Chapter Xxxviii
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
by the passions, which is achieved by means of the moral virtues and of prudence; and freedom from external disturbance, to which the whole governance of the civil life is directed. So that, if we consider the matter rightly, we shall see that all human occupations appear to serve those who contemplate the truth.
Now, it is not possible that man's ultimate happiness consist in contemplation based on the understanding of first principles; for this is most imperfect, as being most universal, containing potentially the knowledge of things. Moreover, it is the beginning and not the end of human inquiry, and comes to us from nature, and not through the pursuit of the truth. Nor does it consist in contemplation based on the sciences that have the lowest things for their object, since happiness must consist in an operation of the intellect in relation to the most noble intelligible objects. It follows then that man's ultimate happiness consists in wisdom, based on the consideration of divine things.
It is therefore evident also by way of induction that man's ultimate happiness consists solely in the contemplation of God, which conclusion was proved above by arguments.^
^Ch.
25.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD WHICH
IS POSSESSED GENERALLY
BY THE MAJORITY
It remains for us to inquire in what kind of knowledge of God the ultimate happiness of an intellectual substance consists. For there is a certain general and confused knowledge of God, which is in almost all men, whether from the fact that, as some think, the existence of God, like other principles of demonstration, is self-evident, as we have stated in the First Book,^ or, as seems nearer to the truth, because by his natural reason man is able at once to arrive at some knowledge of God. For seeing that natural things run their course according to a fixed order, and since there cannot be order without a cause of order, men, for the most part, perceive that there is one who orders the things that we see.
' C. G., I, 10.
HAPPINESS AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
But who or of what kind this cause of order may be, or whether there be but one, cannot be gathered from this general consideration; just as, when we see a man in motion, and performing other works, we perceive that in him there is some cause of these operations which is not in other things, and we give this cause the name of soul, but without knowing yet what the soul is, whether it be a body, or how it brings about operations in question.
Now, this knowledge of God cannot possibly suffice for happiness.
For the activity of the happy man must be without any defect; but this knowledge of God is subject to an admixture of many errors. Thus, some believed that there was no other governor of mundane things than the heavenly bodies; and so they said that the heavenly bodies were gods.—Some ascribed this order to the elements and to the things generated from them; as though they thought that their movements and natural operations were not introduced into them by an external governor, but that the order in other things was caused by them.—And some, deeming human acts not to be subject to any but a human rule, declared that men who cause order in other men were gods.—Evidently this knowledge of God is not sufficient for happiness.
Moreover. Happiness is the end of human acts. But human acts are not directed to the aforesaid knowledge as to their end ; indeed, it is in everyone almost right from the very beginning. Therefore happiness does not consist in this kind of knowledge of God.
Again. No one appears to be blamed for lacking happiness; nay, those who lack it and seek it are praised. But he who lacks the aforesaid knowledge of God is seemingly very much to be blamed, since it is a very clear sign of a man's dullness of perception if he fail to perceive such evident signs of God even as a man would be deemed dull who, seeing man, understood not that he has a soul. Hence it is said in the Psalm (xiii.
I : lii. i) : The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God. Therefore it is not this knowledge of God which suffices for happiness.
Further. Knowledge of a thing in general only, and not in terms of what is proper to it, is most imperfect. Such is the knowledge which is had of man from the fact that he is moved; for this is a knowledge whereby a thing is known