32. Sheets ("Justice in the Moral Thought of St. Anselm") emphasizes the
jeffrey e. brower (1992). Engstrom argues that "the primary focus of attention in Kant's moral theory is not, as is often thought, on isolated instances of choice and action, but rather on a person's disposition or character" (748). For more extended treatments of the same issue, see F. G. Munzel, Kant's
Conception of Moral Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) and Nancy Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue (New York,
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
31.
Though, of course, medieval eudaimonists will explain what is involved in "choosing what is right for the right reason" differently than Anselm.
32.
Sheets ("Justice in the Moral Thought of St. Anselm") emphasizes the supernatural origin of the will's rectitude, though he is skeptical (for reasons I find unconvincing) that Anselm could have possessed the notion of a virtue in the standard Aristotelian sense. See esp. 136–37.
33.
The same point also emerges from the passage quoted above from De Casu Diab. 12, if we restore its original context: "He cannot be called just or unjust for willing only happiness or for willing only what is appropriate, when he wills in that way out of necessity. Again, he neither can nor ought to be happy unless he wills to be happy and wills it justly. For both of these reasons, therefore, God must create both wills in him in such a way that he both wills to be happy and wills it justly.
This added justice governs his will for happiness in such a way as to restrain its excess without eliminating its power to exceed."
34.
I presented earlier versions of this chapter at Purdue University, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, the Cornell Summer
Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy, and Marquette University's Midwest Seminar in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. I am grateful to the audiences on those occasions for stimulating discussion and comments. I am also grateful to Michael Bergmann, John Boler, Jeff Hause,
Patrick Kain, Brian Leftow, Scott MacDonald, Dan Maloney, Michael Rea, Paul Studtmann, and especially Susan Brower-Toland for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.
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