54. See, for example, D. Walton, "Logical Form and Agency," Philosophical
Anselm on modality
53. Fragments, 347.5–8; for Anselm's semantic program, see Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions," 121–30 and Henry, The Logic of Saint
Anselm, 17–21.
54. See, for example, D. Walton, "Logical Form and Agency," Philosophical Studies 29 (1976), 75–89, and K. Segerberg, "Getting Started: Beginnings in the Logic of Action," in G. Corsi et al. (eds.), Atti del Convegno internazionale di storia della logica. Le teorie delle modalit`a (Bologna,
CLUEB, 1989), 222–24.
55. Fragments, 346.22–25.
56. See Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions," 130–44.
57. See Cur Deus Homo 2.5 (S ii: 100.20–28) and 2.17 (S ii: 123.27–30) for the necessities and impossibilities in God.
58. Cur Deus Homo 2.17 (S ii: 123.31–124.2); for the necessity of God's immortality and justice, see Cur Deus Homo 2.10 (S ii: 108.3–8), De
Conc. 1.2 (S ii: 247.6–11).
59. Prosl. 7 (S i: 105.24–27): "When someone is said to have a power (potentia) to do or undergo something which is not his advantage or which he ought not to do, then what is understood by 'power' is impotence, because the more he has this power, the more adversity and perversity have power over him, and the more impotent he is against them"
(translated in Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions," 155, n. 49).
60. De Ver. 8 (S i: 188.18–22); Cur Deus Homo 2.17 (S ii: 123.15–20).
61. De Lib. Arb. 5 (S i: 216.29–217.6).
62. For agent and patient in Aristotle's natural philosophy in general, see S.
Waterlow, Passage and Possibility: A Study in Aristotle's Modal Concepts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 159–203.
63. De Casu Diab. 27 (S i: 275.25–33), 28 (S i: 276.14–15).
64. De Lib. Arb. 12 (S i: 224.6–22); De Conc. 3.3 (S ii: 265.26–266.23).
65. Pace Serene, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions," 141.
66. Reply to Gaunilo (S ii: 131.18–22).
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