CHAPTER LI
HOW GOD MAY BE SEEN
when it knows all things, at least all these material things.
But man cannot obtain this through the speculative sciences, by which we know truth in this life. Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.
For these and like reasons, Alexander and Averroes held that man's ultimate happiness does not consist in that human knowledge obtained through the speculative sciences, but in that which results from a union with a separate substance, which union they deemed possible to man in this life.^^ But as Aristotle realized that man has no knowledge in this life other than that which he obtains through the speculative sciences, he maintained that man attains to a happiness which is not perfect, but a human one.
Hence it becomes sufficiently clear how these great minds suffered from being so straitened on every side. We, however, shall be freed from these straits if we hold, in accordance with the foregoing arguments, that man is able to reach perfect happiness after this life, since man has an immortal soul; and that in that state his soul will understand in the same way as separate substances understand, as we proved in the Second Book.^^ Therefore man's ultimate happiness will consist in that knowledge of God which the human mind possesses after this life, a knowledge similar to that by which separate substances know him. Hence our Lord promises us a reze^ar^
. in heaven {Matt. v. 12) and states {Matt. xxii. 30) that the saints shall be as the angels, who always see God in heaven
{Matt, xviii. 10).
"Cf. ch. 42,43, "C. C, II, 8t.
CHAPTER LI
HOW GOD MAY BE SEEN
IN HIS ESSENCE
Since, then, it is impossible for a natural desire to be empty (and it would be, were it impossible to arrive at understanding the divine substance, for all minds desire this naturally), we must conclude that it is possible for the divine substance to be seen through the intellect, both by separate intellectual substances, and by our souls.
It is sufficiently clear, from what has been said, what man-
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
ner of vision this is. For we have proved that the divine substance cannot be seen by the intellect by means of any created species.^ Therefore, if God's essence is to be seen at all, it must be that the intellect sees it through the divine essence itself ; so that in that vision the divine essence is both the object and the medium of vision.
Since, however, the intellect is unable to understand any particular substance unless it be actualized by a species informing it, which is the likeness of the thing understood, someone might deem it impossible for a created intellect to see the very substance of God through the divine essence as an intelligible species.
For the divine essence is self-subsistent, and we have proved in the First Book that God cannot be the form of anything.^
In order to understand this truth, we must note that a selfsubsisting substance is either a form alone, or a composite of matter and form. Accordingly, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of something else, because the form therein is already confined to that matter, so that it cannot be the form of another thing. But that which so subsists that it is yet a form alone, can be the form of something else, provided its being be such that some other thing can participate in it, as we have proved concerning the human soul in the Second Book.^ If, however, its being cannot be participated in by another, it cannot be the form of anything, because by its very being it is determined in itself, just as material things are determined by their matter. Now we must consider this as being the case not only with regard to substantial or natural being, but also as regards intelligible being. For, since truth is the perfection of the intellect, that intelligible which is truth itself will be a pure form in the genus of intelligible things. This applies solely to God, for, since truth is consequent upon being,^ that alone is its own truth, which is its own being ; and this belongs to God alone, as we have proved in the Second Book.^ Consequently, other subsistent intelligibles are not pure forms in the genus of intelligible things, but have a form in a subject; for each of them is a true thing, but not the truth, even as it is a being, but not being itself. It is therefore clear that the divine essence can be compared to the created intellect as an intelligible
^Ch.
49.
^C.
G., I, 26ff.
'C.
G., II, 68.
*Cf.
Aristotle, Metaph., la, i (993b 30).
^C. G., II, 15.