move to act is the proper function of the appetitive power.
Consequently, to become like nature in the point of consenting to the reason is proper to those virtues which are in the appetitive power.
Second Article
WHETHER MORAL VIRTUE DIFFERS FROM INTELLECTUAL
VIRTUE?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says that virtue is the art of living rightly.^^ But art is an intellectual virtue.
Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ.
Obj. 2. Further, some authors put science in the definition of the moral virtues. Thus some define perseverance as a science or habit regarding those things to which we should hold or not hold; and holiness as a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his duty to God.^^ Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue.
Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says that virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason.^"^ But this belongs to intellectual virtue, as is stated in Ethics vi.^^ Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue.
Obj. 4. Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is. included in the definition of m.oral virtue; for the Philosopher says that moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it.^^ Now this right reason, that fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to "^Aristotle, Phys., II, i (192b 21).
^Z)e Civit. Dei, IV, 21 (PL 41, 128).
^^ Cf. St. Thomas, S. T., II-II, q. 137, a. i, sed contra, and for Andronicus, cf. J. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, III, p. 66.
^' Solil., I, 6 (PL 32, 876).
^' Aristotle, Eth., VI, 13 (1144b 21).
"0/>. cH.,U, 6 (iio6b 36).
Q. 58. Art. 2
DISTINCTION OF VIRTUES
intellectual virtue, as is stated in Ethics v\P Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue.
On the contrary, It is stated in Ethics i. that there are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual, some, moral^^
I answer that, Reason is the first principle of all human acts, and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason in some way, but diversely. For some obey reason instantaneously and without any contradiction whatever. Such are the members of the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the Philosopher says that the soul rules the body with a despotic rule,^^ i.e., as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly, some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way.
If this were true, for a man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect.
Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that virtue existed only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said every virtue is a kind of prudence, as is stated in Ethics vi.^^
Hence he maintained that as long as a man was in possession of knowledge, he could not sin, and that every one who sinned did so through ignorance .^^ Now this is based on a false supposition. For the appetitive part obeys the reason, not instantaneously, but with a certain power of opposition ; and so the Philosopher says that reason commands the appetitive part by a political rule,^^ whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says on Ps. cxviii. that sometimes^the intellect marks the way, while desire lags, or follows not at all;^^ so much so, that sometimes the habits or passions of the appetitive part cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice.
^'Op. cit., VI,
(1144b 21).
"O^ cit., I,
(1103a 3).
^^Polit., I, 2 (1254b 4).
=* Aristotle, Eth., VI, 13 (1144b 19).
"^ Cf op. cit., VII,
(1145b 23).—Cf. also Plato, Protag. (pp. 352B; 3S5A; 3S7B).
"^Polit.,!,
(1254b 4).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 58. Art. 2
Accordingly, for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue, but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence, just as the appetite is the principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so moral habits are to be considered human virtues in so far as they are in conformity with reason.
Reply Obj, i. Augustine usually applies the term art to any form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that virtue is the art of right conduct, this applies to prudence essentially; but to other virtues, by participation, in so far as they are directed by prudence.
Reply Obj.
2. All such definitions, by whomsoever given, have been based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we have said about art.
The same applies to the Third Objection.
Reply Obj.
4. Right reason in matters of prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction of prudence.
Question LX
HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE DISTINGUISHED
FROM ONE ANOTHER
{In Five Articles) We must now consider how the moral virtues are distinguished from one another. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(i) Whether there is only one moral virtue? (2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations are distinguished from those which are about passions?
(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?
(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
(5) Whether the moral virtues are distinguished according to the various objects of the passions?
First Article
WHETHER THERE
IS ONLY ONE MORAL VIRTUE?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection 1.
It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. For just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason, which is the subject of the intellectual virtues, so their inclination belongs to the appetitive power, which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz., prudence.
Therefore, there is^also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations.
Obj.
2. Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspects of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed is one, viz., the mean defined by reason.
Therefore it appears that there is but one moral virtue.
Obj. 3. Further, moral matters are specified by the end_, as vas stated above.^ Now there is but one common end of all the moral virtues, viz., happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.
On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as 'Q.
I, a.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 60. Art. i was stated above.^ But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive part of the soul, which is distinguished into several powers, as was stated in the First Part.^ Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue.
/ answer that, As was stated above, the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive part of the soul.* Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as was stated above.^ Now the species of the object of appetite, as of anything, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the receptive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent in the same manner as the agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a form that is specifically one. Thus, the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire.—Sometimes, however, the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same manner as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation. Thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case, the forms received into matter from one and the same agent are not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the action of the agent. For instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various adaptability of matter.
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the action of reason univocally, so to say; for it is rational, not essentially, but by participation.^ Consequently, appetible objects are established in various species according to the movement of reason, by having various relations to reason; so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species and are not one only.
Reply Obj. i. The object of the reason is the true. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz., prudence.—On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the ap- ''Q. 56, a.
""S.
T., I, q. 80, a.
2; q. 81, a.
*Q. 58, a. i,
and 3.
^Q. 54, a.
"Aristotle, Eth., I, 13 (1102b 13; b 26).
Q. 60. Art. i
THE MORAL VIRTUES
petible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing power.
Reply Obj.
2. This formal element is one generically because of the unity of the agent; but it varies in species because of the various relations of the receiving subjects, as was explained above.
Reply Obj.
3. Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends
; and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.
Question LXI
THE CARDINAL VIRTUES
{In Five Articles) We must now consider the cardinal virtues. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(i) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?
(2) Of their number.
(3) Which are they?
(4) Whether they differ from one another? (5) Whether they are fittingly divided into political, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?
First Article
WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES SHOULD BE CALLED CARDINAL
OR PRINCIPAL VIRTUES?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection i. It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For the opposed members of a division are by nature simultaneous, '^ so that one is not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposed members of the division of the genus virtue. Therefore none of them should be called principal.
Obj.
2. Further, the end is superior to the means. But the theological virtues are about the end, while the moral virtues are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.
Obj. 3. Further, that which is essentially so is superior to that which is so by participation. But the intellectual virtues belong to that which is essentially rational, whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, as was stated above.^ Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues.
On the contrary, Ambrose, in explaining the words Blesstd are the poor in spirit {Luke vi. 20) says: We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz., temperance, justice, prudence and fortitude.^ But these are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.
* Aristotle, Cat., XIII (14b 33).
''Q.
56, a.
6, ad 2; q.
58, a. 3; q. 59, a. 4, obj.
*/n Luc, V, super VI, 20 (PL 15, 1738).
Q.6I.ART.I
THE CARDINAL VIRTUES
/ answer that, When we speak without qualification of virtue, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as was stated above, is virtue according to its perfect nature if it requires the rectitude of the appetite;^ for such a virtue not only confers the ability to do well, but also causes the use of the good work. On the other hand, a virtue is so called according to the imperfect notion of virtue, when it does not require rectitude of the appetite, because it merely confers the ability of doing well without causing the use of the good work. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect; and so those virtues which contain rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues.
Such are the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues prudence alone is such, for it is also in a way a moral virtue 'with respect to its subject matter, as was shown above.^ Consequently, those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly found among the moral virtues.
Reply Obj. i. When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic notion ; although considered according to reality, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man surpasses the other animals. But when we divide an analogous notion, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even with respect to the common notion ; as the notion of being is applied to substance more principally than to accident. Such is the division of virtue into the various genera of virtue, since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things.
Reply Obj.
2. The theological virtues are above man, as was stated above.^ Hence they should properly be called not human, but super-human or divine virtues.
Reply Obj.
3. Although the intellectual virtues, except prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they do not rank before them according to the nature of virtue; for a virtue, as such, has reference to the good, which is the object of the appetite.
*Q. 56, a. 3.
^Q. 57, a. 4.
^Q58, a. 3, ad 3.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q.6i.Art.2
Second Article
WHETHER THERE ARE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection i . It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as is clear from what has been said abovej But that which directs others ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue.
Obj.
2 . Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason and by a right appetite, as is stated in Ethics vi.^ Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues.
Obj, 3. Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it need not rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory says:
The entire structure of good works is built on jour virtues.^ I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are ; and in either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is the good as defined by reason. This good can be considered in two ways. First, as existing in the consideration itself of reason, and thus we have one principal virtue called prudence.—Secondly, according as the reason puts its order into something else, and this either into operations, and then we have justice, or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their thwarting reason
; and this occurs in two ways.
First, when the passions incite to something against reason, and then they need a curb, which we thus call tem^ perance; secondly, when the passions withdraw us from following the dictate of reason, e.g., through fear of danger or toil, and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back, and to this end there is fortitude.
^Q. 58, a.
"Aristotle, Eih., VI,
(1139a 24).
^ Moral, II,
49 (PL 75, 592).
Q.6I.ART.2
THE CARDINAL VIRTUES
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue of which we now speak, viz., the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by prudence
; and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of justice, the concupiscible power, subject of temperance, and the irascible power, subject of fortitude.
Reply Obj. i. Prudence is absolutely the principal of all the virtues. The others are principal, each in its own genus.
Reply Obj.
2. That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as was stated above.
Reply Obj.
All the other virtues, among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as to the formal principles.
Question LXII
THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES
{In Four Articles) We must now consider the Theological Virtues. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether there are theological virtues?
(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinguished from the intellectual and moral virtues?
(3) How many, and which are they? (4) Of their order.
First Article
WHETHER THERE ARE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Physics vii., virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed according to nature}
But that which is divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not the virtues of a man.
Obj.
2. Further, theological virtues are quasi-divine virtues. But the divine virtues are exemplars, as was stated above,^ which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not the virtues of man.
Obj, 3. Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first cause and last end of all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first cause and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits of theological virtue to direct the reason and the will to God.
On the contrary, The precepts of law are about acts of virtue. But the divine law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope and charity: for it is written (Ecclus. ii.
8, seqq.): Ye that fear the Lord believe Him, and again, hope in Him, and again, love Him.
Therefore faith, hope and charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues.
^Aristotle, Phys., VII, 3 (246b 23).—Cf. ibid. (246a 13).
^Q. 61, a. 5.
Q. 62. Art. I
THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES
/ answer that, Man is perfected by virtue for those actions by which he is directed to happiness, as was explained above.^
Now man's happiness or felicity is twofold, as was also stated above.^ One is proportioned to human nature, a happiness, namely, which man can obtain by means of the principles of his nature. The other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead ; and thus it is written (2 Pet. i. 4) that by Christ we are made partakers of the divine nature. And because such happiness surpasses the power of human nature, man's natural principles, which enable him to act well according to his power, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, by which he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end by means of his natural principles, albeit not without the divine assistance. Such principles are called theological virtues.^ They are so called, first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us rightly to God ; secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by divine revelation, contained in Holy Scripture.
Reply Obj.
1. A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways.
First, essentially, and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire, and thus, after a fashion, man becomes a partaker of the divine nature, as was stated above. Hence these virtues befit man according to the nature of which he is made a partaker.
Reply Obj.
These virtues are called divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because by them God makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself.
Hence they are not exemplar virtues but copies.
Reply Obj.
3. The reason and the will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the cause and the end of nature, but according to the ability of nature. But the reason and the will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural happiness.
''Q.
5, a.
^Q.
5, a.
^ Cf . William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, III, tr.
2, ch.
(fol. i3ora).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 62. Art. 2
Second Article
WHETHER THE THEOLOGICAL
VIRTUES ARE DISTINGUISHED
FROM THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL - VIRTUES ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection
. It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinguished from moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it either as to the intellectual part or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues which perfect the intellectual part are called intellectual, and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part are called moral. Therefore the theological virtues are not distinguished from the moral and intellectual virtues.
Obj.
2. Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs us to God, namely, wisdom, which is about divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not distinguished from the intellectual virtues.
Obj.
Further, Augustine shows how the four cardinal virtues are the order of love.^ Now love is charity, which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological.
On the contrary, That which is above man's nature is distinguished from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above man's nature, while the intellectual and moral virtues are proportioned to his nature, as was shown above."^ Therefore they are distinguished from one another.
/ answer that, As was stated above, habits are distinguished specifically from one another according to the formal difference of their objects.^ Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is som^ething comprehensible to human reason. Therefore the theological virtues are distinguished specifically from the moral and intellectual virtues.
*De Mor.
Eccl., I, 15 (PL 32, 1322), Q.
58, a.
'Q.
54, a.
2, ad I.
Q. 62. Art. 3
THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES
Reply Obj. i. The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the power of human nature; the theological virtues, supernaturally.
Reply Obj.
. The wisdom which the Philosopher reckons as an intellectual virtue considers divine things so far as they are open to the investigation of human reason.^ Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about these same things so far as they surpass human reason.
Reply Obj.
3. Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love in so far as each cardinal virtue requires an ordered affection. Now love is the root and cause of every affection, as was stated above.^^ If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially, but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on.^^
Third Article
V^HETHER FAITH, HOPE AND CHARITY ARE FITTINGLY
RECKONED AS THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection i. It would seem that faith, hope and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological virtues are in relation to divine happiness just as the inclination of nature is ih relation to the connatural end.
Now among the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz., the understanding of principles.
Therefore there should be but one theological virtue.
Obj.
2. Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise, hope is not reckoned among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.
Obj. 3. Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to ""Eth., VI, 3 (1139b 17).
'''Q.
27, a. 4; q.
28, a.
6, ad 2; q. 41, a.
2, ad I.
"Q. 65, a.
2 and 4; II-II, q.
23, a.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 62. Art. 3
God. Now man^s soul cannot be directed to God save through the intellectual part, in which are intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other, the will.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (/ Cor. xiii. 13): Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three,
I answer that. As was stated above, the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end.
Now the latter direction happens in two respects.
First, according to the reason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us through the natural light of the intellect, and which are reason's startingpoint, both in speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will tending naturally to the good as defined by reason.
But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to / Cor. ii. 9: The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him. Consequently, in relation to both intellect and will, man needed to receive in addition something supernatural to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which are held by means of a divine light ; and these are the things which are to be believed, about which is faith.—Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to the movement of intention, which tends to that end as something attainable,—this pertains to hope
—and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, in a way, transformed into that end—and this belongs to charity.
For the appetite of a thing is naturally moved and tends towards its connatural end and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end.
Reply Obj.
1. The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand, and consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But in relation to the things which are above nature, the nature itself of the power is insufficient. Consequently there was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects.
Q. 62. Art. 4
THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES
Reply Obj. 2. Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection, since faith is of things unseen, and hope of things not possessed. Hence to have faith and hope in things that are subject to human power falls short of the nature of virtue. But to have faith and hope in things which are above the ability of human nature surpasses every virtue that is proportioned to man, according to i Cor. i. 25: The weakness of God is stronger than men.
Reply Obj.
3. Two things pertain to the appetite, viz., movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity.
Fourth Article
WHETHER FAITH PRECEDES HOPE, AND HOPE CHARITY?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all virtues, according to Ephes. iii.
1 7 Being rooted and founded in charity. Therefore charity precedes the others.
Obj.
2. Further, Augustine says: A man cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping.^^ Therefore it seems that faith precedes charity, and charity hope.
Obj. 3. Further, love is the principle of all our affections, as was stated above. Now hope is a kind of affection, since it is a passion, as was stated above.^^ Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle enumerates them thus (/ Cor. xiii. 13) : Now there remain faith, hope, charity.
I answer that. There is a twofold order, namely, that of generation, and that of perfection. According to the order of generation, in which matter precedes form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one and the same subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts; for the habits are infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, unless that "Z)e Doct. Christ.,
I, 37 (PL 34, 35).
"Q23, a. 4.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 62. Art. 4 thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith that the intellect apprehends what it hopes for and loves. Hence, in the order of generation, faith must precede hope and charity. In like manner, a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good from someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence, for the very reason that a man bases his hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him; so that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards their respective acts.
But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope, because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive from charity their full complement as virtues.
For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on.^^ This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply Obj. 2 . Augustine is speaking of that hope by which a man hopes to obtain beatitude through the merits which he has already; and this belongs to hope quickened by, and following, charity. But it is possible for a man, before having charity, to hope through merits not already possessed, but which he hopes to possess.
Reply Obj. 3. As was stated above in treating of the passions, hope has reference to two things.^^ One is its principal object, viz.^ the good hoped for. With regard to this, love always precedes hope, for a good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved.—Hope also regards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first, though afterwards hope is increased by love. Because, from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him; and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him.
"5. T., II-II, q. 23, a. 8.
^Q.
40, a.
Question LXIII
THE CAUSE OF THE VIRTUES
{In Four Articles) We must now consider the cause of the virtues. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether virtue is in us by nature?
(2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation from our acts?
(3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion? (4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation is of the same species as infused virtue?
First Article
WHETHER VIRTUE
IS IN US BY NATURE?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that virtue is in us by nature.
For Damascene says:
Virtues are natural to us and are equally in all of us.^ And Anthony says in a sermon to the monks : // the will contradicts nature, it is perverse, if it follow nature, it is virtuous.'^ Moreover, the Gloss on Matt. iv.
(Jesus went about, etc.) says: He taught them natural virtues, i.e., chastity, justice, humility, which man possesses naturally.^ Obj. 2. Further, the good of virtue is to be in accord with reason, as was shown above.^ But that which is in accord with reason is natural to man, since reason is man's nature. Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
Obj. 3. Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth, for it is written (Job xxxi.
18): From my infancy mercy grew up with me, and it came out with me from my mother's womb.
Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
On the contrary. Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remain, as Dionysius states.^ But virtue is not in all men, and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature.
/ answer that, With regard to corporeal forms, it has been ' De Fide Orth., Ill, 14 (PG 94, 1045).
' Cf. St. Athanasius, Vita S. Antonii. trans. Evagrius (PG 26, 873).
^ Glossa ordin. (V. 17E).
*'Q. 55, a.
4, ad 2.
^ De Div. Norn., IV, 23 (PG 3, 725).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 63. Art. i maintained by some that they are wholly from within. It was so held, for instance, by those who upheld the theory of latent jorms.^ Others held that forms are entirely from the outside, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated from some separate cause.*^ Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as they pre-exist potentially in matter, and partly from the outside, in so far as they are reduced to act by an agent.
In like manner, with regard to the sciences and the virtues, some held that they are wholly from within,^ so that all virtues and sciences pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which befall the soul because of the burden of the body, are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being polished. This was the opinion of the Platonists. Others said that they are wholly from the outside, being due to the action of the agent intellect, as Avicenna maintained.^^ Others, again, said that the sciences and the virtues are in us by nature, so far as we possess the ability to acquire them, but not in their perfection. This is the teaching of the Philosopher,^^ and is nearer the truth.
To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man. One is according to his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And, since each thing derives its species from its form, and its individuation from matter; furthermore, since the form of man is the rational soul, while the matter is the body, hence it is that whatever belongs to man according to the rational soul is natural to him according to his specific nature, while whatever belongs to him according to the particular temperament of his body is natural to him according to his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man because of his body, considered as part of his species, in a way is to be referred to the soul, in so far as this particular body is proportioned to this particular soul.
In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoately. It is natural to man according to the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason there are to be found naturally present certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and " Cf . S. r., I, q. 45, a.
' Cf . ibid.
« Cf . ibid.
" Cf . S. T., I, q.
84, a.
3, obj.
"^De An., V, 5 (25 rb).
"^ Eth., II, 'i (1103a 25).
Q. 63. Art. 2
THE CAUSE OF THE VIRTUES
action, which are the seeds of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for the good which is in accord with reason. Again, it is natural to man according to the individual nature, in so far as, by reason of a disposition in the body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues. This happens according as certain sensitive powers are acts of certain parts of the body, whose disposition helps or hinders these powers in the exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which such sensitive powers assist. In this way, one man has a natural aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance. This is the manner in which both the intellectual and the moral virtues are in us naturally, namely, according to an inchoateness which consists in our ability to acquire them. But their completion is not present naturally, since nature is determined to one course of action, while the completion of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of action; rather does the completion vary according to the various matters which constitute the sphere of action of the virtues, and according to the variety of circumstances.
It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature aptitudinally and inchoately, but not according to perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from the outside.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the seeds of virtue which are in us by nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings.—The third objection must be taken in the sense thdt, owing to the natural disposition which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue.
Second Article
WHETHER ANY VIRTUE IS CAUSED IN US BY HABITUATION
FROM OUR ACTS?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection i. It would seem that virtues cannot be caused in us by habituation from our acts. For the Gloss of Augustine, commenting on Rom. xiv. 23
(All that is not of faith is sin) says: The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin, and there
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 63. Art. 2 is no good without the highest good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the most excellent behavior}^ Now faith cannot be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by God, according to Ephes. ii. 8:
By grace you are saved through faith. Therefore no virtue can be acquired by us through habituation from our acts.
Obj.
2. Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God, according to Wis. viii. 21:/ knew that J could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it. Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us by habituation from our acts, but only by the gift of God.
Obj. 3. Further, actions which are without virtue lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.
On the contrary, Dionysius says that good is more efficacious than evil.^^ But vicious habits are caused by evil acts.
Much more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.
/ answer that, We have spoken already in a general way about the generation of habits from acts.^* Speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note that, as was stated above, man's virtue perfects him in relation to good.^^ But since the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states,^^ or in number, weight and measure, according to Wis. xi.
21, man's good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as was stated above, viz., human reason and divine law.^*^ And since divine law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason is ruled by the divine law too; but the converse does not hold.
It follows that human virtue, directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason, can be caused by human acts ; for such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the good in question is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the divine law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused
^Glossa ordin.
(VI, 30B).
"Z>e Div, Norn., IV, 20; 32 (PG 3, 717; 732).
"Q. 51, a.
2 and 3.
"^Q. 55, a. 3 and 4.
^^ De Nat.
Boni, III (PL 42, 553).
"Q. 19, a. 3 and 4.
Q. 63. Art. 3
THE CAUSE OF THE VIRTUES
by human acts, whose principle is reason, but is produced in us by the divine operation alone. Hence Augustine, in giving the definition of this virtue, inserts the words, which God works in us without us}^ It is also of this virtue that the First Objection holds good.
Reply Obj. 2 . Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this virtue be considered in its perfect nature. But actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue, because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as was stated above,^^ and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit that is directly contrary to a habit. Therefore, though man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason.
—There are also certain mortal sins which man can in no way avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will be more fully explained later.2o Reply Obj. 3. As was stated above, certain seeds or principles of the acquired virtues pre-exist in us by nature.^^ These principles are more excellent than the virtues acquired through their power. Thus, the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which takes place through participation in the reason.
This rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly, human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher principles, can cause acquired human virtues.
Third Article
WHETHER ANY MORAL VIRTUES ARE IN US BY INFUSION?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. For God does not "Cf. above, q. 55, a. 4, obj. i.
^Q. 49, a. 3- *Q109, a.
''A. i; q. SI, a. i.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 63. Art. 3 do by Himself,, save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; because, as Dionysius says, it is God's rule to bring about extremes through the mean.^^ Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as was stated above. Therefore it is not fitting that they, should be caused in us by infusion.
Obj.
2. Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than in the works of nature. But the theological virtues suffice to direct us to the supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues requiring to be caused in us by God.
Obj. 3 . Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices. Much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls, according to the Gloss on Heb. i.
6.^^ Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion.
On the contrary, It is written {Wis. viii. 7) : She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude.
I answer that. Effects must needs be proportioned to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as was stated above .^^ In the place of these natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, by which we are directed to a supernatural end, as was stated above.^^ Therefore we need to receive from God other habits annexed proportionately to the theological virtues, which are to the theological virtues what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of the virtues.
Reply Obj.
1. Some moral and intellectual virtues can be caused in us by our actions, but they are not proportioned to the theological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportioned to those virtues.
Reply Obj.
2. The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end in an inchoate way, that is, in so far as it is to God Himself immediately. But the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God.
Reply Obj. 3. The power of those naturally instilled prin- ^Z)e Gael Hier., IV, 3 (PG 3, 181).
"^ Glossa ordin.
(VI, 79E).
=^A. i; q. SI, a. i.
^Q. 62, a. i.
Q. 63. Art. 4
THE CAUSE OF THE VIRTUES
ciples does not extend beyond the capability of nature. Consequently man needs in addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end.
Fourth Article WHETHER VIRTUE ACQUIRED BY
HABITUATION FROM
OUR
ACTS BELONGS TO THE SAME SPECIES AS INFUSED VIRTUE?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection i . It would seem that the infused virtues do not differ in species from the acquired virtues. For acquired and infused virtues, according to what has been said, do not seem to differ save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last end, but by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtues do not differ specifically from the acquired virtues.
Obj.
2. Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz., to moderate desires of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species.
Obj. 3. Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, and that which is wrought by a creature. But the man whom God made is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to the same species.
On the contrary, Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition of infused virtue contains the words, which God works in us without us, as was stated above.^^ Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue.
/ answer that. There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as was stated above, is taken from the special and formal aspects of their objects.^''^ Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue's proper matter. Thus, the object of temperance is a good in relation to the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch.
The formal aspect of this object is from reason, which fixes "A, 2; q. 55, a.
^Q. 54, a.
; q. 56, a.
; q. 60, a. i.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 63. Art. 4 the mean in these concupiscences ; while the material element is something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed, in such concupiscences, according to the rule of human reason is of a different nature than the mean which is fixed according to the divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason ; whereas, according to the divine rule, it behooves man to chastise his body^ and bring it into subjection (/ Cor. ix. 27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other virtues.
The other specific difference among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed. For the health of a man and a horse is not of the same species, because of the diverse natures to which the health of the man and the health of the horse are directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government.^^ In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, by which men behave well in relation to their being fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God {Ephes. ii. 19), differ from the acquired virtues by which man behaves well in relation to human affairs.
Reply Obj. i. Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as has been said.
Reply Obj, 2. Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as was stated, and therefore their respective acts are not identical.
Reply Obj. 3. God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally, and consequently it was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues such as those that are acquired by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as has been said.
^Polit., Ill,
(1276b 31).
Question LXIV
ON THE MEAN OF VIRTUE
{In Four Articles) We must now consider the properties of virtues. We must consider ( i ) the mean of virtue ; ( 2 ) the connection among the virtues;^ (3) the equaUty of the virtues ;2 (4) the duration of the virtues.^ Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
( i ) Whether the moral virtues consist in a mean?
(2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is a real mean or a mean of reason?
(3) Whether the intellectual virtues consist in a mean?
(4) Whether the theological virtues do?
First Article
WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES CONSIST IN A MEAN?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue does not consist in a mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Caelo i. that virtue is the peak of power^ Therefore moral virtue does not consist in a mean.
Obj.
2. Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, and magnificence to very large expenditures, as is stated in Ethics ny.^ Therefore not every moral virtue consists in a mean.
Obj, 3. Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to consist in a mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected^ but on the contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme. Thus virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity. In the same way, to give all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is not essential to moral virtue that it should consist in a mean.
^Q.
65.
^Q.
66.
=*Q.
67.
* Aristotle, De Caelo, I, 11 (281a 11; a 18).—Cf.
St. Thomas, In De Caelo, I, lect.
25.
"Aristotle, Eth., IV,
(1122a 18);
(1123a 34).
60S
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 64. Art. i On the contrary, The Philosopher says that moral virtue is an elective habit consisting in the mean.^
I answer that, As has already been explained, the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to goodJ Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter ; and the measure and rule of the appetitive movement in relation to appetible objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule; and, thus, the good of things made by art is that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it ; as we may clearly observe in all things ruled or measured.
Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue consists in a mean.
Reply Obj. i. Moral virtue derives its goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If, therefore, we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which it has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz., conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz., deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect of its matter, then it has the nature of a mean, in so far as it makes the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says that virtue, as to its essence, is a mean, in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter; but it is an extreme in reference to the "best" and "the excellent," viz., as to its conformity with reason.^
Reply Obj, 2. In actions and passions, the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances. Hence nothing hinders something from being extreme in a particular virtue according to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean according to other circumstances, through its conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme ""Op. cit., II, 6 (iio6b 36).
'Q. 55, a. 3- ^ Eth., II, 6 (1107a 7).
<5. 64. Art. 2
THE MEAN OF VIRTUE
and a maximum ; but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances, then it has the character of a mean, since these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e., where it is right, when it is right, and for an end that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum when it is not right, or where it is not right, or for an undue end] and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto where one ought, and when one ought. This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher that the magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity, but the mean in the right mode of his action,^ Reply Obj.
3. The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e., according to God's commandment, and for the sake of eternal life. But if this be done in an undue manner, i.e., out of unlawful superstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by deficiency; as for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty.
Second Article
WHETHER THE MEAN OF MORAL VIRTUE
IS A REAL MEAN,
OR A MEAN OF REASON?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection 1 . It would seeip that the mean of moral virtue is not the mean of reason, but a real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists in a mean. Now good, as is stated in Metaph. vi, is in things themselves.^^ Therefore the mean of moral virtue is a real mean.
Obj. 2. Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a mean between operations and passions.
Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the mean of reason, but a real mean.
Obj.
Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now *0/>. cit.y IV, 3 (1123b 13).
^"Aristotle, Metaph., VI, 4 (1027b 26).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 64. Art. 2 such is the mean of justice, as is stated in Ethics v.^^ Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the mean of reason, but a real mean.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says that moral virtue observes the mean in relation to us, that is set by reason}"^
I answer that, The mean of reason can be understood in two ways. First, according as the mean is found in the act itself of reason, as though the very act of reason were reduced to a mean. In this sense, since moral virtue perfects, not the act of reason, but the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the mean of reason. Secondly, the mean of reason may be considered as that which the reason establishes in some particular matter. In this sense, every mean of moral virtue is a mean of reason; for, as was stated above, moral virtue is said to consist in a mean through conformity, with right reason.
But it happens sometimes that the mean of reason is also a real mean, and in that case the mean of moral virtue is the real mean (for instance, in justice) . On the other hand, sometimes the mean of reason is not the real mean, but is established in relation to us. Such is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is about operations, which deal with external things, wherein the right has to be established absolutely and in itself, as was stated above.^^ Hence the mean of reason in justice is the same as the real mean, in so far, namely, as justice gives to each one his due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions, wherein the right cannot be established in the same way, since men vary in their relations to their passions. Hence the rectitude of reason has to be established in the passions with reference to us, who are influenced through the passions.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the mean of reason as being in the very act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice.
^Aristotle, Eth., V, 4 (1132a 2); 3 (1131b 13); II, 6 (iio6a 28)^ "^Op, cit., II, 6 (iio6b 36).
"^Q. 60, a.
LAW Question XC
ON THE ESSENCE OF LAW
{In Four Articles) We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts.
Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose temptations we have spoken in the First Part.^ But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace. Therefore, in the first place, we must speak of law; in the second place, of grace.^ Concerning law, we must consider (i) law itself in general; (2) its parts.^ Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for our consideration:
(i) its essence; (2) the different kinds of law;^ (3) the effects of law.^ Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
(2) Concerning the end of law. (3) Its cause. (4) The promulgation of law.
First Article
WHETHER LAW
IS SOMETHING PERTAINING TO REASON?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection 1. It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says {Rom. vii. 23)
: / see another law in my members, etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members, since the reason does not make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason.
Obj, 2.
Further, in the reason there is nothing else but ^5. r., I, q.
114.
^Q.
109.
'Q. 93.
*Q. 91.
"Q. 92.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q.qo.Art.i power, habit and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason, because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues, of which we have spoken above.^ Nor again is it an act of reason, because then law would cease when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.
Obj. 3. Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act rightly. But it belongs properly to the will to move to ."^ Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will, according to the words of the Jurist:^ Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign has the force of law. act, as is evident from what has been said above
On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as was stated above.^ Therefore law is something pertaining to reason.
/ answer that. Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting; for lex [law] is derived from ligare [to bind]j because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above.^^ For it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher.^^ Now that which is the principle in any genus is the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently, it follows that law is something pertaining to reason.
Reply Obj. i. Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways.
First, as in that which measures and rules ; and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone.—Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something because of some law; so that any inclination arising from a law may be called a law, not essentially, but by participation as it were.
And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called the law of the members.^^ Reply Obj. 2. Just as, in external acts, we may consider the •Q.
57.
'Q.
9, a.
«Dfg., I, iv, I (I, 35a).
»Q.
17, a.
"'^Q.
I, a.
I, ad 3.
"^Phys., II, 9 (200a 22) ; Eth., VII, 8 (iiSia 16).
"Peter Lombard, Sent., II, xxx, 8
(I, 464).
Q. 90. Art. 2
THE ESSENCE OF LAV/
work and the work done, for instance, the work of building and the house built, so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e., to understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And since the practical reason also makes use of the syllogism in operable matters, as we have stated above^^ and as the Philosopher teaches,^* hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the same position in regard to operations as, in the speculative reason, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such universal propositions of the practical reason that are directed to operations have the nature of law.
And these propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.
Reply Obj.
3. Reason has its power of moving from the will, as was stated above ; ^^ for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; or otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law.
Second Article
WHETHER LAW
IS ALWAYS DIRECTED TO THE
COMMON GOOD?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection i. It would seem that law is not always directed to the common good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of law is not always the common good.
Obj.
2. Further, law directs man in his actions. But human actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore law is directed to some particular good.
"Q. 13, a. 3; q. 76, a. i: q. 77, a.
2, ad 4.
"£iA., VII, 3 (1147a 24).
"Q.
17, a.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 90. Art. 2
Obj.
3. Further, Isidore says:
// law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law}^ But reason is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also of that which is directed to private good. Therefore law is not directed only to the good of all, but also to the private good of an individual.
On the contrary, Isidore says that laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizensP
I answer that. As we have stated above, law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest. Hence to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is happiness or beatitude, as we have stated above.^^ Consequently, law must needs concern itself mainly with the order that is in beatitude. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole as the imperfect to the perfect, and since one man is a part of the perfect community, law must needs concern itself properly with the order directed to universal happiness. Therefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters, mentions both happiness and the body politic, since he says that we call those legal matters just which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic}^
For the state is a perfect community, as he says in Politics i.2o Now, in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong to that genus according to some order towards that thing. Thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good.
Reply Obj. i. A command denotes the application of a "^Eiymol, II, 10; V, 3 (PL 82, 130; 199).
"0/>, cit., V, 21 (PL 82, 203).
"Q.
2, a.
7; q.
3» a. i; q.
69, a. i.
^ Eth., V, i (1129b 17).
'^^ Aristotle, Polii., I, i (i2S2a 5).
Q. 90. Art. 3
THE ESSENCE OF LAW
law to matters regulated by law. Now the order to the common good, at which law aims, is applicable to particular ends.
And in this way commands are given even concerning particular matters.
Reply Obj. 2. Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters, but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end.
Reply Obj. 3. Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end .which is the common good. Now whatever stands to reason in this sense has the nature of a law.
Third Article
WHETHER THE REASON OF ANY MAN
IS COMPETENT
TO MAKE LAWS?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection i. It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says {Rom. ii. 14) that when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law, .
. they are a law to themselves. Now he says this of all in general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself.
Obj.
2. Further, as the Philosopher says, /^e intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue.^^ But every man can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is competent to make laws.
Obj. 3. Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign of a state can maKe laws for the state. Therefore every father of a family can make laws for his household.
On the contrary, Isidore says, and the Decretals repeat:
A law is an ordinance of the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together with the Commonalty,^^
Therefore not everyone can make laws.
"^-Eth., II, I (1103b 3).
^Etymol, V, 10 (PL 82, 200) ; Gratian, Decretum, I, ii, i (I, 3).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 90. Art. 4
/ answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the vicegerent of the whole people.
Hence the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people; for in all other matters the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs.
Reply Obj. i . As was stated above, a law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also, by participation, as in one that is ruled. In the latter way, each one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares the direction that he receives from one who rules him. Hence the same text goes on: Who show the work of the law written in their hearts {Rom. ii. 15).
Reply Obj. 2. A private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously ; for he can only advise, and if his advice be not taken, it has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher says.^ But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some public personage, to whom it belongs to inflict penalties, as we shall state further on.^* Therefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone.
Reply Obj. 3. As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part of the state; and the state is a perfect community, according to Politics i.^^ Therefore, just as the good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the common good, so too the good of one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community.
Consequently, he that governs a family can indeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have properly the nature of law.
Fourth Article
WHETHER PROMULGATION
IS ESSENTIAL TO LAW?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection i . It would seem that promulgation is not essential to law. For the natural law, above all, has the character of law. But the natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to law that it be promulgated.
^ Eih., X, 9 (1180a 20).
^Q.
92, a.
2, ad 3; II-II, q. 64, a.
* Aristotle, Polit., I, i (i2S2a 5).
Q. 90. Art. 4
THE ESSENCE OF LAW
Obj.
. Further, it belongs properly to law to bind one to do or not to do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore promulgation is not essential to law.
Obj. 3. Further, the binding force of law extends even to the future, since laws are binding in matters of the future, as the jurists say.^^ But promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is not essential to law.
On the contrary y It is laid down in the Decretals that laws are established when they are promulgated?'^
I answer that, As was stated above, a law is imposed on others as a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. Therefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. But such application is made by its being made known to them by promulgation. Therefore promulgation is necessary for law to obtain its force.
Thus, from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered. Law is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the community.
Reply Obj. i. The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally.
Reply Obj.
2. Those who are not present when a law is promulgated are bound to observe the law, in so far as it is made known or can be made known to them by others, after it has been promulgated.
Reply Obj.
3. The promulgation that takes place in the present extends to future time by reason of the durability of written characters, by which means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says that lex [law] is derived from legere [to read] because it is written.^^ ^ Codex Justinianus, I, xiv,
(II, 68a).
'" Gratian, Decretum, I, iv, 3 (I, 6).
'^Etymol., II, 10 (PL 82, 130).
Question XCI
ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW
{In Six Articles) We must now consider the various kinds of law, under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(i) Whether there is an eternal law?
(2) Whether there is a natural law?
(3) Whether there is a human law? (4) Whether there is a divine law?
(5) Whether there is one divine law, or several?
(6) Whether there is a law of sin?
First Article
WHETHER THERE
IS AN ETERNAL LAW?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that there is no eternal law. For every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be imposed, since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal.
Obj.
Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from eternity, because there was no one to whom it could be promulgated from eternity.
Therefore no law can be eternal.
Obj. 3. Further, law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal, for the last end alone is eternal.
Therefore no law is eternal.
On the contrary, Augustine says: That Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal} I answer that, As we have stated above, law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community .^ Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by divine providence, as was stated in the First Part,^ that the whole community of the universe is governed by the divine reason. Therefore the very notion of the government of things in God, the ruler of the ^De Lib. Arb.,
I, 6 (PL 32, 1229).
*Q. 90, a. i, ad 2; a. 3 and 4.
*5. r., I, q.
22, a.
I, ad 2.
Q. 91. Art. 2
THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW
universe, has the nature of a law. And since the divine reason's conception of things is not subject to time, but is eternal, according to Prov, viii.
23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.
Reply Obj.
1 . Those things that do not exist in themselves exist in God, inasmuch as they are known and preordained by Him, according to Rom. iv.
17: Who calls those things that are not, as those that are. Accordingly, the eternal concept of the divine law bears the character of an eternal law in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him.
Reply Obj. 2. Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing, and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated, because both the divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads.
Reply Obj.
3. Law implies order to the end actively, namely, in so far as it directs certain things to the end; but not passively,—that is to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end, except accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the divine government is God Himself, and His law is not something other than Himself. Therefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end.
Second Article
WHETHER THERE
IS IN US A NATURAL LAW?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection i . It would seem that there is no natural law in us. For man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law, since
Augustine says that the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly.^ But nature does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore man has no natural law.
Obj. 2. Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as was stated above.^ But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by their nat- *De Lib. Arb., I, 6 (PL 32, 1229).
''Q. 90, a.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 91. Art. 2 ural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore man has no natural law.
Obf, 3. Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals because of his free choice, with which he is endowed in distinction from all other animals. Since, therefore, other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a natural law.
On the contrary, The Gloss on Rom. ii. 14 {When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are oj the law) comments as follows:
Although they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious vf, what is good and what is evil.^
I answer that. As we have stated above,'' law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measr ured in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Therefore, since all things subject to divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above, it is evident that all things partake in some way in the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in a more excellent way, in so far as it itself partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Therefore it has a share of the eternal reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end ; and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist, after saying {Ps. iv. 6) :
Offer up the sacrifice of justice, as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: Many say. Who showeth us good things? in answer to which question he says: The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us. He thus implies that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.
Reply Obj. i. This argument would hold if the natural law • Glossa ordin. (VI, 7E) ; Peter Lombard, In Rom., super II, 14 (PL
I9i> 1345).
' Q, 90, a.
I, ad I.
Q. 91. Art. 3
THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW
were something different from the eternal law; whereas it is nothing but a participation thereof, as we have stated above.
Reply Obj.
2. Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature, as was stated above.®
For every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly, the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be through the natural law.
Reply Obj.
3. Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the eternal reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as was stated above .^ Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner, and therefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of likeness.
Third Article
WHETHER THERE
IS A HUMAN LAW?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that there is not a human law.
For the natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as was stated above. Now through the eternal law all things are most orderly J as Augustine states.^^ Therefore the natural law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law.
Obj. 2. Further, law has the character of a measure, as was stated above.^^ But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as is stated in Metaph. x.^^ Therefore no law can emanate from the human reason.
Obj.
3. Further, a measure should be most certain, as is stated in Metaph. x.^^ But the dictates of the human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, according to Wis. ix. 14:
The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain. Therefore no law can emanate from the human reason.
NJ. 10, a.
•Q. 90, a.
^""De Lib. Arb., I, 6 (PL 32, 1229).
"Q.
90, a.
"Aristotle, Metaph., IX, i (1053a 31).
"^ Ibid,
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 91. Art. 3
On the contrary, Augustine distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human.^*
/ answer that, As we have stated above, a law is a dictate of the practical reason.^^ Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason, for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as was stated above.^^ Accordingly, we conclude that, just as in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is that from the precepts of the natural law, as from common and indemonstrable principles, the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters.
These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided that the other essential conditions of law be observed, as was stated above.^*^ Therefore
Tully says in his Rhetoric that justice has its source in na" ture; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature, and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law}^ Reply Obj. i. The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the divine reason, but according to its own mode, and imperfectly. Consequently, just as on the part of the speculative reason, by a natural participation of divine wisdom, there is in us the knowledge of certain common principles, but not a proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in the divine wisdom, so, too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, according to certain common principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction them by law.
Reply Obj.
2. Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things. But the principles impressed on it by nature are the general rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct, of which the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things that are from nature.
"Z>e Lib. Arb., I, 6 (PL 32, 1229).
"^Q. 90, a. i, ad 2.
'"''Ibid.
"Q. 90.
"Dc Invent., II, S3
(PMS')-
Q. 91. Art. 4
THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW
Reply Obj. 3. The practical reason is concerned with operable matters, which are singular and contingent, but not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Therefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of the sciences.
Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular genus.
Fourth Article
WHETHER THERE WAS ANY NEED FOR A DIVINE LAW?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection 1. It would seem that there was no need for a divine law. For, as was stated above, the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is the divine law, as was stated above. Therefore there is no need for a divine law in addition to the natural law and to human laws derived therefrom.
Obj. 2. Further, it is written {Ecclus. xv. 14) that God left man in the hand of his own counsel. Now counsel is an act of reason, as was stated above.^^ Therefore man was left to the direction of his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law, as was stated above. Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a divine law.
Obj. 3. Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no divine law besides the natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational creature have a divine law in addition to the natural law.
On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before him, saying {Ps. cxviii.
7,7,): Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, Lord.
I answer that. Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a divine law. And this for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. Now if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural ability, there would be no need for man to have any further direction,
"^Q.
14, a.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 91. Art. 4 on the part of his reason, in addition to the natural law and humanly devised law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which exceeds man's natural ability, as we have stated above,^^ therefore it was necessary that, in addition to the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God.
Secondly, because, by reason of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result.
In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.
Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which are observable; and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself rightly in both kinds of acts. Consequently, human law could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts, and it was necessary for this purpose that a divine law should supervene.
Fourthly, because, as Augustine says,^^ human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds, since, while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human living. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.
And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. cxviii.
8, where it is said: The law of the Lord is unspotted, i.e., allowing no foulness of sin; converting souls ^ because it directs not only exterior, but also interior, acts; the testimony of the Lord is faithful, because of the certainty of what is true and right; giving wisdom to little ones, by directing man to an end supernatural and divine.
Reply Obj. i. By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature.
But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet ""Q. 5, a.
^Z)e Lib. Arb.,
I, 5 (PL 32, 1228).
Q. 91. Art. 5
THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW
higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law.
Reply Obj. 2. Counsel is a kind of inquiry, and hence must proceed from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the reasons given above; but there is need for certain additional principles, namely, the precepts of the divine law.
Reply Obj. 3. Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers. Consequently the comparison fails.
Fifth Article
WHETHER THERE
IS BUT ONE DIVINE LAW?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that there is but one divine law.
For, where there is one king in one kingdom, there is but one law. Now the whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to Ps. xlvi.
8: God is the King of all the earth. Therefore there is but one divine law.
Obj. 2. Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends one and the same thing for all men, since according to I Tim. ii. 4: He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. Therefore there is but one divine law.
Obj. 3. Further, the divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the revelation of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge. But natural law is one for all men. Therefore much more is the divine law but. one.
On the contrary, The Apostle says {Heb. vii.
12):
The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law. But the priesthood is twofold, as stated in the same passage, viz., the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the divine law is twofold, namely, the Old Law and the New Law.
/ answer that. As we have stated in the First Part, distinction is the cause of number.22 Now things may be distin- ^5. r., I, q. 30, a. 3.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q.qi-Art.s guished in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether specifically different, e.g,, a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g., a boy and a man; and in this way the divine law is distinguished into Old and New. Hence the Apostle {Gal. iii. 24, 25) compares the state of man under the Old Law to that of a child under a pedagogue; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is no longer under a pedagogue.
Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with the three conditions pertaining to law, as was stated above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to its end, as was stated above.^^ This good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good, and to this man was directly ordained by the Old Law. Hence it is that, at the very outset of the Law, the people were invited to the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans (Exod. iii. 8, 17). Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good, and to this, man is ordained by the New
Law.
Therefore, at the very beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying (Matt. iv. 17): Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.
Hence Augustine says that promises of temporal goods are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament.^^
Secondly, it belongs to law to direct human acts according to the order of justice; wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to Matt. V. 20:
Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Hence the saying that the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the soul.^^
Thirdly, it belongs to law to induce men to observe its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment, but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence Augustine says that there is little difference between the Law and the Gospel—fear
[timox] and love [amor].2* "Q.
90, a.
^Contra Faust., IV,
(PL 42, 217).
="Cf.
Peter Lombard, Sent., Ill, xl, i (II, 734).
"^ Contra Adimant.,
XVII (PL 42, 159).
Q. 91. Art. 6
THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW
Reply Obj. i. As the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one
King, God, in His one kingdom, gave one law to men while they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law when, by the preceding law, they had been led to a greater capacity for divine things.
Reply Obj. 2. The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according to Acts iv.
12:
There is no other name .
. given to men, whereby we must be saved. Consequently, the law that brings all to salvation could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of justice unto salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him.
Reply Obj. 3. The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect. Hence it is one and the same for all. But the divine law directs man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the divine law to be twofold, as we have already explained.
Sixth Article
Vi^HETHER THERE
IS A LAW IN THE FOMES OF SIN?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:— Objection 1.
It would ^eem that there is no law of the *fomes' of sin.2'' For Isidore says that the law is based on reason.^^ But the 'fomes' of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the 'fomes' has not the nature of a law.
Obj.
2. Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey it are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor from not , following the instigations of the *fomes,' but rather from his following them. Therefore the *fomes' has not the nature of a law.
Obj. 3. Further, law is ordained to the common good, as ^ Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., II, xxx, 8 (I, 464) ; St. John Damascene, De Fide Orth., IV, 22 (PG 94, 1200).
"^ EtymoL, V, 3 (PL 82, 199).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 91. Art. 6 was Stated above.^o g^t the 'fomes' inclines us, not to the common good, but to our own private good. Therefore the 'fomes' has not the nature of law.
On the contrary, The Apostle says {Rom. vii. 23): / see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind.
I answer that, As we have stated above, law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures, but, by way of participation, in that which is ruled and measured ;^^ so that every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to law is called a law by participation, as was stated above.^^ Now those who are subject to law may receive a twofold inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly inclines his subjects to something. According to this, he directs different subjects to different acts; and in this way we may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law.
Secondly, indirectly, and thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into another order, so as to be under another law, as it were. For example, if a soldier be turned out of the army, he will become a subject of rural or of mercantile legislation.
Accordingly, under the divine Lawgiver, various creatures have various natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a law for one, is against the law for another. Thus, I might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another meek animal. And so the law of man, which, by the divine ordinance, is allotted to him according to his proper natural condition, is that he should act in accordance with reason; and this law was so effective in man's first state, that nothing either outside or against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses. In fact, this happens to each one individually, according as he has the more departed from the path of reason; so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuality, according to Ps. xlviii. 2 1
: Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them.
Accordingly, then, this very inclination of sensuality, which is called the 'fomes,' in other animals has absolutely
*Q. 90, a.
""A. 2; q. 90, a.
1, ad I.
"^Ibid.
Q. 91. Art. 6
THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW
the nature of law, yet only in so far as we may consider as law what is an inclination subject to law. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this way; rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of God, man is deprived of original justice, and his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is led, has the nature of a law in so far as it is a penalty following from the divine law depriving man of his proper dignity.
Reply Obj. i. This argument considers the 'fomes' in itself as an incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as we have stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the divine law; much as though we were to say that it is a law that a nobleman should be made subject to menial labor because of some misdeed.
Reply Obj.
2. This argument considers law in the light of a rule or measure ; for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law become transgressors. But the *fomes' is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of participation, as was stated above.
Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the ^fomes' as to its proper inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of nature in the species or in the individual.
This is true in man also, in so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called the 'fomes' in so far as it departs from the order of reason.
Question XCIII
THE ETERNAL LAW
(/» Six Articles) We must now consider each law by itself:
(i) the eternal law; (2) the natural law;^ (3) the human law;^ (4) the Old Law;.^ (5) the New Law, which is the law of the Gospel.'* Of the sixth law, which is the law of the 'fomes,' what we have said when treating of original sin must suffice.^
Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
(i) What is the eternal law? (2) Whether it is known to all? (3) Whether every law is derived from it?
(4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law? (5) Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law? (6) Whether all human things are subject to it?
First Article WHETHER THE
ETERNAL LAW
IS A
SUPREME EXEMPLAR
EXISTING IN GOD?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that the eternal law is not a supreme exemplar existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there are many exemplars of things in the divine mind, for Augustine says that God made each thing according to its exemplar.^ Therefore the eternal law does not seem to be the same as an exemplar existing in the divine mind.
Ohj.
Further, it is of the nature of a law that it be promulgated by word, as was stated above
."^ But Word is a Personal name in God, as was stated in the First Part,^ whereas exemplar refers to the essence. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a divine exemplar.
Obj.
3. Further, Augustine says: We see a law above our minds, which is called truth.^ But the law which is above our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal ^ \Q.
94.
^Q.
95.
'Q.
98.
*Q.
106.
''Q.
81, 82, 83.
*Lib. 83 Quaest., q. 46 (PL 40, 30).
' Q. 90, a. 4; q. 91, a. i, ad 2.
•5. r., I, q. 34, a.
'De Vera Relig., XXX (PL 34, 147).
Q. 93. Art. i
THE ETERNAL LAW
law. But the notion of truth is not the same as the notion of an exemplar. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as the supreme exemplar.
On the contrary, Augustine says that the eternal law is the supreme exemplar to which we must always conform}^
I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists an exemplar of the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there must pre-exist the exemplar of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government. And just as the exemplar of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or model of the products of that art, so, too, the exemplar in him who governs the acts of his subjects bears the character of a law, provided the other conditions be present which we have mentioned above as belonging to the nature of law.^^ Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things, in relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as was stated in the First Part.^^ Moreover, He governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in the First Part.^^ Therefore, just as the exemplar of the divine wisdom, inasmuch as all things are created by it, has the character of an art, a model or an idea, so the exemplar of divine wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law. Accordingly, the eternal law is nothing else than the exemplar of divine wisdom, as directing all actions and movements.
Reply Obj. i . Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal exemplars which refer to the proper nature of each single thing ; and consequently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality, according to their different relations to things, as was stated in the First Part.^^ But law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as was stated above.^^ Now things which are in themselves diverse may be considered as one, according as they are ordained to son^ething common. Therefore the eternal law is one since it is the exemplar of this order.
Reply Obj. 2
. With regard to any sort of word, two points may be considered: viz., the word itself, and that which is expressed by the word. For the spoken word is something ^""De Lib, Arb.,
I, 6 (PL 32, 1229).
^Q.
90.
"^ S. T.,
I, q. 14, a.
"5. r., I, q.
103, a. s.
^*5.
T., I, q.
15, a.
^Q. 90, a.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 93. Art. 2
Uttered by the mouth of man, and expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else than something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses mentally the things of which he is thinking. So, too, in God, therefore, the Word conceived by the intellect of the Father is the name of a Person; but all things that are in the Father's knowledge, whether they refer to the essence or to the Persons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares.^^ But among other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal name in God. Nevertheless, it is appropriated to the Son, because of the suitability of exemplar to word.
Reply Obj.
3. The exemplars of the divine intellect do not stand in the same relation to things as do the exemplars of the human intellect. For the human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with things, since an opinion is true or false according as things are or are not.
But the divine intellect is the measure of things, since each thing has truth in it in so far as it is like the divine intellect, as was stated in the First Part.^"^ Consequently the divine intellect is true in itself, and its exemplar is truth itself.
Second Article
WHETHER THE ETERNAL LAW
IS KNOWN TO ALL?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. For, as the Apostle says (/ Cor. ii.
11), the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God. But the eternal law is an exemplar existing in the divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone.
Obj.
. Further, as Augustine says, the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly.^^
But all do not know how all things are most orderly. Therefore all do not know the eternal law.
Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says that the eternal law is not «De Trin., XV, 14 (PL 42, 1076).
"5. T., I, q. 16, a. i.
^ De Lib. Arb.,
I, 6 (PL 32, 1229).
Q. 93. Art. 2
THE ETERNAL LAW
subject to the judgment of manP But according to Ethics i., any man can judge well of what he knows.^^ Therefore the eternal law is not known to us.
On the contrary, Augustine says that knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us?^ I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, in which some likeness of that thing is found: e.g., someone, not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its rays. Hence we must say that no one can know the eternal law as it is in itself, except God and the blessed who see God in His essence. But every rational creature knows it according to some reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says.^^ Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law. As to the other truths, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more, some less ; and in this respect they know the eternal law in a greater or lesser degree.
Reply Obj. i. We cannot know the things that are of God as they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according to Rom. i. 20: The invisible things of God .
. are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.
Reply Obj.
2. Although each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend it, for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law, in the aforesaid way, knows also the whole order of things whereby they are most orderly.
Reply Obj. 3. To judge of a thing may be understood in two ways.
First, as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to Job xii.
11: Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that eateth, the taste?
It is to this kind of judgment that the Philosopher alludes when he says that anyone judges well of what he knows,^^ by judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true. In another way, we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a kind of practical judgment, as to whether he should be
"De Vera Relig., XXXI (PL 34, 148).
^Aristotle, Eth., I,
(1094b 27).
"^De Lib.
Arb., I,
(PL 32, 1229).
^De Vera Relig., XXXI (PL 34, 147).
"^Eth., I, 3 (1094b 27).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 93. Art. 3 such and such or not. And thus none can judge of the eternal law.
Third Article
WHETHER EVERY LAW IS DERIVED FROM THE ETERNAL LAW?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection i. It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law. For there is a law of the 'fomes/ as was stated above,^^ which is not derived from that divine law which is the eternal law, since to it pertains the prudence of the flesh, of which the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 7) that it cannot be subject to the law of God. Therefore, not every law is derived from the eternal law.
Obj.
2. Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, because, as was stated above, the eternal law is that according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly. But some laws are unjust, according to Isa.
X. i: Woe to them that make wicked laws. Therefore, not every law is derived from the eternal law.
Obj.
Further, Augustine says that the law which is framed for ruling the people rightly permits many things which are punished by the divine providence.^^ But the exemplar of the divine providence is the eternal law, as was stated above. Therefore not even every good law is derived from the eternal law.
On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says (Prov. viii, 15):
By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things. But the exemplar of divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as was stated above. Therefore all laws proceed from the eternal law.
/ answer that, As was stated above, law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end.^^ Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must needs be derived from the power of the first mover, since the second mover does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first. Therefore we observe the same in all those who govern, namely, that the plan of government is derived by secondary governors from the governor in chief.
Thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the **Q.
91, a.
"^De Lib. Arb., I, 5 (PL 32, 1228).
"Q.
90, a.
I and 2.
Q. 93. Art. 3
THE ETERNAL LAW
king's command to his inferior administrators; and again in things of art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the under-craftsmen who work with their hands. Since, then, the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all the other laws which are in addition to the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says that in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful but what man has drawn from the eternal law?'^ Reply Obj. i. The 'fomes' has the nature of law in man in so far as it is a punishment resulting from the divine justice; and in this respect it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the divine law, and has not the nature of law, as was stated above.^^ Reply Obj.
2. Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law, but of violence. Nevertheless, even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law, through being framed by one who is in power, is derived from the eternal law; for all power is from the Lord God, according to Rom. xiii. i.
Reply Obj. 3. Human law is said to permit certain things, not as approving of them, but as being unable to direct them.
And many things are directed by the divine law, which human law is unable to direct, because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause. Hence the very fact that human law does not concern itself with matters it cannot direct comes under the ordination of the eternal law. It would be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns. Consequently, it does not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law; what follows is rather that it is not on a perfect equality with it.
"Z)e Lib, Arb., I, 6 (PL 32, 1229).
^Q. 91, a.
Question XCIV
THE NATURAL LAW
{In Six Articles) We must now consider the natural law, concerning which there are six points of inquiry:
(i) What is the natural law?
(2) What are the precepts of the natural law?
(3) Whether all the acts of the virtues are prescribed by the natural law?
(4) Whether the natural law is the same in all? (5) Whether it is changeable?
(6) Whether it can be abolished from the mind of man?
First Article
WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW
IS A HABIT?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection
. It would seem that the natural law is a habit.
For, as the Philosopher says, there are three things in the soul, power, habit and passion} But the natural law is not one of the soul's powers, nor is it one of the passions, as we may see by going through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit.
Obj.
2. Further, Basil says that the conscience or synderesis is the law of our mind;^ which can apply only to the natural law. But synderesis is a habit, as was shown in the First Part.^ Therefore the natural law is a habit.
Obj. 3. Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be shown further on. But man's reason, which the law regards, does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law is not an act, but a habit.
On the contrary, Augustine says that a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary} But such is not the natural law, since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit.
/ answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways.
First, properly and essentially, and thus the natural law is not a habit. For it has been stated above that the natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a "Eth., II,
(1105b 20).
^Cf. In Hexaem., hom. VII (PG 29, 158); St. John Damascene, De Fide Orth., IV,
(PG 94, 1200).
5. T., I, q.
79, a. 12.
*De Bono Coniug., XXI (PL 40, 390).
Q. 94. Art. 2
THE NATURAL LAW
work of reason.^ Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it, for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since, then, a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially.
Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit. Thus jaith may mean that which we hold by faith. Accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit. So, too, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold these principles; they are rather the principles of which we possess the habit.
Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of virtue;^ and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action, he mentions only those things which are principles of human acts, viz., powers, habits and passions.
But there are other things in the soul besides these three: e.g., acts, as to will is in the one that wills; again, there are things known in the knower; moreover its own natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like.
Reply Obj.
2. Synderesis is said to be the law of our intellect because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human actions.
Reply Obj. 3. This argument proves that the natural law is held habitually; and this is granted./
To the argument advanced in the contrary seme we reply that sometimes a man is unable to make use of that which is in him habitually, because of some impediment. Thus, because of sleep, a man is unable to use the habit of science.
In like manner, through the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use the habit of the understanding of principles, or the natural law, which is in him habitually.
Second Article
WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CONTAINS SEVERAL PRECEPTS,
OR ONLY ONE?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that the natural law contaii
"" Eth., II, 5 (iiosb 20).
•"Q. 90, a.
I, ad 2.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 94Art. 2 not several precepts, but only one. For law is a kind of precept, as was stated aboveJ If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws.
Obj.
2. Further, the natural law is consequent upon human nature. But human nature, as a whole, is one, though, as to its parts, it is manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of nature because of the unity of nature
»s a whole, or there are many by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result would be that even things relating to the inclination of the concupiscible power would belong to the natural law.
Obj. 3. Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as was stated above.^ Now reason is but one in man. Therefore there is only one precept of the natural law.
On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man Stand in relation to operable matters as first principles do to matters of demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.
/ answer that, As was stated above, the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason, because both are self-evident principles.^ Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the subject; even though it may happen that to one who does not know the definition of the subject, such a proposition is not selfevident. For instance, this proposition, Man is a rational being, is, in its very nature, self-evident, since he who says man, says a rational being', and yet to one who does not know what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident.
Hence it is that, as Boethius says,^^ certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are the propositions whose terms are known to all, as. Every whole is greater than its part, and. Things eqtial to one and the same are equal to one another. But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions. Thus to one who under- 'Q.
92, a.
»Q.
90, a.
"Q.
91, a.
"Z>e Hebdom.
(PL 64, 1311).
Q. 94. Art. 2
THE NATURAL LAW
Stands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place. But this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended by men. For that which first falls under apprehension is being, the understanding of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Therefore the first indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, which is based on the notion of being and not-being: and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv.^^ Now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension absolutely, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action (since every agent acts for an end, which has the nature of good). Consequently, the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the nature of good, viz., that good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this; so that all the things which the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good belong to the precepts of the natural law under the form of things to be done or avoided.
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of the contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Therefore, the order of ,the precepts of the natural law is according to the order of natural inclinations. For there is in man, first of all, an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances, inasmuch, namely, as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature; and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law.
Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals; and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law which ** Aristotle, Metaph., Ill, 3 (xoosb 29).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 94. Art. 3
^'^ such as sexual intercourse, nature has taught to all animals, the education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an incHnation to good according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him. Thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society; and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law: e.g., to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
Reply Obj, i. All these precepts of the law of nature have the character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept.
Reply Obj.
. All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature, e.g., of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced to one first precept, as was stated above. And thus the precepts of the natural law are many in themselves, but they are based on one common foundation.
Reply Obj.
3. Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all things regarding man ; so that whatever can be ruled by reason is contained under the law of reason.
Third Article
WHETHER ALL THE ACTS OF THE VIRTUES ARE PRESCRIBED
BY THE NATURAL
LAV^^?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection 1. It would seem that not all the acts of the virtues are prescribed by the natural law. For, as was stated above, it is of the nature of law that it be ordained to the common good.^^ But some acts of the virtues are ordained to the private good of the individual, as is evident especially in regard to acts of temperance. Therefore, not all the acts of the virtues are the subject of natural law.
Obj.
2. Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act.
If therefore all the acts of the virtues are prescribed by the natural law, it seems to follow that all sins are against nature; whereas this applies to certain special sins.
" Dig., I, i, I (I, 29a) .—Cf . O. Lottin, Le droit naturel, pp. 34, 78.
"Q. 90, a.
Q. 94. Art. 3
THE NATURAL LAW
Obj. 3. Further, those things which are according to nature are common to all. But the acts of the virtues are not common to all, since a thing is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore, not all the acts of the virtues are prescribed by the natural law.
On the contrary. Damascene says that virtues are natural}'^ Therefore virtuous acts also are subject to the natural law.
/ answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, in so far as they are virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered in their proper species. If, then, we are speaking of the acts of the virtues in so far as they are virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has .been stated that to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to its form: e.g., fire is inclined to give heat.
Therefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason; and this is to act according to virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all the acts of the virtues are prescribed by the natural law, since each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e.^ in their proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law.
For many things are done virtuously, to which nature does not primarily incline, but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive to well-living.
Reply Obj. i. Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the common good of nature, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good.
Reply Obj.
2. By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man, and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are also against nature, as Damascene states ;^^ or we may mean that nature which is common to man and other animals, and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature: e.g., contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime.
"Z)e Fide Ortk., Ill, 14 (PG 94, 1045).
^0/». cit., II, 4; 30; IV,
20 (PG 94, 876; 976; 1196).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 94. Art. 4
Reply Obj, 3. This argument considers acts in themselves.
For it is owing to the various conditions of men that certain acts are virtuous for some, as being proportioned and becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as not being proportioned to them.
Fourth Article
WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW
IS THE SAME IN ALL MEN?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection i . It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals that the natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel}^
But this is not common to all men, because, as it is written (Rom. X. 16), all do not obey the gospel. Therefore the natuta\ law is not the same in all men.
Obj.
2. Further, Things which are according to the law are said to be just, as is stated in Ethics v.^'^ But it is stated in the same book that nothing is so just for all as not to be subject to change in regard to some men.^^ Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men.
Obj.
3. Further, as was stated above, to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things,—some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to other things. Therefore, there is not one natural law for all.
On the contrary, Isidore says: The natural law is common to all nations}^ I answer that, As we have stated above, to the natural law belong those things to which a man is inclined naturally; and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now it belongs to the reason to proceed from what is common to what is proper, as is stated in Physics i.^^ The speculative reason, however, is differently situated, in this matter, from the practical reason.
For, since the speculative reason is concerned chiefly with necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper "Gratian, Decretum, I, i. prol.
(I, i).
"Aristotle, Eth., V, i (1129b 12).
^Op. cit., V,
(1134b 32).
"^Etymol., V, 4 (PL 82, 199).
*^ Aristotle, Phys., I, i (184a 16).
Q. 94. Art. 4
THE NATURAL LAW
conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail." The practical reason, on the other hand, is concerned with contingent matters, which is the domain of human actions; and, consequently, although there is necessity in the common principles, the more -we descend towards the particular, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly, then, in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions ; although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common notions?^
But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all as to what is particular, but only as to the common principles; and where there is the same" rectitude in relation to particulars, it is not equally known to all.
It is therefore evident that, as regards the common principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. But as to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but it is not equally known to all.
Thus, it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus, it is right and true for all to act according to reason, and from this principle it follows, as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases. But it may happen in a particular case that it wpuld be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further towards the particular, e.g.y if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.
Consequently, we must say that the natural law, as to the first common principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain more particular
*^Boethius, De Hebdom. (PL 64, 1311).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 94. Art. 5 aspects, which are conclusions, as it were, of those common principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases because of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature. Thus at one time theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates.^^ Reply Ob), i. The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them. Therefore Gratian, after saying that the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel, adds at once, by way of example, by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done by?^
Reply Ob), 2. The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things that are naturally just, not as common principles, but as conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a few.^*
Reply Ob]. 3. Just as in man reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must needs be directed according to reason. Therefore it is universally right for all men that all their inclinations should be directed according to reason.
Fifth Article
WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CAN BE CHANGED?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that the natural law can be changed. For on Ecclus. xvii. 9 {He gave them instructions and the law of life) the Gloss says: He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order to correct the law of nature.^^ But that which is corrected is changed. Therefore the natural law can be changed.
^Caesar, De Bello Gallico, VI,
(I, 348).
^ Decretum, I, i, prol.
(I, I).
"^Eth., V, I (1129b 12).
"^Glossa ordin, (III, 403E).
Q. 94. Art. 5
THE NATURAL LAW
Obj. 2. Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery and theft are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God: as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gen, xxii. 2); and when He ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians (Exod. xii. 35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself a wife of fornications (Osee i.
2). Therefore the natural law can be changed.
Obj.
Further, Isidore says that the possession of all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law?^ But these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore it seems that the natural law is subject to change.
On the contrary. It is said in the Decretals: The natural law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary according to time, but remains unchangeable.^'^
I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense, nothing hinders the natural law from being changed, since many things for the benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the divine law and by human laws.
Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles. But in its secondary principles, which, as we have said, are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law, is not changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as was stated above.
Reply Obj.
1. The written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to the natural law, or because the natural law was so perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, that they esteemed those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction.
Reply Obj. 2. All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die ^Etymol., V, 4 (PL 82, 199).
^ Gratian, Decretum, I, v, prol.
(I, 7).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 94. Art. 6 the death of nature; which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God because of original sin, according to i Kings ii.
The Lord killeth and maketh alive.
Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatever.—In like manner, adultery is intercourse with another's wife; who is allotted to him by tlie law emanating from God.
Consequently intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor fornication.—The same applies to theft, which is the taking of another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists.—Nor is it only in human things that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done by God is, in some way, natural, as was stated in the First Part.^^
Reply Obj. 3. A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g., that one should not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring with it the contrary. Thus, we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense, the possession of all things in common and universal freedom are said to be of the natural law, because, namely, the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly, the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition.
Sixth Article
WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CAN BE ABOLISHED
FROM THE HEART OF MAN?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the heart of man. For on Rom. ii. 14 (When the Gentiles who have not the law, etc.) the Gloss says that the law of justice, which sin had blotted out, is graven on the heart of tnan when he is restored by grace.^^ But the law of ^S.
T., I, q.
105, a.
6, ad i.
^ Glossa ordin.
(VI, 7E) ; Peter Lombard, In Rom., super
II, 14 (PL
191, 1345).
Q. 94. Art. 6
THE NATURAL LAW
justice is the law of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be blotted out.
Obj.
2. Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin.
Much more, therefore, can the law of nature be blotted out.
Obj.
3. Further, that which is established by law is proposed as something just. But many things are enacted by men which are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man.
On the contrary, Augustine says: Thy law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not.^^ But the law which is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the natural law cannot be blotted out.
/ answer that. As we have stated above, there belong to the natural law, first, certain most common precepts that are known to all ; and secondly, certain secondary and more particular precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to the common principles, the natural law, in its universal meaning, cannot in any way be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the common principle to the particular action because of concupiscence or some other passion, as was stated above.^^—But as to the other, i.e., the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as, among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states {Rom, i.
24), were not esteemed sinful.
* Reply Obj. i. Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts of the natural law, in the way stated above.
Reply Obj.
2. Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring.
Reply Obj. 3. This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain enactments which are unjust.
"^Confess.,
II, 4 (PL 32, 678).
^Q.
77, a.
Question XCV
HUMAN LAW
{In Four Articles) We must now consider human law, and ( i ) concerning this law considered in itself; (2) its power ;^ (3) its mutability.^ Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Its utility. (2) Its origin. (3) Its quality. (4) Its division.
First Article
WHETHER IT WAS USEFUL FOR LAWS TO BE FRAMED
BY MEN?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. For the purpose of every law is that man be made good thereby, as was stated above.^ But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame laws.
Obj, 2. Further, As the Philosopher says, men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice^ But animate justice is better than inanimate justice, which is contained in laws.
Therefore it would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to the decision of judges than to frame laws in addition.
Obj, 3. Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, as is evident from what has been stated above.^ But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number, matters pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of them.
Therefore it would have been better for human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.
On the contrary, Isidore says: Laws were made that in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check , that innocence might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness,
^Q.
96.
""Q.
97.
"Q92, a.
^Eth., V, 4 ("32a 22).
"Q. 90, a.
I and 2.
Q. 95. Art. i
HUMAN LAW
and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm.^ But these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws should be made.
/ answer that, As we have stated above, man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training."^ Thus we observe that a man is helped by diligence in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz., his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiently of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this training, since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be dissolute and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws.
Therefore, in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed ; for, as the Philosopher says, as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so he is the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and justice.^ For man can use his reason to devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to do.
Reply Obj. i . Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion
; but ^Etymol., V,
(PL 82, 202).
'Q.
63, a. i; q.
94, a.
*Polii., I, I (i2S3a 31).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 95. Art. 2 men whose disposition is evil are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.
Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says, it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges,^ And this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be necessary to judge rightly of each single case.—Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make, whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises; and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one solitary instance.—Thirdly, because lawgivers judge universally and about future events, whereas those who sit in judgment judge of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; and thus their judgment becomes perverted.
Since, then, the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be bent, therefore it was necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men.
Reply Obj.
3. Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law have necessarily to be committed to judges, as the Philosopher says in the same passage: e.g., concerning something that has happened or not happened, and the like.^^^ Second Article
WHETHER EVERY HUMAN LAW
IS DERIVED FROM THE
NATURAL LAW?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection i. It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says that the legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference}'^ But those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not all derived from the natural law.
^Rhetor., I, I (1354a 31).
"^ibid.
(1354b 13).
"^ Eth„ V,
(1134b 20).
Q. 95. Art. 2
HUMAN LAW
Obj.
Further, positive law is divided against natural law, as is stated by Isidore^^ ^nd the Philosopher.^^ But those things which flow as conclusions from the common principles of the natural law belong to the natural law, as was stated above.^^ Therefore that which is established by human law is not derived from the natural law.
Obj. 3. Further, the law of nature is the same for all, since the Philosopher says that the natural just is that which is equally valid everywhere}^ If therefore human laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all; which is clearly false.
Obj. 4. Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law. But it is not possible to give the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers, as the Jurist says.^^ Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.
On the contrary, Tully says: Things which emanated from nature, and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws.^'^ I answer that, As Augustine says, that which is not just seems to be no law at all.^^ Hence the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above.^^ Consequently, every human law has just so much of the nature of law as it is derived frorn the law of nature. But if in any point it departs from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.
But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from principles; secondly, by way of a determination of certain common notions. The first way is like to that by which, in the sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles; while the second is likened to that whereby, in the arts, common forms are determined to some particular. Thus, the craftsman needs to determine the common form of a house to the shape of this or that particular house. Some "^Etymol, V, 4 (PL 82, 199).
"^ Eth., V,
(1134b 18).
^*Q.
94, a.
4- "^Eth., V,
(1134b 19).
^""Dig., I, iii,
(I, 34a).
"Z>e Invent., II, 53 (p.
148'').
^ De Lib. Arb., I, 5 (PL 32, 1227).
'^Q. 91, a.
2, ad 2.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 95. Art. 2 things are therefore derived from the common principles of the natural law by way of conclusions: e.g.j that one must not kill may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that one should do harm to no m^n; while some are derived therefrom by way of determination: e.g., the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished, but that he be punished in this or that way is a determination of the law of nature.
Accordingly, both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way are contained in human law, not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but as having some force from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second way have no other force than that of human law.
Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the natural law.
Reply Obj.
2. This argument holds for those things that are derived from the natural law by way of conclusion.
Reply Obj.
3. The common principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way because of the great variety of human affairs; and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people.
Reply Obj. 4. These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to the decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the natural law; and to these determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is related as to its principles, in so far, namely, as they see at once what is the best thing to decide. Hence the Philosopher says that, in such matters, we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations?^
"^Eth., VI, II (1143b II).
GRACE Questioft CIX
ON THE EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN ACTS
NAMELY, THE GRACE OF GOD
{In Ten Articles) We must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e., God, in so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to do the right. First, we must consider the grace of God; secondly, its cause ;^ thirdly, its effects.^
The first point of consideration will be threefold, for we shall consider (i) the necessity of grace;
(2) grace itself, as to its essence;^ (3) its division.^ Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry
(i) Whether without grace man can know any truth?
(2) Whether without God's grace man can do or will any good?
(3) Whether without grace man can love God above all things?
(4) Whether without grace man can keep the commandments of the Law through his natural powers?
(5) Whether without grace he can merit eternal life? (6) Whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace?
(7) Whether without grace hQ can rise from sin?
(8) Whether without grace man can avoid sin? (9) Whether man, having received grace, can do good and avoid sin without any further divine help?
(10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good?
First Article
WHETHER WITHOUT GRACE MAN CAN KNOW ANY TRUTH?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection i.
It would seem that without grace man can know no truth. For on / Cor. xii. 3
(iVo man can say, the ^Q.
112.
^Q.
113.
«Q. no.
*Q.
III.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 109. Art. i Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost) the Gloss of Ambrose says: Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy
Ghost,^ Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we cannot know truth without grace.
Obj.
2. Further, Augustine says that the most certain sciences are like things lit up by the sun so as to be seen. Now
God Himself is He Who illi^mines, while reason is in the mind as sight is in the eye, and the eyes of the mind are the senses of the soul.^ Now the bodily senses, however pure, cannot see any visible thing without the sun^s light. Therefore the human mind, however perfect, cannot, by reasoning, know any truth without divine light; and this pertains to the aid of grace.
Obj, 3.
Further, the human mind can understand truth only by thinking, as is clear from Augustine.*^ But the Apostle says (2 Cor, iii. 5) : Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God, Therefore man cannot, of himself, know truth without the help of grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says / do not approve having said in the prayer: O God, Who dost wish the sinless alone to know the truth; for it may be answered that many who are not sinless know many truths.^ Now man is cleansed from sin by grace, according to Ps.
12:
Create a clean heart in me, God, and renew a right spirit within my bowels. Therefore without grace man of himself can know truth.
/ answer that. To know truth is a certain use or act of intellectual light, since, according to the Apostle (Ephes, v.
13) : All that is made manifest is light. Now every use implies some movement, taking movement broadly, so as to call thinking and willing movements, as is clear from the Philosopher.^ But in corporeal things we see that for movement there is required not merely the form which is the principle of the movement or action, but also the motion of the first mover. Now the first mover in the order of corporeal things is the body of the heavens. Hence no matter how perfectly fire has heat, it would not bring about alteration, except by ''Peter Lombard, In I Cor., super XII, 3 (PL 191, 1651)
; cf. Glossa "" SolU.,
I, 6 (PL 32, 875).
' De Trin., XIV, ordin.
(VI, S2A).
7 (PL 42,
1043).
^Retract.,
I, 4 (PL 32, 589).
"" De An., Ill, 4 (429b 25); 7 (431a 4).
Q. 109. Art. i
THE NECESSITY OF GRACE
the motion of the body of the heavens. But it is clear that, just as all corporeal movements are reduced to the motion of the body of the heavens as to the first corporeal mover, so all movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the absolutely First Mover, Who is God. And hence no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God.
Now this motion is according to the plan of His providence, and not by a necessity of nature, as the motion of the body of the heavens. But not only is every motion from God as from the First Mover, but all formal perfection is from Him as from the First Act. Hence the action of the intellect, or of any created being whatsoever, depends upon God in two ways: first, inasmuch as it is from Him that it has the form whereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved by Him to act.
Now every form bestowed on created things by God has power for a determined act, which it can effect in proportion to its own proper endowment; and beyond this act it is powerless, except by a superadded form, as water can heat only when heated by the fire. And thus, the human understanding has a form, viz., intelligible light itself, which of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligible truths, viz., those we can come to know through sensible things. Higher intelligible truths the human intellect cannot know, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, viz., the light of faith or of prophecy, which is called the light of grace, inasmuch as it is added to nature.
Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs divine help in order that the intellect may be moved by God to its act. But he does not need a new illumination added to his natural light in order to know the truth in all things, but only in those that surpass his natural knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some by His grace in things that can be known by natural reason, even as He sometimes brings about miraculously what nature can do.
Reply Obj. i . Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy Ghost as bestowing the natural light, and moving us to understand and to speak the truth ; but not as dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as bestowing any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this takes place only with regard
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 109. Art. 2 to knowing and speaking certain truths, and especially in regard to such as pertain to faith, of which the Apostle was speaking.
Reply Obj.
2. The material sun sheds its light outside us, but the intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us. Hence the natural light bestowed upon the soul is God's illumination, whereby we are illumined to see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for this there is required no further illumination, but only for such things as surpass natural knowledge.
Reply Obj.
3. We always need God's help for every thought, inasmuch as He moves the intellect to act; for to understand anything actually is to think, as is clear from Augustine.^® Second Article
WHETHER MAN CAN VJTLL OR DO ANY GOOD WITHOUT GRACE?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection i. It would seem that man can will and do good without grace. For that is in man's power of which he is master. Now man is master of his acts, and especially of his willing, as was stated above.^^ Hence man, of himself, can will and do good without the help of grace.
Obj.
2. Further, any being has more power over what is according to its nature than over what is beyond its nature.
Now sin is against nature, as Damascene says;^^ whereas the work of virtue is according to the nature of men, as was stated above.^^ Therefore, since man can sin of himself, much more would it seem that of himself he can will and do good.
Obj. 3. Further, the good of the intellect is truth, as the Philosopher says.^^ Now the intellect can of itself know truth, even as every other thing can perform its natural operation of itself. Therefore, much more can man, of himself, do and will good.
On the contrary, The Apostle says {Rom. ix. 16) : It is not of him that willeth, namely, to will, nor of him that runneth,
^""De Trin., XTV,
(PL 42, 1043).
^Q. i, a. i; q.
13, a.
^De Fide Orth., II, 4; 30 (PG 94, 876; 976); cf. op. cit., IV, 20
(PG 94, 1196).
"^Q.
71, a.
^Eih., VI, 2 (1139a 27).
Q. 109. Art. 2
THE NECESSITY OF GRACE
namely, to run, but of God that showeth mercy. And Augustine says that without grace men do nothing good when they either think or will or love or act}^ I answer that, Man's nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in its integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both states human nature needs the help of God, as First Mover, to do or will any good whatsoever, as was stated above. But in the state of integrity of nature, as regards the sufficiency of operative power, man by his natural endowments could will and do the good proportioned to his nature, which is the good of acquired virtue ; but he could not do the good that exceeded his nature, which is the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupted nature, man falls short even of what he can do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfill all of it by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, namely, so as to be shorn of every good of nature, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, perform some particular good, such as to build dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing. In the same way, a sick man can of himself make some movements, yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the movement of one in health, unless by the help of medicine he be cured.
Hence in the state of the integrity of nature, man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz., in order to do and will supernatural good; but in the state of corrupted nature he needs it for two reasons, viz., in order to be healed and, furthermore, in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond this, in both states man needs the divine help that he may be moved to act well.
Reply Obj, i. Man is master of his acts, both of his willing and not willing, because of the deliberation of reason, which can be bent to one side or another. And although he is master of his deliberating or not deliberating, yet this can only be by a previous deliberation; and since this cannot go on to infinity, we must come at length to this, that man's free choice is moved by an extrinsic principle, which is above the human mind, namely, by God, as the Philosopher proves in the chap- ^De Corrept, et Grat,, II (PL 44, 917).
6S6
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 109. Art. 3 ter on Good Fortune}^ Hence the mind even of an uncorrupted man is not so master of its act that it does not need to be moved by God; and much more needy is the free choice of man weakened by sin, whereby it is hindered from good by the corruption of its nature.
Reply Obj, 2. To sin is nothing else than to fail in the good which belongs to any being according to its nature. Now, as every created thing has its being from another, and, considered in itself, is nothing, so does it need to be conserved by another in the good which pertains to its nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as of itself it can fall into nonexistence, unless it is conserved by God.
Reply Obj.
3. Man cannot even know truth without divine help, as was stated above. And yet human nature is more corrupted by sin in regard to the desire for good, than in regard to the knowledge of truth.
Third Article
WHETHER BY
HIS OWN NATURAL POWERS AND WITHOUT
GRACE MAN CAN LOVE GOD ABOVE ALL THINGS?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection i. It would seem that without grace man cannot love God above all things by his own natural powers. For to love God above all things is the proper and principal act of charity. Now of himself man cannot possess charity, since the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy
Ghost Who is given to us, as it is said Rom. v. 5. Therefore man by his natural powers alone cannot love God above all things.
Obj.
2. Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to love anything more than itself is to tend to something above itself. Therefore without the help of grace no created nature can love God above itself.
O^;. 3. Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is due the highest love, which is that He be loved above all things.
Now without grace man is not capable of giving God the highest love, whith is His due ; otherwise it would be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace, cannot love God above all things through his natural powers alone.
"Cf. Eth. Eudem., VII, 14 (1248a 14).
Q. 109. Art. 3
THE NECESSITY OF GRACE
On the contrary, As some maintain, man was first made with only natural endowments.^^ In that state it is manifest that he loved God to some extent. But he did not love God equally with himself, or less than himself, or otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved God above himself.
Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can love God more than himself and above all things.
/ answer that, As was said above in the First Part, where the various opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set forth, in the state of integral nature man could, by his natural power, do his connatural good without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not without the help of God moving him.^^ Now to love God above all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only rational but irrational, and even inanimate, according to the matter of love which can belong to each creature. The reason for this is that it is natural to all to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit [to be sought and loved] since all things act according as they are naturally fit, as is stated in Physics i\}^
Now it is manifest that the good of the part is for the good of the whole. Hence everything, by its natural appetite and love, loves its own proper good because of the common good of the whole universe, which is God. Hence Dionysius says that God leads everything to the love of Himself?^ Hence in the state of integral nature man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of God as to its end
; and thus he loved God more than himself and above all things. But in the state of corrupted nature man falls short of this in the appetite of his rational will, which, unless it be cured by God's grace, follows its private good, betause of the corruption of nature.
And so we must say that in the state of integral nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments in order to love God above all things naturally, although he needed God's help moving him to it; but in the state of corrupted nature, man needs, even for this, the help of grace healing his nature.
Reply Obj. i. Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and the end of natural good
; whereas charity loves Him according as He is the " Cf. above, 5. T., I, q. 95, a. i.
''5. T., I, q. 60, a.
^* Aristotle, Phys., II, 8 (199a 10).
'^De Div. Norn., IV, 10 (PG 3, 708).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 109. Art. 4 object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover, charity adds to the natural love of God a certain quickness and joy, in the same way that every habit of virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason of a man who has not the habit of virtue.
Reply Obj.
2. When it is said that no nature can rise above itself, we must not understand this as if it could not be directed to any object above itself; for it is clear that our intellect by its natural knowledge can know things above itself, as is shown in our natural knowledge of God. But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength. Now to love God above all things is not such an act, for it is natural to every creature, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 3. Love is said to be highest not only with regard to the degree of love, but also with regard to the motive of loving, and the mode of love. And thus the highest degree of love is that whereby charity loves God as the giver of beatitude, as was said above.
Fourth Article
POWERS, CAN FULFILL THE COMMANDMENTS OF THE LAW?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that man without grace, and by his own natural powers, can fulfill the commandments of the Law. For the Apostle says {Rom. ii. 14) that the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the Law. Now what a man does naturally he can do of himself without grace. Hence a man can fulfill the commandments of the Law without grace.
Obj.
2. Further, Jerome says that they are anathema who say God has laid impossibilities upon man.'^'^ Now what a man cannot fulfill by himself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfill all the commandments of himself.
Obj. 3. Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest is this. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart {Matt. xxii. 37). Now man can fulfill this command by his natural powers, by loving God above all things,
*^Cf. Pelagius, Epist., I, 16 (PL 30, 32).
Q. 109. Art. 4
THE NECESSITY OF GRACE
as was stated above. Therefore man can fulfill all the commandments of the Law without grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says that it is part of the heresy of the Pelagians that they believe that without grace man can fulfill all the divine commandments?^
I answer that, There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the Law.—The first regards the substance of works, as when a man does works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man in the state of integral nature could fulfill all the commandments of the Law; or otherwise he would have been unable not to sin in that state, since to .sin is nothing else than to transgress the divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfill all the divine commandments without healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the Law can be fulfilled not merely as regards the substance of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, i.e., their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in the state of integral nature, nor in the state of corrupted nature can man fulfill the commandments of the Law without grace. Hence, Augustine, having stated that without grace men can do no good whatever, adds: Not only do they know by its light what to do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know.^^ Beyond this, in both states they need the help of God's motion in order to fulfill the commandments, as was stated abovec
Reply Obj, i. As Augustine says, do not be disturbed at his saying that they do by nature those things that are of the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore in us the image of God, after which we were naturally made?^
Reply Obj. 2. What we can do with the divine assistance is not altogether impossible to us; for according to the Philosopher: What we can do through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by ourselves.^^ Hence Jerome concedes that our will is in such a way free that we must confess we still always require God's help.^^ Reply Obj. 3 . Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfill the precept of the love of God according as it is fulfilled through charity, as was stated above.
^De Haeres., 88 (PL 42, 47).
^ De Corrept. et Grat., II (PL 44, 917).
'^De Spir. et Litt., XXVII (PL 44, 229).
"^ Eth., Ill, 3 (1112b 27).
'^Cf.Pelagius, Libellus Fidei ad Innocentium (PL 45, 1718).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 109. Art. $ Fifth Article
WHETHER MAN CAN MERIT ETERNAL LIFE WITHOUT GRACE?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that man can merit eternal life without grace. For our Lord says {Matt. xix. 17):
// thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments; from which it would seem that to enter into eternal life rests with man's will. But what rests with our will, we can do of ourselves.
Hence it seems that man can merit eternal life of himself.
Obj, 2. Further, eternal life is the wage or reward bestowed by God on men, according to Matt. v. 12:
Your reward is very great in heaven. But wage or reward is meted by God to everyone according to his works, according to Ps. Ixi. 13:
Thou wilt render to every man according to his works. Hence, since man is master of his works, it seems that it is within his power to reach eternal life.
Obj. 3. Further, eternal life is the last end of human life.
Now every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end. Much more, therefore, can man attain to eternal life by his natural endowments, without grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. vi. 23) : The grace of God is life everlasting. And, as the Gloss says, this is said that we may understand that God, of His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life.^'^ I answer that, Acts leading to an end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and hence we see in naturd things that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its active power, but only such as is proportioned to its power. Now eternal life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we have said above.^
Hence man, by his natural powers, cannot produce meritorious works proportioned to eternal life ; but for this a higher power is needed, viz., the power of grace. And thus, without grace, man cannot merit eternal life; yet he can perform works leading to a good which is connatural to man, as to ^ Glossa ordin, (VI» 15F) ; Peter Lombard, In Rom., super VI, 23 (PL 191, 1412).—Cf.
St.
Augustine, Enchir., CVII (PL 40, 282).
Q. 109. Art. 6
THE NECESSITY OF GRACE
toil in the fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends, and the like, as Augustine says in his third Reply to the Pelagians?^
Reply Obj. i. Man, by his will, does works meritorious of eternal life ; but, as Augustine says in the same book, for this it is necessary that the will of man should be prepared with grace by God.^^ Reply Obj.
2. As the Gloss says upon Rom. vi. 23 {The grace of God is life everlasting) :
It is certain that everlasting life is meted to good works; but the works to which it is meted belong to God's grace.^^ What is more, it has been said that to fulfill the commandments of the Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfillment may be meritorious, requires grace.
Reply Obj.
3. This objection has to do with the natural end of man. Now human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of grace to a higher end, which lower natures can in no way reach
; even as a man who can recover his health by the help of medicines is better disposed to health than one who can in no way recover it, as the Philosopher obSixth Article
WHETHER A MAN, BY HIMSELF AND WITHOUT THE EXTERNAL
AID OF GRACE, CAN PREPARE HIMSELF FOR GRACE?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that man, by himself and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace.
For nothing impossible is laid .upon man, as was stated above.
But it is written (Zach. i. 3): Turn ye to Me .
. and I will turn to you. Now to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it seems that man of himself, and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace.
Obj.
2, Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in him to do, since, if man does what is in him to do,
God will not deny him grace; for it is written (Matt. vii. 11) that God gives His good Spirit to them that ask Him. But * Pseudo -Augustine, Hypognost., Ill, 4 (PL 45, 1624).
^ Ibid.
•^ Peter Lombard, In Rom., super VI,
(PL 191, 1412).
^ De Caelo, II,
(292b 13).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 109. Art. 6 what is in our power, is in us to do. Therefore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for grace.
Obj. 3. Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for grace, with equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the first grace ; and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems that we must not go beyond what was said first, viz., that man, of himself and without grace, can prepare himself for grace.
Obj. 4. Further, it is written {Prov. xvi. i) that it is the part of man to prepare the soul. Now an action is said to be the part of a man when he can do it by himself. Hence it seems that man by himself can prepare himself for grace.
On the contrary, It is written {Jo. vi. 44): No man can come to Me except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him.
But if man could prepare himself, he would not need to be drawn by another. Hence man cannot prepare himself without the help of grace.
/ answer that, The preparation of the human will for good is twofold:—the first, whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to enjoy God; and this preparation of the will cannot take place without the habitual gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious works, as was stated above.
There is a second way in which the human will may be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace itself. Now in order that man prepare himself to receive this gift, it is not necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in the soul, otherwise we should go on to infinity. But we must presuppose a gratuitous gift of God, Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the good wish. For it is in these two ways that we need the divine assistance, as was stated above. Now that we need the help of God to move us, is manifest. For since every agent acts for an end, every cause must direct its effect to its end ; and hence since the order of ends is according to the order of agents or movers, man must be directed to the last end by the motion of the first mover, and to the proximate end by the motion of any of the subordinate movers. So, too, the spirit of the soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the leader of the army—and towards following the standard of a regiment by the motion of the standard-bearer. And thus, since God is absolutely the First Mover, it is by His motion that everything seeks Him under the common notion of good, whereby everything seeks
Q. 109. Art. 7
THE NECESSITY OF GRACE
to be likened to God in its own way. Hence Dionysius says that God turns all to Himself.^^ But He directs just men to Himself as to a special end, which they seek and to which they wish to cling, according to Ps. Ixxii. 28, it is good for Me to adhere to my God. And that they are turned to God can only spring from God's having turned them. Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, to be turned to God ; just as whoever has his eyes turned away from the light of the sun prepares himself to receive the sun's light, by turning his eyes towards the sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except by the gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly.
Reply Obj. i. Man's turning to God is by free choice; and thus man is bidden to turn himself to God. But free choice can be turned to God only when God turns it, according to Jer. xxxi.
1 8 : Convert me and I shall be converted y for Thou art the Lord, my God; and Lament, v. 21:
Convert us, Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.
Reply Obj.
2. Man can do nothing unless moved by God, according to John xv.
5: Without Me, you can do nothing.
Hence when a man is said to do what is in him to do, this is said to be in his power according as he is moved by God.
Reply Obj.
3. This objection regards habitual grace, for which some preparation is required, since every form requires a disposition in that which is to be its subject. But in order that man should be moved by God, no further motion is presupposed, since God is the First Mover. Hence we need not go to infinity.
Reply Obj.
4. It is the p^rt of man to prepare his soul, since he does this by his free choice. And yet he does not do this without the help of God moving him, and drawing him to Himself, as was said above.
Seventh Article
WHETHER MAN CAN
RISE FROM
SIN WITHOUT THE HELP
OF GRACE?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:— Objection 1.
It would seem that man can rise from sin without the help of grace. For what is presupposed to grace
^De Div. Norn., IV, 10 (PG 3, 708).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 109. Art. 7 takes place without grace. But to rise from sin is presupposed to the illumination of grace, since it is written (Ephes. v.
14) :
Arise from the dead and Christ shall enlighten thee.
Therefore man can rise from sin without grace.
Obj. 2 . Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health, as was stated above.^* Now man, by force of his nature, can rise from illness to health, without the external help of medicine, since there still remains in him the principle of life, from which natural operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal reason, man may be restored by himself, and return from the state of sin to the state of justice without the help of external grace.
Obj. 3. Further, every natural thing can return by itself to the act befitting its nature, as hot water returns by itself to its natural coldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural movement. Now sin is an act against nature, as is clear from Damascene.^^ Hence it seems that man by himself can return from sin to the state of justice.
On the contrary, The Apostle says {Gal. ii.
[cf. iii.
21] ) : For if there had been a law given which could give life, then Christ died in vain, i.e., to no purpose. Hence with equal reason, if man has a nature whereby he can be justified, Christ died in vain, i.e., to no purpose. But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore he cannot be justified by himself, i.e., he cannot return from a state of sin to a state of justice.
/ answer that, Man by himself can in no way rise from sin without the help of grace. For since sin is transient as to the act and abiding in its guilt, as was stated above,^^ to rise from sin is not the same as to cease from the act of sin
; but to rise from sin means that man has restored to him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a triple loss by sinning, as was shown above,^"^ viz., stain, corruption of natural good, and debt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he forfeits the adornment of grace through the deformity of sin.
Natural good is corrupted, inasmuch as man's nature is disordered because man's will is not subject to God's; and when this order is overthrown, the consequence is that the whole nature of sinful man remains disordered. Lastly, there is the ®*Q. 71, a.
I, ad 3.
^ De Fide Orth., II, 4; 30 (PG 94, 876; 976) cf. op. cit., IV, 20 (PG 94, 1 196).
'^Q. 87, a.
''Q. 85, a. i; q. 86, a.
I ; q. 87, a. i.
Q. 109. Art. 8
THE NECESSITY OF GRACE
debt 'of punishment, inasmuch as by sinning man deserves eternal damnation.
Now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by God. For since the adornment of grace comes from the illumination of the divine light, this adornment cannot be brought back, except God give His light anew. Hence a habitual gift is necessary; and this is the light of grace. Likewise, the order of nature can be restored, i.e., man's will can be subject to God, only when God draws man's will to Himself, as was stated above. So, too, the guilt of eternal punishment can be remitted by God alone, against Whom the offense was committed ziid Who is man's Judge. And thus, in order that man rise from sin there is required the help of grace, both as regards a habitual gift and as regards the internal motion of God.
Reply Obj. i. To man is bidden that which pertains to the act of free choice, as this act is required in order that man should fise from sin. Hence when it is said, Arise, and Christ shall enlighten thee, we are not to think that the complete rising from sin precedes the illumination of grace; but that when man by his free choice, moved by God, strives to rise from sin, he receives the light of justifying grace.
Reply Obj. 2. The natural reason is not the sufficient principle of the health that is in man by justifying grace. The principle of this health is grace, which is taken away by sin.
Hence man cannot be restored by himself, but requires the light of grace to be poured upon him anew, as if the soul were infused into a dead body for its resurrection.
Reply Obj. 3. When nature is integral, it can be restored by itself to what is befitting and proportioned to it; but without exterior help it cannot be restored to what surpasses its limits. And thus human nature, undone by reason of the act of sin, remains no longer integral, but corrupted, as was stated above; nor can it be restored, by itself, even to its connatural good, and much less to the good of supernatural justice.
Eighth Article
WHETHER MAN WITHOUT GRACE CAN AVOID SIN?
We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:— Objection 1.
It would seem that without grace man can
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 109. Art. 8 avoid sin. For no one sins in what he cannot avoid, as Augustine says.^^ Hence, if a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, it would seem that in sinning he does not sin, which is impossible.
Obj. 2. Further, men are corrected that they may not sin.
If, therefore, a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, correction would seem to be given to no purpose ; which is absurd.
Obj, 3. Further, it is written (Ecclus. xv. 18) : Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him. But by sinning no one ceases to be a man.
Hence it is still in his power to choose good or evil; and thus man can avoid sin without grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says: Whoever denies that we ought to say the prayer 'Lead us not into temptation* (and they deny it who maintain that the help of God's grace is not necessary to man for salvation, but that the gift of the law is enough for the human will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond all hearing, and to be anathematized by the tongues of allP I answer that. We may speak of man in two ways: first, in the state of integral nature; secondly, in the state of corrupted nature. Now in the state of integral nature, man, even without habitual grace, could avoid sinning either mortally or venially, since to sin is nothing else than to stray from what is according to our nature—and in the state of integral nature man could avoid this. Nevertheless, he could not have done it without God's help upholding him in good, since if this had been withdrawn, even his nature would have fallen back into nothingness.
But in the state of corrupted nature man needs grace to heal his nature in order that he may entirely abstain from sin. And in the present life this healing is wrought first in the mind, since the carnal appetite is not yet entirely healed.
Hence the Apostle {Rom. vii. 25) says in the person of one who is healed: / myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of sin. And in this state man can abstain from all mortal sin, whose source is in the reason, as was stated above ;^^ but man cannot abstain from all venial sin because of the corruption of his lower appetite of sensual- ^De Duab. Anim., X; XI (PL 42, 103; 105)
; De Lib. Arb., Ill, 18 (PL 32, 1295).
^De Perfect. lust., XXI (PL 44, 317).
^Q.
74, a. 4.
Q. 109. Art. 8
THE NECESSITY OF GRACE
ity. For man can, indeed, repress each of its movements (and hence they are sinful and voluntary), but not all, because, while he is resisting one, another may arise, and also because the reason is not always alert to avoid these movements, as was said above.^^ So, too, before man's reason, wherein is mortal sin, is restored by justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin, and for a time, since it is not necessary that he should always be actually sinning. But it cannot be that he remains for a long time without mortal sin. Hence Gregory says that a sin not at once taken away by repentance, by its weight drags us down to other sins,^^ and this because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject to the reason, so should the reason be subject to God, and should place in Him the end of its will. Now it is by the end that all human acts ought to be regulated, even as it is by the judgment of the reason that the movements of the lower appetite should be regulated. And thus, even as inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite cannot help occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, so likewise, since man's reason is not entirely subject to God, the consequence is that many disorders occur in the acts itself of the reason. For when man's heart is not so fixed on God as to be unwilling to be parted from Him for the sake of finding any good or avoiding any evil, many things happen for the achieving or avoiding of which a man strays from God and breaks His commandments, and thus sins mortally; especially since, when surprised, a man acts according to his preconceived end and his pre-existing habits, as the Philosopher says,^ although with the premeditation of his reason a man may do something outside the order of his preconceived end and the inclination of his habit. But because a man cannot always have this premeditation, it cannot help occurring that he acts in accordance with his will turned aside from God, unless, by grace, he is quickly brought back to the due order.
Reply Obj. i. Man can avoid each but not every act of sin, except by grace, as was stated above. Nevertheless, since it is by his own shortcoming that he does not prepare himself to have grace, the fact that he cannot avoid sin without grace does not excuse him from sin.
Reply Obj, 2. Correction is useful in order that out of the *^Q.
74, a.
3, ad 2.
^In Ezech., I, horn.
(PL 76, 915).
*ȣtA., Ill, 8 (1117a 18).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 109. Art. 9 sorrow of correction may spring the. wish to be regenerate; if indeed he who is corrected is a son of promise, in such sort that while the noise of correction is outwardly resounding and punishing, God by hidden inspirations is inwardly also causing him to will, as Augustine says.^^ Correction is therefore necessary, from the fact that man's will is required in order to abstain from sin; and yet it is not sufficient without God's help. Hence it is written (Eccles, vii. 14)
: Consider the works of God that no man can correct whom He hath despised.
Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says, this saying is to be understood of man in the state of integral nature, when as yet he was not a slave of sin.^^ Hence he was able to sin and not to sin. Now, too, whatever a man wills, is given to him; but his willing good, he has by God's assistance.
Ninth Article
WHETHER ONE WHO HAS ALREADY OBTAINEP GRACE
CAN,
OF HIMSELF AND WITHOUT FURTHER HELP OF GRACE,
DO GOOD AND AVOID SIN?
We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that whoever has already obtained grace can, by himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid sin. For a thing is useless or imperfect, if it does not fulfill what it was given for. Now grace is given to us that we may do good and keep from sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that grace is either useless or imperfect.
Obj. 2. Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells in us, according to I Cor. iii.
16: Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?
Now since the Spirit of God is omnipotent. He is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us from sin. Hence a man who has obtained grace can do the above two things without any further assistance of grace.
Obj.
3. Further, if a man who has obtained grace needs further aid of grace in order to live righteously and to keep free from sin, with equal reason he will need yet another
*tDe Corrept. et Grat., I (PL 44, 921).
*^ Pseudo-Augustine, Hypognost., Ill,
2 (PL 45, 1621).
Q. 109. Art. 9
THE NECESSITY OF GRACE
grace, even though he has obtained this first help of grace.
Therefore we must go on to infinity; which is impossible.
Hence, whoever is in grace needs no further help of grace in order to work righteously and to keep free from sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says that as the eye of the body, though most healthy, cannot see unless it is helped by the brightness of light, so neither can a man, even if he is most perfectly justified, live righteously unless he be helped by the eternal light of justice}^ But justification is by grace, according to Rom. iii. 24: Being justified freely by His grace.
Hence, even a man who already possesses grace needs a further assistance of grace in order to live righteously.
/ answer that. As was stated above, in order to live righteously a man needs a twofold help of God—first, a habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds meritorious of eternal life, which exceed the capability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order to be moved by God to act.
Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a further help of grace, that is, a further infused habit. Yet he needs the help of grace in another way, i.e., in order to be moved by God to act righteously; and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the divine motion; secondly, for this special reason—the condition of the state of human nature. For, although healed by grace as to the mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves the law of sin {Rom. vii. 25). In the intellect, too, there remains the darkness of ignorance, whereby, as is written {Rom, viii. 26)
: We know not what we should pray for as we ought; since, because of the various turns of circumstances, and because we do not know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for our good, according to Wis. ix.
14: For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain. Hence we must be guided and guarded by God, Who knows and can do all things. For this reason also it is becoming in those who have been born again as sons of God to say: Lead us not into temptation, and Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven, and whatever else is contained in the Lord's Prayer pertaining to this.
*^De Nat. et Grat., XXVI (PL 44, 261).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 109. Art. 10
Reply Obj. i. The gift of habitual grace is not therefore given to us that we may no longer need the divine help
; for every creature needs to be preserved in the good received from Him. Hence, if after having received grace man still needs the divine help, it cannot be concluded that grace is given to no purpose, or that it is imperfect, since man will need the divine help even in the state of glory, when grace shall be fully perfected. But here grace is to some extent imperfect, inasmuch as it does not completely heal man, as was stated above.
Reply Obj, 2. The operation of the Holy Ghost, which moves and protects, is not circumscribed by the effect of habitual grace which it causes in us; but beyond this effect
He, together with the Father and the Son, moves and protects us.
Tenth Article
WHETHER MAN POSSESSED OF GRACE NEEDS THE HELP OF
GRACE IN ORDER TO PERSEVERE?
We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:— Objection i. It would seem that man possessed of grace needs no help of grace to persevere. For perseverance is something less than virtue, even as continence is, as is clear from the Philosopher.^"^ Now since man is justified by grace, he needs no further help of grace in order to have the virtues.
Much less, therefore, does he need the help of grace to have perseverance.
Obj.
2. Further, all the virtues are infused together. But perseverance is put down as a virtue. Hence it seems that, together with grace, perseverance is given when the other virtues are infused.
Obj. 3. Further, as the Apostle says {Rom. v. 20), more was restored to man by Christ's gift than he had lost by Adam's sin. But Adam received what enabled him to persevere. Therefore, all the more is there restored in us by the grace of Christ the ability to persevere. And thus man does not need grace in order to persevere.
On the contrary, Augustine says: Why is perseverance besought of God, if it is not bestowed by God? For is it not a mocking request to seek what we know He does not give, and ^''Eth., VII, I (ii4Sb i) ; 9 ("Sib 32).
Q. 109. Art. 10
THE NECESSITY OF GRACE
what is in our power without His giving it?^^ Now perseverance is besought even by those who are sanctified by grace; and this is seen when we say Hallowed be Thy name, which Augustine confirms by the words of Cyprian.^^ Hence man, even when possessed of grace, needs perseverance to be given to him by God.
/ answer that. Perseverance is taken in three ways. First, to signify a habit of the mind whereby a man stands steadfastly, lest he be moved by the assault of sadness from what is virtuous. And thus perseverance is to sadness as continence is to concupiscence and pleasure, as the Philosopher says.^^
Secondly, perseverance may be called a habit whereby a man has the purpose of persevering in good until the end. And in both these ways perseverance is infused together with grace, even as are continence and the other virtues. Thirdly, perseverance is called the abiding in good to the end of life. And in order to have this perseverance man does not, indeed, need another habitual grace, but he needs the divine assistance guiding and guarding him against the attacks of the passions, as appears from the preceding article. And hence after anyone has been justified by grace, he still needs to beseech God for the aforesaid gift of perseverance, that he may be kept from evil till the end of his life. For grace is given to many to whom perseverance in grace is not given.
Reply Obj. i. This objection regards the first mode of perseverance, as the second objection regards the second.
Hence the solution of the second objection is clear.
Reply Obj, 3. As Augustine says, in the original state man received a gift whereby he ceuld persevere, but to persevere was not given him. But now, by the grace of Christ, many receive both the gift of grace whereby they may persevere, and the further gift of persevering.^'^ And thus, Ghrist's gift is greater than Adam's fault. Nevertheless, it was easier for man to persevere through the gift of grace in the state of innocence, in which the flesh was not rebellious against the spirit, than it is now. For the restoration by Christ's grace, although it is already begun in the mind, is not yet completed in the flesh, as it will be in heaven, where man will not merely be able to persevere, but will be unable to sin.
*^De Bono Persev., II (PL 45, 996).
'Ubid.—Ci. also De Corrept. et Grat., VI, 10 (PL 44, 922).
"^ Eth., VII,
(iisoa 13).
•^Cf. De Corrept. et Grat., XII, 34 (PL 44, 937),
Question CXII
ON THE CAUSE OF GRACE
(In Five Articles) We must now consider the cause of grace, and under this head there are five points of inquiry:
( i ) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace?
(2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of the recipient, by an act of free choice? (3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity?
(4) Whether grace is equal in all?
(5) Whether anyone can know that he haS grace?
First Article
WHETHER GOD ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF GRACE?
We proceed thus to the First Article:— Objection i . It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace. For it is written {Jo. i. 17) : Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. Now, by the name Jesus Christ is understood not merely the divine nature assuming, but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature may be the cause of grace.
Obj. 2. Further, there is this difference between the sacraments of the New Law and those of the Old, that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it. Now the sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.
Obj.
3. Further, according to Dionysius, Angels cleanse, enlighten and perfect both lesser angels and men.^ Now the rational creature is cleansed, enlightened and perfected by grace. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.
On the contrary, It is written {Ps. Ixxxiii. 12): The Lord will give grace and glory.
I answer that, Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause must always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace surpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short of a partaking of the divine nature, which exceeds every other nature. And thus it is impossible ^De Cael. Hier., Ill, 2; IV, 2; VII, 3; VIII, 2 (PG 3, 165; 180; 209;
240).
Q. 112. Art. 2
THE CAUSE OF GRACE
that any creature should cause grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify, by bestowing a partaking of the divine nature through a participated likeness, as it is impossible that anything save fire should enkindle.
Reply Obj. i. Christ's humanity is an organ of His divinity, as Damascene says.^ Now an instrument does not bring forth the action of the principal agent by its own power, but in virtue of the principal agent. Hence Christ's humanity does not cause grace by its own power, but by the power of the divine nature joined to it, whereby the actions of Christ's humanity are saving actions.
Reply Obj. 2. Just as in the person of Christ the humanity causes our salvation by grace, under the principal agency of the divine power, so likewise in the sacraments of the New
Law, which are derived from Christ, grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and principally by the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments, according to John iii.
Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.
Reply Obj. 3. Angels cleanse, enlighten and perfect angels or men, by instruction, and not by justifying them through grace. Hence Dionysius says that this cleansing and enlightenment and perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of divine science.^ Second Article
WHETHER ANY PREPARATION AND DISPOSITION FOR GRACE
IS REQUIRED ON MAN'S PART?
We proceed thus to the Second Article:— Objection 1 . It would seem that no preparation or disposition for grace is required on man's part, since, as the Apostle says {Rom. iv. 4), To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt. Now a man's preparation by free choice can be only through some operation. Hence it would do away with the notion of grace.
Obj. 2 . Further, whoever continues sinning is not preparing himself to have grace. But to some who continue sinning grace is given, as is clear in the case of Paul, who received
^Z>e Fide Orth., Ill, 19 (PG 94, 1080).
^ Cf. De Gael. Hier., VII, 3 (PG 3, 209).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 1 1 2 . Art. 2 grace while he was breathing out tkreatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord {Acts ix. i). Hence no preparation for grace is required on man's part.
Obj.
3. Further, an agent of infinite power needs no disposition in matter, since it does not even require matter, as appears in creation, to which grace is compared, for it is called a new creature (Gal, vi. 15). But only God, Who has infinite power, causes grace, as was stated above. Hence no preparation is required on man's part to obtain grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Amos iv. 12) : Be prepared to meet thy God, O Israel; and (/ Kings vii. 3): Prepare your hearts unto the Lord.
I answer that, As was stated above, grace is taken in two ways.^ First, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, as a help from God, Who moves the soul to good. Now taking grace in the first sense, a certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a form can be only in disposed matter. Bu^ if we speak of grace as it signifies a help from God moving us to good, no preparation is required on man's part, anticipating, as it were, the divine help, but rather, every preparation in man must be by the help of God moving the soul to good.
And thus even the good movement of free choice, whereby anyone is prepared for receiving the gift of grace, is an act of free choice moved by God. And it is thus that man is said to prepare himself, according to Prov, xvi. i :
It is the part of man to prepare the soul; yet it is principally from God, Who moves the free choice. Hence it is said that man's will is prepared by God
{Prov. viii.
35), and that man's steps are guided by God {Prov. xxxvi. 23).
Reply Obj.
1. A certain preparation of man for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and this operation is meritorious, not indeed of grace, which is already possessed, but of glory, which is not yet possessed. But there is another imperfect preparation, which sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace, which yet is from God's motion. But it does not suffice for merit, since man is not yet justified by grace, and merit can only arise from grace, as will be seen farther on.^ Reply Obj. 2. Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God prevent and move him to good, it is of no account
*Q. 109, a. 2, 3, 6 and 9; q. no, a. 2; q. in, a. 2.
^Q. 114, a. 2.
Q. 112. Art. 3
THE CAUSE OF GRACE
whether anyone arrive at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step. For it is written {Ecclus. xi. 23)
: It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make the poor man rich. Now it sometimes happens that God moves a man to good, but not perfect good, and this preparation precedes grace. But He sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to good, and man receives grace suddenly, according to John vi. 45: Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me. And thus it happened to Paul, since, suddenly when he was in the midst of sin, his heart was perfectly moved by God to hear, to learn, to come; and hence he received grace suddenly.
Reply Obj. 3. An agent of infinite power needs no matter or disposition of matter, brought about by the action of some other cause; and yet, looking to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause, in the thing caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the form. So, likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation is required which He Himself does not bring about.
Third Article
WHETHER GRACE
IS NECESSARILY GIVEN TO WHOEVER PRE-
PARES HIMSELF FOR
IT, OR TO WHOEVER DOES WHAT
HE CAN?
We proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection
. It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himsdf for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because, on Rom. v. i (Being justified .
. by jaith, let us have peace, etc.) the Gloss says: God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there would be injustice with Him.^ But it is impossible for injustice to be with God.
Therefore it is impossible for God not to welcome whoever flies to Him. Hence he receives grace of necessity.
Obj. 2 . Further, Anselm says that the reason why God does not bestow grace on the devil is that he did not wish, nor was he prepared, to receive it."^ But if the cause be removed, the effect must needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing to receive grace it is bestowed on him of necessity.
® Peter Lombard, In Rom., super III, 21 (PL 191, 1360).
'De Casu Diab., Ill (PL 158, 328).
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 112. Art. 3
Obj, 3. Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from Dionysius.^ But the good of grace is better than the good of nature. Hence, since natural forms necessarily come to disposed matter, much more does it seem that grace is necessarily bestowed on whoever prepares himself for grace.
On the contrary, Man is compared to God as clay to the potter, according to Jer. xviii. 6: ^4^ clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand. But however much the clay is prepared, it does not necessarily receive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a man prepares himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God.
/ answer that, As was stated above, man's preparation for grace is from God, as mover, and from free choice, as moved.
Hence the preparation may be looked at in two ways. First, as it is from free choice, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace, since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the mover, and thus it has a necessity—not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility—as regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's intention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine, in his book On the Predestination of the Saints, that by God's good gifts whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated.^ Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to John vi. 45: Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.
Reply Obj.
. This Gloss is speaking of such as fly to God by a meritorious act of their free choice, already informed with grace; for if they did not receive grace, it would be against the justice which He Himself established.—Or if it refers to the movement of free choice before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man's flight to God is by a divine motion, which ought not, in justice, to fail.
Reply Obj.
2. The first cause of the defect of grace is on our part; but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God's, according to Osee xiii. 9: Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.
Reply Obj.
3. Even in natural things, the form does not «De Div.
Norn., IV, 20 (PG 3, 7i9).
' Cf . De Bono Persev.,
XIV (PL 45, 1014).
Q. 112. Art. 4
THE CAUSE OF GRACE
necessarily follow the disposition of the matter, except by the power of the agent that causes the disposition.
Fourth Article
WHETHER GRACE
IS GREATER IN ONE THAN
IN ANOTHER?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:— Objection i . It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in another. For grace is caused in us by the divine love, as was stated above.^^ Now it is written {Wis. vi. 8): He made the little and the great and He hath equally care of all.
Therefore all obtain grace from Him equally.
Obj. 2. Further, whatever is a maximum cannot be more or less. But grace is a maximum since it joins us with our last end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it. Hence it is not greater in one than in another.
Obj.
Further, grace is the soul's life, as was stated above.^^ But there is no greater or less in life. Hence, neither is there in grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Ephes. iv. 7) : But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ. Now what is given in measure is not given to all equally. Hence all have not an equal grace.
/ answer that, As was stated above, habits can have a double magnitude.^2 One concerns the end or object, as when a virtue is said to be more noble through being ordained to a greater good ; the other is on the part of the subject, which participates more or less in the habit inhering to it.
Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be greater or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to the highest good, which is God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive more or less, inasmuch as one may be more perfectly illumined by the light of grace than another. And a certain reason for this is on the part of him who prepares himself for grace; since he who is better prepared for grace receives more grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek the first cause of this diversity, since man prepares himself only inasmuch as his free choice is prepared by God. Hence the first cause of this diversity is to be sought on the part of God,
^Q. no, a.
^Q, no, a. i, ad 2.
^Q. 52, a. i and 2; tj. 66, a.
I and 2.
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 112. Art. S Who dispenses His gifts of grace variously, in order that the beauty and perfection of the Church may result from these various degrees; even as He instituted the various conditions of things, that the universe might be perfect. Hence, after the Apostle had said {Ephes. iv. 7) : To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ, having enumerated the various graces, he adds {verse 12): For the perfecting of the saints .
, , for the edifying of the body of Christ.
Reply Obj, i. The divine care may be looked at in two ways. First, as regards the divine act, which is simple and uniform ; and thus His care looks equally to all, since by one simple act He administers great things and little. But, secondly, it may be considered in those things which come to creatures by the divine care; and thus, inequality is founds inasmuch as God by His care provides greater gifts for some, and lesser gifts for others.
Reply Obj.
2. This objection is based on the first kind of magnitude in grace; since grace cannot be greater by ordaining to a greater good, but inasmuch as it ordains more or less to a greater or lesser participation of the same good. For there may be diversity of intensity and remission both in grace and in final glory as regards the subjects' participation.
Reply Obj. 3. Natural life pertains to man's substance, and hence cannot be more or less; but man partakes of the life of grace accidentally, and hence man may possess it more or less.
Fifth Article
WHETHER MAN CAN KNOW THAT HE HAS GRACE?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:— Objection 1. It would seem that man can know that he has grace. For grace is in the soul by its essence. Now the soul has most certain knowledge of those things that are in it by their essence, as appears from Augustine.^^ Hence grace may be known most certainly by one who has grace.
Obj. 2. Further, as science is a gift of God, so is grace. But whoever receives science from God, knows that he has science, according to Wis. vii. 17: The Lord hath given me
^De Genesi ad Litt., XII, 25; 31 (PL 34>'475; 479) •
Q. 112. Art. 5
THE CAUSE OF GRACE
the true knowledge of the things that are. Hence, with equal reason, whoever receives grace from God, knows that he has grace.
Obj, 3. Further, light is more knowable than darkness, since, according to the Apostle (Ephes. v.
13), all that is made manifest is light. Now sin, which is spiritual darkness, may be known with certainty by one that is in sin. Much more, therefore, may grace, which is spiritual light, be known.
Obj. 4. Further, the Apostle says (i Cor. ii. 12) : Now we have received not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God; that we may know the things that are given us from God. Now grace is God's first gift. Hence, the man who receives grace by the Holy Spirit, by the same Holy Spirit knows the grace given to him.
Obj. 5. Further, it was said by the Lord to Abraham {Gen, xxii.
12): Now I know that thou fearest God, i.e., I have made thee know. But He is speaking there of chaste fear, which is not apart from grace. Hence a man may know that he has grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. ix. i ) : Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred. Now sanctifying grace maketh a man worthy of God's love. Therefore no one can know whether he has sanctifying grace.
/ answer that, There are three ways of knowing a thing.
First, by revelation, and thus anyone may know that he has grace, for God by a special privilege reveals this at times to some, in order that the joy of safety may begin in them even in this life, and that they may carry on toilsome works with greater trust and greater energy, and may bear the evils of this present life, as when it was said to Paul {2 Cor. xii. 9)
My grace is sufficient for thee.
Secondly, a man may, of himself, know something, and with certainty ; and in this way no one can know that he has grace.
For certitude about a thing can be had only when we may judge of it by its proper principle. Thus it is by indemonstrable universal principles that certitude is obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now no one can know he has the science of a conclusion if he does not know its principle. But the principle of grace and its object is God, Who by reason of His very excellence is unknown to us, according to Job xxxvi. 26: Behold God is great, exceeding our knowU
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
Q. 112. Art. 5 edge. And hence His presence in us and His absence cannot be known with certainty, according to Job ix. 11: // He come to me, I shall not see Him; if He depart, I shall not understand. And hence man cannot judge with certainty that he has grace, according to / Cor. iv. 3, 4: But neither do I judge my own self .
. but He that judgeth me is the Lord.
Thirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs ; and thus anyone may know he has grace, when he is conscious of delighting in God and of despising worldly things, and inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any mortal sin. In this sense it is written (Apoc. ii. 17) : To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna .
. which no man knoweth, but he that receiveth it, because whoever receives it knows, by experiencing a certain sweetness, which he who does not receive does not experience. Yet this knowledge is imperfect, and hence the Apostle says (/ Cor. iv. 4)
: I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified, since, according to Ps. xviii.
13: Who can understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from those of others spare Thy servant.
Reply Obj. i . Those things which are in the soul by their essence are known through experimental knowledge, in so far as through his acts man has experience of his inward principles. For example, we perceive our will by willing, and by exercising the functions of life, we observe that there is life in us.
Reply Obj.
2. It belongs to the nature of science that a man should have certitude of the objects of science; so, too, it belongs to the nature of faith that a man should be certain of the things of faith, and this, because certitude belongs to the ' perfection of the intellect, wherein these gifts exist.
Hence, whoever has science or faith is certain that he has them. But it is otherwise with grace and charity and the like, which perfect the appetitive power.
Reply Obj. 3. Sin has for its principal and object a mutable good, which is known to us. But the object or end of grace is unknown to us because of the greatness of its light, according to I Tim. vi. 16: Who .
. inhabiteth light inaccessible.
Reply Obj. 4. The Apostle is here speaking of the gifts of glory (j Cor. ii. 10), which have been given to us in hope, and these we know most certainly by faith, although we do not know for certain that! we have grace to enable us to merit
Q. 112. Art. 5
THE CAUSE OF GRACE
them.—Or it may be said that he is speaking of the privileged knowledge, which comes of revelation. Hence he adds (verse
10) : Bui to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit.
Reply Obj, 5. What was said to Abraham may refer to the experimental knowledge which we have through our deeds.
For in the deed that Abraham had just wrought, he could know experimentally that he had the fear of God.—Or it may refer to a revelation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1
The following list of books does not pretend to be a bibliography either of St. Thomas himself or of all the literature on which the Summa Theologica depends. Such a bibliography is scarcely necessary, since there are in existence excellent and exhaustive Thomistic bibliographical monographs. For the years down to 1920, one may consult the Bibliographie Thomiste of P. Mandonnet and J. Destrez
(Bibliotheque Thomiste, vol. I, Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1921). The years 1920 to 1940 are covered by the recent work of V. Bourke {Thomistic Bibliography, St. Louis:
St. Louis University Press, 1945). On the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas himself, their authenticity, chronology, etc., there are the well known works of Mandonnet and Grabmann
(cf. P. Mandonnet, Des icrits authentiques de s. Thomas d'Aquin, 2nd ed.
[Fribourg: Imprimerie de I'Oeuvre de Saint-Paul, 1910] ; M. Grabmann, Die Werke des Hi. Thomas von Aquin, 2nd ed.
[Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philosophic und Theologie des Mittelalters, Band XX, 1-2, Miinster:
Aschendorff, 1931]).
These ample works of reference dispense with the need of reproducing here any general bibliography on St. Thomas Aquinas.
I have therefore restricted myself to including in the following list only such primary sources, collections of documents and secondary works which have been used in the annotations to the text of St. Thomas Aquinas.
I Abelard, Peter:
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De Quindecim Problematibus (in P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et VAverroisme Latin au Xlllme Siecle, Louvain: Institut Superieur de Philosophie de TUniversite, Pt.
II, 1908, pp. 29-52).
*The only abbreviations which may require explanation are two:
PL stands for Patrologia Latina (i.e., J. P. Migne, Patrologiae Cursus Computus, Series II, 221 vols., Paris, 18441864, with later reprints)
PG stands for Patrologia Graeca (i.e., J. P. Migne, Patrologiae Cursus Computus, Series I, 162 vols., Paris, 1857-1866, with later reprints).
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5. Anselmi Opera Omnia, I-II (continens opera quae Prior et Abbas Beccensis composuit), ed. F.
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Averroes:
Aristotelis Stagiritae Libri Omnes .
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Basil the Great, St.:
Opera Omnia, PG 29-32.
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Bernard of Clairvaux, St.:
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Boethius:
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42:
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Grosseteste, Robert:
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Opera Omnia, PL 9-10.
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John Chrysostom, St.:
Opera Omnia, PG 47-64.
John Damascene, St.:
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I, a. 2"
(Melanges Thomistes [Bibliotheque Thomiste, vol. Ill], Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1923, pp. 123-140).
"Grammaire et theologie aux Xlle et Xllle siecles"
(Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littiraire du moyen age, vol. X, 1935-1936, pp. s-28).
Corpus luris Canonici,
vols., ed. E. L. RichterE. Friedberg (Leipsig:
B. Tauchnitz, 1922).
Vol. I. Decretum Gratiani.
Vol. II. DecretaXium Collectiones.
Corpus luris Civilis, 2 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann. Vol I, 15th ed., 1928; Vol. II, 9th ed., 1915).
Vol.
Institutiones, ed.
Paul Krueger; Digesta, cd.
Theodore Mommsen, revised by Paul Krueger.
Vol.
II. Codex Justinianus, ed. and revised by Paul Krueger.
Denifle, H., and Chatelain, E.:
Chartularium Vniversitatis Parisiensis,
vols.
(Paris:
Delalain, 1889-1897).
Denzinger, H., and Bannwart, C:
Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum, i6th-i7th ed. by J. P. Umberg (Freiburg: Herder and Co., 1928).
De Vaux, R.:
Notes et textes sur Vavicennisme latin aux confins des Xlle-XIlIe sUcles (Bibliotheque Thomiste, vol. XX, Paris:
J. Vrin, 1934).
Duhem, P.:
Le Systime du Monde, 5 vols.
(Paris: Hermann, 1913-1917).
Gaudel, A.:
"Pech6 originel (Dictionnaire de thiologie catholique, vol. XII, 1930, coll. 275-606).
Gilson, E.:
"Pourquoi saint Thomas a critique saint Augustin"
(Archives
BIBLIOGRAPHY
d*histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen-dge, vol.
I, 1926, pp.
1-127).
"Les sources greco-arabes de Taugustinisme avicennisant"
{Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen-dge, vol. IV, 1929, pp.
5-149).
Kleineidam, E.:
Das Problem der hylomorphen Zusammensetzung der geistigen Substanzen im 13.
Jahrhundert, behandelt bis Thomas von Aquin (Breslau, 1930).
Kors, J. B.:
La justice primitive et le pdchd originel d'aprh s. Thomas (Bibliotheque Thomiste, vol. II, Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1922).
Landgraf, A.:
"Studien zur Theologie des Zwolften Jahrhunderts"
(Traditio, vol.
I, 1943, New York: Cosmopolitan Science and Art Service Co., pp.
183-222).
Lottin, 0.:
"Les dons du Saint-Esprit chez les theologiens depuis P. Lombard jusqu'a S. Thomas d'Aquin"
(Recherches de theologie ancienne et midiivale, vol.
I, 1929, pp. 41-97).
Le Droit Naturel chez Saint Thomas d*Aquin et ses prddScesseurs, 2nd ed.
(Bruges: Ch. Beyaert, 1931).
"La composition hylemorphique des substances spirituelles.
Les debuts de la controverse"
(Revue nio-scolastique de philosophic, vol. XXXIV, 1932, pp. 21-41).
Mansi, J. D.:
Sacrorum ConcUiorum Nova et Amplissima CoUectio, 54 vols. (Paris and Leipsig: H. Welter, 1901-1927).
Muckle, J. T.:
"The De OfUciis Ministrorum of Saint Ambrose"
(Mediaeval Studies, vol.
I, 1939, pp. 63-80).
"Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth"
(Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen dge, 1933 ; vol. VIII, pp. 5-8) Parent, J.-M.:
"La notion de dogme au Xllle siede"
(Etudes d'histoire littiraire et doctrinale du Xllle siicle, premiere serie, 1932, Ottawa:
Institut d'fitudes Medievales, pp. 141-163).
Von Amim, H.:
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta,
vols.
(Leipsig:
G. Teubner, 1921-1924).
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Irish Fairy and Folk Tales
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G77 An Anthology of Famous Am,erican Stories G54 An Anthology of Famous\ British Stories G67 Anthology of Famous English and American Poetry
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G89 Great Classical Myths G72 Great Tales of Terror and the Supernatural G9 Great Voices of the Reformation G87 Medieval Epics G48 The Metropolitan Opera Guide G46 A New Anthology of Modern Poetry G69 One Hundred and One Years' Entertainment
G90 Philosophies of Art and Beauty: Readings in Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger G21 Sixteen Famous American Plays G63 Sixteen Famous British Plays G71 Sixteen Famous European Plays G45 Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers G22 Thirty Famous One-Act Plays G66 Three Famous Murder Novels, Before the Fact, Francis lies, Trent's Last Case, E. C. Bentley, The House of the Arrow,
A. E. W. Mason Gio Twelve Famous Plays of the Restoration and Eighteenth Century ( 1 660-1 820) Dryden, Congreve, Wycherley, Gay, etc.
G56 The Wisdom of Catholicism'
G59 The Wisdom of China and India G79 The Wisdom of Israel
Modern Library College Editions A distinguished paperbound series acclaimed for its excellent translations, outstanding critical introductions, and reliable texts.
Included are American, British, and Continental classics newly edited especially for this series as well as volumes selected from the Modern Library titles most frequently used in colleges and universities throughout the country.