Commonplace XIV: On Free Choice, That Is, on the Human Powers Still Left After the Fall
COMMONPLACE XIV
ON FREE CHOICE,
THAT IS, ON THE HUMAN POWERS
STILL LEFT AFTER THE FALL
The connection with the preceding commonplace.
§ 1. Above we saw in what strange and wretched ways original sin has pervaded every power of man like poison, how closely the corruption from it has clung to human nature, [and] what noxious fruits that poisoned seed produces. It remains to be investigated what continues to be within the powers of man. Once there existed a most beautiful structure for this edifice, namely, the dwelling place and temple of God Almighty. But a wandering guest was given entry and has destroyed it horribly. Let us see what ruins and wreckage have been left.
The root of free choice.
§ 2. The powers of man are evaluated especially on the basis of the rational soul, through which man is separated from brute animals and set in a certain species. There are two faculties of the rational soul: the mind and the will. The former carries out its office by knowing, discerning, planning, and judging; the latter, by selecting and rejecting. From the combination and commingling of the power of both is born that which is commonly called “free choice” [liberum arbitrium], which is the faculty of the mind and will [together], so that “choice” pertains to the mind and “free” to the will.
Free choice is a faculty of the mind.
§ 3. As Thomas says ([ST,] part 1, q. 83, art. 3): “Although free choice is a faculty of the mind and will, mixed from intelligence and the” (rational) “appetite,” nevertheless he correctly adds that “it inclines more toward the appetite” because the judgment of the mind is, as it were, prevenient, [while] the choosing adds a complement and form to this liberty. From this, Bellarmine (De gratia et liber. arbitr., bk. 2, ch. 2) concludes not quite correctly: “Free choice signifies an act of the will only.” In fact, he says (De lib. arbitr., bk. 3, ch. 7): “Free choice is the will itself.” Obviously he does this in order to be able to play a trick with his false charge that, by denying the freedom of choice, we deny its very nature. But we are not saying that man has been deprived of his will but of the soundness of his will.