Chapter 3 of 12

Xv. Money And Banking.

Xv. Money And Banking.

XIII. PROBLEMS OF DISTRIBUTION.

So far we have discussed for the most part those economic problems that center round the production of wealth, such as the use of natural resources, large-scale production, trusts and monopolies, labor organizations, unemployment, industrial education and co-operation. Now we shall consider briefly a few of the problems that are connected with the distribution of wealth. Professor Blockmar says that the three great problems of economic society are: “First, how to create the largest amount of utilities or wealth; second, how justly to divide this amount; and third, how to make the product minister to the permanent rather than to the transient well-being of society.” The first problem we have already discussed; the second forms the subject of the present section; while the third will be taken up in the next section. Within the last century the center of interest in the practical application of economic principles has decidedly shifted from production to distribution. The earlier writers in economics, as shown in the mercantile lists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, even Adam Smith, were chiefly interested in methods of increasing a nation’s wealth. With the introduction of the factory system and the opening up of vast natural resources by improvements in mining and transportation, the production of wealth has enormously increased, and now the question of the method of its distribution or division is felt to be more pressing.

Under the term distribution two different processes are included, which should be distinguished before going further. The first is called functional distribution, and concerns the distribution of the product of industry or the income of society, among the different factors of production. That is to say, land, labor, capital and managerial ability have contributed in varying degrees to the production of a certain amount of current wealth, and the problem of functional distribution is to ascertain how the net product resulting from these joint efforts is divided. How much goes to rent, how much to wages, how much to interest and how much to profits? The second kind of distribution is the division of the wealth of society among individuals or families; this is personal distribution, and raises the question of poverty and great wealth. In discussing these problems, however, we must remember that wealth production and distribution takes place in modern society under conditions imposed by the social order in which we live; these were defined as competition, private property and personal liberty. If any modifications of the processes of distribution were desired, it would undoubtedly be necessary to alter these fundamental institutions.

John Stuart Mill held that production was governed by natural laws, which could be ascertained and stated, but that distribution was artificial and hence that it was not possible to discover constant and certain laws governing it. Beginning mainly with Mill, the ethical question has been more and more asked as to what share each factor in production ought to get, not merely what he does receive. “Hence the question is rising more and more as to what should be the basis of division, and many proposals have been made. It is proposed that laborers combine to get a larger share. Hence we have trade unions, Knights of Labor, etc. It is proposed that capitalists and landlords give a larger proportion of the produce to the laborers than they are able to secure by mere private struggle. Hence we have proposals for profit-sharing and various charities. It is proposed that laborers combine to be their own capitalists and landlords; hence we have all sorts of co-operative and communistic experiments. It is asserted that the wealthy classes have so much power in their hands that private co-operation cannot succeed in competing against them, and hence it is proposed that all the people, through government (municipal, state, and national), secure all the means of production (capital and land, so far at least as land is used for production), and operate them collectively for the equitable good of all, the people thus being their own employers, capitalists, and landlords. Hence we have municipalism, nationalism, socialism. It is claimed that capitalists and landlords have been able to secure, and are today able to maintain, their large share in distribution, only through the favoritism of the Government. Hence we have proposals for free trade, the single tax,... the extreme proposals of the very great minimizing of the state in individualism, or the abolition of the Government in anarchism.” In view of this very imperfect list it is not too much to say that most of the economic problems that are stirring society today are connected with the distribution of wealth.

The first question that suggests itself in the discussion of functional distribution is as to whether it is actually governed by natural law, so-called. It is observable that the amounts which go to rent, to wages, to interest, and to profits are regularly quite constant. What determines this? The socialists contend that natural distribution is the only just method and insist that the state should regulate this just distribution; they are not clear, however, as to what this natural method is. Henry George uses the same phrase when he says, “the just distribution of wealth is manifestly a natural distribution of wealth, and this is that which gives to him who makes it and secures to him who saves it.” All such statements beg the question for they all turn on the use of the word natural. Many modern economists are inclined to assert that the question of distribution is not an ethical one, not a question of what ought to be but of what is. Thus Professor Tetter says : “Distribution in economics is the seasoned explanation of the way in which the total product of a society is divided among its members. It is a logical question and not an ethical one.” And Professor Clark writes, “There is, in short, a deep-acting natural law at work amid the confusing struggles of the labor market.” It will not be possible, in the brief limits of this section, to take up all the theories as to the way in which this distribution is effected among the claimants to a share of the product, but a few of the more important practical results may be stated. We shall take up the four different factors in turn.

Rent is usually defined as the return for the use of natural objects and agencies. Rent has usually been low in the United States because of the large amount of land and other natural agents available. In general it may be said that when any factor of production is relatively abundant in comparison with the other factors, its share of the product will be small. Henry George, however, argues that as the amount of land is limited and is now practically all taken up, the future will see a constantly increasing demand for land, and hence the landlords will absorb most of the future income of society. This is true of most of land and other natural agents especially in demand, as choice sites in our cities, anthracite coal mines, etc. The practical problem that suggests itself is, do we wish private property in land? The socialists answer no, but the individualists insist that the best use has been and can be made of land only by reducing it to private ownership. In practice, however, even in modern individualistic societies, the absolute and unregulated use of land by the owner is restricted in various ways.

Interest is the amount paid for the use of capital. From the time of the church fathers in the Middle Ages down to the present-day socialists, interest and the private ownership of productive capital have formed favorite objects of attack. The justification of interest lies in the fact that men prefer present goods to future goods—a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush—and interest is the difference in value between the two at the present moment; it is time value. The justification of private property, on the other hand, lies rather in its expediency than in any inherent and unalterable law of nature. It has developed with civilization and has been, without question, a fundamental cause of material progress. But moderate individualists even, as John Stuart Mill, have attacked the institution of inheritance while leaving the main edifice of private property untouched. They would limit absolutely the amount of bequest or, as President Roosevelt advocated, would use inheritance taxes as a means of breaking up large fortunes.

Profits are the reward which the manager of a business receives for his services in organizing and superintending the business. This share of the social income was the last to be recognized by economists, and its rightfulness is even yet denied by the socialists. They insist that profits are really the earnings of labor which have been withheld from the laborer by the superior skill and economic strength of the capitalist manager; they are institutional robbery, the exploitation of labor. It is not possible to take up the arguments on this point, but it may be said in a word that the manager of business contributes a needed service to the work of society just as truly as the laborer does, and receives his earned reward in the form of profits.

Wages are the reward of labor. It is often assumed that wages are lower than they should be, that the laborer in some way is deprived of a portion of what he has rightfully earned. It is worth while inquiring briefly how the share of labor in the distribution of the social income is determined. Various theories have been developed to explain the distributive process, of which we may notice three. The oldest in point of time and the most pessimistic theory held that wages were fixed by competition and the growth of population at the bare subsistence minimum, a bare starvation level. If by some happy chance wages were raised above this point, then the population would speedily multiply and the increased competition thus brought about among the laborers would depress wages again to the lowest amount sufficient to support a family. Under the name of the “iron law of wages,” this theory is still put forth by the socialists as the explanation—together with the institution of private property—of wages. Historically, however, this theory has happily been proven untrue, as the advance in the standard of living among the working class during the past century testifies. It has now been almost wholly superseded by the so-called productivity theory, which asserts that wages depend upon the productivity of labor; that the laborer gets what he produces, and that this share is assured him by the working out of the competitive process under free competition. If this theory is true, there can be no ethical question raised; if labor is dissatisfied with its share, then it must increase its productive efficiency. As a matter of fact wages have always been high in the United States because labor has been relatively scarce compared with land and capital, and consequently its marginal productivity has been high. The third theory says that wages are a result of bargaining, of competition in the labor market, a question of supply and demand. Under these circumstances it is largely a question of economic strength between labor and capital, and if labor is well-organized, alert, and able to drive a good bargain, then wages will be high; otherwise they will be low. While there is an element of truth in the last theory, the second one seems the truest explanation of general wages; certain it is that no monopoly power of labor, however great, could permanently maintain wages at a level higher than the actual produce of labor. The element of truth in the first theory is that wages can never, for any length of time, fall below the cost of subsistence.

Of more practical interest are questions connected with the personal distribution of wealth. In this connection arise such problems as the increase of large fortunes, the causes of poverty, and similar questions. The boast of our Republic has long been that here opportunity was open to all, that wealth was widely diffused, and that such inequalities of fortune as characterized the nations of the Old World were happily lacking. In the fifty-five years, 1850-1904, the per capita value of all property in the United States exactly quadrupled; how has this increase been distributed? Unfortunately we have no complete statistics on this point, yet reliable estimates by authoritative writers all tell the same story—of great concentration of wealth in the possession of a comparatively few rich families. In 1893 Mr. George K. Holmes concluded from a study of the statistics of farm and home ownership in the United States that “91 per cent of the families of the country own no more than about 29 per cent of the wealth, and 9 per cent of the families own about 71 per cent of the wealth.” A more accurate and satisfactory statement can be drawn from the income-tax returns for Prussia, which tells almost the same story with regard to income. The table on the following page is condensed from an article by Professor A. Wagner:

Distribution of Income in Prussia, 1902

Income

Below $214

70.7
33.0

$214 to $714

25.8
34.9

Over $714

3.5
32.1

According to these figures over two-thirds of the persons—heads of families or single adults—had only one-third of the income, while 3½ per cent had another third. Another striking fact shown by the table is the large proportion of persons receiving incomes of less than $214 a year, the minimum taxable income. It shows the poverty of the mass of the people as well as the concentration of wealth among the few rich. In the United States, where the natural resources have been so much richer than in Germany, a similar table would probably show a much smaller proportion under the Prussian minimum, but on the other hand it would probably show a greater concentration of income in the hands of a few. Europe has as yet no billionaire. The great fortunes of the United States have been made possible by the unrivaled opportunities for the exploitation of rich natural resources, the appropriation of natural monopolies, and to special privileges and opportunities in manufactures and transportation. The importance of monopoly privileges in the distribution of wealth is well shown by the results of an investigation made in 1892 by the New York Tribune into the sources of the fortunes of millionaires. It was undertaken to show that protection was not the main cause; but while it proved this, it showed clearly that most of them were built up on monopoly. “Of the 4,047 millionaires reported, only 1,125, or 28 per cent, obtained their fortunes in protected industries.... About 78 per cent of the fortunes were derived from permanent monopoly privileges, and only 22 per cent from competitive industries unaided by natural and artificial monopolies.... Furthermore, if the size of fortunes is taken into account it will be found that perhaps 95 per cent of the total values represented by these millionaire fortunes is due to those investments classed as land values and natural monopolies, and to competitive industries aided by such monopolies.” It is essential to the stability of our democratic institutions that all special privileges be absolutely prohibited, and that monopoly be brought under strict government control and regulation. Improper methods of wealth accumulation should certainly be prevented.

The opposite question of poverty has already been discussed and some of the causes of poverty pointed out. It will be sufficient here to try to answer the question which has often been asked: Are the rich growing richer and the poor poorer? Though the first part of the question has just been affirmed, the second part may be denied. The nineteenth century has witnessed a vast improvement in the condition of the laboring man, who has shared in the increasing wealth which he has helped to produce. Wages have steadily increased, the hours of labor have been reduced, and the material well-being of the wage-earner is greater today than it has ever been before. It has more than once been pointed out by writers on this subject that with an equal distribution of wealth no one would be well-to-do, while many others insist that inequality in itself is a desirable thing. Greater diffusion of wealth can come about only by very slow processes, and permanent plenty can be secured only by a great increase in the accumulations of capital and the efficiency of each worker. Any suggested reform, therefore, that would weaken the motives to thrift and industry must be rejected.

XIV. SAVING AND SPENDING.

The goal and purpose of all economic activities is the satisfaction of human wants. The object of production is consumption. We work because we desire and need various things which we can get only if we produce them or earn the money to buy them. In this section we take up some of the problems connected with the rational use or consumption of the wealth which is continually being produced. We have seen something of the conditions under which it is produced, and the manner in which it is distributed; we must now study the not less important subject of its application to human needs and desires. The great question is, how can we get the largest and most rational return for a given expenditure? Before trying to answer this question, it will be helpful to present a summary statement of actual expenditures in different places:

Expenditures for Different Purposes.

Items United

States

1903
New York

City
Great

Britain
Prussia Average
Food
43.1
43.4
51.4
55.0
48.2
Clothing
13.0
10.6
18.1
18.0
14.9
Rent
18.1
19.4
13.5
12.0
15.8
Fuel and light
5.7
5.1
3.5
5.0
4.8
Miscellaneous
20.1
21.5
13.5
10.0
16.3
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Items United

States

1903
New

York

City
Great

Britain
Food
43.1
43.4
51.4
Clothing
13.0
10.6
18.1
Rent
18.1
19.4
13.5
Fuel and light
5.7
5.1
3.5
Miscellaneous
20.1
21.5
13.5
 Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
Items Prussia Average
Food
55.0
48.2
Clothing
18.0
14.9
Rent
12.0
15.8
Fuel and light
5.0
4.8
Miscellaneous
10.0
16.3
 Total
100.0
100.0

From this table it is seen that practically half of the income of average working-class families is expended for food, and five-sixths of it goes for the bare necessaries. It is therefore of the utmost importance that this be spent wisely. The remaining one-sixth, included here under the head “miscellaneous,” comprises such items as education, care of health, comfort, mental and bodily recreation, etc. It is manifest that this group can be expanded in only one of two ways: either by enlarging the total income, or by economizing on the other items by a wiser and better-ordered expenditure. The former question has already been discussed; here we are concerned only with the latter. Dr. Frederick Engel, a Prussian statistician, laid down certain laws with regard to consumption: as the income of a family increases a smaller percentage is spent for food and a larger percentage for education, health, recreation, etc.; while the percentage spent for clothing, rent, fuel and light remains approximately the same. A higher civilization and culture for the mass of the people can only be secured by expanding the group of culture expenditures. As long as these remain unsatisfied for the ordinary family we cannot claim to have attained our economic goal. The author of a recent study of conditions in New York City, where the cost of living is high, concludes that a “fair living wage for a workingman’s family in New York City should be at least $728 a year, or a steady income of $14 a week.” The actual earnings are certainly below this figure.

One of the problems which has often proved very puzzling is the relation between saving and spending. At what point should one stop spending in order to save? If the satisfaction of our wants is the object of production, why should we save at all? This is the point urged by the author of a specious little book called “The Fallacy of Saving.” The problem can be most easily solved by a more careful analysis of terms. In the popular view, saving involves the withdrawal of goods or money from use, while spending means putting them to immediate use. The spendthrift is proverbially popular. “If the rich do not spend, the poor die of hunger,” said Montesquieu. Saving may take the form of hoarding or withdrawing things from use, but nowadays this is practised only by misers; saving ordinarily takes the form of investment in some productive enterprise, either directly or through a bank. In this way a demand is created for goods just as truly as though the money had been spent for a dinner or a suit of clothes. Saving is spending, but it is spending for the future rather than the present; it usually causes the production of permanent material goods rather than transient or immaterial pleasures. Another cause of the confusion of ideas on this subject is that we always speak of money and thus lose sight of the acts of production and consumption that lie back of the money transfer. We see that money is transferred by spending and think that it increases trade. Consequently, when a prodigal spends his money foolishly, it is excused on the ground that it makes employment and puts money in circulation. We forget that it would have been “put in circulation” just as effectively if he had not spent it, but had placed it in a bank. If we look back of the money transfer, we see that usually there has been a foolish or wasteful expenditure, sometimes an absolute destruction of wealth. A fire which burns down valuable buildings is an absolute social loss, even though employment be given to masons and carpenters in putting them up again.

A third confusion of ideas that exists in the popular mind is due to an over-emphasis of the desirability of work for its own sake. The man who “makes work” is thought to be doing a desirable thing, even though this results from the unnecessary destruction of useful things. Now the real goal of all rational economic endeavor is not production for its own sake, but consumption; not work, but the gratification of wants. Every destruction of durable commodities which lessens the power to gratify wants is a loss to a community and no juggling with words can make it anything else. If it gives employment to labor, that means that the labor has been diverted from the production of other things to which it would have been devoted. Edward Atkinson several years ago calculated that every year fires destroyed property in the United States to the amount $150,000,000. That workmen are employed to reproduce the buildings, etc., can surely not be reckoned as a social gain. There is great danger in a commercial age like ours of forgetting that work is not an end in itself, but simply a means to an end. But it may be argued that unless these men had been given employment of this sort, they would have starved. It is conceivable that during or after a revolution industry would be so interrupted that ordinary employments would not be open. But in ordinary times such a statement is simply an assertion of the fallacious lump-of-labor theory, that there is just so much work to be done and no more. New wants are continually pressing for satisfaction, waiting only for the prior ones to be satisfied before they urge their claims. So soon as the old ones are satisfied, additional employment is provided in meeting the newer desires. The aim of society is to expand continually the circle of gratified desires. As durable goods and agents are accumulated by the process of saving, this becomes increasingly possible in every progressive society. Useless destruction involves sheer waste and cannot be justified on any grounds.

On the other hand, saving is socially necessary in every industrially developed community in order to furnish the requisite capital for the continued production of wealth. Professor Marshall has estimated that every year one-fifth of the wealth of a nation is used up in the processes of manufacture and production; just to keep machines, factories, railroads, and other instruments of production up to the point of efficiency and restore loss and depreciation would therefore require considerable saving. If the nation is to grow wealthier and is to accumulate additional capital, manifestly still more must be saved. This is done in all progressive countries. Saving is carried on by individuals, however, and not by nations, and the motives that lead to it are personal. The most important is probably the desire to provide for wife and children or other relatives; next to that is the wish to lay by sufficient for one’s old age. In our individualistic society, where each family forms an independent unit and is assumed to be self-supporting, it is very desirable that habits of thrift and saving be developed. Both from a social and a personal point of view therefore saving must be approved, though it is undesirable that it should proceed so far as to prevent spending for the gratification of essential present needs.

But what shall we say about expenditures for luxuries? Here the spending is for the gratification of a want, though it may be out of proportion to the results. What shall be our attitude to it? This question is not so easy to answer as the other. Three different schools have given as many answers to the problem of luxury: the first condemns it utterly; the second approves it wholly; and the third takes an intermediate position between the two extremes. Luxury is condemned by the first school from three points of view: as a question of individual morals, it is regarded as debasing and enervating, thus preventing the highest development of the human faculties; as a question of economics it is condemned as wasteful; and as a question of right and justice it is incompatible with an equitable distribution of wealth. It is upon this last point that the opponents of luxury lay the greatest emphasis. As the quantity of existing wealth is insufficient to satisfy even the primal wants of the large majority of our fellow-creatures, we should endeavor to increase this available store as much as we can, and should refrain from drawing upon it in a reckless manner in order to gratify superfluous wants. Furthermore, the productive powers that we can use are, as a matter of fact, limited; and therefore, if the wealthy classes divert a portion of these forces towards the production of articles of luxury, there will be so much the less available for the production of those staple articles that the masses require for their consumption. In the case of a Robinson Crusoe this would be perfectly clear: if he devoted several months to the polishing of a diamond for ornament, he would have to go without a house or other improvements he might have made in that time. Or, if he forced his man Friday to spend half his time polishing diamonds for him, Friday might be compelled to go without sufficient clothing or food or housing. The same thing is true of organized society, only the truth is hidden by the phenomena of exchange. It has been estimated that the annual consumption of wealth in the United States is divided somewhat as follows: necessaries, six billion dollars; luxuries, three and one-half billion (of which $900,000,000 go for liquor and $500,000,000 for tobacco); capitalistic uses, three and three-quarter billion. It is manifest that if the expenditure for luxuries was curtailed or abandoned, there would be more to devote to the other categories.

The opposite school replies to these arguments that luxury is an indispensable stimulus to progress; that really all economic progress is first manifested in the form of a need of luxury, and that luxury therefore is a necessary phase of its development. Since luxury is wholly relative, every want or need is, on its first appearance in the world, regarded as superfluous; first, because no one has hitherto wanted it, and secondly, because its production probably requires a considerable amount of labor, on account of man’s inexperience and the inevitable gropings in the dark that attend all beginnings. The decencies of life today and even the necessities were once regarded as luxuries—chimneys in houses, shoes, forks and knives, linen for the body, bath tubs, etc. If all luxury had always been sternly suppressed when it made its appearance, all the needs that constitute civilization would have been nipped in the bud, and we should still be in the condition of our ancestors of the Stone Age. Civilization depends on the multiplication of wants. Economic progress is a process of converting superfluities into conveniences, and conveniences into necessities.

The attitude taken by practically all economists today is intermediate between these two extremes. Moderate luxury is justified, but lavish and indiscriminate luxury is disapproved of. This justification of luxury rests upon purely economic grounds. In so far as personal consumption is the objective point of production, the prohibition of luxury would act as an impediment to enterprise. If the desire to enjoy luxuries stimulates the productive powers of economically important members of society, it is justifiable as a necessary motive force. The introduction of luxuries and the consequent raising of the standard of living seems often the only way to secure progress. If the mass of the people live on the minimum of cheap food, multiply as long as cheap food is to be had, and spend little for comforts and luxuries, then most of the labor of such a community must be spent in obtaining food for the masses. Such is the condition in India and China. But if a large part of the community has a higher standard of living, it will exercise self-restraint in the increase of its numbers, and the whole level of intelligence and comfort will be raised, as in France or Switzerland or New England. On the other hand, it is urged that “failure on the part of any family to secure the necessaries of life is injurious, not only to it, but to the whole community. Under-consumption means under-nutrition and loss in industrial efficiency. If permitted to continue it must inevitably undermine the standards which make a family self-supporting and self-sufficient and reduce its members to dependency. The general interest requires, therefore, acceptance of the maxim: the consumption of luxuries should be deferred until all are provided with necessaries.... This suggests that no one is justified in spending income for a luxury for himself or his family that will afford less happiness than would the same income spent for someone else.”

But the difficult question at once suggests itself: How can the surplus incomes of the rich be used so as to provide for the needs of the poor, without undermining their independence or permanently lowering their earning power? It has been suggested that there should be a socialization of luxury; that the rich should use their wealth for the construction of public art galleries, libraries, parks, baths, etc., which would thus gratify as great a number as possible. The feeling is growing in the United States and in the world that wealth is a social trust, and that the ownership of wealth imposes upon a person certain moral obligations. While every man has a legal right to spend his surplus income as he pleases, he is morally bound to spend it in such a way as to increase the welfare of the whole community.

Let us now finally take up the problem of economy in consumption. It is said that an American family will waste enough food for a French family to live on. The farmer who leaves his implements out in the rain or his cattle without proper shelter, is guilty of waste. We all waste clothing by frequent changes in fashion. Such waste is as much due to a lack of knowledge and training as to carelessness. The single example of the consumption of food will illustrate this point. “If we place the average income of an American family at $500—and it will not greatly exceed that figure—then nearly $250 of this amount is expended each year for food. Waste occurs in any or all of the following ways: (1) needlessly expensive foods containing little real nutriment are used; (2) there is a failure to select the foods best suited to the needs of the family; (3) a great deal is thrown away which ought to be utilized; (4) bad preparation of the food causes it to lose much of the nutriment which it does contain; (5) badly constructed ovens diffuse heat, instead of confining it, and cause enormous loss of fuel. We shall state less than the truth if we estimate that fully one-fifth of the money expended for food is absolutely wasted, while the excessive expenditure often fails to provide adequate nutrition.” The remedy for such a waste as this clearly lies in the teaching of domestic science in our public schools to the daughters and future wives of the workingmen. As the ordinary household expenses, as shown above, absorb from 80 to 90 per cent of the ordinary income, the training of the housewife, under whose control they fall, is almost as imperative as that of the wage-earner.

The economic evils of intemperance have already been partially stated in the objections to luxury. There is, however, one additional objection to the excessive use of intoxicating liquor which is not true of most indulgences: it diminishes a man’s productive powers. It is harmful in its effects upon both consumption and production. Other items of consumption appear, however, not so clearly under the immediate control of the consumer. The housing accommodations in many of our large cities have often been unsanitary and unworthy of being called homes. Legislation has been necessary to compel the erection of better tenements and prevent the exploitation of helpless people. So too it has been found necessary to legislate against loan-sharks, in order to protect people against their own improvidence and ignorance. In addition to legislation against positive evils, we must of course look to education as the great remedy of waste in consumption.

There is one other phase of the subject of consumption that may well be mentioned before leaving this subject. Owing to the constant pressure of the consuming public for cheap goods, many articles are produced under conditions dangerous to the health, morality and well-being of the operatives, as in the case of the “sweated trades.” To remedy these evils consumers’ leagues have been started in many places, the members of which pledge themselves not to buy goods or to trade in stores where the conditions of work are not up to certain prescribed standards. They realize that as consumers they owe a duty to other members of society not to exploit them. While this method has proven a fairly effective method of protest in some cases, it cannot be looked to as a solution of this evil. But it emphasizes the fact that the interests of all members of society as producers and consumers are closely interdependent, and that the progress of society requires the improvement of the condition of all.

XV. MONEY AND BANKING.

Probably on no subject has there been such confused thinking or have such widely varying views been held as on that of money. There is, however, substantial unanimity of opinion on the important points among economists today, though in practice there still remain many unsolved problems. The modern industrial system has already been characterized as one of capitalistic production, of large-scale enterprises with extended use of machinery. Not less fundamental are the processes of valuation and exchange made possible by the use of money and credit; and also by the machinery for the geographical distribution of goods, our railroads and steamship lines. The modern stage of economic development has been described by Hildebrand as one of “credit economy,” as opposed to those of barter and money economy, which preceded. It is inconceivable that the modern complex system of exchange could be maintained without the extended use of money and credit. Without attempting to define these terms or to trace their historical development, we may proceed at once to state some of the problems to which they have given rise.

The first question that suggests itself is, what determines the value of money? The generally accepted answer may be briefly stated: it is, that the value of money depends, other things remaining the same, upon its quantity. According to the quantity theory an increase in the supply of money will cause a fall in the value of each unit, just as an increase in the supply of wheat or cotton will cause a fall in the value of each bushel or bale. Conversely, a decrease in the quantity of money will cause a rise in the value of money. It is simply an application of the general law of value to money. The phrase “other things remaining the same” is however an important one, for it assumes that the amount of business and the methods by which it is conducted will remain substantially unchanged. Of course if an increase in the amount of money is accompanied by an equivalent expansion of trade, the one may offset the other and the value of money remain unchanged. Now, inasmuch as the prices of all goods and services are measured and expressed in terms of money, it is clear that a fall in the value of money means a rise of general prices; the value of each commodity is now expressed in terms of a larger number of less valuable units or dollars. Prices will be high if the quantity of money in circulation in a country is large; they will be low if the quantity is small. To the question, which is better for a country, high prices or low prices, it may be answered that it is a matter of indifference, provided only that there is enough money to do the work of exchange efficiently and that fluctuations are prevented. Just how much constitutes enough is, however, a matter of contention. In the undeveloped sections of our country, where capital is scarce and banking facilities undeveloped and where most of the people are debtors, there has always been a demand for cheap and abundant money. Capital and money have been confused and the need of one has led to a demand for the other.

It is not a matter of indifference, however, whether prices be rising or falling, that is, whether inflation or contraction of the currency is taking place. A period of falling prices means hardship and injustice to debtors and producers of goods, as farmers, manufacturers, etc. Having contracted obligations and engaged in the production of commodities with the expectation of a given price, they find their goods worth less when ready for the market and themselves confronted with a loss instead of the anticipated profit. Under such circumstances a contraction of the currency and falling prices means lessened production of wealth. Consequently many writers, and even so good an economist as President Walker, have urged that a slow steady inflation of the currency would promote trade and “give a fillip to industry.” The monetary history of the United States is filled with attempts to realize this in practice: colonial and revolutionary bills of credit were first issued; when these were forbidden by the new Constitution resort was had to issues by state banks. When the Federal Government began the issue of greenbacks and restricted the use of state bank notes, the inflationists looked to this source for assistance. After the defeat of the Greenback party, they turned finally to the coinage of silver, which was now falling in price, and the question of bimetallism in the United States was made a practical political issue.

Down to 1870 practically all the nations of Europe and America had the system of bimetallism at ratios of 15½ or 16 to 1. About that date the great increase in the supply of gold and the fall in the value of silver led one country after another to abandon the latter and to adopt the system of gold monometallism. This was vigorously resisted by many persons and several fruitless efforts made to secure a system of international bimetallism. Failing that, the friends of silver in this country endeavored to secure independent action by the United States alone, and were ultimately successful in obtaining the purchase by the Federal Government of practically the entire silver output of the country during the years 1878-1893.

Development of the Manufacturing Industries in the United States, 1800-1905.
Fiscal Year, ending June 30— Population

June 1.
Wealth. Production of wool. Raw wool imported.
Total. Per capita.
Dollars. Dollars. Pounds. Pounds.
1800 5,308,483 … … … …
1810 7,239,881 … … … …
1820 9,638,453 … … … …
1830 12,866,020 … … 35,802,114 669,883
1840 17,069,453 … … 52,516,959 9,898,740
1850 23,191,876 7,135,780,000
307.69
… 18,695,294
1851 23,995,000 … … … 32,607,315
1852 24,802,000 … … … 18,343,218
1853 25,615,000 … … … 21,616,035
1854 26,433,000 … … … 20,228,035
1855 27,256,000 … … … 18,599,784
1856 28,083,000 … … … 14,778,496
1857 28,916,000 … … … 16,505,216
1858 29,758,000 … … … …
1859 30,596,000 … … 60,264,913 …
1860 31,443,321 16,159,616,000
513.93
75,000,000 …
1861 32,064,000 … … 90,000,000 …
1862 32,704,000 … … 106,000,000 42,131,061
1863 33,365,000 … … 123,000,000 73,931,944
1864 34,046,000 … … 142,000,000 90,464,002
1865 34,748,000 … … 155,000,000 43,877,408
1866 35,469,000 … … 160,000,000 67,918,253
1867 36,211,000 … … 168,000,000 16,558,046
1868 36,973,000 … … 180,000,000 24,124,803
1869 37,756,000 … … 162,000,000 39,275,926
1870 38,558,371 30,068,518,000
779.83
160,000,000 49,230,199
1871 39,555,000 … … 150,000,000 68,058,028
1872 40,596,000 … … 158,000,000 122,256,499
1873 41,677,000 … … 170,000,000 85,496,049
1874 42,796,000 … … 181,000,000 42,939,541
1875 43,951,000 … … 192,000,000 54,901,760
1876 45,137,000 … … 200,000,000 44,642,836
1877 46,353,000 … … 208,250,000 42,171,192
1878 47,598,000 … … 211,000,000 48,449,079
1879 48,866,000 … … 232,500,000 39,005,155
1880 50,155,783 43,642,000,000
850.20
240,000,000 128,131,747
1881 51,316,000 … … 272,000,000 55,964,236
1882 52,495,000 … … 290,000,000 67,861,744
1883 53,693,000 … … 300,000,000 70,575,478
1884 54,911,000 … … 308,000,000 78,350,651
1885 56,148,000 … … 302,000,000 70,596,170
1886 57,404,000 … … 285,000,000 129,084,958
1887 58,680,000 … … 269,000,000 114,038,030
1888 59,974,000 … … 265,000,000 113,558,753
1889 61,289,000 … … 276,000,000 126,487,729
1890 62,622,250 65,037,091,000 1,038.57 285,000,000 105,431,285
1891 63,844,000 … … 294,000,000 129,303,648
1892 65,086,000 … … 303,153,000 148,670,652
1893 66,349,000 … … 298,057,384 172,433,838
1894 67,632,000 … … 309,748,000 55,152,585
1895 68,934,000 77,000,000,000 1,117.01 272,474,708 206,033,906
1896 70,254,000 … … 259,153,251 230,911,473
1897 71,592,000 … … 266,720,684 350,852,026
1898 72,947,000 … … 272,191,330 132,795,202
1899 74,318,000 … … 288,636,621 76,736,209
1900 76,303,387 88,517,306,775 1,164.79 302,502,328 155,928,455
1901 79,003,000 … … 287,450,000 166,576,966
1903 80,372,000 … … 291,783,032 177,137,796
1904 81,752,000 107,104,211,917 1,310.11 295,488,438 173,742,834
1905 83,143,000 … … 298,915,130 249,135,746
1906 84,216,433 … … 298,294,750 201,688,668
1907 85,817,239 … … 311,138,321 203,847,545
1908 87,189,392 … … … 125,980,524
Fiscal Year, ending June 30— Production

of cotton.

(500-lb. bales,

gross weight.)
Manufactures of cotton.
Thousands of spindles in operation on Sept. 1st. Thousands of bales of domestic cotton taken by mills.
In Southern States. In Northern States. Total United States. In Southern States. In Northern States. Total United States
Number. Thou-

sands.
Thou-

sands.
Thou-

sands.
Thou-

sands.
Thou-

sands.
Thou-

sands.
1800 73,222 … … … … … …
1810 177,824 … … … … … …
1820 334,728 … … … … … …
1830 732,218 … … … … … …
1840 1,347,640 181 2,104 2,285 71 166 237
1850 2,136,083 265 3,733 3,998 78 497 575
1851 2,799,290 … … … 60 404 464
1852 3,130,338 … … … 111 588 699
1853 2,766,194 … … … 153 650 803
1854 2,708,082 … … … 145 592 737
1855 3,220,782 … … … 135 571 706
1856 3,873,680 … … … 138 633 771
1857 3,012,016 … … … 154 666 820
1858 3,758,273 … … … 143 452 595
1859 4,309,642 … … … 167 760 927
1860 3,841,416 324 4,912 5,236 94 751 845
1861 4,490,586 … … … 153 650 803
1862 1,596,653 … … … … … …
1863 449,059 … … … … … …
1864 299,372 … … … … … …
1865 2,093,658 … … … … … …
1866 1,948,077 … … … 127 541 668
1867 2,345,610 … … … 150 573 723
1868 2,198,141 … … … 168 800 968
1869 2,409,597 … … … 173 822 995
1870 4,024,527 328 6,804 7,132 69 728 797
1871 2,756,564 … … … 91 1,072 1,163
1872 3,650,932 … … … 120 977 1,097
1873 3,873,750 … … … 138 1,063 1,201
1874 3,528,276 … … … 128 1,192 1,320
1875 4,302,818 … … … 130 1,071 1,201
1876 4,118,390 … … … 134 1,220 1,354
1877 4,494,224 … … … 127 1,302 1,429
1878 4,745,078 … … … 151 1,345 1,496
1879 5,466,387 … … … 186 1,375 1,561
1880 6,356,998 561 10,092 10,653 189 1,382 1,570
1881 5,136,447 … … … 225 1,713 1,938
1882 6,833,442 … … … 287 1,677 1,964
1883 5,521,963 860 11,800 12,660 313 1,759 2,072
1884 5,477,448 1,050 12,250 13,300 340 1,537 1,877
1885 6,369,341 1,125 12,250 13,375 316 1,437 1,753
1886 6,314,561 1,150 12,250 13,400 381 1,781 2,162
1887 6,884,667 1,200 12,300 13,500 401 1,687 2,088
1888 6,923,775 1,250 12,300 13,550 456 1,805 2,261
1889 7,742,511 1,360 2,700 14,060 480 1,790 2,270
1890 8,562,089 1,570 12,814 14,384 539 1,979 2,518
1891 8,940,867 1,740 12,900 14,640 613 2,027 2,640
1892 6,658,313 1,950 13,250 15,200 684 2,172 2,856
1893 7,433.056 2,100 13,450 15,550 723 1,652 2,375
1894 10,025,534 2,200 13,500 15,700 711 1,580 2,291
1895 7,146,772 2,400 13,700 16,100 852 2,019 2,871
1896 8,515,640 2,850 13,800 16,650 900 1,605 2,505
1897 10,985,040 3,250 13,900 17,150 999 1,793 2,792
1898 11,435,368 3,550 13,900 17,450 1,254 2,211 3,465
1899 9,459,935 3,950 14,150 18,100 1,415 2,217 3,632
1900 10,266,527 4,368 15,104 19,472 1,523 2,350 3,873
1901 9,675,771 5,500 11,700 20,200 1,583 1,964 3,547
1902 10,827,168 6,400 15,000 21,400 2,017 2,066 4,083
1903 10,045,615 6,900 15,100 22,000 1,958 1,966 3,924
1904 13,679,954 7,650 15,200 22,850 1,889 2,046 3,935
1905 10,804,556 7,631 16,056 23,687 2,140 2,139 4,279
1906 13,595,498 8,995 16,255 25,250 2,373 2,536 4,909
1907 11,375,461 9,528 16,847 26,275 2,411 2,574 4,985
1908 13,587,306 10,201 17,304 27,505 2,187 2,352 4,539
Fiscal Year,

ending

June 30—
Exports.

(domestic)
Imports. Unmanufactured

silk imported.
Imports of

crude rubber.
Dollars. Dollars. Pounds. Pounds.
1800 … … … …
1810 … … … …
1820 … 7,812,326 … …
1830 1,318,183 5,774,013 … …
1840 3,549,607 6,504,104 … …
1850 4,734,424 20,781,346 … …
1851 7,241,205 22,164,442 … …
1852 7,672,151 19,689,496 … …
1853 8,768,894 27,731,363 … …
1854 5,535,516 33,949,503 … …
1855 5,857,181 17,757,112 … …
1856 6,967,309 25,917,999 … …
1857 6,115,177 28,685,726 … …
1858 5,651,504 18,584,810 … …
1859 8,316,222 26,976,381 … …
1860 10,934,796 33,215,541 … …
1861 7,957,038 25,271,382 … …
1862 2,946,464 8,890,119 … 2,125,561
1863 2,906,411 14,121,589 … 5,104,650
1864 1,456,901 14,341,501 407,935 …
1865 3,451,561 9,223,686 288,286 …
1866 1,780,175 27,502,194 567,904 …
1867 4,608,235 19,302,005 491,983 …
1868 4,871,054 17,335,406 512,449 8,438,019
1869 5,874,222 20,481,312 720,045 7,813,134
1870 3,787,282 23,380,053 583,589 9,624,098
1871 3,558,236 29,876,640 1,100,281 11,031,939
1872 2,304,330 35,307,447 1,063,809 11,803,437
1873 2,947,528 35,201,324 1,159,420 14,536,978
1874 3,095,840 28,193,869 794,837 14,191,320
1875 4,071,882 27,738,401 1,101,681 12,035,909
1876 7,722,978 22,725,598 1,354,991 10,589,297
1877 10,235,843 18,923,614 1,186,170 13,821,109
1878 11,438,660 19,081,037 1,182,750 12,512,203
1879 10,853,950 19,928,310 1,889,776 14,878,584
1880 9,981,418 29,929,366 2,562,236 16,826,099
1881 13,571,387 31,219,329 2,790,413 20,015,176
1882 13,222,979 35,719,791 3,549,404 22,712,862
1883 12,951,145 38,036,044 4,731,106 21,646,320
1884 11,885,211 29,074,626 4,284,888 24,574,025
1885 11,836,591 27,197,241 4,308,908 24,208,148
1886 13,959,934 29,709,266 6,818,060 29,263,632
1887 14,929,342 28,940,353 6,028,091 28,649,446
1888 13,013,189 28,917,799 6,370,322 36,628,351
1889 10,212,644 26,805,942 6,645,124 32,339,503
1890 9,999,277 29,918,055 7,510,440 33,842,374
1891 13,604,857 29,712,624 6,266,629 33,712,089
1892 13,226,277 28,323,841 8,834,049 39,976,205
1893 11,809,355 33,560,293 8,497,477 41,547,680
1894 14,340,886 22,346,547 5,902,485 33,757,783
1895 13,789,810 33,196,625 9,316,460 39,741,607
1896 16,837,396 32,437,504 9,363,987 36,774,460
1897 21,037,678 34,429,363 7,993,444 35,574,449
1898 17,024,092 27,267,300 12,087,951 46,055,497
1899 23,566,914 32,054,434 11,250,383 51,063,066
1900 24,003,087 41,296,239 13,073,718 49,377,138
1901 20,272,418 40,246,935 10,405,555 55,275,529
1902 32,108,362 44,460,126 14,234,826 50,413,481
1903 32,216,304 52,462,755 15,270,859 55,010,571
1904 22,403,713 49,524,246 16,722,709 59,015,551
1905 49,666,080 48,919,936 22,357,307 67,234,256
1906 52,944,033 63,043,322 17,352,021 57,844,345
1907 32,305,412 73,704,636 18,743,904 76,963,838
1908 25,177,758 68,379,781 16,662,132 62,233,160
Fiscal

Year,

ending

June 30—
Population

June 1.
Wealth.
Total. Per capita.
Dollars. Dollars.
1800
5,308,483
… …
1810
7,239,881
… …
1820
9,638,453
… …
1830 12,866,020 … …
1840 17,069,453 … …
1850 23,191,876
7,135,780,000
307.69
1851 23,995,000 … …
1852 24,802,000 … …
1853 25,615,000 … …
1854 26,433,000 … …
1855 27,256,000 … …
1856 28,083,000 … …
1857 28,916,000 … …
1858 29,758,000 … …
1859 30,596,000 … …
1860 31,443,321
16,159,616,000
513.93
1861 32,064,000 … …
1862 32,704,000 … …
1863 33,365,000 … …
1864 34,046,000 … …
1865 34,748,000 … …
1866 35,469,000 … …
1867 36,211,000 … …
1868 36,973,000 … …
1869 37,756,000 … …
1870 38,558,371
30,068,518,000
779.83
1871 39,555,000 … …
1872 40,596,000 … …
1873 41,677,000 … …
1874 42,796,000 … …
1875 43,951,000 … …
1876 45,137,000 … …
1877 46,353,000 … …
1878 47,598,000 … …
1879 48,866,000 … …
1880 50,155,783
43,642,000,000
850.20
1881 51,316,000 … …
1882 52,495,000 … …
1883 53,693,000 … …
1884 54,911,000 … …
1885 56,148,000 … …
1886 57,404,000 … …
1887 58,680,000 … …
1888 59,974,000 … …
1889 61,289,000 … …
1890 62,622,250
65,037,091,000
1,038.57
1891 63,844,000 … …
1892 65,086,000 … …
1893 66,349,000 … …
1894 67,632,000 … …
1895 68,934,000
77,000,000,000
1,117.01
1896 70,254,000 … …
1897 71,592,000 … …
1898 72,947,000 … …
1899 74,318,000 … …
1900 76,303,387
88,517,306,775
1,164.79
1901 79,003,000 … …
1903 80,372,000 … …
1904 81,752,000
107,104,211,917
1,310.11
1905 83,143,000 … …
1906 84,216,433 … …
1907 85,817,239 … …
1908 87,189,392 … …
Fiscal

Year,

ending

June 30—
Production

of wool.
Raw wool

imported.
Pounds. Pounds.
1800 … …
1810 … …
1820 … …
1830
35,802,114
669,883
1840
52,516,959
9,898,740
1850 …
18,695,294
1851 …
32,607,315
1852 …
18,343,218
1853 …
21,616,035
1854 …
20,228,035
1855 …
18,599,784
1856 …
14,778,496
1857 …
16,505,216
1858 … …
1859
60,264,913
…
1860
75,000,000
…
1861
90,000,000
…
1862
106,000,000
42,131,061
1863
123,000,000
73,931,944
1864
142,000,000
90,464,002
1865
155,000,000
43,877,408
1866
160,000,000
67,918,253
1867
168,000,000
16,558,046
1868
180,000,000
24,124,803
1869
162,000,000
39,275,926
1870
160,000,000
49,230,199
1871
150,000,000
68,058,028
1872
158,000,000
122,256,499
1873
170,000,000
85,496,049
1874
181,000,000
42,939,541
1875
192,000,000
54,901,760
1876
200,000,000
44,642,836
1877
208,250,000
42,171,192
1878
211,000,000
48,449,079
1879
232,500,000
39,005,155
1880
240,000,000
128,131,747
1881
272,000,000
55,964,236
1882
290,000,000
67,861,744
1883
300,000,000
70,575,478
1884
308,000,000
78,350,651
1885
302,000,000
70,596,170
1886
285,000,000
129,084,958
1887
269,000,000
114,038,030
1888
265,000,000
113,558,753
1889
276,000,000
126,487,729
1890
285,000,000
105,431,285
1891
294,000,000
129,303,648
1892
303,153,000
148,670,652
1893
298,057,384
172,433,838
1894
309,748,000
55,152,585
1895
272,474,708
206,033,906
1896
259,153,251
230,911,473
1897
266,720,684
350,852,026
1898
272,191,330
132,795,202
1899
288,636,621
76,736,209
1900
302,502,328
155,928,455
1901
287,450,000
166,576,966
1903
291,783,032
177,137,796
1904
295,488,438
173,742,834
1905
298,915,130
249,135,746
1906
298,294,750
201,688,668
1907
311,138,321
203,847,545
1908 …
125,980,524
Fiscal

Year,

ending

June 30—
Production

of cotton.

(500-lb. bales,

gross weight.)
Manufactures of cotton.
Thousands of spindles

in operation on Sept. 1st.
In

Southern

States.
In

Northern

States.
Total

United

States.
Number. Thou-

sands.
Thou-

sands.
Thou-

sands.
1800
73,222
… … …
1810
177,824
… … …
1820
334,728
… … …
1830
732,218
… … …
1840
1,347,640
181
2,104
2,285
1850
2,136,083
265
3,733
3,998
1851
2,799,290
… … …
1852
3,130,338
… … …
1853
2,766,194
… … …
1854
2,708,082
… … …
1855
3,220,782
… … …
1856
3,873,680
… … …
1857
3,012,016
… … …
1858
3,758,273
… … …
1859
4,309,642
… … …
1860
3,841,416
324
4,912
5,236
1861
4,490,586
… … …
1862
1,596,653
… … …
1863
449,059
… … …
1864
299,372
… … …
1865
2,093,658
… … …
1866
1,948,077
… … …
1867
2,345,610
… … …
1868
2,198,141
… … …
1869
2,409,597
… … …
1870
4,024,527
328
6,804
7,132
1871
2,756,564
… … …
1872
3,650,932
… … …
1873
3,873,750
… … …
1874
3,528,276
… … …
1875
4,302,818
… … …
1876
4,118,390
… … …
1877
4,494,224
… … …
1878
4,745,078
… … …
1879
5,466,387
… … …
1880
6,356,998
561
10,092
10,653
1881
5,136,447
… … …
1882
6,833,442
… … …
1883
5,521,963
860
11,800
12,660
1884
5,477,448
1,050
12,250
13,300
1885
6,369,341
1,125
12,250
13,375
1886
6,314,561
1,150
12,250
13,400
1887
6,884,667
1,200
12,300
13,500
1888
6,923,775
1,250
12,300
13,550
1889
7,742,511
1,360
12,700
14,060
1890
8,562,089
1,570
12,814
14,384
1891
8,940,867
1,740
12,900
14,640
1892
6,658,313
1,950
13,250
15,200
1893
7,433,056
2,100
13,450
15,550
1894
10,025,534
2,200
13,500
15,700
1895
7,146,772
2,400
13,700
16,100
1896
8,515,640
2,850
13,800
16,650
1897
10,985,040
3,250
13,900
17,150
1898
11,435,368
3,550
13,900
17,450
1899
9,459,935
3,950
14,150
18,100
1900
10,266,527
4,368
15,104
19,472
1901
9,675,771
5,500
11,700
20,200
1902
10,827,168
6,400
15,000
21,400
1903
10,045,615
6,900
15,100
22,000
1904
13,679,954
7,650
15,200
22,850
1905
10,804,556
7,631
16,056
23,687
1906
13,595,498
8,995
16,255
25,250
1907
11,375,461
9,528
16,847
26,275
1908
13,587,306
10,201
17,304
27,505
Fiscal

Year,

ending

June 30—
Manufactures of cotton.
Thousands of bales of domestic cotton taken by mills.
In Southern States. In Northern States. Total United States
Thou-

sands.
Thou-

sands.
Thou-

sands.
1800 … … …
1810 … … …
1820 … … …
1830 … … …
1840
71
166
237
1850
78
497
575
1851
60
404
464
1852
111
588
699
1853
153
650
803
1854
145
592
737
1855
135
571
706
1856
138
633
771
1857
154
666
820
1858
143
452
595
1859
167
760
927
1860
94
751
845
1861
153
650
803
1862 … … …
1863 … … …
1864 … … …
1865 … … …
1866
127
541
668
1867
150
573
723
1868
168
800
968
1869
173
822
995
1870
69
728
797
1871
91
1,072
1,163
1872
120
977
1,097
1873
138
1,063
1,201
1874
128
1,192
1,320
1875
130
1,071
1,201
1876
134
1,220
1,354
1877
127
1,302
1,429
1878
151
1,345
1,496
1879
186
1,375
1,561
1880
189
1,382
1,570
1881
225
1,713
1,938
1882
287
1,677
1,964
1883
313
1,759
2,072
1884
340
1,537
1,877
1885
316
1,437
1,753
1886
381
1,781
2,162
1887
401
1,687
2,088
1888
456
1,805
2,261
1889
480
1,790
2,270
1890
539
1,979
2,518
1891
613
2,027
2,640
1892
684
2,172
2,856
1893
723
1,652
2,375
1894
711
1,580
2,291
1895
852
2,019
2,871
1896
900
1,605
2,505
1897
999
1,793
2,792
1898
1,254
2,211
3,465
1899
1,415
2,217
3,632
1900
1,523
2,350
3,873
1901
1,583
1,964
3,547
1902
2,017
2,066
4,083
1903
1,958
1,966
3,924
1904
1,889
2,046
3,935
1905
2,140
2,139
4,279
1906
2,373
2,536
4,909
1907
2,411
2,574
4,985
1908
2,187
2,352
4,539
Fiscal Year,

ending

June 30—
Exports.

(domestic)
Imports.
Dollars. Dollars.
1800 … …
1810 … …
1820 …
7,812,326
1830
1,318,183
5,774,013
1840
3,549,607
6,504,104
1850
4,734,424
20,781,346
1851
7,241,205
22,164,442
1852
7,672,151
19,689,496
1853
8,768,894
27,731,363
1854
5,535,516
33,949,503
1855
5,857,181
17,757,112
1856
6,967,309
25,917,999
1857
6,115,177
28,685,726
1858
5,651,504
18,584,810
1859
8,316,222
26,976,381
1860
10,934,796
33,215,541
1861
7,957,038
25,271,382
1862
2,946,464
8,890,119
1863
2,906,411
14,121,589
1864
1,456,901
14,341,501
1865
3,451,561
9,223,686
1866
1,780,175
27,502,194
1867
4,608,235
19,302,005
1868
4,871,054
17,335,406
1869
5,874,222
20,481,312
1870
3,787,282
23,380,053
1871
3,558,236
29,876,640
1872
2,304,330
35,307,447
1873
2,947,528
35,201,324
1874
3,095,840
28,193,869
1875
4,071,882
27,738,401
1876
7,722,978
22,725,598
1877
10,235,843
18,923,614
1878
11,438,660
19,081,037
1879
10,853,950
19,928,310
1880
9,981,418
29,929,366
1881
13,571,387
31,219,329
1882
13,222,979
35,719,791
1883
12,951,145
38,036,044
1884
11,885,211
29,074,626
1885
11,836,591
27,197,241
1886
13,959,934
29,709,266
1887
14,929,342
28,940,353
1888
13,013,189
28,917,799
1889
10,212,644
26,805,942
1890
9,999,277
29,918,055
1891
13,604,857
29,712,624
1892
13,226,277
28,323,841
1893
11,809,355
33,560,293
1894
14,340,886
22,346,547
1895
13,789,810
33,196,625
1896
16,837,396
32,437,504
1897
21,037,678
34,429,363
1898
17,024,092
27,267,300
1899
23,566,914
32,054,434
1900
24,003,087
41,296,239
1901
20,272,418
40,246,935
1902
32,108,362
44,460,126
1903
32,216,304
52,462,755
1904
22,403,713
49,524,246
1905
49,666,080
48,919,936
1906
52,944,033
63,043,322
1907
32,305,412
73,704,636
1908
25,177,758
68,379,781
Fiscal Year,

ending

June 30—
Unmanu-

factured

silk imported.
Imports of

crude rubber.
Pounds. Pounds.
1800 … …
1810 … …
1820 … …
1830 … …
1840 … …
1850 … …
1851 … …
1852 … …
1853 … …
1854 … …
1855 … …
1856 … …
1857 … …
1858 … …
1859 … …
1860 … …
1861 … …
1862 …
2,125,561
1863 …
5,104,650
1864
407,935
…
1865
288,286
…
1866
567,904
…
1867
491,983
…
1868
512,449
8,438,019
1869
720,045
7,813,134
1870
583,589
9,624,098
1871
1,100,281
11,031,939
1872
1,063,809
11,803,437
1873
1,159,420
14,536,978
1874
794,837
14,191,320
1875
1,101,681
12,035,909
1876
1,354,991
10,589,297
1877
1,186,170
13,821,109
1878
1,182,750
12,512,203
1879
1,889,776
14,878,584
1880
2,562,236
16,826,099
1881
2,790,413
20,015,176
1882
3,549,404
22,712,862
1883
4,731,106
21,646,320
1884
4,284,888
24,574,025
1885
4,308,908
24,208,148
1886
6,818,060
29,263,632
1887
6,028,091
28,649,446
1888
6,370,322
36,628,351
1889
6,645,124
32,339,503
1890
7,510,440
33,842,374
1891
6,266,629
33,712,089
1892
8,834,049
39,976,205
1893
8,497,477
41,547,680
1894
5,902,485
33,757,783
1895
9,316,460
39,741,607
1896
9,363,987
36,774,460
1897
7,993,444
35,574,449
1898
12,087,951
46,055,497
1899
11,250,383
51,063,066
1900
13,073,718
49,377,138
1901
10,405,555
55,275,529
1902
14,234,826
50,413,481
1903
15,270,859
55,010,571
1904
16,722,709
59,015,551
1905
22,357,307
67,234,256
1906
17,352,021
57,844,345
1907
18,743,904
76,963,838
1908
16,662,132
62,233,160

[B] Calendar years.

Development of the Manufacturing Industries in the United States, 1800-1905—Continued.
Year. Production of Exports of

domestic

copper &

manufactures

of.
Coal. Copper.
Long tons. Long tons. Dollars.
1800 … … …
1810
20
…
17,426
1820
3,080
…
18,547
1830
285,779
…
36,601
1840
1,848,249
100
86,954
1850
6,266,233
650
105,060
1851
7,798,683
900
91,871
1852
8,764,879
1,100
103,039
1853
9,437,757
2,000
108,205
1854
10,698,841
2,250
91,984
1855
11,541,672
3,000
690,766
1856
12,095,469
4,000
534,846
1857
11,910,883
4,800
607,054
1858
12,477,213
5,500
1,985,223
1859
13,958,192
6,300
1,048,246
1860
13,044,680
7,200
1,664,122
1861
14,721,439
7,500
2,375,029
1862
15,612,353
9,000
1,098,546
1863
19,034,877
8,500
1,026,038
1864
21,076,003
8,000
251,272
1865
21,243,012
8,500
991,746
1866
25,896,056
8,900
143,761
1867
27,432,520
10,000
474,110
1868
29,341,036
11,600
479,488
1869
29,378,893
12,500
355,274
1870
29,496,054
12,600
504,741
1871
41,861,679
13,000
188,218
1872
45,940,535
12,500
185,983
1873
51,430,786
15,500
88,711
1874
46,969,571
17,500
356,758
1875
46,739,571
18,000
1,085,688
1876
47,571,429
19,000
3,441,939
1877
54,019,429
21,000
2,913,943
1878
51,728,214
21,500
2,319,901
1879
60,808,749
23,000
2,831,053
1880
63,822,830
27,000
793,455
1881
76,679,491
32,000
824,896
1882
92,456,419
40,467
658,941
1883 103,310,290
51,574
1,404,243
1884 107,281,742
64,708
2,664,964
1885
99,250,263
74,052
5,447,423
1886 101,500,381
70,430
2,602,869
1887 116,652,242
81,017
2,033,523
1888 132,731,837 101,054
3,812,798
1889 126,097,779 101,239
2,348,954
1890 140,866,931 115,966
2,349,392
1891 150,505,954 126,839
4,614,597
1892 160,115,242 154,018
7,226,392
1893 162,814,977 147,033
4,525,573
1894 152,447,791 158,120
19,697,140
1895 172,426,366 169,917
14,468,703
1896 171,416,390 205,384
19,720,104
1897 178,776,070 220,571
31,621,125
1898 196,407,381 235,050
32,180,872
1899 226,554,636 253,870
35,983,529
1900 240,789,310 270,588
57,852,960
1901 261,874,836 268,782
43,267,021
1902 269,277,178 294,423
41,218,373
1903 319,068,229 311,627
39,667,196
1904 314,121,784 362,739
57,142,081
1905 350,820,840 402,637
86,225,291
1906 369,783,284 409,735
81,282,664
1907 428,895,914 387,945
94,762,110
1908 … …
104,064,580
Year. Production of Iron and steel Manufactures.
Natural gas. Iron ore. Pig iron. Steel. Imports. Exports

(domestic)
Dollars. Long tons. Long tons. Long tons. Dollars. Dollars.
1800 … … … … … 52,144
1810 … … 53,908 … … 91,914
1820 … … 20,000 … … 46,552
1830 … … 165,000 … 6,346,287 322,747
1840 … … 286,903 … 8,157,923 1,127,877
1850 … … 563,755 … 20,145,067 1,953,702
1851 … … … … 22,439,297 2,336,587
1852 … … … … 23,568,649 2,368,384
1853 … … … … 34,944,002 2,541,554
1855 … … 700,159 … 28,693,979 3,803,706
1856 … … 788,515 … 29,050,101 4,256,613
1857 … … 712,640 … 30,743,649 4,959,238
1858 … … 629,548 … 20,171,007 4,843,592
1859 … … 750,560 … 22,379,743 5,577,748
1860 … … 821,223 … 26,158,235 5,870,114
1861 … … 653,164 … 21,160,235 6,039,149
1862 … … 703,270 … 11,451,707 4,732,348
1863 … … 846,075 … 16,152,843 6,681,417
1864 … … 1,014,282 … 23,822,876 7,541,967
1865 … … 831,770 … 16,660,991 11,227,294
1866 … … 1,205,663 … 25,598,147 4,006,180
1867 … … 1,305,023 19,643 31,630,519 9,351,062
1868 … … 1,431,250 26,786 30,346,768 10,950,275
1869 … … 1,711,287 31,250 38,213,717 10,938,492
1870 … 3,031,891 1,665,179 68,750 40,273,682 13,483,163
1871 … … 1,706,793 73,214 53,024,075 21,189,692
1872 … … 2,548,713 142,954 67,852,616 11,463,880
1873 … … 2,560,963 198,796 74,302,102 13,655,087
1874 … … 2,023,733 389,799 31,432,380 19,534,215
1876 … … 1,868,961 533,191 23,197,417 15,449,846
1877 … … 2,066,594 569,618 19,320,927 16,501,638
1878 … … 2,301,215 731,977 18,987,130 16,053,571
1879 … … 2,741,853 935,273 19,594,608 15,133,493
1880 … 7,120,362 3,835,191 1,247,335 71,266,699 14,716,524
1881 … … 4,144,254 1,588,314 60,604,477 16,608,767
1882 215,000 … 4,623,323 1,736,692 67,976,897 20,748,206
1883 475,000 … 4,595,510 1,673,535 58,495,246 22,826,528
1884 1,460,000 … 4,097,868 1,550,879 40,147,053 21,909,881
1885 4,857,200 … 4,044,526 1,711,920 33,610,093 16,592,155
1886 10,012,000 … 5,683,329 2,562,503 37,534,078 15,745,569
1887 15,817,500 … 6,417,148 3,339,071 49,203,164 15,958,502
1888 22,629,875 … 6,489,738 2,899,440 48,992,757 17,763,034
1889 21,097,099 14,518,041 7,603,642 3,385,732 42,377,793 21,156,077
1890 18,792,725 16,036,043 9,202,703 4,277,071 41,679,591 25,542,208
1891 15,500,084 14,591,178 8,279,876 3,904,240 53,544,372 28,909,614
1892 14,870,714 16,296,666 9,157,000 4,927,581 28,928,103 28,800,930
1893 14,346,250 11,587,629 7,124,502 4,019,995 34,937,974 30,106,482
1894 13,954,400 11,879,679 6,657,888 4,412,032 20,925,769 29,220,264
1895 13,006,650 15,957,614 9,446,308 6,114,834 23,048,515 32,000,989
1896 13,002,512 16,005,449 8,623,127 5,281,689 25,338,103 41,160,877
1897 13,826,422 17,518,046 9,652,680 7,156,957 16,094,557 57,497,872
1898 15,296,813 19,433,716 11,773,934 8,932,857 12,626,431 70,406,885
1899 20,074,873 24,683,173 13,620,703 10,639,857 12,100,440 93,716,031
1900 23,698,674 27,553,161 13,789,242 10,188,329 20,478,728 121,913,548
1901 27,066,077 28,887,479 15,878,354 13,473,595 17,874,789 117,319,320
1902 30,867,863 35,554,135 17,821,307 14,947,250 27,180,247 98,552,562
1903 35,807,860 35,019,308 18,009,252 14,534,978 51,617,312 96,642,467
1904 38,496,760 27,644,330 16,497,033 13,859,887 27,028,312 111,948,586
1905 41,562,855 42,526,133 22,992,380 20,023,947 23,510,164 134,728,363
1906 46,873,932 47,749,728 25,307,191 23,398,136 29,053,987 160,984,985
1907 52,866,835 51,720,619 25,781,361 23,362,594 40,587,865 181,530,871
1908 … … 15,936,018 … 27,607,909 183,982,182
Year. Prices of staple commodities.
Per ton. Middling

cotton

per pound.
Standard

sheetings

per yard.
Washed Ohio

fleece wool,

per lb.,

in eastern

m’k’ts,

July 1.

Medium.
Pig iron

No. 1,

foundry.
Steel rails,

standard

sections
Dollars. Dollars. Cents. Cents. Cents.
1800 … … … … …
1810 … … … … …
1820 … … … … …
1830 … … … … 50.0
1840
27.88
… … … 39.0
1850
20.88
…
12.34
7.87
37.0
1851
21.38
…
12.14
7.08
42.0
1852
22.63
… .50
6.96
38.0
1853
36.13
…
11.02
7.92
53.0
1854
36.88
…
10.97
7.96
37.0
1855
27.75
…
10.39
7.64
40.0
1856
27.18
…
10.30
7.50
42.0
1857
26.34
…
13.51
8.90
50.0
1858
22.19
…
12.23
8.25
37.0
1859
23.33
…
12.08
8.50
40.0
1860
22.70
…
11.00
8.73
50.0
1861
20.26
…
13.01
10.00
30.0
1862
23.92
…
31.29
18.55
47.0
1863
35.24
…
67.21
36.04
70.0
1864
59.22
…
101.50
52.07
100.0
1865
46.08
…
83.38
38.04
73.0
1866
46.84
…
43.20
24.31
67.0
1867
44.08
166.00
31.59
18.28
49.0
1868
39.25
158.46
24.85
16.79
45.0
1869
40.61
132.19
29.01
16.19
48.0
1870
33.23
106.79
23.98
14.58
45.0
1871
35.08
102.52
16.95
13.00
60.0
1872
48.94
111.94
22.19
14.27
70.0
1873
42.79
120.58
20.14
13.31
48.0
1874
30.19
94.28
17.95
11.42
53.0
1875
25.53
68.75
15.46
10.41
49.0
1876
22.19
59.25
12.98
8.85
35.0
1877
18.92
45.58
11.82
8.46
44.0
1878
17.67
42.21
11.22
7.80
36.0
1879
21.72
48.21
10.84
7.97
38.0
1880
28.48
67.52
11.51
8.51
48.0
1881
25.17
61.08
12.03
8.51
44.0
1882
25.77
48.50
11.56
8.45
45.0
1883
22.42
37.75
11.88
8.32
41.0
1884
19.81
30.75
10.88
7.28
34.0
1885
17.99
28.52
10.45
6.75
31.0
1886
18.71
34.52
9.28
6.75
33.0
1887
20.93
37.08
10.21
7.15
37.0
1888
18.88
29.83
10.03
7.00
39.0
1889
17.76
29.25
10.65
7.00
39.0
1890
18.41
31.78
11.07
7.00
37.0
1891
17.52
29.92
8.60
6.83
35.0
1892
15.75
30.00
7.71
6.50
34.0
1893
14.52
28.12
8.56
5.90
26.0
1894
12.66
24.00
6.94
5.11
21.0
1895
13.10
24.33
7.44
5.74
21.0
1896
12.95
28.00
7.93
5.45
18.0
1897
12.10
18.75
7.00
4.73
23½
1898
11.66
17.62
5.94
4.20
29.0
1899
19.36
28.12
6.88
5.28
31½
1900
19.98
32.29
9.25
6.05
31½
1901
15.87
27.33
8.75
5.54
26.0
1902
22.19
28.00
9.00
5.48
26¾
1903
19.92
28.00
11.18
6.25
31½
1904
15.57
28.00
11.75
7.13
32½
1905
17.88
28.00
9.80
7.00
39.0
1906
20.98
28.00
11.50
7.25
37.0
1907
23.89
28.00
12.10
7.62
36.0
1908
17.70
28.00
10.62
6.75
38.0
Year. Production of
Natural gas. Iron ore.
Dollars. Long tons.
1800 … …
1810 … …
1820 … …
1830 … …
1840 … …
1850 … …
1851 … …
1852 … …
1853 … …
1855 … …
1856 … …
1857 … …
1858 … …
1859 … …
1860 … …
1861 … …
1862 … …
1863 … …
1864 … …
1865 … …
1866 … …
1867 … …
1868 … …
1869 … …
1870 …
3,031,891
1871 … …
1872 … …
1873 … …
1874 … …
1876 … …
1877 … …
1878 … …
1879 … …
1880 …
7,120,362
1881 … …
1882
215,000
…
1883
475,000
…
1884
1,460,000
…
1885
4,857,200
…
1886
10,012,000
…
1887
15,817,500
…
1888
22,629,875
…
1889
21,097,099
14,518,041
1890
18,792,725
16,036,043
1891
15,500,084
14,591,178
1892
14,870,714
16,296,666
1893
14,346,250
11,587,629
1894
13,954,400
11,879,679
1895
13,006,650
15,957,614
1896
13,002,512
16,005,449
1897
13,826,422
17,518,046
1898
15,296,813
19,433,716
1899
20,074,873
24,683,173
1900
23,698,674
27,553,161
1901
27,066,077
28,887,479
1902
30,867,863
35,554,135
1903
35,807,860
35,019,308
1904
38,496,760
27,644,330
1905
41,562,855
42,526,133
1906
46,873,932
47,749,728
1907
52,866,835
51,720,619
1908 … …
Year. Production of
Pig iron. Steel.
Long tons. Long tons.
1800 … …
1810
53,908
…
1820
20,000
…
1830
165,000
…
1840
286,903
…
1850
563,755
…
1851 … …
1852 … …
1853 … …
1855
700,159
…
1856
788,515
…
1857
712,640
…
1858
629,548
…
1859
750,560
…
1860
821,223
…
1861
653,164
…
1862
703,270
…
1863
846,075
…
1864
1,014,282
…
1865
831,770
…
1866
1,205,663
…
1867
1,305,023
19,643
1868
1,431,250
26,786
1869
1,711,287
31,250
1870
1,665,179
68,750
1871
1,706,793
73,214
1872
2,548,713
142,954
1873
2,560,963
198,796
1874
2,023,733
389,799
1876
1,868,961
533,191
1877
2,066,594
569,618
1878
2,301,215
731,977
1879
2,741,853
935,273
1880
3,835,191
1,247,335
1881
4,144,254
1,588,314
1882
4,623,323
1,736,692
1883
4,595,510
1,673,535
1884
4,097,868
1,550,879
1885
4,044,526
1,711,920
1886
5,683,329
2,562,503
1887
6,417,148
3,339,071
1888
6,489,738
2,899,440
1889
7,603,642
3,385,732
1890
9,202,703
4,277,071
1891
8,279,876
3,904,240
1892
9,157,000
4,927,581
1893
7,124,502
4,019,995
1894
6,657,888
4,412,032
1895
9,446,308
6,114,834
1896
8,623,127
5,281,689
1897
9,652,680
7,156,957
1898
11,773,934
8,932,857
1899
13,620,703
10,639,857
1900
13,789,242
10,188,329
1901
15,878,354
13,473,595
1902
17,821,307
14,947,250
1903
18,009,252
14,534,978
1904
16,497,033
13,859,887
1905
22,992,380
20,023,947
1906
25,307,191
23,398,136
1907
25,781,361
23,362,594
1908
15,936,018
…
Year. Iron and steel Manufactures.
Imports. Exports

(domestic)
Dollars. Dollars.
1800 …
52,144
1810 …
91,914
1820 …
46,552
1830
6,346,287
322,747
1840
8,157,923
1,127,877
1850
20,145,067
1,953,702
1851
22,439,297
2,336,587
1852
23,568,649
2,368,384
1853
34,944,002
2,541,554
1855
28,693,979
3,803,706
1856
29,050,101
4,256,613
1857
30,743,649
4,959,238
1858
20,171,007
4,843,592
1859
22,379,743
5,577,748
1860
26,158,235
5,870,114
1861
21,160,235
6,039,149
1862
11,451,707
4,732,348
1863
16,152,843
6,681,417
1864
23,822,876
7,541,967
1865
16,660,991
11,227,294
1866
25,598,147
4,006,180
1867
31,630,519
9,351,062
1868
30,346,768
10,950,275
1869
38,213,717
10,938,492
1870
40,273,682
13,483,163
1871
53,024,075
21,189,692
1872
67,852,616
11,463,880
1873
74,302,102
13,655,087
1874
31,432,380
19,534,215
1876
23,197,417
15,449,846
1877
19,320,927
16,501,638
1878
18,987,130
16,053,571
1879
19,594,608
15,133,493
1880
71,266,699
14,716,524
1881
60,604,477
16,608,767
1882
67,976,897
20,748,206
1883
40,147,053
21,909,881
1885
33,610,093
16,592,155
1886
37,534,078
15,745,569
1887
49,203,164
15,958,502
1888
48,992,757
17,763,034
1889
42,377,793
21,156,077
1890
41,679,591
25,542,208
1891
53,544,372
28,909,614
1892
28,928,103
28,800,930
1893
34,937,974
30,106,482
1894
20,925,769
29,220,264
1895
23,048,515
32,000,989
1896
25,338,103
41,160,877
1897
16,094,557
57,497,872
1898
12,626,431
70,406,885
1899
12,100,440
93,716,031
1900
20,478,728
121,913,548
1901
17,874,789
117,319,320
1902
27,180,247
98,552,562
1903
51,617,312
96,642,467
1904
27,028,312
111,948,586
1905
23,510,164
134,728,363
1906
29,053,987
160,984,985
1907
40,587,865
181,530,871
1908
27,607,909
183,982,182
Year. Prices of staple commodities.
Per ton.
Pig iron

No. 1,

foundry.
Steel rails,

standard

sections
Dollars. Dollars.
1800 … …
1810 … …
1820 … …
1830 … …
1840
27.88
…
1850
20.88
…
1851
21.38
…
1852
22.63
…
1853
36.13
…
1854
36.88
…
1855
27.75
…
1856
27.18
…
1857
26.34
…
1858
22.19
…
1859
23.33
…
1860
22.70
…
1861
20.26
…
1862
23.92
…
1863
35.24
…
1864
59.22
…
1865
46.08
…
1866
46.84
…
1867
44.08
166.00
1868
39.25
158.46
1869
40.61
132.19
1870
33.23
106.79
1871
35.08
102.52
1872
48.94
111.94
1873
42.79
120.58
1874
30.19
94.28
1875
25.53
68.75
1876
22.19
59.25
1877
18.92
45.58
1878
17.67
42.21
1879
21.72
48.21
1880
28.48
67.52
1881
25.17
61.08
1882
25.77
48.50
1883
22.42
37.75
1884
19.81
30.75
1885
17.99
28.52
1886
18.71
34.52
1887
20.93
37.08
1888
18.88
29.83
1889
17.76
29.25
1890
18.41
31.78
1891
17.52
29.92
1892
15.75
30.00
1893
14.52
28.12
1894
12.66
24.00
1895
13.10
24.33
1896
12.95
28.00
1897
12.10
18.75
1898
11.66
17.62
1899
19.36
28.12
1900
19.98
32.29
1901
15.87
27.33
1902
22.19
28.00
1903
19.92
28.00
1904
15.57
28.00
1905
17.88
28.00
1906
20.98
28.00
1907
23.89
28.00
1908
17.70
28.00
Year. Prices of staple commodities.
Middling

cotton

per pound.
Standard

sheetings

per yard.
Washed Ohio

fleece wool,

per lb.,

in eastern

m’k’ts,

July 1.

Medium.
Cents. Cents. Cents.
1800 … … …
1810 … … …
1820 … … …
1830 … …
50..0
1840 … …
39..0
1850
12.34
7.87
37..0
1851
12.14
7.08
42..0
1852
.50
6.96
38..0
1853
11.02
7.92
53..0
1854
10.97
7.96
37..0
1855
10.39
7.64
40..0
1856
10.30
7.50
42..0
1857
13.51
8.90
50..0
1858
12.23
8.25
37..0
1859
12.08
8.50
40..0
1860
11.00
8.73
50..0
1861
13.01
10.00
30..0
1862
31.29
18.55
47..0
1863
67.21
36.04
70..0
1864
101.50
52.07
100..0
1865
83.38
38.04
73..0
1866
43.20
24.31
67..0
1867
31.59
18.28
49..0
1868
24.85
16.79
45..0
1869
29.01
16.19
48..0
1870
23.98
14.58
45..0
1871
16.95
13.00
60..0
1872
22.19
14.27
70..0
1873
20.14
13.31
48..0
1874
17.95
11.42
53..0
1875
15.46
10.41
49..0
1876
12.98
8.85
35..0
1877
11.82
8.46
44..0
1878
11.22
7.80
36..0
1879
10.84
7.97
38..0
1880
11.51
8.51
48..0
1881
12.03
8.51
44..0
1882
11.56
8.45
45..0
1883
11.88
8.32
41..0
1884
10.88
7.28
34..0
1885
10.45
6.75
31..0
1886
9.28
6.75
33..0
1887
10.21
7.15
37..0
1888
10.03
7.00
39..0
1889
10.65
7.00
39..0
1890
11.07
7.00
37..0
1891
8.60
6.83
35..0
1892
7.71
6.50
34..0
1893
8.56
5.90
26..0
1894
6.94
5.11
21..0
1895
7.44
5.74
21..0
1896
7.93
5.45
18..0
1897
7.00
4.73
23½
1898
5.94
4.20
29..0
1899
6.88
5.28
31½
1900
9.25
6.05
31½
1901
8.75
5.54
26..0
1902
9.00
5.48
26¾
1903
11.18
6.25
31½
1904
11.75
7.13
32½
1905
9.80
7.00
39..0
1906
11.50
7.25
37..0
1907
12.10
7.62
36..0
1908
10.62
6.75
38..0

[C] Calendar year.

The arguments in favor of bimetallism are as various as the motives of its advocates, but two or three of the more important ones may be briefly stated. It is urged because it would give a more stable measure of value than either silver or gold alone could do; and the evil effects of fluctuations in the value of gold since 1873 are pointed out to illustrate this contention. Monometallists answer this by asserting that most of the price changes can be accounted for by improvements in production; that even if they were caused by a contraction of the currency, this was simply one of the risks of business; and finally, that the evil effects of falling prices are offset by a corresponding reduction in interest rates. A second argument of the bimetallists was the alleged insufficiency of gold on which to do the world’s business. As this has been practically met by the phenomenal increase in gold production in the last decade, especially since the gold discoveries in Alaska, it is not necessary to dwell upon this argument. On February 1, 1909, the per capita circulation of money in the United States reached $35.00, the highest point in our history. A final argument of the bimetallists concerns foreign trade: it would facilitate this by establishing a fixed par-of-exchange between all countries. While the weight of this may be admitted, it has been practically deprived of all force by the adoption of the gold standard by virtually all the industrially developed nations of the world. This last fact shows that the question has now been actually settled by the logic of events and today the issue of bimetallism has only an academic interest.

Another problem connected with money which has been removed from the arena of oratory to that of calm discussion is that of government paper money. It is urged, with much truth, that if a nation issued paper money instead of gold or silver, it would save all the expense of mining these metals. It would resemble, as Adam Smith said, the discovery of wagon roads through the air in the realm of transportation. Another argument advanced in favor of government paper money is that it would be possible by a scientific adjustment of the issues to regulate the amount of money in circulation and so to prevent all fluctuations in prices. Both contraction and inflation would be prevented and a cheap and yet ideal system of money would exist. Still others see in this form of money an instrument for the creation of wealth; this last argument simply results from a confusion of ideas and need not be dealt with. A sufficient answer to the other two is an appeal to the lesson of history: no government which has embarked upon the issue of paper money has ever been able to restrict the issues within reasonable limits; often it has led to national bankruptcy and the repudiation of the entire issues. The experience of the United States with the greenbacks has been more fortunate than that of many countries, but does not tempt to further experiment.

The monetary situation in the United States today may be regarded as fairly well settled. Although we have a very heterogeneous assortment of different kinds of money, a fairly distinct sphere is allotted to each, and as the basis for all, the gold standard has been definitely established by law. Money of large denominations consists of gold and gold certificates (lowest denomination, $20), of greenbacks and national bank notes (lowest denomination, $10, though one-third of bank notes may be $5); the needs of retail trade are met by the issue of silver certificates and silver dollars, and of fractional currency. The system would be much simplified by the retirement and destruction of the $346,000,000 in greenbacks, but as there is now a fifty-per cent reserve in gold back of them, little danger need be apprehended from their presence. Many people have regarded the existence of some $500,000,000 worth of silver dollars as a menace to the goodness of our money supply, but as the amount of gold in circulation increases the silver will form a constantly smaller percentage of the whole. It is a cumbersome and not very valuable asset of the Government, but is now almost powerless for good or ill.

Important as is the subject of money and essential as is the need of a standard of undoubted goodness, it is overshadowed in practical significance by the problems of banking and credit. An investigation by the Comptroller of the Currency some years ago showed that over 90 per cent of the receipts of the national banks consisted of credit instruments, while probably 60 per cent of the trade of the country was carried on by credit rather than by cash transactions. A credit transaction is a transfer of goods or money for a future equivalent; the element of time is introduced. This makes possible an enormous increase in the number of exchanges and obviates the necessity, to a large extent, of using money. Most of us enjoy personal credit, which is limited only by our ability to persuade other people to trust in us. But this power of purchasing things without immediate payment must be made readily available if the ordinary business man is to make use of it. This is done through the medium of a bank, whose business it is to discount the notes of its customers, which in turn is based upon confidence in their prospective earnings. The bank credit thus obtained may be transferred by means of checks to other persons and to other banks. It is the most fluid and volatile means of payment yet devised, and is subject to dangers and abuses. In the last analysis business based upon such a system of credit rests upon confidence in the honesty of individuals and in the enforcement of the law governing contracts, and also in the ability of those who have pledged themselves to future payment to make good their obligations. In times of panic credit fails and resort is had to money.

The fundamental institution in our credit economy is the bank, and it is therefore essential that it be thoroughly safe and responsive to the needs of the business world. A bank may furnish its customers with the ready means of payment they need in exchange for their future promises either in the form of bank notes or bank credit. The former are more largely used on the continent of Europe and in rural districts in this country, the latter by England and the United States, especially in the cities. The preference for one or the other seems to be a matter of geography. The issue of bank notes has been very carefully safeguarded since the establishment of the national banking system in 1863. They are based upon the purchase of government bonds and are absolutely safe. They lack, however, one essential quality of good bank money in that they are quite inelastic. That is to say, the amount of bank notes in circulation does not vary according to the needs of business, increasing to meet an increased demand, and then declining again when the demand has passed. Being based upon government bonds and not upon the value of business assets, they vary in amount only with the price of the former and not at all with the volume of the latter.

The main practical problem connected with our banking system is, therefore, to find some other basis for the issue of bank notes, especially as it is not desirable to maintain a permanent bonded indebtedness solely for this purpose. Various suggestions have been made, as the establishment of a central bank with sole power of issue, like the government banks in European countries. This is a favorite proposal with the big bankers, but is unlikely to be adopted as it is directly contrary to the spirit of the existing system. The Canadian system is held up as a model, with its system of branch banking and 5 per cent safety fund for the redemption of the notes of failed banks. Curiously enough this was copied after the system in operation in New York State, which was nipped in the bud by some early mistakes and by the development of the national banking system. It works admirably in Canada and is well worth careful study. The plan of asset currency is another suggestion, according to which bank notes should be issued up to a certain percentage of the resources of the bank, but without pledging any specific property for their redemption as is done in the case of the national banks at present. It has finally been urged that our present bond deposit system should be modified by substituting state, municipal, railroad, or industrial bonds for those of the Federal Government, but that in other respects the system should be left intact. We may look for legislation along one or another of these lines in the next few years, as the subject is an urgent one whose solution cannot long be postponed.

Another problem is connected with the money reserves that the banks are required by law to keep on hand in order to meet demand liabilities. Under the national system in the United States the country banks may deposit three-fifths of their lawful reserves with banks in reserve cities, and these banks in turn may deposit one-half of their reserves in banks in central reserve cities (New York, Chicago, and St. Louis). Thus there is a massing, under this system, of the bank reserves of the country in the city of New York, and within that city in some twenty banks. While there is great economy in such a system the concentration of reserves is certainly attended by great dangers, not the least of which is its use by speculative influences in the New York money market, as a great part of it is loaned out to speculators on call.

Still another practical problem connected with the monetary and banking system of the United States is that of the independent treasury system. The Federal Government is to a large extent its own banker; it collects, disburses its revenue and keeps its money in its own vaults; it even, as we have seen, issues paper money and keeps a reserve therefor. By its action in withdrawing large amounts of money from use, or on the other hand making large disbursements, it can and does affect the money market vitally and sometimes disastrously. While it is permitted to deposit funds in selected national banks and has recently made increasing use of this privilege, thus correlating in a measure the reserves of the Government and the needs of the business community, it is held by most students that the independent treasury system should be abolished, and that the banks should act as the intermediaries between the Government and the people in the collection and expenditure of its funds.

So far we have been discussing commercial banks, but there is another kind of institution which goes by the same name but serves quite a different purpose, namely, the savings bank. The essential and almost the only requirement of such an institution is safety. As we have seen, it is not only desirable for personal reasons to inculcate habits of saving and thrift in individuals, but it is also necessary to secure the accumulation of capital needed in modern industry. It is therefore important that such institutions should be widespread, accessible, and thoroughly trusted. These requirements seem to be best fulfilled by the postal savings banks in England and elsewhere, which have led to a great increase in savings on the part of the people. The introduction of such a system in the United States is greatly to be desired.

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