58. For example, in response to the teacher's contention that sin does not
Anselm on faith and reason
58. For example, in response to the teacher's contention that sin does not take away freedom of choice but only the occasion to use it, the student replies, "I believe, but I desire to understand" (De Lib. Arb. 3; S i: 211.1).
Again, regarding the claim that fallen angels would not be condemned if they were not guilty, the student declares, "I am certain, even if I do not see it" (De Casu Diab. 2; S i: 235.27; cf. 4; S i: 240.22–23). Likewise, to the contention that the good angels were able to sin before the evil ones fell, the student responds, "I think so, but I wish to comprehend it by reason" (De Casu Diab. 5; S i: 242.28).
59. Cur Deus Homo 2.13 (S ii: 113.17–18).
60. De Gramm. 1–2 (S i: 145.4–146.26); 3 (S i: 147.21–148.6); De Ver. 1 (S i: 176); De Lib. Arb. 1 (S i: 207.4–10); 2 (S i: 209.13–26); De Casu Diab.
2 (S i: 235.20–236.9); 7 (S i: 244.11–245.18); 10 (S i: 247.6–28); 21 (S i:
266.15–267.19).
61. See De Lib. Arb. 1 (S i: 208.1–13); 2 (S i: 209.27–210.21); 3 (S i: 210.25– 211.1); 5 (S i: 214.5–17.24–26); 6 (S i: 217.10–22); 8 (S i: 220.12–16); 10
(S i: 222.20); 11 (S i: 222.26–233.2); 13 (S i: 225.4–9).
62. The student offers linguistic (De Lib. Arb. 5; S i: 214.24–26) and experiential (6; S i: 217.20–25) counter-evidence to the teacher's claim that the will cannot be overcome by temptation. Likewise, he wonders whether
God is a counter-example to the teacher's claim that no alien force can coerce an upright will to sin (De Lib. Arb. 8; S i: 220.12–16).
63. Cur Deus Homo 1.25 (S ii: 95.15–22).
64. For example, he asks whether humans were part of God's original creative plan, or whether we were made only to fill up the number of fallen angels (Cur Deus Homo 1.16; S ii: 74.14 and 1.18; S ii: 84.3); how God was able to take a sinless human nature from Adam's race (Cur Deus Homo
2.16; S ii: 116.16–24, 117.18–22); and whether Christ's death was not necessary, on the assumption that Mary was cleansed by it in advance
(Cur Deus Homo 2.16; S ii: 120.2–11).
65. Cur Deus Homo 1.3 (S ii; 50.16–22).
66. Cur Deus Homo 1.7 (S ii: 55.13–59.5).
67. For example, in De Veritate, when the student appeals to Aristotelian– Boethian correspondence as an account of truth of statement, the teacher denies it is definitional, but then allows it to stand as a statement of truth-conditions within the teacher's teleological account of what truth is. Again, in De Libertate Arbitrii, the teacher rejects the student's proposal – "power to sin and power not to sin" – as definitional of free choice, but allows it to stand as a de facto necessary condition of imputability.
68. The teacher offers the final definitions in De Veritate (11–12; S i:
191.3–196.25) and De Libertate Arbitrii (3; S i: 211.5–212.23 and 14; Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006
Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006