Chapter Xlviii
ULTIMATE HAPPINESS NOT IN THIS LIFE
And though this mirror, which is the human mind, reflects the likeness of God in a higher way than creatures of lower degree, yet the knowledge of God that can be gathered from the human mind does not transcend the genus of the knowledge gathered from sensible things ; since even the soul knows what it itself is through understanding the natures of sensible things, as we have already stated.^ Consequently, even in this way God is not known in higher manner than the cause is known from its effect.
"011.45,46.
CHAPTER XLVIII
THAT man's ultimate HAPPINESS IS NOT
IN THIS LIFE
Seeing, then, that man's ultimate happiness does not consist in that knowledge of God whereby He is known by all or many in a vague kind of opinion, nor again in that knowledge of God whereby He is known in the speculative sciences through demonstration, nor in that knowledge whereby He is known through faith, as v/e have proved above ;^ and seeing that it is not possible in this life to arrive at a higher knowledge of God in His essence, or at least so that we understand other separate substances, and thus know God through that which is nearest to Him, so to say, as we have proved;^ and since we must place our ultimate happiness in some kind of knowledge of God, as we have shown :^—it is impossible for man's happiness to be in this life.
Again. Man's last end is the term of his natural appetite, so that when he has obtained it, he desires nothing more; because if he still has a movement towards something, he has not yet reached an end wherein to be at rest. Now this cannot happen in this life, since the more m.an understands, the more is the desire to understand increased in him
(for this is natural to man), unless perhaps there be someone who understands all things. Now in this life this never did nor can happen to anyone that was a mere man, seeing that in this life we are unable to know separate substances which in themselves are most intelligible, as we have proved.^ Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot possibly be in this life.
Besides. Whatever is in motion towards an end has a nat- ^Ch. 38ff.
^Ch. 45.
^Ch. 37.
*Ch. 45.
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
ural desire to be established and at rest therein. Hence a body does not move away from the place towards which it has a natural movement, except by a violent movement which is contrary to that appetite. Now happiness is the last end which man naturally desires. Therefore it is his natural desire to be established in happiness. Consequently, unless together with happiness he acquires a state of immobility, he is not yet happy, since his natural desire is not yet at rest.
When, therefore, a man acquires happiness, he also acquires stability and rest ; so that all agree in conceiving stability as a necessary condition of happiness. Hence the Philosopher says: We do not look upon the happy man as a kind of chameleon.^ Now in this life there is no sure stability, since, however happy a man may be, sickness and misfortune may come upon him, so that he is hindered in the operation, whatever it be, in which happiness consists. Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.
Moreover. It would seem unfitting and unreasonable for a thing to take a long time in becoming, and to have but a short time in being; for it would follow that for a longer duration of time nature would be deprived of its end. Hence we see that animals which live but a short time are perfected in a short time. But if happiness consists in a perfect operation according to perfect virtue,^ whether intellectual or moral, it cannot possibly come to man except after a long time. This is most evident in speculative matters, wherein man's ultimate happiness consists, as we have proved
;''^ for hardly is man able to arrive at perfection in the speculations of science, even though he reach the last stage of life, and then, in the majority of cases, but a short space of life remains to him. Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.
Further. All admit that happiness is a perfect good, or else it would not bring rest to the appetite. Now perfect good is that which is wholly free from any admixture of evil; just as that which is perfectly white is that which is entirely free from any admixture of black. But man cannot be wholly free from evils in this state of life, and not only from evils of the body, such as hunger, thirst, heat, cold and the like, but also from evils of the soul. For there is no one who at times is ^Eih., I, 10 (iioob 5).
^Op. cit., X, 7 (1177a 11).
'Ch. 37.
ULTIMATE HAPPINESS NOT IN THIS LIFE
not disturbed by inordinate passions; who sometimes does not go beyond the mean, wherein virtue consists,^ either in excess or in deficiency; who isnot deceived in some thing or another; or who at least is not ignorant of what he would wish to know, or does not feel doubtful about an opinion of which he would like to be certain. Therefore no man is happy in this life.
Again. Man naturally shuns death, and is sad about it, not only shunning it at the moment when he feels its presence, but also when he thinks about it. But man, in this Hfe, cannot obtain not to die. Therefore it is not possible for man to be happy in this life.
Besides. Ultimate happiness consists, not in*a habit, but in an operation, since habits are for the sake of actions. But in this life it is impossible to perform any action continuously.
Therefore man cannot be entirely happy in this life.
Further. The more a thing is desired and loved, the more does its loss bring sorrow and pain. Now happiness is most desired and loved. Therefore its loss brings the greatest sorrow. But if there be ultimate happiness in this life, it will certainly be lost, at least by death. Nor is it certain that it will last till death, since it is possible for every man in this life to encounter sickness, whereby he is wholly hindered from the operation of virtue, e.g., madness and the like, which hinder the use of reason. Such happiness therefore always has sorrow naturally connected with it, and consequently it will not be perfect happiness.
But someone might say that, since happiness is a good of the intellectual nature, perfect and true happiness is for those in whom the intellectual nature is perfect, namely, in separate substances, and that in man it is imperfect, and by a kind of participation. For man can arrive at a full understanding of the truth only by a sort of movement of inquiry ; and he fails entirely to understand things that are by nature most intelligible, as we have proved. Therefore neither is happiness, in its perfect nature, possible to man; but he has a certain participation of it, even in this life. This seems to have been
Aristotle's opinion about happiness. Hence, inquiring whether misfortunes destroy happiness, he shows that happiness seems especially to consist in deeds of virtue, which seem to be ^Cf. Aristotle, Eth., II, 6 (iio6b 24).
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
most Stable in this life, and concludes that those who in this life attain to this perfection are happy as men, as though not attaining to happiness absolutely, but in a human way.^
We must now show that this explanation does not remove the foregoing arguments. For although man is below the separate substances according to the order of nature, he is above irrational creatures, and so he attains his ultimate end in a more perfect way than they. Now these attain their last end so perfectly that they seek nothing further. Thus a heavy body rests when it is in its own proper place, and when an animal enjoys sensible pleasure, its natural desire is at rest.
Much more, therefore, when man has obtained his last end, must his natural desire be at rest. But this cannot happen in this life. Therefore in this life man does not obtain happiness considered as his proper end, as we have proved. Therefore he must obtain it after this life.
Again. Natural desire cannot be empty, since nature does nothing in vain}^ But nature's desire would be empty if it could never be fulfilled. Therefore man's natural desire can be fulfilled. But not in this life, as we have shown. Therefore it must be fulfilled after this life. Therefore man's ultimate happiness is after this life.
Besides. As long as a thing is in motion towards perfection, it has not reached its last end. Now in the knowledge of truth all men are always in motion and tending towards perfection because those who follow make discoveries in addition to those made by their predecessors, as is also stated in Metaph.
\\}'^ Therefore in the knowledge of truth man is not situated as though he had arrived at his last end. Since, then, as Aristotle himself shows,^^ man's ultimate happiness in this life consists apparently in speculation, whereby he seeks the knowledge of truth, we cannot possibly allow that man obtains his last end in this life.
Moreover. Whatever is in potentiality tends to become actual, so that as long as it is not wholly actual, it has not reached its last end. Now our intellect is in potentiality to the knowledge of all the forms of things, and it becomes actual when it knows any one of them. Consequently, it will not be wholly actual, nor in possession of its last end, except
^Op. cit., I, lo (iioia i8).
^"Aristotle, De Caelo, II, ii (291b 13).
"^ Aristotle, Metaph., la, i (993a 31)- ^ Eih., X, 7 (ii77a 18).