CHAPTER II
THE END OF MAN
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
THIRD BOOK
CHAPTER II
THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR AN END
Accordingly we must first show that every agent, by its action, intends an end.
For in those things which clearly act for an end, we declare the end to be that towards which the movement of the agent tends; for when" this is reached, the end is said to be reached, and to fail in this is to fail in the end intended. This may be seen in the physician who aims at health, and in a man who runs towards an appointed goal. Nor does it matter, as to this, whether that which tends to an end be endowed with knowledge or not ; for just as the target is the end of the archer, so is it the end of the arrow's flight. Now the movement of every agent tends to something determinate, since it is not from any force that any action proceeds, but heating proceeds from heat, and cooling from cold
; and therefore actions are differentiated by their active principles.
Action sometimes terminates in something made, as for instance building terminates in a house, and healing in health; while sometimes it does not so terminate, as for instance, in the case of understanding and sensation. And if action terminates in something made, the movement of the agent tends by that action towards the thing made; while if it does not terminate in something made, the movement of the agent tends to the action itself. It follows therefore that every agent intends an end while acting, which end is sometimes the action itself, sometimes a thing made by the action.
Again. In all things that act for an end, that is ^aid to be
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
the last end beyond which the agent seeks nothing further; and thus the physician's action goes as far as health, and when this is attained, his efforts cease. But in the action of every agent, a point can be reached beyond which the agent does not desire to go; or else actions would tend to infinity, which is impossible, for since it is not possible to pass through en infinite medium,^ the agent would never begin to act, because nothing moves towards what it cannot reach. Therefore every agent acts for an end.
Moreover. If the actions of an agent proceed to infinity, these actions must needs result either in something made, or not. If the result is something made, the being of that thing made, will follow after an infinity of actions.
But that which presupposes an infinity of things cannot possibly be, since an infinite medium cannot be passed through. Now impossibility of being argues impossibiHty of becoming, and that which cannot become, it is impossible to make. Therefore it is impossible for an agent to begin to make a thing for the making of which an infinity of actions is presupposed.
If, however, the result of such actions be not something made, the order of these actions must be either according to the order of active powers (for instance, if a man feels that he may imagine, and imagines that he may understand, and understands that he may will), or according to the order of objects (for instance, I consider the body that I may consider the soul, which I consider in order to consider a separate substance, which again I consider so that I may consider God).
Now it is not possible to proceed to infinity, either in active powers (as neither is this possible in the forms of things, as is proved in Metaph. ii,^ since the form is the principle of activity), or in objects (as neither is this possible in beings, since there is one first being, as we have proved above ).^ Therefore it is not possible for agents to proceed to infinity, and consequently there must be something, upon whose attainment the efforts of the agent cease. Therefore every agent acts for an end.
Further. In things that act for an end, whatsoever comes between the first agent and the last end, is an end in respect to what precedes, and an active principle in respect of what follows. Hence if the effort of the agent does not tend to ^Aristotle, Post. Anal., I, 22 (82b 38).
* Aristotle, Metaph., la, 2 (994,6).
• »C.G. 1,42.
EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR AN END
something determinate, and if its action, as stated, proceeds to infinity, the active principles must needs proceed to infinity; which is impossible, as we have shown above. Therefore the effort of the agent must of necessity tend to something determinate.
Again. Every agent acts either by nature or by intellect.
Now there can be no doubt that those which act by intellect act for an end, since they act with an intellectual preconception of what they attain by their action, and they act through such a preconception; for this is to act by intellect. Now just as in the preconceiving intellect there exists the entire likeness of the effect that is attained by the action of the intellectual being, so in the natural agent there pre-exists the likeness of the natural effect, by virtue of which the action is determined to the appointed effect; for fire begets fire, and an olive produces an olive. Therefore, even as that which acts by intellect tends by its action to a definite end, so also does that which acts by nature. Therefore every agent acts for an end.
Moreover. Fault is not found save in those things which are for an end, for we do not find fault with one who fails in that to which he is not appointed ; and thus we find fault with a physician if he fail to heal, but not with a builder or a grammarian. But we find fault in things done according to art, as when a grammarian fails to speak correctly, and in things that are ruled by nature, as in the case of monstrosities. Therefore every agent, whether according to nature, or according to art, or acting of set purpose, acts for an end.
Again. Were an agent not to act for a definite effect, all effects would be indifferent to it. Now that which is indifferent to many effects does not produce one rather than another.
Therefore, from that which is indifferent to either of two effects, no effect results, unless it be determined by something to one of them. Hence it would be impossible for it to act.
Therefore every agent tends to some definite effect, which is called its end.
There are, however, certain actions which would seem not to be for an end, such as playful and contemplative actions, and those which are done without attention, such as scratching one's beard, and the like. Whence some might be led to think that there is an agent that acts not for an end.—But we must observe that contemplative actions are not for an-