4. For the sake of simplicity, I treat consequentialist and eudaimonistic
Anselm on ethics
relation between Augustine and Anselm, see R. D. Crouse, "The Augustinian Background of St. Anselm's Concept Justitia," Canadian Journal of Theology 4 (1958) and Hiroko Yamazaki, "Anselm and the Problem of Evil," Anselm Studies 2 (1988).
Anselm's ethical views have received very little attention from contemporary scholars, and as a result there is no satisfactory systematic treatment of them available in the contemporary literature. Important aspects of Anselm's ethical views, however, are discussed in: Eugene
Fairweather, "Truth, Justice and Moral Responsibility in the Thought of St. Anselm," in L'homme et son destin d'apr`es les penseurs du moyen age: Actes du premier congr`es internationale de philosophie m´edi´evale (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1960); Jorge J. E. Gracia and J. J.
Sandford, "Ratio quarens beatitudinem: Anselm on Rationality and Happiness," in J. Yu and Jorge Gracia (eds.), Rationality and Happiness: From the Ancients to the Early Medievals (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2003); Douglas Langston, "Did Scotus Embrace
Anselm's Notion of Freedom?," Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5 (1996); Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, "Anselm's Account of Freedom," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (2001); and the works cited in note 1. For more complete bibliographical information, see Klaus Kienzler et al., International Bibliography – Anselm of Canterbury: Anselm
Studies Volume iv (Lewiston, Queenston, and Lampeter: Mellen Press, 1999), especially §10.5.
For the sake of simplicity, I treat consequentialist and eudaimonistic (or virtue-ethical) theories as species of teleological theory, though they are often treated separately.
For Scotus's ethical theory, see John Hare, God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands, and Human Autonomy (Grand Rapids: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001); John Hare, "Scotus on Morality and Nature," Medieval Philosophy and Theology 9 (2000); and Thomas
Williams, "How Scotus Separates Morality from Happiness," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995). Hare suggests not only that Scotus's ethical theory can be seen as a natural development of views already present in Anselm, but also that Anselm's ethical theory can be seen as a natural development of certain views of Augustine.
Although Hare seems to me right about the relationship between Scotus and Anselm, his suggestion about the relationship of both to Augustine seems mistaken. Augustine certainly emphasizes the role of justice in morality, and in this respect must be regarded as a source for Anselm's views. But I see no evidence to suggest that the emphasis on justice led
Augustine either to separate morality from happiness or to develop (as both Anselm and Scotus do) a doctrine of two affections or wills.
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