CHAPTER XXVI
HAPPINESS AND THE WILL
knowledge tends to a definite end. This can be none other than the highest thing knowable, which is God. Therefore the knowledge of God is man's last end.
Now the last end of man and of any intelligent substance is called happiness or beatitude, for it is this that every intellectual substance desires as its last end, and for its own sake alone. Therefore the last beatitude or happiness of any intellectual substance is to know God.
Hence it is said {Matt. v. 8):
Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God; and {Jo. xvii. 3) : This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God. Aristotle himself agrees with this judgment when he says that man's ultimate happiness is speculative, and this with regard to the highest object of speculation.^^ '^Eth.,X,
(1177a 18).
CHAPTER XXVI
DOES HAPPINESS CONSIST IN AN ACT OF THE WILL?
Since the intellectual substance attains to God by its operation, not only by an act of understanding but also by an act of the will, through desiring and loving Him, and through delighting in Him, someone hiight think that man's last end and ultimate happiness consists, not in knowing God, but in loving Him, or in some other act of the will towards Him;
[ I ] especially since the object of the will is the good, which has the nature of an end, whereas the true, which is the object of the intellect, has not the nature of an end except in so far as it also is a good. Therefore, seemingly, man does not attain to his last end by an act of his intellect, but rather by an act of his will.
[2] Further. The ultimate perfection of operation is delight, which perfects operation as beauty perfects youth, as the Philosopher says.^ Hence, if the last end be a perfect operation, it would seem that it must consist in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.
[3] Again. Delight apparently is desired for its own sake, so that it is never desired for the sake of something else; for it is silly to ask of anyone why he seeks to be delighted. Now this is a condition of the ultimate end, namely, that it be ^Eth.,X,4 (1174b 31).
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
sought for its own sake. Therefore, seemingly, the last end consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.
[4] Moreover. All agree in their desire of the last end, for it is a natural desire. But more people seek delight than knowledge. Therefore delight would seem to be the last end rather than knowledge.
[5] Furthermore. The will is seemingly a higher power than the intellect, for the will moves the intellect to its act; since when a person wills, his intellect considers by an act what he holds by a habit. Therefore, seemingly, the action of the will is more noble than the action of the intellect.
Therefore, it would seem that the last end, which is beatitude, consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.
But this can be clearly shown to be impossible.
For since happiness is the proper good of the intellectual nature, it must needs become the intellectual nature accord- ''ing to that which is proper thereto. Now appetite is not proper to the intellectual nature, but is in all things, although it is found diversely in diverse things. This diversity, however, arises from the fact that things are diversely related to knowledge. For things wholly devoid of knowledge have only a natural appetite; those that have a sensitive knowledge have also a sensitive appetite, under which the irascible and concupiscible appetites are comprised; and those which have intellectual knowledge have also an appetite proportionate to that knowledge, namely, the will. The will, therefore, in so far as it is an appetite, is not proper to the intellectual nature, but only in so far as it is dependent on the intellect. On the other hand, the intellect is in itself proper to the intellectual natureQCherefore, beatitude or happiness consists principally and essentially in an act of the intellect, rather than in an act of the willTJ
Again. In all powers that are moved by their objects, the object is naturally prior to the acts of those powers, even as the mover is naturally prior to the movable being moved.
Now the will is such a power, for the appetible object moves the appetite. Therefore the will's object is naturally prior to its act, and consequently its first object precedes its every act. Therefore an act of the will cannot be the first thing willed. But this is the last end, which is beatitude. [Therefore beatitude or happiness cannot be the very act of the will^
HAPPINESS AND THE WILL
? Besides. In all those powers which are able to reflect on their acts, their act must first bear on some other object, and afterwards the power is brought to bear on its own act.
For if the intellect understands that it understands, we must suppose first that it understands some particular thing, and that afterwards it understands that it understands; for this very act of understanding, which the intellect understands, must have an object. Hence either we must go on forever, or if we come to some first thing understood, this will not be an act of understanding, but some intelligible thing. In the same way, the first thing willed cannot be the very act of wilHng, but must be some other good. Now the first thing willed by an intellectual nature is beatitude or happiness; because it is for its sake that we will whatever we will.Clherefore happiness cannot consist in an act of the wilp
*J Further. The truth of a thing's nature is derived from those things which constitute its substance; for a true man differs from a man in a picture by the things which constitute man's substance. Now false happiness does not differ from true in an act of the will; because, whatever be proposed to the will as the supreme good, whether truly or falsely, it makes no difference to the will in its desiring, loving, or enjoying that good: the difference is on the part of the intellect, as to whether the good proposed as supreme be truly so or notiiherefore beatitude or happiness consists essentially in an act of the intellect rather than of the willTJ
5 Again. If an act of the will were happiness itself, this act would be an act either of desire, or love, or delight. But desire cannot possibly be the last end. For desire implies that the will is tending to w^hat it has not yet; and this is contrary to the very notion of the last end.—Nor can love be the last end. For a good is loved not only while it is in our possession, but even when it is not, because it is through love that we seek by desire what we have not; and if the love of a thing we possess is more perfect, this arises from the fact that we possess the good we love. It is one thing, therefore, to possess the good which is our end, and another to love it; for love was imperfect before we possessed the end, and perfect after we obtained possession.—Nor again is delight the last end. For it is possession of the good that causes delight, whether we are conscious of possessing it actually, or call to mind our previous possession, or hope to possess it
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
in the future. Therefore delight is not the last end.—^Therefore no act of the will can be happiness itself essentially.
C Furthermore. If delight were the last end, it would be desirable for its own sake. But this is not true. For the desirabiHty of a delight depends on what gives rise to the delight, since that which arises from good and desirable operations is itself good and desirable, but that which arises from evil operations is itself evil and to be avoided. Therefore its goodness and desirability are from something else, and consequently it is not itself the last end or happiness.
Moreover. The right order of things agrees with Jhe^order_ of nature, for irithe natural order things are orderedjojheir end without any error. Now, in the natural order delight is for the sake of operation, and not conversely. For it is to be observed that nature has joined delight with those animal operations which are clearly ordered to necessary ends: for instance, to the use of food that is ordered to the preservation of the individual, and to sexual matters, that are appointed for the preservation of the species ; since were there no pleasure, animals would abstain from the use of these necessary things. Therefore delight cannot be the last end. f Again. Delight, seemingly, is nothing else than the quiescence of the will in some becoming good, just as desire is the inclining of the will towards the attaining of some good. Now just as by his will a man is inclined towards an end, and rests in it, so too natural bodies have a natural inclination to their respective ends, and are at rest when they have once attained their end. Now it is absurd to say that the end of the movement of a heavy body is not to be in its proper place, but that it is the quiescence of the inclination towards that place.
For if it were nature's chief intent that this inclination should be quiescent, it would not give such an inchnation; but it gives the inclination so that the body may tend towards its proper place, and when it has arrived there, as though it were its end, quiescence of the inclination follows. Hence this quiescence is not the end, but accompanies the end. Neither therefore is delight the ultimate end, but accompanies it.
Much less therefore is happiness any act of the will. a Besides.
If a thing have something extrinsic for its end, the operation whereby it first obtains that thing will be called its last end. Thus, for those whose end is money possession is said to be their end, but not love or desire. Now the last
HAPPINESS AND THE WILL
end of the intellectual substance is God. Hence that operation of man whereby he first obtains God is essentially his happiness or beatitude. And this is understanding, since we cannot will what we do not understand. Therefore man's ultimate happiness is essentially to know God by the intellect; it is not an act of the will.
From what has been said v/e can now solve the arguments that were objected in the contrary sense. For it does not necessarily follow that happiness is essentially the very act of the will, from the fact that it is the object of the will, through being the highest good, as the first argument reasoned. On the contrary, the fact that it is the first object of the will shows that it is not an act of the will, as appears from what we have said.
Nor does it follow that whatever perfects a thing in any way whatever must be the end of that thing, as the second objection argued. For a thing perfects another in two ways: first, it perfects a thing that has its species; secondly, it perfects a thing that it may have its species. Thus the perfection of a house, considered as already having its species, is that to which the species "house" is directed, namely to be a dwelling ; for one would not build a house but for that purpose, and consequently we must include this in the definition of a house, if the definition is to be perfect. On the other hand, the perfection that conduces to the species of a house is both that which is directed to the completion of the species, for instance, its substantial principles; and also that which conduces to the preservation of the species, for instance, the buttresses which are made to support the building; as well as those things which make the house more fit for use, for instance, the beauty of the house. Accordingly, that which is the perfection of a thing, considered as already having its species, is its end ; as the end of a house is to be a dwelling. Likewise, the operation proper to a thing, its use, as it were, is its end. On the other hand, whatever perfects a thing by conducing to its species is not the end of that thing ; in fact, the thing itself is its end, for matter and form are for the sake of the species. For although the form is the end of generation, it is not the end of the thing already generated and having its species, but is required in order that the species be complete. Again, whatever preserves the thing in its species, such as health and the nutritive power, al-
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
though it perfects the animal, is not the animal's end, but vice versa. And again, whatever adapts a thing for the perfection of its proper specific operations, and for the easier attainment of its proper end, is not the end of that thing, but vice versa; for instance, a man's comeliness and bodily strength, and the like, of which the Philosopher says that they conduce to happiness instrumentally?—Now delight is a perfection of operation, not as though operation were directed thereto in respect of its species, for thus it is directed to other ends (thus, eating, in respect of its species, is directed to the preservation of the individual)
; but it is like a perfection that is conducive to a thing's species, since for the sake of the delight we perform more attentively and becomingly an operation we delight in. Hence the Philosopher says that delight perfects operation as beauty perfects youth for beauty is for the sake of the one who has youth and not vice versa.
Nor is the fact that men seek delight not for the sake of something else but for its own sake a sufficient indication that delight is the last end, as the third objection argued.
Because delight, though it is not the last end, nevertheless accompanies the last end, since delight arises from the attainment of the end.
Nor do more people seek the pleasure that comes from knowledge than knowledge itself. But more there are who seek sensible delights than intellectual knowledge and the delight consequent thereto; because those things that are outside us are better known to the majority, in that human knowledge takes its beginning from sensible objects.
The suggestion put forward by the fifth argument, that the will is a higher power than the intellect, as being the latter's motive power, is clearly untrue. Because the intellect moves the will first and per se, for the will, as such, is moved by its object, which is the apprehended good; whereas the will moves the intellect accidentally as it were, in so far, namely, as the act of understanding is itself apprehended as a good, and on that account is desired by the will, with the result that the intellect understands actually. Even in this, the intellect precedes the will, for the will would never desire understanding, did not the intellect first apprehend its ^Eth., I, 8 (1099b 2);
(1099b 28).
^0/>. cit., X, 4 (1174b 31).
MAN'S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS
understanding as a good.—And again, the will moves the intellect to actual operation in the same way as an agent is said to move; whereas the intellect moves the will in the same way as the end moves, for the good understood is the end of the will. Now the agent in moving presupposes the end, for the agent does not move except for the sake of the end.
It is therefore clear that the intellect is higher than the will absolutely, while the will is higher tEan the intellect accidentally and in a restricted sense.
CHAPTER XXXVII
THAT man's ultimate HAPPINESS CONSISTS
IN CONTEMPLATING GOD
Accordingly, if man's ultimate happiness does not consist in external things, which are called goods of fortune; nor in goods of the body; nor in goods of the soul, as regards the sensitive part; nor as regards the intellectual part, in terms of the life of moral virtue; nor in terms of the intellectual virtues which are concerned with action, namely, art and prudence:—it remains for us to conclude that man's ultimate happiness consists in the contemplation of truth.
For this operation alone is proper to man, and it is in it that none of the other animals communicates.
Again. This is not directed to anything further as to its end, since the contemplation of the truth is sought for its own sake.
Again. By this operation man is united to beings above him, by becoming like them; because of all human actions this alone is both in God and in the separate substances.
Also, by this operation man comes into contact with those higher beings, through knowing them in any way whatever.
Besides, man is more self-sufficing for this operation, seeing that he stands in little need of the help of external things in order to perform it.
Further. All other human operations seem to be ordered to this as to their end. For perfect contemplation requires that the body should be disencumbered, and to this effect are directed all the products of art that are necessary for life.
Moreover, it requires freedom from the disturbance caused