47. We call it "enriched" because it makes explicit certain requirements
Anselm's account of freedom
42. De Conc. 1.3 (S ii: 250; Major Works, 439).
43. De Conc. 2.3 (S ii: 262; Major Works, 451).
44. Cur Deus Homo 2.5 (S ii: 99–100; Major Works, 319). "Honorableness" and "dishonorableness" translate "honestas" and "inhonestas," respectively.
45. De Ver. 12 (S i: 193–94; Dialogues, 23).
46. De Ver. 12 (S i: 194; Dialogues, 23).
47. We call it "enriched" because it makes explicit certain requirements that Anselm takes to be implied by the original descriptive definition, not because it actually adds something new.
48. De Conc. 1.6 (S ii: 257; Major Works, 446).
49. Because the enriched descriptive definition is silent about what an agent's goals are or should be, and hence says nothing about the content of the agent's "knowledge," it is ultimately merely Anselmian, not Anselm's. Anselm insists that we have only two motivations – one for happiness, the other for justice. The only sorts of choices that are of interest to him are ones that involve a conflict between the two. Any other decisions require a conflict among intermediate goals and their potential to make a person happy. Mistakes in this regard are all due to lack of knowledge or lack of rationality. Anselm wants to be able to say that a person is most free when his motivation for action is justice
(preserving rectitude for its own sake). Thus, the person who believes (and acts on the belief) that a base hedonistic life leads to happiness, but does not realize that it is inconsistent with justice, is less free than the person who knows that they are inconsistent, but chooses happiness over justice (not realizing that ignoring justice will preclude ultimate happiness), and he in turn is less free than the person who once chose justice over happiness, now realizes that they lead to the same place, and maintains his desire to uphold justice for its own sake. By contrast, if we refrain from building a substantive moral theory into the enriched descriptive definition, there will be no such hierarchy of degrees of freedom. If, say, a person foolishly believes that smoking combats colds, then the smoker can smoke as freely as the non-smoker refrains.
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