Chapter I: The Cause of Adam’s Fall.
CHAPTER I: ON THE CAUSE OF ADAM’S FALL
The occasion of the fall.
§ 4. Among the rest of the trees in Paradise, God had planted the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and had given man the command that he not eat the fruit of that tree, with a warning added that, if man would ignore that command and eat the forbidden fruit, in death he should die [cf. Gen 2:16–17]. That is, temporal and eternal death would certainly be prepared for him.
Why the original law was given to man.
§ 5. Doubtless, with this legislation God intended to declare that: (1) He is the Creator and Lord of man, whom man is bound to serve and obey as servant and creature. (2) Man had been equipped with perfect powers of reason and with a wholeness of his entire nature and, moreover, the faculty of free choice so that he could serve God. (3) In fact, He proposed to man in this precept a sort of schoolhouse of obedience which would have been very pleasing to God and very useful to man. For if man had persisted in holy obedience to this commandment, at the appointed time he would have been transferred from his earthly Paradise into heaven without the intervention of death or pain and would have been confirmed in goodness.
§ 6. This is the response they give to those who ask why God gave man such a command when He foresaw that he would deviate from it. On the contrary, He commanded it so that he might observe it. He equipped him with perfect powers so that he might be able to observe it. Lest he refuse to observe it, He had added the threat of death. Isa. 5:4: “What more should God have done for His vineyard which He did not do?”
The devil was the impulsive cause1 of the fall.
§ 7. Moreover, after Satan had turned away from God his Creator, he was aroused by his hatred for God and jealousy of man and planned to encourage man to transgress this commandment, and in this way to move him out of his very blessed state of incorruption. Consequently, [Satan] entered the serpent—an animal astute and clever beyond the rest and, moreover, familiar to man—“by the permission of God and filled him with his own impulse” (these are the words of Augustine, De Gen. ad lit., bk. 11, ch. 2) “so that with this specious costume he might conduct his plan of seducing mankind.” Theodoret (Q. 32 on Genesis): “The serpent was the instrument of the enemy of the truth.” Epiphanius (Haeres. 37, vol. 3, bk. 1): “The sole cause, then, was not the visible serpent, but the serpent who spoke in the serpent, that is, the devil,” etc.
What sort of a serpent is meant.
§ 8. Josephus (Antiquit. Jud., bk. 1, ch. 3) clings too much to the letter and writes that he thinks that here this is nothing else but a natural serpent, and that its voice has been replaced by venom as a punishment. Philo (in his book Περì κoσμoπoιίας and also in his book Ἀλληγoρ.) leaves history completely and turns this entire passage into an allegory. He says: “These are figurative specimens which invite an investigation of the allegory by veiled inferences. If someone should follow these as is fitting, the passage will be interpreted, by no means absurdly, such that the serpent stands for pleasure.” Origen follows Philo and understands “man as reason and woman as the sensitive appetite”2 (on Exodus, homily 3). Julian (according to Cyril, In Julian., bk. 3) “argued that the narrative of Moses was a fable, because a human voice is attributed to the serpent.”
We claim that the serpent here described is neither a mere serpent nor a purely allegorical serpent, but one possessed and filled by the devil, for the sort of things which do not at all fit a mere serpent deprived of reason are attributed to it:
(1) The serpent here is using articulated speech; but now, “the uttered word is indicative of inner reason,”3 and who would ascribe reason and its result—speech—to beasts? What the Parva Genesis and Josephus opine—that animals once had been endowed with the power to speak—is ridiculous.
(2) The natural serpent was a good creation of God, to which the maxim of Gen. 1:31 also pertained. Yet here the serpent speaks, perverts the command of God, and leads man away from Him.
(3) The punishment inflicted justly upon this serpent indeed befits a natural serpent, but not completely, since the woman’s Seed bruised the head not of a natural serpent but of an infernal one, and that enmity between the serpent and the woman’s Seed must be attributed not to a natural but to an infernal serpent [cf. Gen. 3:15].
(Bellarmine, De grat. primi hominis, bk. 3, ch. 3, and Calvin, commentary on Genesis 3, as well as the Photinian Johannes Sommer, Contra Carolium, bk. 2, ch. 3, follow the rabbinic scholars and ignorantly claim: “The enmity must be understood to mean the natural discord between the sons of Eve and the serpent.”)
But God says that He wants to establish or create this hatred. Indeed, He proclaimed this natural hatred in this public proscription of the natural serpent [cf. Gen. 3:15]. Furthermore, the woman’s Seed is Christ alone, according to the witness of the Holy Spirit in other passages of Scripture, and this should not be extended to the children of Eve except insofar as they fight and conquer the infernal serpent and his instruments by the power of Christ. Indeed, as long as that Jewish corruption of the text stands, will there be any place for the evangelical promise given to our first parents after the fall? Finally, the quality of this conflict is explained fully in Ps. 91:13; Matt. 4:3ff.; 1 John 3:8; and Rev. 12:17.
§ 9. In fact, the Holy Spirit elsewhere has explained His intent clearly as to what serpent and what kind of serpent is meant here. For as often as the apostles and prophets, “carried along by the Holy Spirit,” speak about the origin of sin and death, they ascribe it not to a mere serpent but to Satan. Wisdom 2:24: “Through the devil’s envy, death entered into the world.” John 8:44: “The devil is a murderer from the beginning. When he speaks a lie, he speaks from his own resources, because he is a liar and the father of lies.” He, then, is that serpent who with his own lying promises deceived man and made him subject to death. 2 Cor. 11:3: “I am afraid that, as the serpent deceived Eve by his cunning, your thoughts will be led astray from the simplicity which is in Christ” (namely, through false apostles who are the ministers of Satan). It is for this reason that the devil, who once abused the ministry of a natural serpent to mislead man, is called “the ancient serpent,” “the crooked serpent,” “the great dragon,” etc., in Isa. 27:1; Luke 10:19; Rev 12:7 and 9; 20:2; and in Ps. 140:[3] sin is called “the poison of the serpent.” In Matt. 3:7 and 23:33, people who deliver themselves up to Satan by their sins are said to be “serpents” and “the brood of vipers.”
Therefore Satan is that serpent who once misled Eve, not by speaking with her without means and by himself, but clad and disguised in the attractive guise of a natural serpent. He is the same one who misled some heretics into that terrible madness of claiming that the snake was Christ, and of giving the eucharistic bread first to a live snake to be licked, because of which they have received the name “Ophites.” In regard to these, see Irenaeus (Adv. haeres., bk. 1, ch. 34), Tertullian (De praescript. adv. haer., ch. 47), Epiphanius (Haeres. 27, vol. 3, bk. 1), Jerome (Dial. advers. Lucifer.), and Augustine (De haeresibus, ch. 17). All these points prove clearly that it was not a mere serpent who once spoke with Eve. But the letter of the text proves clearly that these things must not be imagined to be mere allegories. Thus it remains that the devil, as the infernal serpent, deceived the first humans through the natural serpent.
§ 10. Alas! The disguised serpent achieved his goal of seducing mankind, with its desired results. First, he attacked Eve, who was not in every way equal to the man in her gifts of wisdom and knowledge. Through his deceiving interrogation he encouraged her mind to doubt the word of God, Gen. 3:1: “Did God say that you should not eat of every tree of the garden?” Lombard (Sent., bk. 2, dist. 21, letter C): “While the devil asks Eve outwardly in this manner through the visible serpent and with a pretended voice about the meaning and certainty of God’s command, he wounds her mind within with his poisoned fangs and fills her mind with doubt as to the rigor of the added threat.”
The order and manner of the seduction.
§ 11. A great many insidious ideas are contained in these words of Satan. For he asks this that he may snatch the Word away from Eve. He usurps the very will of God and wants to persuade Eve, with the Word set aside, to begin to think otherwise about the will of God. For he knew that once the Word was lost, all trust in God was also lost at the same time. He did not immediately and openly deny the Word of God, lest he be discovered to be a liar at the very outset, but through his questions he encourages her to doubt, for the meaning of his words is this: “Because God is good, He is surely ready to share a good thing. But now, the fruit of this tree is good. Hence it cannot be the Word of God, or it cannot be the true meaning of the command, that the fruit of this tree must not be handled.” Furthermore, there are traps hiding in the general clause, for he intends to say: “With all the rest of the trees permitted for eating, is this one forbidden? With dominion over all the beasts given to you by the kindness of God, are not all the trees also given over to you along with them?”
§ 12. The woman, tempted in this way by Satan, appears to show herself as quite faithful in the first conflict, but in the end she fails. She says: “We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden, but of the fruit of the tree which is in the middle of Paradise, God said, ‘You shall not eat of it, nor shall you go near it, lest perchance you die’” [Gen. 3:2–3 Vg]. On her own she added “perchance,” as if it were uncertain that they would die if they had eaten of it, though God nevertheless had expressed His will openly and clearly [Gen. 2:17]. She also adds on her own that the tree was indeed not even to be touched. Lyra thinks that by doing this she wished to indicate the unfairness of God’s command.
§ 13. Thus the devil became more bold and turned the doubt of Eve into denial, and in [Gen. 3:]4 he completely denies God’s Word and encourages the woman toward pride. [Verses 4–5]: “You surely will not die, but God knows that on the day that you eat of that tree, your eyes will be opened and you will be like gods, knowing good and evil.” So, then, in one action he accuses God’s Law of wickedness, prosecutes God for malevolence, falsely denies God’s Word, pretends to wish human beings well, and invites them to sin with a false promise of divine eminence and wisdom. On account of this, a depraved desire takes Eve, whose dictate she follows. She eats of the fruit of the tree and even draws Adam into the fellowship of her sin (v. 6).
God did not force man to fall, nor did He want him to fall.
§ 14. Here human curiosity is in great confusion and tries in whatever ways it can to draw God, who is good and the author of nothing except good, into fellowship with this fall. Thus the honor of God must be vindicated from the tongues of detractors.
(1) God created man after His own image in true righteousness and holiness and for immortality; moreover, He wanted man always to be the sort of man He created. Therefore He did not force him to fall by an effectual decree and hidden will, for these are directly contrary to Him.
(2) Anything that God forbids (3) and punishes (4) and for which He provides a remedy, such a thing He cannot be said to will. He forbade the fall, punished it with a grave penalty, and provided a remedy for it through the precious death of His own Son. Far be it from us, then, to say that Adam fell by of the will of God!
Fulgentius (Ad Mon., bk. 1): “God is the avenger of that of which He is not the author; thus He did not create the iniquity which He punishes.” Augustine (De corrept. et grat., ch. 12): “Adam, both without being threatened by anyone and, furthermore, contrary to the command of a threatening God, employed his free choice and did not stand in such felicity, in such readiness, that he did not sin.”
Opposing objections: First, [that] God did not hinder the fall of Adam.
§ 15. (I) They say, “But if Adam fell not because of a decree of God, why did God not hinder the fall itself, since He could have yet done so?”
We respond. Before they fell, and that they might be able to desire not to fall, God had given mankind a sound will; and lest they fall, He had added a most severe threat of death. The clear knowledge of God shining in their mind, the perfect conformity of their will with the Law, the sound obedience of all their powers were like an internal bridle by which God pulled them back from sin. In place of an external rein, He had added the very serious threat of death. It was unnecessary to use some violent hindrance to hold back the hand of Eve from touching the tree because God is obliged to no one. Nor was that proper, because sin would not yet have been restrained if, with her hand restrained, her will nonetheless burned with sinful desires. What does it profit if the hand is sound and the mind corrupted?
Therefore Ursinus himself is correct (Oper. theol., vol. 1, fol. 222): “Not hindering is not [the same thing as] willing, but is permitting and also at the same time not willing, insofar as those things which He does not hinder displease Him. God does not hinder the fall of man because He knows how to draw something good from it. Nevertheless it does not happen because He wanted the fall itself, but rather He wanted the good which He knew how to draw from the fall. However, the fall itself He hates and detests very much.”
Second, [that] God did not create the sort of human being who was unable to sin.
§ 16. (II) They go on: “Why did God not create man in such a way that he could not sin?”
We respond. God wanted to create man, and thus equipped him with a free will. Man was not created in such a way that he wished to sin; but nevertheless, because he had been endowed with reason, he was constituted in such freedom that he was able to will and was illumined with so great a light that he was able to not will. Basil (in his homily Quod Deus non sit auctor malorum):
You do not consider your servants faithful and fruitful if, bound by chains and fetters, they do what you command, but rather [only] if they do what is their duty spontaneously and freely. In the same way, anything that has been forced and squeezed out by some violence is in no way acceptable to God, but rather anything that proceeds from genuine virtue. Moreover, virtue stems from choosing, not from necessity, and choosing and decision require a freedom of choice.
Augustine (De Gen. ad lit., bk. 11, ch. 7) responds:
We concede that the nature which does not wish to sin at all is better. Let them admit in turn, then, that the nature which is made in such a way that it is able not to sin, if it so wishes, is not evil, and that the nature which sins by will and not by necessity is justly punished. Thus, since both are good, why should God make the one and not the other in order to be praised the more richly for both?
Athanasius (Sermon de incarnat. verb., Commelin. edition, vol. 1, p. 39): “God shaped man after His own image and gave him the gift of his own reason that he might be able to persevere in blessedness, living the true life, the very life of saints in Paradise. Again, when He noticed that the delight and will of man were turning in two directions, He strengthened this grace which He had given them with the protection of the Law and the place [Paradise].”
Bonaventure (Sent., 2, dist. 23, q. 1) lists four reasons why God made man in such a way that he could be assailed by an enemy:
The first is the manifestation of divine power, for God wanted to show man that just as he had not been created without Him, so also he could not endure without Him. Second, the manifestation of divine wisdom, for it is a display of a greater wisdom to know how to arrange good things with evil and to select good things from evil than to arrange only good things with good. Third, the manifestation of divine mercy, which is revealed especially when God gave up His own Son to free the slave. Fourth, the manifestation of divine righteousness, which is revealed especially in the fact that God gives to each according to his works, particularly in respect to the eternal punishment of evil.
Biel (Sent., 2, dist. 23, q. 1) responds briefly: “God did not produce an impeccable nature4 because that did not please Him.”
Third, [that] God did not confirm man in goodness.
§ 17. (III) They object: “God could have confirmed man in goodness, which confirmation in goodness would have destroyed neither the intelligence of reason nor the freedom of choice.”
We respond. By nature man could not be immutable in good because only God is Himself such goodness, essentially and thus immutably good, for every created thing is mutable. He ought not be immutable in goodness by grace, because the reward is not given before the battle, and no crown is given except to the victor. Thus God wanted free obedience first to be given to Him by man before He would confirm him in good. Augustine responds (De Gen. ad lit., bk. 11, ch. 10): “He could have done so because He was omnipotent. Why did He not do it? Because He did not want to. Why did He not want to? God Himself did not want to. We should not know more than is necessary. Furthermore, I think that the rational creature which avoids evil in contention with evil things is of great goodness.”
Fourth, [that] God permitted him to be tempted who He knew would succumb.
§ 18. (IV) They still do not rest. They ask: “Why did God allow man to be tempted by the devil when He knew that he would be overcome?”
We respond. Augustine claims (De Gen. ad lit., bk. 11, ch. 5): “In the mind of man there was a certain self-exaltation which needed to be suppressed, because of which they deserved to be conquered by the tempter.” And yet the temptation of the devil preceded the inner pride itself, because the poison of pride did not spring up inwardly in the mind of the first parents except by the promise given outwardly: “You will be like gods” [Gen. 3:5 Vg].
Bellarmine (De amiss. grat. et stat. peccat., ch. 2) gathers these three conclusions from Augustine: “First, that God did no injury to man by allowing him to be tempted by the devil, because He equipped him with sufficient powers to resist and overcome (Augustine, De corr. et grat., ch. 12; De civ. Dei, bk. 14, ch. 27). Second, that the primary cause for this permission is known to God alone (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit., bk. 11, ch. 4). Third, that we can offer some probable reasons, namely, that the omnipotence of God first required exactly this, since bringing good out of evil is more proper to His altogether omnipotent goodness than not allowing evils to exist (Augustine, De corr. et grat., ch. 10).” The second [probable reason] is that “the providence of God required it, since God administers matters in such a way that He permits [rational creatures] to carry out their own proper impulses” (Augustine, De civit. Dei, bk. 7, ch. 30). The third [probable reason] is that “the justice and mercy of God require it, since He seems able to use the fall of man to declare mercy on the elect and justice upon the wicked” (Augustine, De corr. et grat., ch. 10). The fourth [probable reason]: “The beauty of the universe required it, since if there were no soul which could become wretched by sinning, then some adornment would be lacking in the world” (Augustine, De liber. arbitr., bk. 3, ch. 9). The fifth [probable reason]: “The very glory and usefulness of man required it, because it does not seem that man was going to be worthy of great praise if he could live well only because no one persuaded him to live badly” (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit., bk. 11, ch. 4). “Because the case of the first man is profitable for the instruction of the saints” (Augustine, same book, ch. 6). “Because by man’s seed, aided by the grace of God, the devil himself was to be overcome, to the greater glory of the saints” (Augustine, De civit. Dei, bk. 14, ch. 27). Finally: “Since by the occasion of this transgression Christ was given to us, through whom we have received more than was lost in Adam.”
Those are the words of Bellarmine, which statements are not all of the same strength. But this especially must be explained rightly: that the omnipotence, providence, mercy, etc., of God required that He allow man to be tempted. For God did not permit man to be tempted and to fall so that He would have the opportunity to elicit a good thing from evil things and to declare His mercy upon the elect and His righteousness upon the wicked; but rather, because He wanted free obedience to be shown to Him by man, He allowed man to be tempted. Since He knew how to elicit good from the fall of man, He did not hinder the voluntary fall of man.
§ 19. Thus it may be stated in reply very simply that God used the wickedness of the devil (who already beforehand had turned away from God voluntarily) as an exercise for the obedience of man. Virtue unknown will languish, and it is more glorious not to give in to the tempter than to be unable to be tempted.
Dr. Luther says it beautifully in his commentary on Genesis 3: “There should be this one response to all arguments of that type: that it thus pleased the Lord that Adam be endangered and exercise his powers. So also today, when we are baptized and transferred into the kingdom of Christ, God does not want us to be lazy, but He desires that His Word and gifts be exercised. Thus He permits us weak people to be sifted by Satan.”5
In addition, Augustine points out (De Gen. ad literam, bk. 11, ch. 3): “The devil did not select for himself the serpent through which he would tempt man and persuade him to sin. But since there existed in him, on account of his perverse and jealous will, the desire to deceive, he was not permitted by God to tempt man except through that animal.” From this Lombard (Sent., 2, dist. 21, letter B) draws the following conclusion:
Lest the deceit of the devil, which could not be guarded against, be so hidden that man would, at the same time, appear to suffer an injustice—if God had permitted him to be so encompassed in such a way that he could not beware of it—the devil was permitted to come in a form not his own, and yet in the sort of form in which his wickedness could be detected easily. Therefore that the devil did not come in his own form happened by God’s own proper will, but that he came in the form congruent with his own wickedness happened by divine providence. Therefore he came to man in a serpent. If he by chance had been allowed, he would have preferred to come in the form of a dove.
Fifth, [that] God foreknew the fall of man.
§ 20. (V) They go on: “However it may be, nevertheless it cannot be denied that from eternity God foresaw this fall of man. But the foreknowledge of God is immutable; therefore the things foreknown happen immutably, and thus also by necessity.”
We respond. We have dealt with this matter in the commonplace On Providence [Commonplace IX, §§ 32–46], and we showed that a distinction must be made in the objects of divine foreknowledge, namely, between good and evil actions. The former are not only known by God but also helped, promoted, and approved through His good-pleasure, which cannot be said about evil actions. God foresees not only the thing itself but also the causes for the thing, or, rather, He sees not only its existence but also its agency and manner. Thus He has foreseen not only the fall of Adam but also has foreseen him being willing [to fall] and free of any necessity [to fall]. Anselm argues this matter throughout an entire book.
Sixth, [that] God wanted man to fall in order to have the opportunity to exercise mercy and justice.
§ 21. (VI) They take another tack: “Had Adam not sinned, God would not have had the opportunity to exercise His mercy and righteousness. Surely, then, He willed that fall.”
We respond. God is self-sufficient and is not in need of our good works, much less of our sins. God does not need the righteousness of the upright; therefore He does not need the iniquity of the depraved either. There is an argument in Augustine (De Gen. ad lit., bk. 11, ch. 7): “Scripture teaches clearly” (in Ecclus. 15:12) “that wicked people are unnecessary to God. God is not perfected by external works, which are merely traces and evidences of divine perfection and blessedness.” Furthermore, had God not displayed a clear enough token of His mercy in the creation of man, and of His justice in punishing Satan? If man had remained in integrity, he still would have represented and declared the mercy and righteousness of God. To this we can also apply what the apostle says in similar fashion in Rom. 11:12. If the sin of Adam gave God the opportunity to exercise His mercy and righteousness, all the more so did Adam’s integrity.
In brief, the good end which God drew out of the fall should not be ascribed to the fall itself but to divine goodness, and accordingly it cannot be proved from that good end, by way of accident,6 that man was driven to the fall by a decree of God.
Seventh, [that] God decreed the fall so that a more abundant grace might come to people through the incarnation of Christ.
§ 22. (VII) With the Word set aside, those who follow the dictates of reason argue another way: “God decreed the fall of man in such a way that a more abundant grace might come to people through the incarnation of Christ.”
We respond. The Scholastics disputed even over this question which was stirred in an earlier time: If man had not sinned, would Christ still have had to become incarnate? Here we consider the words of Scripture which assign this unique purpose to the incarnation of Christ: the redemption and liberation of the human race. Remove illnesses, remove the wounds, and there will be no need for medicine. The Savior Himself says, Matt. 9:12: “Those who are well do not need a physician.” Thus we praise the words of Bonaventure (found [commenting] on Sent., 3, q. 1, art. 3): “The opinion of those who deny that Christ would have had to be incarnate if man had persevered in his integrity is quite in harmony with Scripture. The opinion of those who affirm it is more in harmony with reason. We must say nothing beyond those things that are clear from Holy Writ.”
We approve of this saying of Bonaventure and are surprised that Bucanus (Loci, p. 88) wanted to affirm that “even if man had persisted in his original righteousness, he still would have had need for Christ as his Mediator.” Thus, as far as this argument is concerned, we respond that it must not be concluded that God Himself is the cause of the sickness merely because God wanted to prepare a most precious medicine for this ailment, but rather the contrary, namely, that He does not want and hates that illness. Augustine expresses it beautifully (Confess., bk. 3, ch. 2): “If someone should wish that man would be wretched in order to have compassion on him, benevolence would become malevolence.”
Eighth, [that] God is not an idle spectator of the fall.
§ 23. (VIII) Finally, they exclaim: “If God merely foreknew the fall, He would be established as an idle spectator of it.”
We respond. But who asserts that God is concurring only by foreknowledge? Before the fall, God gave [Adam and Eve] complete powers that they might have the power not to fall, and He added the threat of death that they might be unwilling to fall. In the fall itself, He restrained the lust stirred up by the devil, lest it advance even farther and put its hand even on the tree of life, and thus preserve that ailment in us eternally. Finally, He punished that fall very seriously and knew how to elicit this good from it: that He used it to declare His mercy upon the elect and His justice against the reprobate. These things are not characteristic of an idle spectator.
Ninth, [that] it would have been quite sufficient for man not to be created.
§ 24. (IX) But not even thus are they satisfied: “Would it not have been more satisfactory for people not to have been created at all than to be created in such a way that they could fall? Was it not better to not be than to be so wretched?”
We respond. This conclusion would have a place if God had created people to the end that they fall and if God had impelled them to the fall. But, to the contrary, God created them after His own image and prohibited them from the fall with the very serious threat of death. What the Lord says about Judas the betrayer in Matt. 26:24, that “it would have been better had he not been born,” Damascenus explains correctly (Orthod. fid., bk. 4, ch. 22): “This is said by the Lord not because He disapproved of His own creature, but that He might all the more censure the wickedness which came to the creation of God, which was good in and of itself, by its own will, and that He might express the seriousness of the punishment which was to follow.” If anyone endowed with dominion by a king were to rise up against the king and try to oppress him with that very power which he had received, then surely the king would most justly say that it would have been better if he had not been equipped with such power—namely, by comparison. In explaining this argument, it must not be thought that God left this ailment in him without medication, for He prepared a fitting remedy for him in Christ before the foundations of the world were laid [cf. Eph. 1:3–4].
§ 25. Therefore let it remain firmly fixed that God neither decreed nor willed the fall of the first-made people, nor did He drive them to sin, nor was He pleased with it. The devil seduced man, and man agreed to the persuasion of the devil, and in this way sin was introduced into the world and death passed over onto all men. 2 Cor. 11:3: “It is the devil who seduced Eve with his cunning”; Luke 10:30: “who inflicted wounds on man”; Wisdom 2:24: “by whose envy death entered into the world.” In John 8:44, sins are said to be his “desires” and, in 1 John 3:8, his “works.” In John 8:41 those who sin are called “the children [of the devil.]” For this reason Christ says about him, John 8:44, that “he is a murderer from the beginning and the father of lies.” It is man who consented to the devil and freely turned away from God. Rom. 5:12: “Through that one man, sin entered into the world.” God must in no way be drawn into part of the blame and into fellowship with the fall.
Whether the first people sinned.
§ 26. Bellarmine (De amiss. grat. et stat. peccat., bk. 3, ch. 1) reports: “Some claim that the first parents did not sin and could not sin, and they confirm this with an argument drawn quite aptly from Lutheran principles, namely, that ‘the Law was not posited for the just person, but for the sinner’ (1 Tim. 1[:9]). The first people in Paradise were just.”
We respond. We confess with a loud voice that the Word of God is the principle7 for our doctrine, but it is a calumny of Bellarmine [to say] that this argument was drawn rightly from this principle. For there are three uses of the Law: to accuse sin adhering to the nature, to apply external discipline, and to prescribe for the reborn a norm of good works. The apostle, then, with regard to the second use, is denying that the Law was posited for the just. The expression of the apostle must also be noted, for he does not say, “The Law is not set down [τίθεται],” but “is not laid down [κεῖται].” The former speaks about publication and an obligation to obedience, and the latter, about accusation and condemnation.
What Bellarmine adds is a greater calumny, that those heretics denied the sin of the first people at the instigation of Luther. On the contrary, both throughout his other works and in his commentary on Genesis 2, Luther clearly and lucidly refutes them very vehemently, nor, as Bellarmine shamelessly writes, does he “in vain discuss nothing at all in many words.” (Perhaps he has not looked carefully at the actual commentary of Luther, since he asserts that the things which Luther wrote in his explanation of the first chapter are those which actually occur in the explanation of the second chapter.) Instead, Luther shows from the very innards of Paul’s text that the topic here is not the Law given to the first man before the fall for the exercise of his obedience, but the accidental8 use of the Law which it obtained in accusing and condemning after the fall, as the antithesis teaches.9 With what color, then, will the bold Bellarmine be able to paint his pronouncement that we cannot deal with the arguments of the Libertines unless we wish to attack ourselves?
1 That which impels a principal efficient cause to act. This impulsion comes either from inside or outside of the principal cause.
2 The “sensitive appetite” is the desire that arises from the physical senses. It is also called “animal appetite” or “sensual appetite.” See below, pp. 90–91 nn. 2–3.
3 λόγoς πρoφoρικὸς τoῦ ἐνδιθέτoυ λόγoυ index. The Greek here plays on the double meaning of λόγoς, which means both “word” and “reason.”
4 naturam impeccabilem. That is, “a nature unable to sin,” from peccare (“to sin”).
5 Cf. Lectures on Genesis (1535–45/1544–54), AE 1:145 (WA 42:109).
6 An “accident” is an incidental property of a thing, that which affects something and is outside its essence. Here, the expression “by way of accident” means that the good end of the fall (redemption through God’s incarnate Son) was God’s intention due to the additional occurrence [accidentia] of the fall. God did not cause the fall for the purpose of providing redemption.
7 principium. A source or origin from which something proceeds or emanates.
8 Here Gerhard is saying that the Law’s essence is not that it condemns and accuses. The Law—after it had been written in the hearts of Adam and Eve and had been proclaimed in the positive law about not eating from the tree (Gen. 2:16–17)—condemns and accuses only as a result of sin, which came later.
9 See Lectures on Genesis (1535–45/1544–54), AE 1:106–15 (WA 42:81–83).