9 Shaping Reformed Aristotelianism: Otto Werdmüller’s Evaluation of the Nicomachean Ethics in De dignitate, usu et meth

In the last decades an increasing number of scholars have challenged the validity of this thesis, questioning its very presuppositions.³ On the one hand, such concepts as ‘scholasticism’ and ‘Aristotelianism’ have been newly examined and redefined in view of their early modern meaning. On the other, it has been shown how the use of Aristotelian patterns of thought and the construction of a Protestant scholastic theology – that is, a theology organized in order to be taught in schools – did not necessarily bring with them a derogation from the original contents of Reformation theology. Rather, such means were employed to serve the cause of the Reformation, giving to its contents a form fitting the needs of students and defending it efficaciously against the attacks of both ‘Papists’ and Radicals.

A further challenge for the advocates of the traditional view comes from the observation that the interest of Protestants in philosophy, which manifested itself increasingly from the 1560s on, was not a new phenomenon at all. Apart from Philipp Melanchthon’s well-known interest in philosophy and especially in ethics early in the 1520s and 1530s – which was never opposed by Luther – there is evidence that philosophy was also held in high esteem at reformed academies. If we look at the Schola Tigurina, it is first of all Conrad Gessner (1516–65) who merits mention. Starting in 1541, he taught in Zurich physics, astronomy, mathematics and ethics for 26 years, basing his lectures on Aristotle’s works, as well as on compendia of Aristotelian philosophy and on commentaries of contemporary authors.⁴ Till 1546 he shared these incumbences with Otto Werdmüller (1513–52), a former student of Melanchthon who had taught in Basel and returned to Zurich in 1541. In contrast with Gessner, whose lectures on the Physics were printed only posthumously,⁵ Werdmüller published in his lifetime a work on philosophy, more precisely on ethics: De dignitate, usu et methodo philosophiae moralis, quam Aristoteles ad Nicomachum filium conscripsit.⁶

In the remainder of this chapter we will focus on this work of Werdmüller’s in order to understand how he qualified the relationship between ethics and other disciplines, such as dialectic, jurisprudence, medicine and especially theology. Our study will show that Werdmüller’s De dignitate represents in fact one of the first fruits of the reception and elaboration of the Aristotelian heritage among the reformed. Werdmüller clearly viewed Aristotle’s philosophy as a model of argumentative cogency and regarded it as a reliable source in matters of scientific methodology and logic. Moreover, he specially commended Aristotle’s ethics as a complementary – but indispensable – reference towards the development of a systematic account of Christian ethics, a project which was to be pursued by later authors.

Werdmüller’s long studies and wide-ranging reading had made of him a competent scholar indebted, however, not only to his teachers, but also to the booksellers from whom he bought year after year the volumes which formed his large private library. It was because of financial problems that Werdmüller returned in 1541 to Zurich, where he immediately began to teach ethics and physics at the Schola Tigurina. The first work he completed in Zurich, an anthology of texts by classical authors on the similitudes between different species of animals, was printed posthumously.⁸ In 1545 Werdmüller published in Basel his major work on philosophy, De dignitate, usu et methodo philosophiae moralis. It must be noticed, however, that since his ordination as deacon in 1543 Werdmüller gradually abandoned his philosophical studies in order to dedicate himself thoroughly to theology and the preaching of the gospel. In 1547 he was promoted to the office of archdeacon. In the remaining nine years of his life – Werdmüller died of the plague at the age of 39 in 1552 – he composed some theological and pastoral works, which were frequently reprinted and even translated in other languages.⁹

As the title of this book indicates, Werdmüller wanted to offer a form of apology for ethical studies and for Aristotelian ethics in particular. Actually Werdmüller tends to identify moral philosophy in general with the Aristotelian one, or even with the very text of the NE, something which can be considered as a sign of the normativity the latter text continued to have in the Renaissance and particularly at Protestant universities and seminars, in spite of Luther’s rather destructive criticism some decades before. Werdmüller’s purpose in his De dignitate, usu et methodo philosophiae moralis is to show how useful a thorough study of Aristotle’s moral philosophy can be, first, as a kind of complement to the study of the three main disciplines of theology, jurisprudence and medicine; and secondly, for a better understanding of the principles of dialectic, the instruments and rules of which were applied by Aristotle in the NE. According to Werdmüller, the students of today can therefore look at Aristotle’s text as a catalogue of examples for the practical application of dialectical and logical tools.¹²

Werdmüller’s work – or, specifically, the first part of it – opens with a dedicatory letter to Heinrich Bullinger and contains 23 chapters and an epilogue. Chapters two to ten are dedicated to the question of the relationship between ethics and theology, whereas the connections between moral philosophy and jurisprudence as well as medicine are dealt with in a much more cursory way in the eleventh and twelfth chapters. After an excursus on the excellence of Aristotelian philosophy (ch. 15), Werdmüller analyses the positive interactions between the study of the NE and that of dialectic. According to the Ciceronian distinction between inventio and iudicium – revived in early modern times through its application in Rudolph Agricola’s De inventione dialectica¹³ – Werdmüller shows that in the NE examples are to be found not only for the use of not less than 22 ‘common places’, but also illuminating applications of apodictical and anapodictical (that is, non-demonstrative) arguments, such as syllogisms and enthimemes. Moreover, it is the very structure and style of the NE that, according to Werdmüller, offers an example of order and elegance to be followed: ‘Aristotle offers excellent examples of pure, elegant and sound eloquence’.¹⁴

However, before addressing the question about Werdmüller’s view of the relationship between philosophy and Christian faith, it is necessary to examine how he justifies the possibility of philosophy in general. Philosophy has been defined as a true knowledge of the totality of being, and at the same time it has been emphasized that philosophy develops apart from grace. The question is therefore: is it possible that human beings attain through their autonomous efforts any kind of true knowledge, given the corruption of the human faculties derived from original sin? According to Werdmüller, human nature was not destroyed, but only corrupted by Adam’s fall, so that there still remain ‘traces’ (vestigia) of the original perfection.¹⁸ Human beings still possess a ‘sound mind’ (sana mens) which can attain to a true knowledge of method (via docendi), of civil virtue and of the natural world without any special intervention of God.¹⁹ Although Werdmüller does not mention it explicitly, it is evident that he draws here on a traditional distinction between natural and supernatural gifts which God would have imparted to Adam: whereas the supernatural gifts, such as faith and righteousness, were taken away by the fall, the natural ones – the intellect and the will – were only partially corrupted, but not annihilated. This distinction, which had been typical for medieval theology and derives probably from Augustine, was borrowed also by reformed theologians, who used it both to affirm that human beings are able to act spontaneously and are therefore responsible for their actions, and to justify – as in the case of Werdmüller – the possibility of philosophy.²⁰ It is interesting to notice, however, that the use of the distinction between natural and supernatural gifts urged Werdmüller also to modify his previous definition of philosophy, accommodating it to the peculiar needs of Christian theology. From a postlapsarian perspective philosophy is indeed possible, but it cannot aspire any more to a universal knowledge ‘of things human and divine’, and has to content itself with the investigation of logic (via docendi), ethics (civilis virtus) and physics (naturales res), that is, of those realms which the created and fallen intellect of men is still able to explore.

Nonetheless, to affirm in creational perspective that philosophy is possible did not amount yet to a ratification of its legitimacy from a Christian point of view. Werdmüller was indeed conscious that such New Testament statements as Colossians 2:8 (‘See to it that no one takes you captive through philosophy and empty deceit’, NRSV) could be interpreted as a complete rejection of any kind of ‘human wisdom’ and required therefore further examination. Adopting also in this respect a point of view shared by most of his contemporaries, Werdmüller offers a conciliatory reading of Colossians 2:8, restricting the signification of the term ‘philosophy’ to that of ‘sophistry’. In this manner he can interpret Paul’s statement as being directed only against undue mixing of profane and sacred wisdom, but not against philosophy as such, which has rather to be considered as God’s gift.²¹ We can see, therefore, how this ratification of the legitimacy of philosophy entails also a reaffirmation of its limits and, at least implicitly, of its subordination to theology. Philosophy enjoys indeed a certain autonomy in the investigation of logic, civil ethics and nature, but as soon as the results of its enquiry come to clash with the contents of biblical revelation, these are to be rejected as a degeneration of ‘sound philosophy’ into sophistry. It is therefore hardly surprising that, recommending the study of Aristotelian philosophy to the students of the Schola Tigurina, he revitalized the traditional metaphor of philosophy as ‘maiden of theology’, in order to underline the subordination of human wisdom to the latter.²²

Werdmüller corroborates further his thesis about the legitimacy of philosophical enquiry from a Christian point of view by indicating its usefulness and even indispensableness for theology. First of all, theology – exactly as any other discipline which desires to present itself as a science – needs to be developed according to the rules of scientific method.²³ These rules, which govern the construction of any coherent argumentation, must be observed by the theologian in order to clearly present the truth and defend it against the objections of heretics.²⁴ In fact – Werdmüller notices – the rules of scientific argumentation are employed also in the Bible, but their application is not accompanied there by a detailed explanation. This is the reason why Christians need to apprehend those rules from philosophy, and especially from Aristotle, who remains according to Werdmüller the unsurpassed ‘master of method’.²⁵ Although Werdmüller reserves for dialectic the label of ‘God’s most distinguished gift’,²⁶ he expresses the conviction that also natural philosophy can turn out to be useful for the theologian. On the one hand Werdmüller thinks that the study of the created world in its different parts, as well as the appreciation of its harmony as a whole, leads almost necessarily to the acknowledgment of the existence of a divine ordaining mind. Even though the mysteries of Christian theology (the Trinity, the two natures in Christ, the remission of sin) cannot be grasped but by faith, Werdmüller does not exclude the possibility of natural theology, which, moving from a consideration of the series of causes, of the harmony between the different parts of the world and of the eternal conservation of the species, can demonstrate the existence of a wise, just and benevolent God.²⁷ On the other hand he considers the knowledge of natural philosophy as a precondition for a proper exegesis of several biblical texts. Such sciences as astronomy or geography are in fact as fundamental for the explanation of God’s word as the mastery of Hebrew and Greek.²⁸ Therefore, for these reasons philosophy should not be rejected, but rather praised by Christians. As Werdmüller pointedly expresses it, God’s deeds and prophecies cannot be properly investigated but with the aid of philosophy; thus, the contempt of the latter amounts to a contempt of the former.²⁹

Concluding this section on Werdmüller’s view of philosophy, it is important to notice that he does not only insist on the usefulness of philosophy in general, but states his decided commitment to Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition. His appreciation of Aristotle can already be observed in what he said about the special merits of the Stagirite in the development of logic and scientific methodology. However, it is in chapter fifteen of De dignitate that Werdmüller addresses the issue of Aristotle’s excellence in a more direct and detailed way. On the one hand he emphasizes once more that Aristotle stands out against Socrates, Plato and the Pythagoric tradition for the perspicuity of his style and his straightforward application of the rules of scientific method.³⁰ On the other, he declares Aristotle’s philosophy to be the one which most closely corresponds to nature, and hence to divine ordinances.³¹ Further, Aristotle’s moral philosophy is commendable because it avoids the excesses of other ethical systems like that of the Stoics, who condemned every passion and propounded a paradoxical ideal of apatheia as highest good.³²

Both in his recognition of the legitimacy of philosophy, under the condition that it deports as a maiden of theology, and in his preference for the Peripatetic tradition, Werdmüller shows plainly the continuity between his approach and that of his former master, Philipp Melanchthon. Melanchthon was deeply concerned with the foundation of an ‘erudite theology’, capable of expounding consistently the revealed truth and of answering efficaciously to the objections of adversaries. For him philosophy, considered in its broadest sense as orbis artium, had an indispensable part to play in the realization of this goal. And this was for exactly the same reasons which Werdmüller refers to in De dignitate (importance of logic for pedagogical and polemical purposes, and of natural philosophy for natural theology and exegesis).³³ In addition, Melanchthon made no secret of his preference for Aristotle over against other philosophers. According to him Aristotle’s mastering of method and perspicuity make his philosophy more suitable for teaching purposes,³⁴ whereas his ethics, holding to a moderate ideal of metriopatheia, avoids the excesses of Stoicism and proves therefore to be more compatible with Christian doctrine.³⁵ These views of Melanchthon’s concerning the relationship of philosophy to theology and the excellence of Aristotle became part of a general consensus among Lutheran, as well as reformed divines. As far as the reformed were concerned, such positions were championed in the second half of the sixteenth century by Girolamo Zanchi, Peter Martyr Vermigli and Theodore Beza.³⁶ In this regard, indeed, Werdmüller’s approach cannot be regarded as either revolutionary or exceedingly original. Nonetheless, if we consider the early date of publication of De dignitate (1545), it seems actually that the Zuricher Werdmüller was one of the first reformed authors – if not the first – who made Melanchthon’s viewpoint his own, thereby acting as intermediary between Wittenberg and the reformed world.

Although the NE cannot be, of course, considered as a manual of dialectic, Werdmüller insists nonetheless on its extreme usefulness as a complement to the study of this discipline. He considers that students will find in it clear examples of the application of those rules which in Aristotle’s logical works are presented just in abstract form. Hence, seeing how those rules can be applied in concrete situations, they will also be able to understand them better.³⁷ Indeed, Werdmüller constantly refers to Aristotle as the sole authority in matters of logic, but in his presentation of this subject there is also discernable an influence of humanistic logic, with which he might have come in touch through his master, Philipp Melanchthon. Thus, Werdmüller divides dialectic in ‘invention of individual things’ and ‘argumentation’, which evidently correspond to inventio and iudicium, the two main parts of dialectic according to both Rudolph Agricola and Melanchthon.³⁸ Moreover, Werdmüller defines inventio as the identification of those topics (sedes et domicilia), by means of which individual things can be known and explained,³⁹ showing that for him – as well as for Agricola and Melanchthon – dialectic is at the core a topical discipline, concerned with fixing those loci which enable to argue conclusively on any given subject matter.⁴⁰ As far as ‘invention’ is concerned, Werdmüller refers to 22 passages from the NE which contain examples for the use of just as many loci.⁴¹ If inventio has to do with individual things and concepts, ‘argumentation’ consists in the connection of different concepts into a coherent discourse, aiming at the clarification of contentious questions.⁴² Werdmüller shows his dependence on humanist models also in the treatment of this second part of dialectic. For example, although he does not reject altogether the validity and usefulness of syllogistic argumentation, only a small portion of text is devoted to show how this kind of argumentation is used in the NE. Instead, the treatment of different kinds of topical argumentation, all to be found in the NE and each related to a specific locus, covers 13 pages.⁴³

If students of logic may take advantage from the study of the NE, regarding it as a collection of different kinds of definitions and argumentations, an even deeper linkage has to be acknowledged between ethics and jurisprudence. In fact, the interest of logicians in the NE rests only on formal considerations. Lawyers should be concerned with ethics for the more substantial reason that jurisprudence and ethics share to a certain extent the same object, that is, virtue. Of course, there is also a fundamental difference in the way in which both disciplines deal with this common subject matter; ethics being concerned with the ‘universal doctrine of virtue’, whereas jurisprudence is rather a collection of ‘all the precepts leading to virtue’.⁴⁴ So, for example, it is ethics which determines the conditions upon which an action can be considered voluntary or involuntary, while jurisprudence simply takes up from ethics such concepts as ‘voluntary’, ‘involuntary’ or ‘coercion’, and applies them to specific juridical cases in order to establish whether and how a crime has to be punished.⁴⁵ Therefore, the difference existing between ethics and jurisprudence is analogous to that between a theory and its application: ‘The law applies to different cases those things which moral philosophy – which has to be regarded as the source of civil laws – generally and synthetically has established’.⁴⁶ Against this background it becomes obvious that Werdmüller insists on the necessity of ethics as a complement to the study of law because only through the knowledge of ethics is it possible to understand, as it were, the general logic of specific laws.⁴⁷ At the same time, it is quite evident that Werdmüller’s explanation of how jurisprudence and ethics are related to one another suggests a certain superiority of ethics as compared with jurisprudence, as the latter consists for him in a mere accumulation of cases, whereas the former is a ‘methodical inquiry’ of the very nature of virtue and vice.⁴⁸

Finally, also the complementarity of the study of ethics to that of medicine rests for Werdmüller on a certain overlapping of the two disciplines as to their object. Relying upon a long tradition going back to Hippocrates and Galenus, and still alive in the Renaissance, Werdmüller expresses the conviction that physical disease derives from an alteration of the natural equilibrium among the humours in the human body.⁴⁹ Moreover, according to this theory there is a close relationship between alterations of the humours and affections of the soul,⁵⁰ whereby an excess of certain humours can cause specific affections, and affections exercise in turn an influence on the blend of humours in the body.⁵¹ Since this theory admits the possibility of feedback from the affections of the soul to the blend of the body, and since physical health depends primarily on this same blend, it becomes evident in which sense there is for Werdmüller a deep linkage between ethics and medicine. On the one hand, ethics endeavours to moderate the emotions without regard to the state of the body; but in view of the fact that emotions exercise a retroaction on the blend of the body, ethics can also contribute to preserve the physical health of human beings.⁵² Therefore, this is the reason why Werdmüller recommends the study of the NE to physicians: although medicine as such is concerned only with the health of the body, it must be recognized that ethics, insofar it deals with the moderation of emotions, is relevant also from a medical point of view.⁵³

It is easy to see how this identification of practical reason with the law of nature provides a creational foundation of philosophical ethics, which amounts at a legitimation of it from a Christian point of view. For, since Christians believe that all which God created is good, they must consider also ethics as something good, because it grounds on that faculty of moral judgment that God gave to human beings when he created them. Moreover, affirming that ethics develops itself in a natural way apart from any special divine influence, Werdmüller emphasizes its universal validity for Christians and pagans alike. It must be noticed, however, that precisely this universal validity of ethics beyond all religious boundaries hints also at the essential difference between ethics and theology: the former is in itself a mere philosophical discipline, which develops independently from divine revelation and grace, and is therefore devoid of any soteriological relevance.

Werdmüller further develops this line of thought, addressing directly the question about the relationship between ethics and Christian doctrine as to their respective content. According to him ethics identifies first of all the goal of human life, proceeding afterwards to analyse the means to attain this goal. Therefore, ethics contains a doctrine of happiness (the final aim of human action) and a doctrine of virtue (the practice of which leads to happiness). As far as happiness is concerned, it is defined by Aristotle as an ‘activity of the soul in accordance with virtue’,⁵⁷ or more simply – in Werdmüller’s rendering – as the ‘practice of virtue’ (usus virtutum).⁵⁸ Further, according to Aristotle this chief good can be attained by human beings through a due moderation of the passions and through contemplation.⁵⁹

On the background of this sketchy exposition of Aristotle’s doctrine, Werdmüller emphasizes that such a definition of happiness can be accepted by Christians only upon one fundamental condition: that the realm of civil life be clearly distinguished from that of theology proper. In the realm of civil life Aristotle’s doctrine of happiness can be well applied, because in this sphere virtues are indeed acquired by habituation and human beings can attain through their own efforts some kind of mundane happiness. Instead, the situation changes completely if we address the issue of happiness from a theological point of view. In this case it must be recognized that happiness does not consist in the practice of virtue, but rather in ‘redemption through Christ’.⁶⁰ Moreover, in contrast with civil happiness this specific Christian chief good cannot be attained by human beings, unless they are led to it by God himself.⁶¹ However, neither the Christian notion of happiness nor the necessity of God’s help in order to attain it could have been grasped by pagan philosophers, because they lacked any knowledge of the sinfulness of human nature, proclaimed in biblical revelation through the doctrine of Adam’s fall.⁶²

What distinguishes civil ethics from Christian doctrine is, therefore, their different anthropological starting point. Moving from a negative account of the faculties of the human soul, Christians cannot help considering the teachings of the philosophers in general and of Aristotle in particular, according to whom happiness may be attained through a mere moderation of the passions, as defective. Ethics indeed maintains its validity in the realm of civil life and in this sense does not contradict theology, but the only use it seems to have from a theological point of view is a negative one. Eventually, according to Werdmüller, the study of Aristotelian ethics must be recommended to theologians because it enables them to appreciate the utter incommensurability of pagan moral philosophy and Christian doctrine.⁶³

The way in which Werdmüller has developed his argumentation so far bears witness to the deep influence Melanchthon’s ethics exercised on him. Werdmüller seems to have been well aware of his debts to his former master and actually does not conceal this circumstance. Rather, he acknowledges it, referring explicitly to Melanchthon’s Epitome philosophiae moralis as an authoritative ethics handbook and as a source for his own investigations.⁶⁴ Werdmüller’s dependence on Melanchthon comes to the fore first of all in his definition of ethics as an explanation of the law of nature, whereby the latter is identified with that moral faculty which God engraved in human souls at the moment of creation.⁶⁵ Equally derived from Melanchthon appears the sharp distinction between theology proper and ethics, which is complementary to the creational foundation of the latter.⁶⁶ Melanchthon had defined moral philosophy as ‘that part of God’s law which directs external action’⁶⁷ and therefore pertains to the sphere of civil life in human societies. Hence, ethics is indeed fundamental for the preservation of order in a state, but it is at the same time completely irrelevant from a soteriological point of view, because eternal salvation is brought about only by the Gospel which announces the remission of sins through Christ. Whereas ethics is concerned with the control of external behaviour and is therefore associated with the category of ‘Law’, the Gospel – which is received by faith – proclaims the efficacy of God’s grace apart from any human deed.⁶⁸ In this way, ethics enjoys indeed universal validity on account of its religious neutrality, but it is at the same time and precisely for this reason completely irrelevant from a theological – that is, soteriological – standpoint. Werdmüller shares therefore with Melanchthon also the fundamental conviction that ethics and theology are utterly incommensurable in view of their respective goals.

First of all it must be recognized that the very concept of virtue is not alien to Christian doctrine, for even the Gospel contains several moral precepts. Nonetheless, as Werdmüller notices, this similarity of Christian doctrine with ethics turns out to be quite superficial, as it is confined to a material level: both ethics and theology teach virtue. As soon as the formal determination of ‘virtue’ in theology and ethics is considered, however, it becomes evident that the account of virtue is rather different in the two contexts. Whereas in pagan ethics virtue constitutes the path leading to happiness, Christian theology conceives the practice of virtue rather as a consequence of the attainment of happiness, whereby the latter coincides – as we saw earlier – with redemption through Christ.⁶⁹ Moreover, according to pagan ethics human beings should be driven to the practice of virtue by the love of virtue itself, while Christians endeavour to be virtuous to the glory of God.⁷⁰ The definition of virtuous behaviour as a consequence of redemption mirrors evidently the Protestant doctrine about the relationship of justification and sanctification. Moreover, the special emphasis Werdmüller lays on it can be considered as evidence of his peculiarly reformed stance. As is well known, other than the Lutherans the reformed gave particular weight to the necessity of good works as a result of the inner renovation which accompanies justification, and insisted that the only true faith is that which bears fruits of righteousness.⁷¹

In view of this fundamental divergence in the definition of virtue and apart from the material connection mentioned above, it would seem that also with regard to the doctrine of virtue the differences between pagan ethics and Christian theology outweigh the similarities, impeding any positive relationship.

However, it is precisely the recognition of another fundamental difference between theology and ethics which gives occasion to an important shift in Werdmüller’s discourse. The philosophical and the theological accounts of virtue differ not only formally, but also with regard to method. Holy Scripture contains indeed moral precepts, but does not offer a complete theory of virtue. Aristotle, instead, deals in the NE with the very nature and the causes of virtue, giving detailed definitions of important concepts, which Werdmüller considers very useful towards a better understanding of biblical morals. Therefore – writes Werdmüller – ‘we hold that the young should study Aristotle, because he does not deal scantily with vices and virtues, as holy scripture does, but treats every single virtue and vice in a structured and detailed way’.⁷²

It is at this point that Werdmüller seems most clearly to depart from Melanchthon’s model, in order to delineate an alternative understanding of the relationship of pagan ethics to theology. According to him, the philosophical doctrine of virtue, as it is contained in the NE, can and even should fulfil an ancillary function in view of the foundation and development of a system of Christian ethics. For example, Christians find in the Bible such precepts as: ‘Do not swerve to the right or to the left; turn your foot away from evil’ (Proverbs 4:27, NRSV). Werdmüller discerns a fundamental agreement between that precept and Aristotle’s definition of virtue as the golden mean between two vicious extremes and is therefore convinced that also the description of different virtues and vices the Stagirite offers may help the theologian developing a thorough system of Christian ethics.⁷³ Equally helpful and ‘most true’ in philosophical as well as in theological context are Aristotle’s definitions of such concepts as ‘voluntary’, ‘involuntary’ and ‘choice’. Among others, they lead Christians to understand that what matters in moral action is, above all, the intention and not the action itself. This is the reason why Jesus regarded the alms of the poor widow as greater than those of the rich (Luke 21:1–4).⁷⁴

Indeed, there remains always a margin of difference between moral philosophy and Christian doctrine. As an example Werdmüller refers to the fact that, according to Aristotle’s doctrine, original sin could not be imputed to human beings after Adam and Eve, because nobody apart from them perpetrate it actually and ‘voluntarily’. This, of course, must not be considered as a proof of the non-imputability of original sin, but only as a demonstration that the Aristotelian concept of ‘voluntary’ is too narrow.⁷⁵ The recognition of such discrepancies between Aristotle’s moral philosophy and Christian doctrine, however, should not induce to a total rejection of the former. Theologians can further on take profit from Aristotle’s ethics, although they must bear in mind that there is no perfect coincidence between revelation and philosophy.

As we see, Werdmüller holds that the contents of Christian ethics – that is, the single precepts, as well as the definition of the goal of human life – must be derived exclusively from Holy Scripture. Nonetheless, the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue retains, on account of his ‘scientificity’, a fundamental role for a better understanding of the moral precepts contained in the Bible. In this sense the function of moral philosophy in relationship with Christian ethics is comparable with that which Werdmüller ascribed to it in relationship with jurisprudence. Just as the collections of Roman laws contain the rules for the administration of justice, but no explanation of them, Holy Scripture provides, as it were, the contents of Christian ethics, whereas it is the task of philosophy to convey those definitions and conceptual explanations which are necessary for a thorough understanding of them. It is important to notice, however, that contrary to his account of the relationship between ethics and jurisprudence Werdmüller does not conclude to any – not even relative – eminence of moral philosophy over Holy Scripture. Rather, he carefully emphasizes that, although philosophy is indeed very useful for the explanation of theological issues, it must always be considered inferior to theology, as a maiden is with respect to her mistress.⁷⁶

Although also Werdmüller emphasized – as any Protestant author did – the exclusivity of grace as the only ground for our salvation, he refused to confine ethics to the sphere of external action and civil life, but insisted on the close relationship between redemption and actual renewal, which must result in the practice of virtue. Moreover, Werdmüller regarded Aristotle’s doctrine of virtue as a very helpful model towards the development of a Christian ethics, because in the NE it can be found such detailed explanations and definitions of the causes and the nature of virtue, which constitute a sort of complement to the catalogues of moral precepts contained in the Scriptures. A similar approach can be found later in Peter Martyr Vermigli. In his own Commentary on the NE Vermigli admitted the possibility of a theological application of Aristotle’s doctrine of virtue, though restraining it to those virtues the believers develop as a consequence of their inner renewal through the Holy Spirit.⁷⁸ Even Lambert Daneau, who in the Ethices christianae libri tres (Geneva: Eustache Vignon, 1577) tried to present his system of Christian ethics simply as a ‘concretion of God’s law as it is summarized in the decalogue’,⁷⁹ drew de facto to a great extent on the Aristotelian tradition, which he appropriated among others through the mediation of Melanchthon’s textbooks.⁸⁰

From this point of view, therefore, Werdmüller’s work as a Christian moral philosopher can be considered to stay at the beginning of a process which led during the remnant of the sixteenth century to the formation of a distinctively reformed ethics. Of course, the reformed recognized the existence of boundaries between ancient moral philosophy and Christian doctrine, but were at the same time open to the possibility of letting Aristotle, and philosophy in general, interact with the Bible towards the development of a systematic account of Christian ethics. That the development of such a system was for them a priority is clearly demonstrated by the emphasis reformed divines always laid on the essential nexus of Gospel and Law, an emphasis which cannot be found, on the contrary, either in Melanchthon nor in Lutheran theology in general.