Xii. Profit-Sharing And Co-Operation.

Xii. Profit-Sharing And Co-Operation.

VI. SPECULATION AND CRISES.

An unavoidable element of risk enters into all modern business. In the old handicraft stage of industry goods were made upon order; demand preceded supply very definitely, and there was little possibility of mistakes in production. Nowadays, as we have seen, production is for a distant and often uncertain market. It is carried on by machine methods and roundabout processes; sometimes the result is a very remote one and the uncertainty of success is correspondingly great. Production is not based upon order, but upon a forecast of the possible demand, upon a future market. Chance and change are inseparable from productive enterprise—natural chances from the elements, political changes, as war or unfavorable legislation, industrial mistakes or sickness or death of oneself or others, and economic changes, as the invention of a new machine or a change in fashion. These are the unavoidable incidents in industry and are not under the control of the individual business. Some of them, however, are so regularly recurrent that they can be foretold on a large scale for any industrial society, and can be guarded against by insurance. Everyone recognizes the desirability of having such risks as those of fire, shipwreck, lightning, death, etc., assumed by certain individuals or companies who make a business of such risk-taking. A small premium is paid by the individual for protection, and he is freed from anxiety from mischance and is able to devote his whole energies and capital to his business; the insurance company has specialized in this one department and by equalizing the chances over a wide field has practically eliminated them. In doing this it performs a service of recognized and undoubted social value.

There is another kind of risk-taking the social utility of which is not at first sight so clear. Among the chances of productive enterprise are those due to the rise and fall in the prices of the raw materials, the labor, and the finished product between the time when the process of production is begun and the time when it is completed. Every farmer, every manufacturer, every student even who invests capital in his own education, is to some extent a speculator. Along certain lines he can protect himself by insurance, but that is not possible in all. Is there no way, then, by which he can guard himself against price fluctuations and assure himself of the legitimate gains of his business? This, it may be answered, is the function of the speculator in modern business, and in performing this service he is benefiting society in much the same way that the insurance company does. We must, however, clearly distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate speculation; we are discussing only the former.

One way in which the speculative risk attaching to price fluctuations is reduced for the manufacturer and assumed by the speculator is by the establishment of a continuous open market, as the stock and produce exchanges. If a miller, for instance, engages to deliver flour a year hence and expects to begin milling in six months, he must know at what price he can buy his wheat when he needs it, or his anticipated gain may be turned into a loss by an unexpected rise in the price of wheat. He is able, however, to buy a “future” in wheat on the produce exchange from some broker who makes a specialty of this business. He buys his needed wheat now for delivery six months hence, and on the basis of this price is able to accept an order for his flour a year from now, allowing himself a fair profit as a miller but wholly eliminating the speculative risk of price fluctuations. Or a building contractor, before making an estimate of the cost of erecting a structure, will secure options at definite prices from dealers on the materials he will require. So, too, in the iron and steel business it is customary for manufacturers to contract in advance for materials at the same time that they accept orders for the delivery of the finished products. In all these cases the business of dealing in futures is assumed by a particular class, who have developed a special skill and ability in forecasting price variations, and who can do so very accurately. It is not a matter of luck or chance, but the result of wide knowledge and careful study. “To foretell the price of wheat one must know the rainfall in India, the condition of the crop in Argentina, must be in touch as nearly as possible with every unit of supply that will come into the market.” Sometimes the speculators make mistakes, but they are certainly less apt to do so than men who are without their special talent and training.

The social value of this service lies in the equalization of demand and supply between the present and future that is thereby effected. Let us take as an illustration the case of the miller cited above. If at the time he accepts the order for flour the price of wheat is high, he will be inclined to charge a high price. But the wheat broker, foreseeing that there is going to be an abundant crop six months hence, engages to sell him his wheat for future delivery at a low price, and he is thereby enabled to sell his flour at a lower price. At the same time the price of the wheat on hand at the present time, instead of being held and sold at famine prices, is consumed for present needs at moderate prices. The operations of the wheat brokers in such a case have a very steadying influence on prices, preventing the oscillation between very high prices in times of scarcity and very low prices in times of glut. It must be admitted that dealings in futures are highly speculative; “but it must be remembered that it is not merely the dealings in futures, but the future itself, that is uncertain. If such dealings can be confined to the men most competent to make accurate predictions, their tendency will clearly be to lessen the uncertainties of business.” But closely connected with legitimate speculation or risk-taking by a specialized and trained class, there is, as our stock and produce exchanges are actually conducted, a large amount of illegitimate speculation, and to this we may now turn for a brief consideration.

The facilities offered by the open markets on the exchanges and the practice of dealing in futures are taken advantage of by many who, without any special training or opportunities of knowing the market, simply bet on the price movements. Brokers are willing to buy and sell produce or stocks for their customers if the latter will put up with them a margin of about 10 per cent to protect them from loss. It is therefore possible for a person with little capital and no knowledge to speculate on a margin, buying what he does not want and selling what he does not own. In practice it is impossible to distinguish between those dealings in which actual delivery is intended (legitimate speculation) and those in which no such delivery is contemplated (gambling), and consequently most efforts to regulate transactions on the exchanges have failed to accomplish their purpose. The purification of their methods would seem to lie with the members of such exchanges themselves. The contention has often been made that these fictitious transactions in such commodities as wheat or corn or cotton create an artificial reduction in prices, since the professional gambler usually sells short or “bears” the market, and that this injuriously affects the farmer. This is manifestly untenable, since every fictitious sale must be balanced by a fictitious purchase. What actually takes place is simply a bet between the two parties to such a transaction on the actual course of prices and of itself does not affect prices, except in the unusual case of a “corner.” There is, however, great possibility of evil in the presence of a crowd of uninformed speculators, for they can greatly increase the power of an unscrupulous operator who can persuade them to follow his lead. Their presence, too, increases the temptation to such a man to rig the market. Under present conditions the abuses of speculation are more in evidence than the economic advantages. How to confine speculation to the small group of risk-takers who have special training and aptitude for it, and to prevent gambling on the stock and produce exchanges is one of the economic problems of the day.

One of the most striking phenomena of modern industry is the frequent and violent convulsions of business known as crises. They are characteristic of all commercially advanced countries and are generally most marked in those countries which are most advanced. They are a product of modern methods of capitalistic production and are essentially a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. A crisis in its last analysis is the result of a lack of adjustment between production and consumption, due primarily to mistakes in production. It is significant that crises usually occur in periods of business prosperity when credit is easy, prices high, and employment general. Such a period of business prosperity and rising credit may have been begun by a series of good harvests. The demand for manufactured commodities increases, prices rise, manufacturers enlarge their factories or engage in new enterprises, wages and profits go up. Many speculators, seeing the rise, and thinking it will continue, borrow money to buy goods with the expectation of selling again at a profit. Credit operations are expanded to a dangerous extent, and when at last a shock to confidence occurs the house of cards collapses and a painful liquidation and readjustment of industry ensues. The state of trade, in the words of Lord Overstone, “revolves apparently in an established cycle. First we find it in a state of quiescence—next improvement, growing confidence, prosperity, excitement, over-trading, convulsion, pressure, stagnation, distress, ending again in quiescence.”

The immediate occasion of a crisis is always a shock to credit or confidence. Such a shock, begun perhaps by the failure of a bank or merchant, creates a demand for ready money. No one is sure that his neighbor will remain solvent. Everyone accordingly tries to secure himself against loss by enlarging his cash reserve and thus lessens the supply for others. Now modern industry is carried on by means of credit. There is at no one time enough money in the country to meet all obligations expressed in terms of money. Considerably over three-fourths of the larger commercial transactions in the United States are carried on by means of credit. If everyone tries at the same time to get actual cash, there is simply not enough money in the country to go around. This increase of demand and diminution in the supply of money forces up the interest rate on short-time loans. Money—actual cash—is needed by many people to meet immediate engagements and they are willing to pay almost any price for it. In the last panic the rates for call money went up to over 100 per cent and in many cities in the United States clearing-house certificates and other substitutes for money were issued for use in ordinary retail trade. But even at high rates money can often not be borrowed. Many merchants and manufacturers are compelled to sell their goods at a sacrifice in order to obtain it. Vast quantities of goods and securities are thrown on the market just when investors and consumers feel least able to purchase. The result is a fall in prices. Such a fall in prices lowers profits. Enterprises have been started and engagements made on the supposition that prices would continue at the old high level. When they fall it is impossible to pay interest out of current earnings. Foreclosures and readjustments take place. There is a general liquidation and reorganization of industry. When interest contracts have been adjusted, then the effect on wages begins to be felt. As long as a manufacturer is struggling to maintain his credit he will keep his factory going, but when he has failed and perhaps been foreclosed, then the factory stops. Men are thrown out of work, and wages—the price of labor—fall. Labor troubles usually mark the end of such a period of readjustment.

This stage marks the end of the crisis and the beginning of a period of depression or “hard times,” which continues for a longer or shorter period. The panic of 1893 was followed by a long-continued depression which lasted until 1897, a period which was marked by low prices and slack work. In 1898 began a revival of business and an era of marked prosperity set in which continued for almost ten years, interrupted only slightly by a “Wall Street panic” in 1903. In October, 1907, a severe crisis occurred, recovery from which, however, has been remarkably rapid. The periodicity which has attended crises in the past is so marked—occurring as they have at intervals of about ten years—that many writers consider them inevitable. As the easiest way to answer this question we may take up three main theories as to the causes of crises.

A much quoted, but now generally discredited, theory is that of W. S. Jevons, a noted English economist, who ascribed crises to sun-spots. Every ten years and a fraction there occur outbursts of electrical and heat energy on the sun, which we call sun-spots. These result in increased heat waves, which affect the crops on the earth, causing enlarged harvests in Europe and the United States and drought and famine in India and the tropics. The large harvests and good prices start a wave of prosperity and speculation, which culminates inevitably in a panic and depression, until a recurrence of the heat phenomenon starts the cycle again. The theory states some undoubted facts, but no causal connection between sun-spots and crises can be traced, as the latter are too irregular and the two do not always coincide. Were this theory true crises would be beyond human control.

A second theory, or group of theories, are those which attribute crises to over-production. Under modern conditions of industry a small group of men direct industry and determine what shall be produced. They try to estimate future demand and to adjust production to consumption, but they often make mistakes. They divert capital into unproductive industries, they produce the wrong things and create a comparative glut in certain lines, and when they cannot sell their goods at a profitable price they fail and precipitate a crisis. Industry must then be reorganized and frequently control be put in the hands of other men. A variation has been given this theory by the socialists, under the leadership of Rodbertus, who insist that the reason that there is over-production is because of the institution of private property. Since the capitalists own all the tools of production they pay the laborers only starvation wages. The latter cannot possibly buy all that is produced and commodities consequently heap up in the warehouses until they are thrown upon the market to be sold at any price. Then a panic occurs and a readjustment of production.

The last of these theories regards a crisis as essentially due to a failure of credit. It is seen that a large part of modern industry is carried on by borrowed capital, by roundabout processes and for a distant market and not upon order. That is, the success of a business depends upon its ability to sell its goods when produced. Now the aggregate volume of transactions that can be carried on in a year, so runs the theory, depends upon the efficiency of the credit system; that is, in general, upon the freedom with which banks are willing to loan money to people who engage to repay it in the future out of their ventures. If for any reason the banks reduce this accommodation the amount of business that can be transacted upon borrowed capital is lessened. Either some transactions must stop or prices must fall. Either of these events causes commercial disaster. The contraction of credit makes it impossible to get the goods into the right hands, and so we have the phenomena of over-production in a great many lines. As exchange and transportation have developed and markets widened, crises have become more universal. According to this theory, they are inseparably connected with the use of credit and can be controlled only by a more careful granting of credit by the banks to industrial managers. Another phase of the credit theory is presented by those who insist that the cause of crises is the rhythmic overestimation of the profits to be secured out of certain lines of production, or their over-capitalization. The new enterprises are financed by the banks on the basis of this mistaken over-capitalization, their organizers engage to pay rates of interest which they cannot earn, and the crash inevitably follows. This is often called the over-capitalization theory, and is essentially psychological in its character.

There is no doubt as to the truth contained in this last theory. It helps to explain the rhythmic periodicity of crises. After every period of business depression confidence revives and hope is renewed; overestimation of the success of new ventures is inevitable. Then follows a mistaken investment of capital in certain lines of production, as in railroads in 1884, and a relative over-production at profitable prices of certain commodities. The true explanation seems to be found in a combination of the over-production and over-capitalization theories.

The practical problem that presents itself in this connection is the question as to whether it is possible to prevent the recurrence of crises. In view of the explanation just given it would seem that they must be regarded as unpreventable as long as industry is carried on under the competitive capitalistic system of production and the modern credit system. Moreover, crops differ in amount from year to year and probably always will. Human production and human genius are unequal. Crises may be regarded as the price a progressive society pays for its advance, and they may be expected to recur pretty regularly at periodic intervals. Their disastrous effects may, however, be greatly lessened by wise currency legislation, by greater care in granting credit, and by greater wisdom in the direction of individual effort.

VII. THE MODERN WAGE SYSTEM.

We have already characterized the modern system of industry as capitalistic, that is, as involving the use of expensive and complex machinery in factories under the control of the capitalist managers of industry. As we have seen, such a system has caused an enormous increase in the production of wealth; it has also raised the general standard of comfort and the level of wages, and has relieved labor to a considerable extent of the deadly strain of hard manual toil that was characteristic of preceding systems. The factory system, under which capitalistic production is now carried on, may also fairly be credited with other beneficial results: as steadiness and punctuality are essential, it has on the whole led to increased sobriety and temperance; the work in general is healthier, being performed under better sanitary conditions than under the old domestic system; the intellectual status of the workingman has been raised, as vastly more intelligence is required of a skilled machine operator than of the old-time hand laborer; and finally the general well-being of the working class has been improved, as they have shared in the larger production made possible by machine methods. But, on the other hand, the new processes and methods have been accompanied by great abuses, though never so great in this country as in England. Long hours, the employment of women and children, the weakened economic position of the laborer, fluctuations in production, liability to be without employment, industrial accidents, the abolition of personal ties between employer and employe, the crowding of workmen into a small space to work by day and their concentration in city tenements by night—these are some of the problems for which the factory system must be held responsible. The condition and position of labor have been vitally affected. So far we have considered mainly the problems connected with the organization and use of capital. We must now take up the various questions connected with the relation of labor to capital and to the capitalistic system of production.

One of the most vital factors in the situation—which we must frankly admit at the start—is the existence in modern industrial society of a distinct wage-earning class. It is perfectly obvious that under present conditions of production great capital or great ability is necessary in order to become the manager of an industrial enterprise. Most laborers do not possess either the one or the other of these, and although there are fortunate examples of industrial leaders who have risen from the ranks, the general rule is, once a wage-earner always a wage-earner. The number of those who can achieve industrial independence is moreover growing smaller as business becomes more specialized and centralized. The laborer therefore belongs to a class, which is rapidly developing what the German socialists call class-consciousness, that is, the feeling that he belongs to a distinct industrial group with interests different from and often antagonistic to those of other groups or classes. In his struggles with employers over wages this antagonism of immediate aims obscures the deeper mutuality and interdependence of their really complementary interests and not infrequently leads to a feeling of hostility, finding expression in strikes and labor agitation.

In the transition to the factory system Mr. John A. Hobson points out that the position of the laborer has been one of increasing dependence in the following five important points: (1) The ownership of material—at first the worker owned this and made it into the finished product, but now he has only a passing interest in a small part of the process of working it up. (2) Ownership of tools—he retained these up to the time of the introduction of machinery, but now seldom owns them. (3) Control of productive power—with the displacement of hand labor and muscular power by steam-driven machinery, he no longer owns even this. (4) Relations between workers and employers—they were formerly on an equality; under the guild system the master and the apprentice had the same social position; now the laborer has sunk in the scale, or the employer has risen, until the only bond between them is, as Carlyle said, the “cash nexus.” A case was recently instanced where a workingman who had been working in a factory met his employer for the first time at the end of seventeen years. (5) Workplace—until the establishment of the factory system this had always been the home; now it is the factory, and there is a complete divorcement between work and the home.

Another characteristic of modern industry from the labor point of view is the existence not merely of a wage-earning class, but, more fundamental, of the wage system. “It is characteristic of the modern industrial system,” writes President Hadley, “that a laborer who owns no capital, though nominally free to do what he pleases, must actually find some property owner who will give him enough to keep him alive during the period which must elapse between the rendering of the labor and the sale of the finished product. Under such circumstances, the laborer almost inevitably submits to the direction of the property owner in deciding how his labor shall be applied. Laborers without capital must necessarily work on this basis; even those who have small amounts of capital habitually do so. Such advances of capital are known as wages.” Here we have the essence of the wage system in a nut shell. The laborer sells his labor to an employer for a stipulated wage. He has a commodity, his labor, consisting of a certain amount of strength and skill, which he is free to dispose of on the market to the best advantage, as the owner of any other commodity might do. Legally, labor is property. Owing, however, to the fact that all modern production requires capital, the only buyer of his labor is a capitalist, who directs the way in which the labor shall be applied. Such a condition, as well as some peculiarities of the commodity labor leave the laborer, indeed, only “nominally” free. In theory the labor contract is a perfectly free contract, entered into voluntarily by both employer and wage-earner, and the courts have generally insisted that this theoretical freedom must be maintained. In practice various modifications of the theory have taken place: legislation has been passed protecting laborers from bargaining away their rights, and trade unions have been formed to bargain collectively for a group of laborers. In the last analysis, however, the laborer must support himself by the sale of his labor; society guarantees him neither a living nor even the right to work. He is a bargainer in a competitive industrial world and he must assume the responsibility of providing for himself and his family by securing work. Just what is involved in such a statement is perhaps best brought out by comparing the modern wage system with previous systems of labor.

The first historical system of labor, aside from that in the family, was that of slaves. In this case the labor was forced, and being given under coercion was probably very inefficient; but the laborer was at least assured of a minimum of food, clothes and shelter. Slavery was the main source of manual labor in the ancient world, and did not disappear in England until the eleventh century. The feudal system of the Middle Ages was characterized by serfdom, according to which the laborer was bound to the soil and was compelled to render his lord certain services. Gradually serfdom was broken down and the wage system took its place, although remnants of serfdom remained in England until the eighteenth century. Four centuries before this, however, the disintegration of the feudal society had already begun, the serfdom of the agricultural laborer was commuted into regular money payments, and the artisan bought or otherwise secured his freedom from feudal exactions. In the towns industry was regulated by the guilds, and while at first they were distinctly beneficial, in time they became monopolistic and oppressive. Power was lodged in the hands of the wealthy traders and merchants and they legislated in their own behalf against the growing class of laborers, as did the wealthy land owners against the agricultural laborers. The Statute of Laborers and other acts sought to fix wages and to prevent the freedom of the laborer in moving about or choosing his own occupation. Not indeed until the nineteenth century were the last of these old regulative laws repealed and the modern labor contract recognized in law and practice as a free contract. “The growth of labor,” says Brentano, has been “from the system of authority to the system of contract.” The system of authority, by which rates of wages, length of apprenticeship, and other details of industry were fixed by some superior authority, was found to be restrictive, uneconomic and unjust, and it gave way to the principle of economic freedom. According to the newer theory, first given effective voice by Adam Smith, in 1776, the individual should be left to himself, as he knows his own interest better than does the most enlightened government. The freest scope was given to the powers of individuals and each was to be the unlimited master of himself and his possessions.

It has since been found necessary, however, to modify both the theory and practice of this extreme individualism in order to protect the interests of various classes of society, especially the laborer. The legal theory still is that “today the labor contract is perfectly free: either side may make whatever contract he can get the other side to sign. Not only this, but either side may freely combine to demand any form of contract from the other side, as mere combinations alone are now made perfectly legal.” In practice, however, this complete freedom has been greatly modified by factory acts, acts restricting the hours and conditions of employment of women and children, anti-truck acts, laws providing for weekly payments, guarding of machinery, limiting the hours of labor, and on the other hand prohibiting intimidation and molesting. For the most part these laws have applied to women and children, who are thought less capable of guarding their own interests, and to a much less degree to labor contracts made by men, who have been considered better able to make equal contracts with employers. But concerning certain conditions of employment it has been realized that even adult males are not capable of securing equitable bargains, and along these lines the nominal freedom of the labor contract has been decidedly abridged. The attitude of the courts toward such legislation shows that they have declared many laws unconstitutional on the ground that they infringe upon the right of free contract, but in the long run seem inclined to uphold as much of this restrictive legislation as seems necessary to obviate the undoubtedly evil results that flow from this real inequality of employer and laborer.

It is a very vital and important practical economic problem that presents itself in this connection. How far shall we carry this regulative principle, or how far shall we insist upon the principle of freedom? Many labor leaders are again asking for an effectual control of the labor contract, not by the action of trade unions, but by the direct legislation of the state. What shall be our attitude to this demand? Before we can fairly answer this question we must consider somewhat more fully the character of the bargain that takes place between an employer and an individual workman, and the nature of the commodity that the laborer has to sell.

It has already been stated that the commodity which the laborer brings upon the market is his labor, that is, himself, his time, and his energies. But these wares are peculiar and differ in several important respects from ordinary marketable commodities. In the first place, labor is like a perishable commodity which must be sold at once if the owner is not to incur loss. The laborer has usually little if any capital by which to support himself in case he cannot find work, and may be compelled to make a forced sale of his labor, that is, to accept unduly low wages. In this respect then he is at a disadvantage in bargaining with his employer. A second peculiarity of the sale of labor is that the laborer and his work are inseparable. The seller of an ordinary commodity disposes of it absolutely when he makes a sale. “It matters nothing to the seller of bricks whether they are to be used in building a palace or a sewer; but it matters a great deal to the seller of labor, who undertakes to perform a task of given difficulty, whether or not the place in which it is to be done is a wholesome and a pleasant one, or whether or not his associates will be such as he cares to have.” The person who buys this labor necessarily directs the application of it to the task in hand, and thus controls very largely the place, the sanitary and social conditions, the hours, the character, and safety of the work. In the third place, the superior knowledge and intelligence of the employers gives them an advantage in bargaining with their employes, while the reluctance of employers to “spoil the labor market” often prevents that freedom of competition which is supposed to secure to the laborer his full share of the product he helps to produce.

In view of these facts we may fairly conclude that workmen are inferior to employers as bargainers and that protective legislation is necessary in order to put them on a real equality. “When laborers have to make a forced sale of their labor, their freedom of contract is more nominal than real. When women and children stand individually before the manager of hundreds of thousands of capital, it is possible that there may be little freedom and less equality in the contract by which they sell their services.” It is clear that between two parties of such unequal knowledge, resources and ability as a laborer and his employer the labor contract cannot be entirely free and equal. While trade unions, by combining isolated workmen into formidable and unified groups, have immeasurably increased their bargaining strength, yet legislation has also been found necessary to remedy the disadvantages already enumerated. It is realized that “there is no greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals.” In the opening section of this text attention was called to the fact that economic freedom or liberty was one of the corner stones of our modern industrial society. But freedom can best be secured by securing equality and responsibility. Factory legislation and labor laws are designed to correct the inequalities imposed by nature or involved in the very nature of capitalistic production. Direct interference by the state in the freedom of contract is justified as leading to a more real and certain equality and liberty. But while we may thoroughly approve the principle of labor legislation it is difficult to know at what point we should stop. A leading American authority on the law of labor has stated that “the industrial laborer at least is beginning to be a privileged class in the law.” On the other hand, it was possible for Disraeli to say as late as 1875, after the passage of the Employers and Workmen Act by the British Parliament, “for the first time in the history of this country employer and employed sit under equal laws”—so recently were the legal disabilities removed under which the English workmen had suffered up to this time. The pendulum has swung so rapidly and so far in labor’s direction in the last generation that it is a fair question how far it will—or should—continue to go.

VIII. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.

As modern capitalistic production caused the growth of a distinct wage-earning class and brought about a sharp separation between employers and laborers, and as the latter were thrown upon their own resources under the prevailing theories of free competition and free contract, it was inevitable that they should organize to secure their interests as a class. The growth of labor organizations has been greatest in those countries where the laborer has been forced to depend mostly upon his own efforts for protection and improvement, namely, in England and the United States. On the continent of Europe, on the other hand, where the individual has been accustomed to look to the government for the redress of industrial grievances, there has been a much less vigorous and spontaneous development of such organizations. They are a product of the nineteenth century and had their origin in modern machine production.

The growth of labor organizations in the United States has proceeded hand in hand with the industrial development of this country, and has been especially rapid since the Civil War. Two distinct types of trade unions may be noted—the local and the national (or international) unions. The former, which comprises members who live and work in the same locality, is the primary unit, and dates back to the beginning of the century. Each local union, even when subordinate to a national organization, is a self-governing unit, and is absolutely democratic. Its relation to the national body has been well compared to that of one of our states to the United States. The first national union was not formed until 1850, but now these far surpass the locals in importance. Their government is representative, as they are made up of local unions. The great majority of the national trade unions are bound together in the powerful federal organization, the American Federation of Labor. The membership of this body numbers considerably over 1,000,000, while the railroad unions, which are not connected with it, claim about 125,000 more. Probably not far from 1,500,000 persons in the United States belong to labor organizations, which is about 10 per cent of the total working population or about 15 per cent of those engaged in trade and transportation, manufacturing and mechanical pursuits. While this does not seem a very large proportion and is not as large as the membership of British trade unions, yet it must be remembered that they constitute on the whole the elite of the labor world and exercise an authority and power out of proportion to their numbers. Many other workmen, who do not themselves belong to the unions, follow their lead and are directly affected by their actions.

Historically the two most important national organizations in this country have been the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor, and they represent such different principles that it will be worth while to describe them. The Knights of Labor was organized in 1869 as a local union of seven garment cutters and had a meteoric career, counting a membership of 730,000 in 1886, the year of its greatest strength. It was a national amalgamation of mixed local assemblies composed of workers of all trades who lived in the same locality. It held the theory that the interests of all members of the laboring class are identical and must be cared for at the same time, if possible, by political action, by co-operation, and by education. In 1886, however, it entered upon a series of disastrous strikes; later it came into conflict with trade unions which had not joined its ranks and were opposed to its policies; and finally it became entangled in politics. As it lost in influence and strength its place was taken by the American Federation of Labor, which was its very opposite in organization and government. This latter body is a “confederation of trade and labor unions,” each trade being organized separately into local unions which are given great autonomy, these unions alone being represented in the national body. Only matters of general interest come before it, all local trade matters being left to the local unions. In 1903 it claimed a membership of 1,745,000.

More important than the history of labor organizations is a knowledge of their objects and methods. The primary purpose is of course to control the conditions of labor and to substitute the principle of collective bargaining for individual contract. As one of the most effective ways to secure this result they aim at a more or less complete monopoly of the labor market. This they may do by bringing all workers in a trade within the union or by preventing non-union men from working. The first of these is called the inclusive method, and if successful makes the union the sole seller of the kind of labor controlled by its members. It is a monopoly of the laborers against the employers and is sought to be enforced by inducing men to join the union either by persuasion or coercion, the latter finding expression in the strikes against the employment of non-union men and the insistence upon the “closed shop.” The other form of monopoly consists in the exclusion of new members from the trade and in a control of employment; this is a monopoly of a small group against their fellow-workmen. It is enforced by regulating the entrance to the trade, making it difficult or expensive, or by limiting the number of apprentices. Sometimes, as in the Chicago Building Trades in 1900, they have united with their employers by means of “exclusive agreements” to raise wages and prices of the finished products at the same time, and thus jointly to mulct the public. Such efforts to monopolize the labor market have their counterparts in the organization of capital, as we have seen. In practice such a labor monopoly has sometimes been used to improve and elevate conditions, just as sometimes a capitalistic monopoly has reduced prices below the competitive point. In general, however, we must condemn monopoly on principle in the competitive field and insist that freedom and opportunity be given to all on as equal terms as possible. Of the two forms of trade union monopoly, the former alone, which endeavors to make it all comprehensive and to enforce generally union conditions, can be economically justified.

“The establishment of a standard rate of wages may perhaps be said to be the primary object of trade union policy. Without the standard rate the trade union, such as it is, could have no existence.” The purpose of the union is to substitute collective bargaining for individual agreements and thereby to improve the condition of its members. But if a single bargain is to determine the pay of a large number of men, there must be a common standard. In every employment on a large scale the men are necessarily grouped together and their pay is determined by a common rule. This is true even in non-union shops. It is generally assumed that the standard rate of labor organizations means a uniform wage for each member, but this is not the case; it means rather a uniform rate of pay to all for the same performance. In the case of piece work, it could manifestly not mean anything else; but a large number of labor leaders object to piece work. They insist that a standard wage means a minimum wage, and that by the establishment of such a minimum the whole standard of efficiency and the plane of competition are raised, as the employers cannot then afford to hire any but competent workmen. The question immediately presents itself as to what is to become of the older or partially disabled men, who are no longer able to earn the standard or minimum wage? In England they are practically guaranteed a subsistence by the union; in this country the union not infrequently exempts them from the provisions as to the standard wage. When the rule is enforced there is certainly a real hardship for these men. But from the employers there comes the more serious complaint that the effect of the standard wage is to reduce to a dead level the efficient and the inefficient; that it is a maximum wage and that the efficient and industrious are prevented from earning more than a fixed amount. There is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in this charge; the man who hastens the pace is said to be taking “blood money,” and sometimes a maximum wage is set which the members are forbidden to exceed. On the other hand, it may fairly be said that while the union regulation of wages does tend to produce greater uniformity, the union rate is usually higher than the competitive rate would be, that is, wages are leveled up, not down; and finally, that territorial variations make the local rate conform to local conditions.

A reduction in the hours of labor has been even more strenuously urged by progressive labor leaders in the United States than an increase in wages. “Organize and control your trade and shorten your hours,” is their contention, “and wages will take care of themselves.” Their arguments in favor of a general shortening of the working day are twofold. In the first place, owing to the intensity and strain of work under modern machine methods, the worker cannot work efficiently more than eight or nine hours a day. The work is too exacting and the strain on the attention too great; it is a noticeable fact that most of the accidents in industrial establishments occur in the last hour or two of the working day. Not only that, but the laborer is entitled to his share of industrial progress in the form of more leisure, giving him time for a better family and social life, affording opportunity for intellectual improvement, and permitting the development of more rational and higher wants. With the improvement in the condition of the laboring classes, will go the elevation of society as a whole.

The second argument in favor of shorter hours put forward by the trade unionist, is economic rather than social. He argues that a “reduction of hours will diminish the supply of labor in the market, and so will raise its price. It will make room for the unemployed, and so will remove the depressing influence of their competition.” There is involved in this contention the familiar lump-of-labor argument of the trade unionist: there is just so much work to be done, and if some men do each a little less there will be more for others. By shortening the hours of labor of everybody employment will be made more general, and the work will be better distributed. Now the economists in general have supported the trade unions in their demands for a shorter working day, but they have done so because they believed that the product of industry would not thereby be diminished. They have seen that when the hours of labor were reduced the laborer was less rapidly worn out physically, that he could work more rapidly for a short time, and that his increased leisure and pay, if rationally used, made him a more intelligent and efficient worker. In other words, a reduction in the hours of labor from 15 a day to 12, to 10, and even in some cases to 8, was not attended by a parallel reduction in the output, but the latter remained about the same. This is the great economic justification of the shorter working day, and as long as this can go on without materially affecting the product of industry it must be approved. If, however, the latter is decreased there will be less to divide and then the relative disadvantages of a smaller dividend must be weighed against the advantages of increased leisure. Of course the point to which the number of hours can be reduced without lessening the product can only be determined by experiment, and will differ in different trades, but it is inevitable that until this point is reached the pressure of the trade unions for shorter working days—or for more holidays or half-holidays—will not be successfully resisted.

Turning now from theory to fact, we find that there has been a great improvement in the condition of labor in this respect. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the almost universal working day was, as McMaster tells us, from sun to sun. As factories grew up the habits of agricultural labor were carried over into industrial occupations, and working days of 16 and 18 hours were not uncommon. In 1903 the average length of the working day in the United States was 9.6 hours. This great reform may fairly be credited to the efforts of organized labor itself, for without their insistence and struggles it is unlikely that it would have been voluntarily granted by employers.

The limitation of output results almost necessarily from the above-mentioned practices of the unions: reduction of hours, prohibition of piece work, and the standardization of wages all tend to restrict the output of the individual worker. But some of the unions have gone further and have directly limited the amount that could be produced during a given period by the laborer. This has been particularly true of British unions and is the subject of common complaint by English employers and writers, but illustrations may easily be found in the United States. Thus in Chicago in 1900 “the lathers limited a day’s work to twenty-five bundles of lath, for which they received $3; they had formerly done thirty-five bundles for a daily wage of $1.75. Plasterers were limited to thirty square yards a day; the steam fitters were permitted to lay only ninety feet of steam pipe per day; but the plumbers had the most objectionable rules and restricted materially the amount of work that could be done in a day.” These rules were defended by the unions on the ground that they were necessary in order to secure careful work and to prevent the “rusher” for setting the pace for a fair day’s work. The practice has not been uncommon, especially in the sweated trades, for an unscrupulous employer to pay a few particularly able workmen to put extra speed into their work and so set a pace that the other workmen would be compelled to maintain. This was especially objected to by the unions in the case of team work. They claimed that when all the workmen had come up to the new standard, particularly in piece work, the wages were reduced so that even by working at the higher rate of speed, they could only make a fair wage. One of the rules of the Chicago carpenters’ union provided that “any member guilty of excessive work or rushing on any job shall be reported and shall be subject to a fine of $5.” Whatever the excuse it is clear that such limitations cannot be economically justified. Not only does such dawdling undermine the industrial efficiency of the worker, but it is unfair to the employer. If the latter bargains for the union rate of wages and the normal working day, he is entitled to a full return of the laborer’s best efforts. Otherwise there is no fairness in collective bargaining. “So far as labor leaders are concerned,” said Mr. John Burns, the English trade unionist, “we are all strongly opposed to the restriction of production; we are all in favor of better and more conscientious work.”

Laboring men have never been quite able to divest themselves of their old antipathy to labor-saving machinery. They generally regard the introduction of a new machine as a displacer of men, a creator of unemployment, a depresser of wages. Some unions have successfully resisted the introduction of machinery into their trades, as the stone cutters in Chicago, but in general they have recognized the impossibility of this attitude. In general they now demand that when machinery is introduced it shall be operated by union men and their wages shall be fixed so as to give the workers a share of the increased production.

The policies and methods of the trade unions thus far discussed are those of a militant nature, but the fraternal objects of these associations, though less conspicuous, are none the less important. Labor organizations generally; have insurance and benefit features, by which sick, injured, or unemployed members are assisted. This is particularly true of the English organizations, which developed these features before the rise of the militant new unionism. They often possess large funds and have been rendered thereby more conservative and responsible. The educative effect of trade unionism among the members is marked; some of them possess libraries and all of them promote discussion and thought upon economic problems, while the administration of their affairs often gives valuable training. The older unions did much to encourage co-operation among their members, but today the tendency is to limit their activities to the essential one for which they are organized, namely, collective bargaining.

Intelligent unionists realize that they can secure the various objects for which they strive only by substituting collective bargaining for contracts between employers and individual laborers. Where this plan is accepted by employers, representatives of the two sides agree upon wage scales, usually for a year; during this period the chief task of union officials is to see that the agreement is lived up to, and if possible to add to their membership and strengthen the union. In the United States relatively few trades have adopted this method as a general practice, the employers still being able to dictate wages and conditions of employment in most of them, while the unions are still struggling for recognition, if not for existence. Employers insist, in refusing to make collective bargains with the unions, that, as they run all the risks, they must be permitted to manage their business as they see fit and without interference from the business agent of the union. In reply the unions insist that hours, wages, and conditions of employment are as much their business as that of the employer. The latter also urges that the trade unions as at present organized are too irresponsible and before they ask for collective bargaining should be incorporated, so that they could be sued for breach of contract if guilty of such. As yet, however, the unions have preferred their present position of irresponsibility and immunity and have almost invariably refused to be incorporated.

“In the minds of a large section of the public,” writes President Hadley, “labor unions are chiefly associated with strikes. It is believed by many who ought to know better, that such organizations exist for the purpose of striking, and that if the organizations were suppressed, industrial peace would be secured. The first of these ideas is a distorted one; the second is wholly unfounded.” Strikes are, however, a necessary concomitant of collective bargaining. If the representatives of a union cannot come to terms with an employer, they may compel their members to refuse to sell their commodity, labor; such a concerted refusal to work is a strike. The “right to quit work” has been regarded as a sacred one by trade unionists, but it involves social consequences of great importance. For the workingman, it means loss of wages and demoralizing idleness; to the employer, idle capital, loss of profits, and depreciation of plant; and to the consuming public, inconvenience and annoyance together with curtailed production. Quite aside from all acts of violence and lawlessness, by which they are too often accompanied, there is involved an enormous money waste. According to a report of the Department of Labor, losses from strikes and lockouts in the United States from 1881 to 1900 amounted to $449,342,000 or an average loss per establishment involved of about $3,500.

The public is awakening to the realization that it suffers the greatest injury as the innocent third party to every industrial dispute, and is insisting that the industrial peace be kept or more reasonable methods of settling differences be found than a strike or lockout. Such a method is found in conciliation and arbitration. In the older and more strongly organized unions strikes are infrequent and methods of joint discussion and agreement are increasingly resorted to. Boards of conciliation are often provided for, which endeavor by means of conference and concession to prevent a dispute from arising; they succeed best where both employers and employes are organized. Should the dispute come to a head, however, provision is usually made for its reference to a board of arbitration, which may be selected by the disputants themselves or may be created by the state; in the latter case the acceptance of the award may be voluntary or compulsory. In the United States most of the successful boards have been those selected by the parties to the dispute; the state boards have usually the power only of investigating the causes of the trouble, but this in itself has proved of considerable value in more than one instance, notably in the case of the Anthracite Coal Commission. Compulsory arbitration is being given a thorough trial in Australasia and seems to be meeting with success there. In this country, however, the trade unions are strongly opposed to compulsory or enforced governmental arbitration. Writing of Great Britain, Mr. and Mrs. Webb assert that the principle of arbitration, having been found inconsistent with collective bargaining, is fast going out of favor. It would seem from the experience of both England and the United States that the chief virtue in these methods lies in the habit of joint conference and conciliation between the representatives of labor and capital.

IX. WOMEN AND CHILDREN AT WORK.

While women and children have always assisted in the work of the home, it was not until the development of the factory system that they began to work for wages outside of the family. From the earliest days the preparation of food, spinning and weaving and making up of garments, and other branches of domestic economy had been the peculiar tasks of the housewife. With the removal of the textile industries from the home to the factory and the invention of light-running machinery, many women followed them and employment was found also for young children. Thus with the inception of the modern factory system and machine production there arose the problem of woman and child labor. In England the evils of the early factory system were incredibly bad. “The beginning of the present century,” wrote President Walker, “found children of five, and even of three years of age, in England, working in factories and brickyards; women working underground in mines, harnessed with mules to carts, drawing heavy loads; found the hours of labor whatever the avarice of individual mill owners might exact, were it thirteen, or fourteen, or fifteen; found no guards about machinery to protect life and limb; found the air of the factory fouler than language can describe, even could human ears bear to hear the story.” Conditions were never so bad in this country as in England owing to the later development of the system and prompter legislation against its evils, and especially to the scarcity of labor which compelled employers to make the conditions of labor more attractive.

The field of employment for women has been a constantly expanding one. When Miss Harriet Martineau visited the United States in 1840 she found only seven occupations open to women, namely, teaching, needle-work, keeping boarders, work in the cotton mills, type-setting, book-binding, and domestic service. Since that time the area has widened until there is scarcely an occupation in which women are not found except those closed to her by law or by physical inability. The number of females 10 years of age and over engaged in gainful occupations was 2,647,000 in 1880 or 14.7 per cent of the total female population; this number more than doubled in the next twenty years, being 5,319,000 in 1900 or 18.8 per cent of all. The largest number employed was in domestic and personal service, and next to that in manufacturing and mechanical pursuits, though even in that branch they were most numerous in the traditional branches of woman’s work, as dressmakers, seamstresses, etc. It is nevertheless in the manufacturing industries that the most serious evils connected with woman and child labor are found. The problems differ greatly in different sections of the United States: in the Atlantic states the greatest proportion of women as compared with men find employment and give rise to special problems of women’s work; in the South child labor is more conspicuous; while in the West both woman and child labor are of relatively small importance.

An interesting question suggests itself at this point: Is the increase in the employment of women at the expense of men? Are the women crowding the men out of their occupations and taking their places? At first inspection the statistics of occupations would seem to lead to an affirmative answer, for the percentage of women breadwinners increased from 13.5 per cent of all such in 1880 to 16.6 per cent in 1900, while that of the men fell from 80 to 77.3 per cent, and that of the children remained about the same. The cause of the change in the proportion of the sexes was not due, however, to any falling off in the number of men, but to the great influx of women into the ranks of wage-workers. In some lines of employment, like those of bookkeepers, stenographers, typewriters, clerks, etc., there has undoubtedly been an encroachment and men have been displaced. But on the other hand, many occupations have been opened to men during the last fifty years that were unknown before. Such have been the expanding fields of railroad construction and operation, the steel industry, the utilization of electricity, and other similar lines. In most of these the muscular effort involved or the character of the work have kept women out, but in other lines where special rapidity or lightness of touch are required the women outnumber the men, as in the manufacture of cotton goods, hosiery, hats and caps, etc. The development and improvement of machinery has of course favored the employment of women. Mr. John A. Hobson asserts that “in modern machinery a larger and larger amount of inventive skill is engaged in adjusting machine-tending to the physical and mental capacity of women and children.” He concludes that if the exploitation of these forms of cheap labor had not been prevented by factory legislation and by public disapproval, “the great mass of the textile factories of this country [England] would have been almost entirely worked by women and children.” As a matter of fact one of the reasons for the great expansion of woman labor in the United States as well as England is because it has been found cheaper than man’s labor. We are thus brought face to face with a fundamental question in the discussion of the problem—why are women paid lower wages than men?

As to the fact there is no doubt; one comparison taken from the Census of 1900 will be sufficient to illustrate it: the annual average earnings of men in mechanical and manufacturing industries were $490, and of women $272 per annum. The more important question is why this difference exists. A number of reasons suggest themselves at once. In the first place women are less efficient than men and produce less; hence they are paid less. In some industries, particularly those requiring physical strength, women cannot compete successfully, and those are usually the highest paid employments. Other well-paid industries are regarded by men as essentially their own and social pressure is applied to keep women out. Then, too, woman’s ambition to attain industrial efficiency is not so great, owing to her expectation of marriage and release from industrial life. Women are more often absent from work owing to sickness and domestic claims upon their time; this irregularity of employment tends to reduce their efficiency. But even in employments where the efficiency of men and women are admittedly equal the women receive lower wages in the majority of cases. According to a report of the Bureau of Labor, out of 100 cases where the women did the same work as the men and did it as well, they received lower wages than the men in 80. This leads to the consideration of a second group of causes, which have to do with woman’s standard of living. One reason why she receives less is because she is able and willing to live on less. Physiologically, Dr. Atwater has said, man needs one-fifth more nutriment than woman. Women’s wages are less because of their somewhat lower cost of subsistence. But even aside from this fact, the frequent partial dependence of women upon other members of their family for support makes them willing to accept less and consequently reduces their wages. The average American workingwoman is young, only about twenty-two and a half years old, and after the age of twenty-five is reached the number declines rapidly. That is to say, working girls regard their employment as a temporary affair, remaining only about five years on the average in the store or factory; during this time they often live at home with their parents and are content to receive a wage much smaller than a man would require as head of a household.

The third reason is, however, the most important, because it explains at the same time the low economic position which woman occupies in the industrial world. The narrowing of the field within which women can readily find employment has the effect of greatly intensifying the competition within that field. There is also a great reserve army of potential women wage-earners, whom a slight increase of wages or force of circumstances—loss of employment by the male members of the family—will bring into the field as competitors. There is, in other words, a constant over-supply of labor in most women’s industries, which does not exist in any men’s industries except the most unskilled. Women exhibit, furthermore, a comparative lack of mobility from one industry to another, as well as from one locality to another. According to Professor Smart, women are so unready to leave home that their pay on one side of narrow Scotland is 50 per cent lower than on the other side. In the same way, the flow of labor from one occupation to another, which tends to equalize the advantages and rates of pay of different employments, is far feebler among women than among men. Finally, there is little organization among women. Their individualistic, almost jealous, attitude to one another prevents their combination and united action, while their submissive acceptance of what is offered leads to apathy. They have only infrequently formed unions and endeavored to substitute collective bargaining for individual action. Women are therefore industrially in much the same situation as unskilled, unorganized male laborers, and the remedy in both cases would seem to be the same—education and organization.

The presence of a large supply of cheap woman labor undoubtedly has a depressing effect upon men’s wages, and consequently upon the standard of life of the whole laboring class. George Gunton is authority for the statement that “in proportion as the wife and children contribute to the support of the family the wages of the father are reduced.” The family wage tends to remain the same whether it is earned by the father alone, or by the father with the assistance of his wife and children. It is, however, not quite clear in most cases whether the men’s wages are low because the women and children work, or whether the women and children work because the men’s wages are low. It may fairly be concluded, however, that the evil effects of low wages for women are not confined to themselves but are felt by all with whom they come in competition.

What conclusion shall we draw then, in view of all these facts, as to the desirability of employment of women? The fact of their low wages and industrial dependence is not sufficient to lead one to condemn it. These are transitional phenomena and can be remedied. Women have always worked—on the farm, in the home, in making household supplies. When this work was taken over by the factory woman became a wage-worker in the modern sense. “The census records in respect to the labor of women, therefore, read in the light of collateral facts, are a history of industrial readjustment rather than a record of the relative extent of the employment of women, and it is impossible to say, so far as the census figures are concerned, whether a larger proportion of women are actively engaged in labor today than formerly or not. The one fact which is clear is that factory or shop work is displacing home work, and that this readjustment of industrial conditions is leading to the employment of women outside the home in constantly increasing numbers.” The effect of this readjustment has been to increase greatly the production of wealth. The production of household supplies was removed from the family to the factory when it was handed over to machinery and done better and more cheaply. If the work of women thus released were expended for no useful purpose society would gain only in the increased leisure of the women. But if these then took up other new lines or set men free from old employments so that they could turn to still different ones, then the production of goods could be greatly increased. “Without women’s help,” says Mr. George L. Bolen, “their work in stores and offices would be done by men taken from other employment. The latter’s present work would have to be stopped to that extent, lessening the quantity of goods produced by men. The effect would be the same as if a farmer had to stop plowing two hours before noon to go to the house and cook his dinner.... Women behind the counter, and at the typewriter, release men for work that women cannot do.” From the standpoint of woman herself, industrial independence must be regarded as a great gain. Set free from the necessity of contracting marriage for the sake of a home, and of depending upon mere sex attraction to attain that end, she will develop her capacities more fully and when she does enter upon marriage will do so as a result of mutual attraction. The entrance of women into gainful occupations must be regarded as an essential step in their own progress and the improvement of society.

Quite different must be our attitude towards child labor, which can only be condemned as a waste of labor power and as stunting the development of the children. The Census of 1870 stated for the first time the number of children at work in the United States; there were 739,164 between the ages of 10 and 15 years, of whom 114,628 were employed in manufactures. During the next decade the number increased over 58 per cent to 1,118,356 children at work in all occupations. The disclosure of such an undesirable tendency called forth restrictive legislation in most of the states and the number declined materially by 1890. Since 1890 however there has been a reversal of this tendency back to the conditions of 1880, owing chiefly to the industrial development of the South, where almost no factory legislation exists as yet. In 1904 there were 1,752,187 children at work between the ages of 10 and 15 years, or almost one-fifth of all the children of those ages. The evils connected with child labor are the long hours—usually 11 or 12 hours a day where no restrictive legislation exists—and the exhausting and often dangerous work. The effect on the health of the children of monotonous and exhausting toil before their muscles are set and their frames knit up is thoroughly bad; they are stunted and deformed and prematurely aged. Many of the occupations, too, in which child laborers are most numerous, are dangerous or injurious, as tin can factories, saw mills, paper box factories, type foundries, and tobacco establishments. Second only to the physical effects of child labor is the mental and moral injury suffered not merely by the child but also by society in depriving these youthful laborers of a thorough education. While it is well that children should be kept busy, there is no compensating reward either in money wage or preparation for adult life in such monotonous, profitless drudgery. The influence of the competition of children upon wages is leveling, and their employment indicates either a willingness on the part of employers and parents to exploit this cheap and defenseless form of labor, or a backward state of civilization. Such an evil can be cured only by determined public opposition, by the passage of laws forbidding all labor by children under a certain age, say 15 (except possibly in agricultural or housework), compelling school attendance, and providing for careful inspection. Most of all is needed an aroused public conscience.

Labor legislation is the most effective method of improving the conditions of employment, and to a consideration of this subject we must devote the remainder of this section. We have already seen that the fundamental principle of our modern wage system is freedom of contract. This is guaranteed in our federal and state constitutions as both a personal and a property right. As a result of this fact the courts have generally declared unconstitutional any legislation, designed to protect the interests of labor, that seemed to abrogate this freedom of contract or that savored of class legislation. Efforts to improve the condition of labor by legislation have therefore met with especial obstacles in this country. On the whole, however, means have been discovered of evading these constitutional restrictions when it has seemed clearly demanded by the welfare of society, and the history of labor legislation in this country is one of fairly steady progress. The early laws were practically confined to imprisonment for debt, mechanics’ liens, the hours of education of children employed in factories, and similar matters. Nothing noteworthy was accomplished until 1866 when Massachusetts passed an eight-hour child labor law for children under fourteen; in 1874 she passed a ten-hour law for women and children under eighteen, engaged in manufacturing establishments, and in 1877 enacted the first factory inspection act, which has since been copied in about twenty-four states, and without which mere legislation is of little avail.

The factory acts may be divided into two classes, those that endeavor to secure the safe or healthful manner of conducting a business, and those that attempt to limit the occupations, the hours, and the methods of payment of the workers. Under the first head come such matters as fire protection, ventilation, guarding of machinery, inspection of boilers and mines, etc. Such legislation and inspection have in many states been extended to churches, schoolhouses, hotels, theaters and public buildings. The second group includes those laws which are usually meant when factory acts are referred to. In England there has been a very steady development and extension of such legislation, beginning in 1802, when Peel’s Act tried to protect the health and morals of the pauper apprentices in the cotton mills; this was extended to all young people in textile industries in 1833, to women in 1844, then to all large industries in 1864, and to smaller ones in 1867, and finally in 1878 these various provisions were codified into a complete factory act, regulating the health and safety of the laboring people generally. In the United States the movement was considerably later and has not been so uninterrupted. But today laws limiting the number of hours of labor to eight have been passed by the Federal Government and fifteen of the states for all those engaged on public works. Attempts to fix the hours of labor of adult male workers have usually been declared unconstitutional, for the reasons stated above, except in especially dangerous or unhealthful occupations, as bakeries, mines, smelters and similar lines. Consequently the men have been forced to rely largely upon their own efforts for the redress of industrial grievances; in this fact lies one explanation of the growth and strength of labor organizations in this country. On the other hand, legislation in behalf of women and especially children—wards of the state—has usually been held constitutional by the courts, and has had a more extended application. About twenty of the states have regulated the length of the working day for women and children. Special child labor laws limit the age below which employment is illegal, usually between ten and fourteen years of age; and provide for a minimum of education before a child can be employed. About half the states provide for factory inspection to see that the provisions of the various acts are lived up to. In general we may conclude that by the passage of such legislation society has definitely decided that there are some conditions of employment that cannot be safely left to free contract or to collective bargaining between employer and employe, but that they must be regulated by society itself on the broad grounds of social welfare.

X. UNEMPLOYMENT AND INSURANCE.

The greatest problem in modern industry as well as the greatest curse to the laboring classes, is unemployment. While unemployment has always existed under all systems of labor, it assumed added significance when the introduction of the wage system threw every worker upon his own resources and made him responsible for the care of himself and his family. Modern industry is sensitive and unstable and its delicate mechanism, very likely to get out of order; credit and fashion, to mention no others, are factors that make for instability, and these are essentially modern. Professor Marshall is of the opinion that the factory system has not increased inconstancy of employment, but has simply rendered it plainer by localizing it. But whether more or fewer than in earlier times, the number of the unemployed in modern industry is appallingly great. It is not easy to estimate correctly the extent and amount of this evil and we accordingly find considerable variations in the statistical presentations of fact. In 1885 two investigations of the amount of employment were made, one by Carroll D. Wright, in his report as United States Commissioner of Labor for 1886, and the other by the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor in its report for 1887. Mr. Wright defines the unemployed very narrowly as “those who under prosperous times would be fully employed, and who, during the time mentioned, were seeking employment”; using the term in this restricted sense he concluded that 7½ per cent of the working population engaged in manufacturing and mechanical pursuits, and trade and transportation were idle during the year, which moreover he considered one of extreme depression. The Massachusetts statistics, on the other hand, were presented as indicative of general conditions in normal years and may safely be regarded as such. According to this report, 30 per cent of the total number of breadwinners in the state had been unemployed at their principal occupations on an average of 4.11 months in the year covered; some of these found work at other or secondary occupations. But the net result of the investigation was well put in the terse statement of the report, that “about one-third of the total persons engaged in remunerative labor were unemployed at their principal occupation for about one-third of the working time.” At the lowest estimate the whole working population lost on the average almost one-tenth of their working time. The loss of such a proportion of the community’s productive force, with all the demoralization attendant upon irregular or no labor, is evidence of a problem of grave import.

Unemployment is such a broad term and covers so many different ideas that it will be well to classify the unemployed before proceeding further. They may be logically divided into the following classes: I. The temporarily unemployed, who comprise (a) those certain of work again, as efficient workmen who are temporarily out of work owing to seasonal variations, shut downs, etc.; (b) those without such prospect, a group which again divides into two groups, namely, (1) efficient and industrious workmen who have been thrown out of work by a change in fashion, the introduction of new machinery, foreign competition, a prolonged depression, etc., and (2) those whose work is essentially fluctuating and casual in its nature, as casual day laborers, charwomen, etc. II. The permanently unemployed, consisting in turn of (a) the “won’t-works,” as tramps, and (b) the “can’t-works,” or the defective and dependent classes generally. Such a classification renders much easier the analysis both of the causes and of the cure of unemployment.

The first question that presents itself in any discussion of the causes of unemployment is whether it is due primarily to personal causes, as inefficiency or intemperance, or to industrial causes over which the individual has no control. “Personal causes are those mental, moral, and physical defects which show themselves either in the inability and inefficiency of the workman or in his unwillingness to work. Here are included all the varieties of personal inaptitude, ranging from idiocy, intemperance, and vice to old age, sickness, and accident.” Such a comprehensive definition includes many cases, of course, where no blame can be attached to the individual, and yet each one of these causes is personal, that is, it does not affect at the same time a whole group, as an industrial depression would do. Persons included in this group are always on the margin of employment; in bad times the first to be discharged, in good times they are the last to be employed. Nor is the cause of their lack of employment always easy to give; it may be itself the result of industrial accident or unhealthful occupation, or the result of heredity, evil habits and associations, and defective education. We may present two tables giving briefly the causes of poverty and unemployment. The first gives the causes of poverty ascribed by the charity organization societies of New York, Boston, and Baltimore to applicants for relief:

Causes of poverty: charity organization society records.

Cause.

Per cent.

Drink

Shiftlessness and inefficiency

Other moral defects

Total, Character

No male support

Lack of other normal support

Total, Support

Lack of employment

Insufficient employment

Poorly paid, etc.

Total, Employment

Sickness and death in family

Insanity and physical defects

Old Age

Other incapacity

Total, Incapacity

0

0

[A] Warner, American Charities, Rev. Ed., 53.

The first group of causes indicates misconduct, as the last group indicates misfortune; the other two shade off into industrial causes, though lack of employment—the largest single cause—may in turn be ascribed to any one of several remoter causes according to the bias of the investigator. This table is a record of the causes of failure on the part of those who have fallen behind or dropped out altogether in the race of life. At the other end of the scale stand the members of labor organization, on the whole, the elite of the labor world. The following table gives the causes of unemployment of 31,339 cases at the end of September, 1900, as reported to the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics:

Causes of idleness, members of trade unions, 1900.

Cause

Per Cent

No work

Bad weather

Strike or lockout

Sickness

Superannuation

Other causes

Total

This table emphasizes very strongly the industrial causes of unemployment, three-fourths of which is ascribed to lack of work. In some cases, as the iron and steel workers, where there is a regular two months’ shut-down to make repairs, and the building trades where the inclemency of the weather usually prevents work during the winter, the lack of employment may be regarded as a vacation rather than a hardship, for the rates of pay are high enough during the remaining months to offset those of idleness. In other cases, however, as in coal-mining, there is a large reserve army of workers on hand and employment is secured for only one-half to two-thirds the time. In 1900, when the average number of days of employment was larger than it had been in ten years, the bituminous miners were employed only 234 days and the anthracite miners only 166 days in the year. This indicates a very bad organization of the industry. The same thing was formerly true of the London dockyards, where there was a reserve army of some 4,000 surplus workers. Of course the effect of this is to depress wages. The clothing trade is subject to seasonal fluctuations and the caprice of fashion, and offers very irregular employment. Machinery and improved processes were frequently spoken of by witnesses before the Industrial Commission as the leading cause of unemployment. If the general conditions of business are good at the time of the first introduction of machinery the displaced laborer is reabsorbed again and the hardship is not so noticeable. But if it coincides with a period of business depression the introduction of machinery appears to be the cause of a large displacement of labor, which might more truly be ascribed to industrial depression. This last cause is responsible for enormous suffering among the laboring classes, for the method oftenest resorted to by industrial enterprises to reduce expenses is the wholesale discharge of laborers, who are thus made to bear the burden of industrial disorganization. This was well illustrated by the economies effected by the railroads in the year 1908, in their general reduction of the labor force and of wages. But even in good years the inconstancy of employment is startling. In the four years 1897-1900 the men in trade unions in New York State lost 16.2 per cent of their time from unemployment, which is almost exactly one day in every week. And these, it must be remembered, were skilled and efficient workers in organized trades. Finally, strikes are given as a cause of unemployment in the table; these are a peculiar feature of modern industry, and do not call for further discussion, except to point out that they are not as important as often represented.

The foregoing analysis of the causes of unemployment shows that they are deep-seated in the nature of modern industry, and that it would be unjust to the workingman to attribute them in any large measure to his incapacity or indisposition to labor. The care of the unemployable must of course be undertaken by society, and such persons prevented as far as possible from depressing the wages of competent labor by their competition. Exceptional periods of distress may and should be met by temporary relief measures. But what we may call the normal unemployment in modern industry, which amounts to 2-2½ per cent of the labor force, cannot be overcome by direct methods. The remedy for this lies “in a better organization of employers and employes, more steady expansion of trade, and greater stability of industry and of legislation affecting industry. These are not problems directly of unemployment, but rather of taxation, currency, monopoly, immigration, over-production, and technical advances in industry. Their treatment must be undertaken, not primarily as measures of providing for the unemployed, but as measures for improving the conditions of business.” The problem of unemployment would thus seem to be a permanent one, bound up in the very nature of a dynamic society; it may be regarded as the price of progress. But the question may fairly be raised as to whether the laboring classes should foot the bill, or whether the cost might not fairly be borne by society as a whole. This has suggested, as a solution of the problem, insurance of workingmen against unemployment, a discussion of which, however, must be deferred to the end of the section. Some methods of alleviation, if not of abolition, of the evils of unemployment may be suggested. Free public employment bureaus and agencies, national in scope and well integrated, would do much to secure a better adjustment of demand and supply in the labor market, and secure a better distribution of the labor force and greater mobility of labor. Better organization and mutual understanding on the part of both employers and employes is needed, to prevent the loss through strikes and lockouts. And finally, improved industrial and technical education is essential, whereby the loss in skill through the introduction of new inventions and machinery may be minimized, and the productivity of the laboring class be increased.

Among the measures of relief for unemployment due to accident, sickness, and old age, none is more important or more deserving of a hearing in the United States than that of insurance against these evils. The earnings of the average male wage-earner are so small—half of the number earn annually less than $436, and half of the adult male factory workers earn less than $400 a year—that the unemployment, sickness, disablement, or old age of the breadwinner must throw a large proportion of families so afflicted into a condition of periodic poverty. Any remedies that will alleviate the miseries caused by fluctuations in employment, industrial accidents, diseases incident to industry, etc., deserve a respectful hearing.

No adequate statistics of industrial accidents exist in the United States, but a recent estimate by F. L. Hoffman gave the number of fatal accidents among occupied males in 1908 as between 30,000 and 35,000. An analysis of the reports of the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1901 to 1906, shows that of the total number (39,244) of industrial accidents reported in that state a little over 2 per cent were fatal, almost 17 per cent resulted in permanent disablement, and 81 per cent resulted in temporary disablement. More than half of the accidents in industry are the result of machinery in motion. Mr. Hoffman calculates that “it should not be impossible to save at least one-third or perhaps one-half by intelligent and rational methods of factory inspection, legislation, and control.” Prevention of accidents rather than compensation to the workingman after they occur should be the aim of society, in order to avoid the wasteful loss of productive power, not to mention the suffering and misery entailed by such accidents. “Immunity, not compensation,” has been the demand of the British trade unions. Of first importance then is careful factory legislation, safeguarding of machinery, and factory inspection. But here we are interested primarily in the question of responsibility and compensation. In the United States, legislatures and the courts have taken the position that the workingman was responsible unless he could prove the employer responsible for his injury. How impossible such proof is and consequently how intenable such a position, is clear from the following table, compiled by the German Government for purposes of accident insurance:

Accidents in German industries traceable to different causes.

Causes.

Fault of employer

Fault of injured workman

Fault of both

Fault of third person

Unavoidable or indeterminable

Total

Statistics from both Germany and Austria show that a full half or more of all industrial accidents are due to causes for which neither employers, injured workmen, nor fellow employes are responsible, but which are incidental to the nature of the industry itself. But besides the danger of injury from machinery, there are numerous specially dangerous or injurious trades, in which injury by poisoning, disease, etc., is almost unavoidable as trade processes are at present conducted. These have been classified as follows: trades in which lead is a poisonous element, trades which produce other chemical poisons, trades in which lockjaw is an incident, trades in which the danger arises from injurious particles in the air, or from dust, processes that require a sudden change from heat to cold and vice versa, and those that require artificial humidity, and trades in which accidents are so frequent as to demand special legislation. Before we try to decide who in justice should bear the cost of sickness or injury arising from these causes, let us inquire as to the practice in the United States and in other countries, so as to have the data necessary for a fair conclusion.

The original legal doctrine regarding liability for accident in England and America, which is still practically unmodified in the latter country, was based on the principle of individual responsibility for acts of negligence. Briefly stated the common law doctrine is that an employer must provide reasonably safe conditions of employment, and that then the employe assumes the risks incident to the occupation, or arising from the carelessness of fellow-servants; moreover, even if the employer has been remiss, the employe cannot collect damages if he has been guilty of contributory negligence. These three doctrines—assumption of risk, doctrine of the fellow-servant, and contributory negligence—have been used practically to free the employer from all responsibility in cases where injured employes have sought to secure damages. Moreover, as has been shown above, many cases exist where it is impossible to fix the blame on either employer, employe, or a third party, and in such cases no compensation could be secured for injury under the law. The full rigor of the common law, which has worked out so unfairly for the workingman in modern machine production, has been modified in about twenty-seven states by statutes defining more exactly the duties of the employer, and repealing the fellow-servant doctrine in regard to railway employes and in a few states in regard to all mechanical industries. With these exceptions, however, the law of employers’ liability has not been changed, and compensation for industrial accidents must be sought by injured employes through a suit for damages against the employer. In 1906 and again in 1908 Congress passed a federal employers’ liability act, limited to common carriers, which, however, represents only development along the lines of negligence law. That is, we are still proceeding upon the assumption that in every accident which occurs somebody is to blame. We shall have to look to foreign countries for a practical application of the principle that the cost of accidents in modern industry should be made a charge upon the industry itself, and ultimately be incorporated in the higher price of the article produced.

Germany was the first country to introduce the principle of compulsory accident insurance in 1884. Employers are there organized into associations and sections and are compelled to bear the expense of granting to injured workingmen compensation, which amounts to about two-thirds their average wages. England in 1897, by the passage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, adopted the principle “that a workman is entitled for all accidents of occupation to a moderate and reasonable compensation.” Twenty-three countries, or practically all the advanced industrial nations of the world except the United States, have passed laws to compensate sufferers for all accidents of industry, thus placing the burden of industrial accidents upon the industry as such and not upon the laborer.

As we have seen, sickness and old age are still more usual causes of poverty and unemployment than accident. All the arguments for compulsory insurance therefore apply with redoubled force to these evils. Germany was again the pioneer in the establishment of these forms of insurance. In 1883 sickness insurance was organized, being made compulsory for all persons with incomes under $500; the expense is borne one-third by the workers and two-thirds by employers, the main purpose being to secure a sufficient relief—amounting to one-half the wage—for a period of thirteen weeks. In 1889 invalidity and old-age insurance was introduced for the same class; contributions are made in equal proportion by employe and employer, the state contributing about $12 a year to each annuity. Pensions are granted after thirty years of payment or to those over seventy. In 1908 Great Britain passed a still more comprehensive measure, providing for pensioning all citizens of seventy years or over, who have been residents for twenty years, in accordance with a sliding scale based upon private income, the pensions ranging from five shillings weekly down to one shilling. The pensions were expected to cost $35,000,000 the first year, but will probably entail double that amount. Finally, insurance against unemployment was tried in Switzerland in 1893 to 1897, but was finally abolished, owing to abuses and difficulty of administration.

There are probably no more important practical economic problems than those connected with unemployment and workingmen’s insurance. Slowly the conviction has spread that under present conditions of industry workingmen cannot fairly be held responsible for industrial accidents, and that with prevailing wages they cannot be expected to save enough to maintain themselves in sickness and old age. It therefore becomes the duty of society so to organize industry and legislation that the terrors of accidents, sickness, and old age, shall be reduced to a minimum.

XI. MACHINERY AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY.

So far in the discussion of modern capitalistic production and of the various labor problems to which it has given rise we have not treated in detail the question of machinery and its effects on labor. We cannot, however, leave this subject without taking up this phase of it with considerable care. The advantages of machinery have been more often emphasized than the evils, so that we may profitably begin with the darker side of the picture. President Hadley enumerates three evils which are charged against machinery, as now managed and operated: “1. That it displaces a large amount of human labor, thus taking income away from employes and giving it to employers. 2. That when it does not actually drive human labor out of use, it employs it in circumstances unfavorable to efficiency, health, and morals. 3. That under the best conditions it deprives the workman of independence, making him a specialized machine instead of a broad-minded man.” We cannot do better than take up these points one by one.

In answer to the first charge President Hadley flatly denies that machinery has displaced labor, but insists that “there has been a most conspicuous increase of employment in those lines where improvements in machinery have been greatest,” giving the expansion of railroads as an illustration. But it is not possible to generalize from this case without further analysis. The immediate effect of improved machinery, especially if suddenly introduced, is practically always to throw men out of employment. The extent to which this will occur depends on the suddenness and extensiveness of the change, but fortunately, as Professor Nicholson points out, new inventions seldom come suddenly or are introduced all at once on an extensive scale. It took almost a generation, for example, for American machine methods to displace Swiss hand labor in the making of watches. But when such a change does occur it hits hardest the least efficient and older men, those just on the margin of employment, for a man past middle life can rarely learn a new trade. The effect of displacement in causing suffering will also depend somewhat upon the mobility of labor, both the knowledge of new opportunities and the capital to make possible a change of location or industry, and improvements in the means of transportation. It can easily be shown that as a general principle the lump-of-labor theory is erroneous, namely, that there is just so much work to be done and that if machinery is introduced there will be less work for men to do. But there is this element of truth in it, that the question whether men will be reabsorbed in the same industry depends upon the fact as to whether the market for the goods produced by the new machine can be expanded. If the demand is elastic, that is, can be largely extended because of the fall in price brought about by the cheaper production, as in the case of cotton goods, then the displaced laborers will probably be re-employed to produce an enlarged supply. If, however, the demand is inelastic, that is, will not be expanded by reason of a fall in price, as in the case of salt or coffins, then the displaced labor will not be reabsorbed in the same industry but must look elsewhere for employment.

The elaborate investigation of the Department of Labor in 1898 regarding the relative merits of hand and machine labor shows clearly the effect on the displacement of labor by the introduction of machinery. A few cases will serve as illustrations (see table on next page).

Hand and Machine Methods Compared.

These cases, chosen at random, all show an increase in the number of different men employed, and an immense saving in time and in labor cost. Nothing is indicated however as to the total amount of employment. Optimistic writers like Carroll D. Wright claim that if machinery has displaced labor in one direction it has created more employment for them in others. He shows for instance that the per capita consumption of cotton in this country in 1830 was 5.9 lbs., while in 1890 it was 19 lbs., and gives similar figures for iron and steel, and railroad traffic. It will be noticed that all of his examples are chosen from industries in which the demand is elastic. Mr. J. A. Hobson, a more careful and conservative writer, draws less optimistic conclusions from a study of Great Britain. He says: “First, so far as the aggregate of manufactures is concerned, the net result of the increased use of machinery has not been to offer an increased demand for labor in those industries commensurate with the growth of the working population. Second, an increased proportion of the manufacturing population is employed either in those branches of the large industries where machinery is least used, or in the smaller manufactures which are either subsidiary to the large industries, or are engaged in providing miscellaneous comforts and luxuries.” It must be said, however, in modification of Mr. Hobson’s inferences, that it may be accounted as a social gain if the demand for manufactured commodities can be met by the labor of a smaller proportion of the population, since the energies of the rest are then set free for professional or artistic or similar pursuits. A study of the census reports of Great Britain seems to show that this is what has happened in that country.

The amount of labor is not the only factor to be considered; the regularity of employment, as we saw in the last section, is of hardly less importance. “Another danger of an entirely opposite kind,” says Professor Nicholson , “lurks in this immense power of machinery, which is continually showing its reality and remedies for which will, it is to be feared, be the fruit of long years of tentative adaptation to the new environment. What all sensible workingmen desire, what the advocates of the trade unions say is their chief object, is to get a “steady sufficient wage,” but it has been proved inductively that great fluctuations in price occur in those commodities which require for their production a large proportion of fixed capital. These fluctuations in price are accompanied by corresponding fluctuations in wages and irregularity of employment. But fluctuations in wages and discontinuities in employment are two of the greatest evils which can befall the laboring classes.” We have already seen how modern capitalistic methods of production may lead to over-production and to a crisis. We now see how machine methods may cause unemployment or irregular employment. The men displaced directly by new machinery, those thrown out of work by industrial depression resulting from over-production in machine industries, and finally those irregularly employed in the new occupations supplying luxuries—all of these may fairly attribute their suffering in large measure to machine methods.

“The second great charge made against the factory system is that it displaces a higher grade of labor by a lower grade; sometimes substituting the work of women and children for that of men; sometimes substituting work under conditions physically or morally unhealthful, for work under healthful conditions; sometimes substituting specialized and mechanical work for diversified occupation which contributes to general intelligence.” The point as to the labor of women and children has already been discussed. The charge that factory labor is physically unhealthful may in general be denied. Mr. Wright, in an elaborate defense of the factory system in the Tenth Census, concluded that the conditions of work in the modern factory are much more conducive to good health than those under the preceding domestic system, while morally they are far superior. The qualities demanded by the machine production of the modern factory are punctuality, steadiness, reliability, and sobriety, and it therefore makes against intemperance and immorality. So far as these exist in factory towns, they are the result of town life rather than of manufacturing. It must, however, be said that while the factory system is not inherently unhealthful, the high pressure at which operatives of steam-driven machinery are compelled to work, particularly in this country, may and often does wear him out prematurely. This again is partially offset by a shortening of the hours of labor.

The final charge against the factory system is monotony of work. Many writers, from Adam Smith down, take the view that it is more stupefying to make a small part of an article, say the sixty-fourth part of a shoe, than to make the whole article. Professor Marshall, who has considered the subject carefully , concludes that while it takes away manual skill, it substitutes higher or more intellectual forms of skill. “The more delicate the machine’s power the greater is the judgment and carefulness which is called for from those who see after it.” But after all there is less danger from monotony of work than from monotony of life, and the cure for this would seem to be in an increase of machinery rather than in its abolition.

Let us now try to summarize our conclusions on this intricate question. The first effects of the introduction of labor-saving machinery is to displace particular laborers; these suffer real injury, though they are often reabsorbed in the industrial organism. The social gain is undoubted, for the improved methods lead to lower prices and thus to an increase in the real wages of labor. To the improvement and wider use of machinery we must indeed look for the ultimate relief of the human race from exhausting toil. Says a socialist writer: “On mechanical slavery, on the slavery of the machine, the future of the world depends.... All unintellectual labor, all monotonous, dull labor, all labor that deals with dreadful things, and involves unpleasant conditions, must be done by machinery. Machinery must work for us in coal mines, and do all sanitary services, and be the stoker of steamers, and clean the streets, and run messages on wet days, and do anything that is tedious or distressing.” If labor today has a complaint to make against the use of machinery, it is that labor has not shared sufficiently in the improvements thus far effected. But the evil here is connected with the inequitable distribution of wealth, not with the methods of its production. In justice labor should share in the technical improvements which characterized the nineteenth century and will revolutionize to a still greater extent the industries of the twentieth. The practical question in this connection is as to the best method for labor to secure its claim to a share in the increased production. One answer, to which we will turn next, is by increasing its efficiency through better industrial education and training.

The subject of industrial education has recently been receiving considerable attention in the United States and the needs and shortcomings of our country in this regard have been described. Under modern methods of production, with their extreme specialization of labor and extended use of machinery, it is practically impossible for a worker to secure an adequate knowledge of a trade in the actual practice of it. In former days boys acquired training in their trades by the system of apprenticeship under the immediate charge of a master of the craft. The system of apprenticeship has today almost disappeared; boys are taken into shops as helpers, not as apprentices, and receive practically no systematic instruction in their trade, especially in a modern large establishment. In consequence of these facts it is insisted that school instruction should be given to make good the absence of shop practice; that a general system of industrial education should be developed to give our workingmen systematic training in the various trades. The superiority of the opportunities for industrial education on the continent of Europe, especially in Germany, have been frequently emphasized, and their industrial advance has been credited in large measure to this fact. We can probably not approach the subject better than by explaining the systems in these other countries and then comparing them with that of the United States.

Beginning with Germany as the country in which industrial education has received the greatest attention, we find there three different kinds of schools, which we may call the lower, middle, and higher. The lower group includes artisan and specialized trade schools, and is intended to be a substitute for the apprenticeship system. While they have an important influence on the general industrial efficiency of the nation, they concern chiefly the small handicrafts. The middle group comprises the trade schools (gewerbeschulen), of which the most famous are the weaving and dyeing schools at Chemnitz; other branches taught are soap-boiling, milling, building, pottery, etc. These are the schools that provide technical instruction for the large manufacturing industries, and are consequently of great importance; they train the foremen, superintendents, managers, and heads of establishments rather than the workingmen. The higher group is formed of the technical high schools or technological institutes, where are trained the scientific experts. The importance of the German system lies in the development of the last two groups rather than in provision for the training of the workmen. Germany’s recent industrial advance must be credited to the training of the officers, not the rank and file, in the industrial army, to the development of managerial ability rather than of manual skill.

In England the last twenty years have seen a marvelous development in industrial education, brought about in part by the “made in Germany” agitation. The English system differs from the German in educating working-class boys, while at work in the mill or at the forge, into foremen, managers, etc., mainly by means of evening classes in trade or technical schools. The German system, on the other hand, trained men who already had a superior general education. These schools are regarded as stepping stones for the more ambitious and intelligent young workingmen. They give a practical grasp of the subjects, but do not teach actual processes of manufacture, owing to trade union objections. They thus come between the lower and middle schools in Germany. The higher technical schools also exist and have recently been greatly expanded.

The system of industrial education in the United States may be said to resemble that of Germany more than England in that it supplies industries from above rather than from below, but it is in a very chaotic state as yet. The most important schools are institutes of technology and the technical departments of the universities, but these train men only for the highest positions. Provision for the industrial training of the workingman is almost lacking except in a few manufacturing centers. Thus there are a few trade schools resembling somewhat those in the Middle German group, as the textile schools at Philadelphia, Lowell, and a few other cities. Lower trade schools are found in New York City, but hardly anywhere else. That there is a distinct need of and demand for instruction of this character is shown by the enormous expansion of correspondence schools, a peculiarly American institution, which endeavor to give the training afforded by the English schools to the more ambitious young artisans.

So far in their industrial development the people of the United States have been immensely aided by two factors: the rich natural resources of the country, and the high quality of the labor. But as we have already seen, the natural resources are being either rapidly exhausted or monopolized. As to the character of the second factor, we may quote from the testimony of a recent careful observer, Dr. A. Shadwell : “The American method of work in the industrial sphere is distinguished by the following features: enterprise, audacity, push, restlessness, eagerness for novelty, inventiveness, emulation, and cupidity. Employers and employed have exhibited the same qualities in their degree.”... But they suffer “from the national defect of want of thoroughness, which arises from the craving for short cuts.” Now that American industries are entering the markets of the world in international competition, it becomes important to correct any faults that will cause us to fall behind. So far the movement for better industrial education through the establishment of trade schools has met two obstacles in this country. The first is the hostility of the trade unions, which fear to see their control of the labor market disturbed by the annual turning out of hundreds or thousands of workers from the trade schools without any especial sympathy with trade union methods or policies. The other difficulty lies in the satisfaction with prevailing methods, the belief that the American workman without training possesses skill superior to that of his European competitors, and a naïve national self-conceit in all things American. Now that we are for almost the first time in a hundred years measuring our industrial efficiency in foreign markets against our European competitors, we shall be compelled to take stock of all the items that make for industrial supremacy. There seems to be little doubt that when once this is fairly done, the need of a better system of industrial education will be recognized and met.

XII. PROFIT-SHARING AND CO-OPERATION.

Among the reforms suggested for remedying some of the evils incident to the modern wage system those of profit-sharing and co-operation occupy a prominent place. The separation of the community into capitalists and laborers, classes different in conditions and ideals, constitutes a menace to the peace and progress of industrial society. The wage system moreover is thought by many to have broken down the former intimate relation of employer and worker, and some scheme is needed to correlate their interests again and to bind them together. To secure this result profit-sharing is advocated. As defined by the International Co-operative Congress in 1897 this is “the agreement, freely entered into, by which the employe receives a share, fixed in advance, of the profits.” It is not a change from the present wage system, but simply a modification of that system according to which the laborer receives a share in the profits in addition to his wages. The purpose is to identify the interests of the employes with those of their employer and thus to give him some of the same motives for energy, care, and thrift in the conduct of the business. Three principal methods of profit-sharing may be mentioned, though the variations are manifold. The favorite method in England and the United States is the payment of a cash bonus at the end of a fixed period, as a year. A second plan, which is the rule in France, is a deferred participation by means of a savings bank deposit, provident fund, or annuity, for the purpose of providing for old age and disability. The third plan, which has recently grown in favor in this country, is the payment in shares of stock of the company.

The economic theory of profit-sharing is that by inducing greater care and diligence on the part of the employe he will himself create the fund from which he is paid. It is claimed by its advocates that it increases both the quantity and the quality of the product and that it promotes greater care of implements and materials, thus reducing the cost at the same time that it increases the output. The classic example of this is the case of the original profit-sharing scheme, the Maison Leclaire, in Paris; the result of the first six years’ experiment was a dividend on wages of $3,753 a year, derived entirely from the increased economy and care of the workers. In some cases, however, the object of the employers is to secure immunity from strikes and other labor disturbances and a greater permanence of the labor force; and participation in profits is conditioned on the men abstaining from joining a trade union, or on uninterrupted service. In these cases the deferred participation plan is used. The advantages claimed for the system are not merely the increase in product already spoken of and the greatest efficiency of the worker, but also the improvement in his material and moral standards, and the promotion of industrial peace by lessening discontent and friction. The main basis for the system, since it is economic and not philanthropic in its nature, must of course be the increase in production brought about by its adoption.

More weighty, however, appear the objections against profit-sharing, which seem to have had sufficient force to cause the failure of a number of ventures in this direction. In the first place, the relation between the increased effort of a single workman and the success of a general business is so remote, especially in our complicated modern industry, that it is unlikely to act as a very powerful stimulus. But even if it should, the savings thus effected might be swept away by the poor business management of the employer. “It is quite possible that the workman who, in the hope of earning ‘bonus to labor,’ has done work 10 per cent in excess of the normal standard, may, even under a liberal scheme, find that, instead of receiving an addition to his normal wages of, say, 7 per cent, the bad management of his employer has reduced his bonus to so low a level that he has to be content with a supplement equivalent to only 2 per cent on his wages, or that, as has been the case in a large proportion of the schemes ... no bonus whatever is forthcoming.” It is undesirable to make the earnings of the laborer dependent in any way upon the fluctuations of business or the ability of the employer. The ordinary wage system has at least the merit that the reward of the laborer is made dependent only on his own efforts. The lot of the modern worker is too unstable and employment too unsteady to add a new element of uncertainty in wages. If the laborer has really earned the premium, say labor leaders, why not add it to his wages instead of adopting this roundabout method. The sliding scale, or a system of premiums or bonus payments for increased output, would be better than profit-sharing, and is rapidly spreading.

This leads to the second objection, which is that profit-sharing paralyzes the efforts of the laborers to better their own conditions through trade unions, strikes or other methods. The trade union attitude was vigorously stated by President Gompers of the American Federation of Labor in his testimony before the Industrial Commission: “There have been few, if any, of these concerns which have been even comparatively fair to their employes.... They made the work harder, longer hours, and when the employes of other concerns in the same line of trade were enjoying increased wages, shorter hours of labor, and other improvements, tending to the material progress of the worker, the employes of the concern where so-called profit-sharing was the system at the end of the year found themselves receiving lower wages for harder work than were those who were not under that beneficent system.” As long as the system is viewed with suspicion by the laborer or used as a weapon in industrial bargaining by employers, the plan is foredoomed to failure. But even were it managed in the proper spirit, it is after all applicable to only a comparatively few industries, those, namely, in which labor makes up the largest part of the cost of production. In most modern industries capital plays such an important role as compared with labor that the field for this plan is comparatively limited.

In the actual practice of profit-sharing there have been many interesting experiments, and not a few failures. It may be said to date from 1842, when M. Leclaire, a Parisian painter and house decorator, introduced it into his business, and has since spread over France and England; it has met with little success in the rest of Europe. In the United States the movement has also been more recent and of smaller proportions. The reason for this is suggested by President Hadley as follows: “Where the laborers under the old wage system are not working up to a high standard of efficiency, there is more chance for the success of profit-sharing. This seems to be the reason why it works better on the Continent than in England, and better in England than in America.” It was estimated in 1900 that there had been in the entire world some 500 experiments in profit-sharing, of which about 400 were still in existence: a more conservative estimate would place the latter number at about 300.

More radical than profit-sharing, which involves only a change in the method of payment of wages, is co-operation, which involves a change of management as well. Its final goal, in the minds of its advocates, is the radical modification if not ultimate abolition of the present wage system. While profit-sharing is paternalistic and is directed to an increase of production, co-operation may be said to be democratic, and to aim at a more equitable distribution. Under this plan the laborers hope to divert to themselves the large amount of profits which they now see going into the possession of their employers. By eliminating the manager or enterpriser they hope to save his profits for themselves. Two different kinds of co-operation are usually distinguished—distributive or consumers’ co-operation, and producers’ co-operation—which we may profitably take up in turn.

Successful consumers’ co-operation may be said to have originated in Great Britain when twenty-eight Rochdale workingmen founded their famous society of Equitable Pioneers. The success and growth of this remarkable experiment, starting with a capital of £28, to a great system of 8,000 members with a capital of £200,000 in 1874, is a most romantic story. It was largely imitated and retail co-operative stores sprang up all over England. In 1864 the English Co-operative Wholesale Society was started, for the purpose of the joint purchase of supplies for the retail co-operative stores on better terms than these could secure singly from ordinary wholesalers. It effected large economies and was successful from the beginning; by 1901 it had a capital of £2,500,000 and acted as purchaser for over 1,000 retail societies. From buying, the society soon passed to making its own goods and now manufactures directly a long list of commodities. In 1868 the Scottish Wholesale Society was inaugurated upon practically the same plan. Consumers’ co-operation has met with considerable success in Europe also. In the United States, however, experiments of this kind have in general had only a brief existence. It is impossible to say how many such societies exist today as no adequate statistics on the subject exist. Trade union stores in New England, the grange stores of the Patrons of Husbandry and later similar ones of the Sovereigns of Industry, and a few sporadic movements since in different parts of the country, show what has been attempted. The reasons for the lack of success in this country are not hard to find. Co-operation requires a willingness to take considerable trouble for small economies, which American workingmen, with their generally high wages, have not yet been willing to take. It also requires a considerable degree of homogeneity in thought and interests on the part of a people, which is naturally less present in the United States with its large admixture of foreign population than in England or the countries of Europe.

The methods of the Rochdale Society will serve as an illustration of the way in which the savings effected by co-operation are distributed among the members. Any one might become a member upon payment of one shilling and was then entitled to trade at the store. The prices charged were those current in the town, but purity of goods was assured; cash payments were an essential feature. At the end of the year the profits were divided among the members in proportion to the amount of their purchases. On the other hand, it may be noted that no attempt was made to, introduce profit-sharing with the employes, who are paid ordinary but good wages only. Other forms of consumers’ co-operation are those which undertake to supply insurance, or credit, like the co-operative insurance companies, banks, and building and loan associations. The latter especially have had considerable success in the United States and have helped many a laborer or man of small means to the ownership of a home.

Producers’ co-operation differs from that just described in that it is a union on the part of laborers to do away with the employer and to secure for themselves the profits. The object of the first is to lower prices for the co-operators as consumers; the object of the second is rather to secure higher prices for themselves as producers by eliminating the profits of the industrial manager. They hope to perform his function by their collective effort, and to manage as well as labor; indeed, by diminishing friction and strikes they even hope to increase the profits. Examples of successful co-operation of this sort are not numerous, as it has great difficulties to contend with. Most of the experiments have failed, though recently it would seem that the movement is making substantial though slow progress, especially in France and England. Most of those in the latter country, however, seem to be of simple industries, as agriculture and dairy-farming. The most notable example of successful productive co-operation in the United States has been furnished by the coopers of Minneapolis, who organized a shop of their own in 1868 and have steadily increased their business since that time. Other instances often cited are the wood-workers in St. Louis and boot and shoe companies in Massachusetts. More recently there has been a considerable extension of co-operative creameries, cheese factories and similar businesses of a simple kind.

The advantages of co-operation are summed up as follows by President Walker. From the laborer’s point of view: “First, to secure for the laboring class that large amount of wealth, which ... goes annually in profits to the employer. Second, to secure for the laborer the opportunity to produce independently of the will of an employer.... In addition to these, the political economist beholds in cooperation three sources of advantage. First, co-operation would, by the very terms of the case, do away with strikes.... Second, the workman would be incited to greater industry and to greater carefulness in dealing with materials and with machinery. Third, in no small degree frugality would be encouraged.” To these may be added other advantages, mostly realizable, however, in consumers’ co-operation. Saving in store-room, clerk hire, advertising, book-keeping, etc., is effected, while above all, the practice of cash payments saves all loss from bad debts. The initial success of the Rochdale pioneers was in large part due to the economy in this line, as a system of long credits burdened the retail trade of England at the time they began. In this country the large department stores have introduced this system and have thus been able to give their customers lower prices, and by so much have lessened the motive for consumers’ co-operation. The educative effects of successful co-operation upon the participators in developing habits of thrift, careful management and a knowledge of business principles, is one of the chief advantages of the system. The ultimate ideal of enthusiastic co-operators does not, however, stop short of a mere saving in price. The goal is stated as follows by the Right Relationship League of America, which has several co-operative stores in the Northwest: Consumers’ co-operation is merely the first step which “will lead next to co-operative production, next to public ownership of natural resources and finally to complete industrial and economic equality, social and political right relationship—the Kingdom of God on Earth.”

The defects of co-operation have already been suggested in the account of their failure. In the first place, the importance and need of intelligent and efficient management are usually underrated by workingmen. They are unwilling to pay high salaries and as a consequence lose the best men and secure inefficient service. Co-operation has therefore succeeded best in retail trade where the processes are comparatively simple, or in those branches of production where industry counts for most and management for least. But even if it were possible to secure an efficient and progressive manager for a co-operative shop, it is found very difficult for a man chosen by the workmen to enforce discipline among them. A second disadvantage is the difficulty of securing capital. Where, as in many branches of large-scale manufacturing today, the average investment of capital amounts to more than $1,000 per employe, the impossibility of obtaining this by the contributions of the workers is obvious. Nor are capitalists usually willing to lend to such organizations, as the risks are too great. To meet this difficulty Ferdinand Lassalle, a German socialist, proposed that the state should advance the necessary capital to associations of workmen. But the experience so far with productive co-operation would seem to suggest that the social benefits would not equal the waste of public capital. There is danger also that if successful the co-operative associations would tend to become monopolies; they are profit-seeking societies and would probably not differ materially in their methods from ordinary joint stock enterprises.

It seems impossible, therefore, to expect from co-operation a final solution of the labor problem, such as John Stuart Mill, for instance, hoped for. Where successful, it has succeeded in distributing profits among a larger number of persons than would otherwise have received them. Its educative and moral effects, moreover, in the appeals which it makes to higher motives and to character, are of the highest value. But as an industrial system of enterprise it cannot supplant the present system as long as the manager of industry is needed. Today he performs a useful social service and profits are his pay therefor. If he is to be eliminated, society must first be raised to a higher plane of efficiency, intelligence, and morality. But just because it makes these high demands upon the members of the laboring class, attempts at co-operation should receive all reasonable encouragement.

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