Chapter V: Those Who Err About Free Choice in Excess, § 50.
CHAPTER V: THOSE WHO ERR ABOUT FREE CHOICE IN EXCESS
The Pelagians.
§ 50. The Pelagians formerly departed from the path of heavenly truth when they attributed more than is right to the powers of free choice, and they were followed by the Scholastics, in whose steps the Papists stand, with whom the Synergists agree in part. Around 415, under the Emperors Arcadius, Theodosius the Younger, and Honorius, Pelagius, a British monk, began to extol excessively the powers of free choice. Dr. Chemnitz (Loci, part 1, p. 499) claims four occasions from history for this error.
(1) [Pelagius] wanted to refute the Manichaeans sharply, who were attributing the origin of sins not to the free choice of the will but to a contrary substance mixed with man. Therefore he leaned too far in the other direction, and the same thing happened to him which happens to grafters who try to correct the curve in a young tree and err by drawing it too far in the opposite direction. (See Basil, Letter 41.)
(2) He did not approve of the violent raptures of the Enthusiasts who were scattered around in those days, as the Tripart. (bk. 7, ch. 11) recounts it.
(3) He was a lover of discipline and kept seeing the disgraceful laziness of Christians.
(4) Without good judgment, he grasped at the words of the fathers ineptly. Augustine (De haeres., ch. 88) describes his error in this way:
The most recent of all the current Pelagian heresies came from Pelagius the monk, whom Coelestius followed as his teacher, so that their adherents are also called Coelestines. They are so hostile to the grace of God—by which we have been predestined into the adoption of the children of God through Jesus Christ and by which we are plucked from the power of darkness so that we believe in Him, etc.—that they believe that man can keep all the divine Commandments without it. Pelagius, chided by his brethren because he was attributing nothing to the help of the grace of God for keeping the Commandments, finally made them stop their rebuke, not because he [now] placed grace ahead of free choice, but by displacing it with faithless deceitfulness. He said that grace was given to people so that they might more easily be able to fulfill through grace what they are commanded to do through free choice. Of course, by saying that they could do it more easily, he wanted it to be believed that, even if it were more difficult, nevertheless men could perform the commands without divine grace. But they say that this grace of God, without which we can do nothing good, does not exist except in free choice, which our nature, with no preceding merits, receives from Him for this great purpose, as He gives aid through His Law and doctrine: that we might learn what we should do and for what we should hope, etc. They say that the grace of God by which we are freed from wickedness is given according to our merits.
From this quotation of Augustine it appears that Pelagius corrected his language several times, and yet retained the very core of his error, which is so customary to the heterodox. At first he denied the necessity of divine grace plainly; later on he conceded that the help of grace was necessary, but he explained it in terms of free choice itself, which is an unearned gift of God.
Augustine (Sermon 11 de verb. apost.): The Pelagians
argued against grace in favor of free choice, [and] causing offense to pious and catholic ears, they began to be afraid, etc., and invented the following untruth to alleviate that unpopularity. “I do not,” he says, “argue against the grace of God.” How do you prove it? “By the very fact,” he says, “that I do not argue against the grace of God, because I am defending free choice.” See the shrewdness! But it is glass which shines with vanity but is broken by the truth. If
(as they say)
God created man and God endowed man with free choice, what can man do about free choice? To whose grace does he owe it except to His who created him with free choice? When they noticed that this was too thin, he said that grace must be understood as the revelation of the Law.
Augustine (De grat. Christi cont. Pelag. et Coelest., bk. 1, ch. 3): “The grace of God and the aid by which we are helped so that we do not sin are placed by Him in nature and free choice or in the Law and doctrine, so that obviously, when God helps man, it is believed that He helps man to turn away from evil and to do good by revealing and showing him what he ought to do.”
When this opinion, too, was refuted, Pelagius said that the grace of God was necessary for past sins to be forgiven but that nevertheless it was unnecessary to avoid future sins. Augustine (De grat. et lib. arb., ch. 13): “They say that the grace of God which is given through faith in Jesus Christ, which is neither the Law nor nature, is able to accomplish only this: that past sins be forgiven, not that future ones be avoided or those which assail us be overcome.”
But after Pelagius was cast down from this fortified position, he said that the help of grace accomplishes this: that we can more easily fulfill through grace what we are ordered to do through free choice. Augustine (De grat. Christ. contra Pelag., bk. 1, ch. 19): “Pelagius says that grace is given so that what God commands may be more easily fulfilled. Here he shows clearly what he feels about [grace], namely, that what God commands can be done even without it, though less easily.”
At last he admitted that the grace of God was necessary, but he added that it was given according to the desire of good will, which must certainly precede. Augustine (De grat. et lib. arbit., ch. 14): “Since they have been convicted of being not defenders but deceivers and overthrowers of free choice, because the grace which is given through our Lord Jesus Christ is not the knowledge of the divine Law nor nature nor mere remission of sins, they resort to this: that they try in some way to show that the grace of God is given according to our merits. For they say that even though it is not given according to the merits of our good works, because through it we are to do good works, nevertheless it is given according to the merits of good will.”
But even though Pelagius had men of great authority in Palestine, Africa, Italy, France, and Britain as his disciples, Augustine was yet stirred by the singular grace of God, and he, more than all others, sharply opposed Pelagius, Julian, Coelestius, and the rest with various writings which are in vol. 7 of the writings of Augustine. Afterward, from the school of Pelagius came Cassian, the monk of Marseilles, who (in his Collationes) says that in some people grace goes ahead of the will and that in others grace is preceded by the will; and Faustus, the Gallic bishop, who around the year 500 argued that all people are supplied by the law of nature [sufficiently] that they might believe.
The Semi-Pelagians.
Here we should place the Semi-Pelagians, the so-called remnants of the Pelagians, who are mentioned in vol. 7 of the works of Augustine, in the letters of Prosper and Hilary, who taught that eternal life was apprehended through free choice by those who believed voluntarily in God and received the help of grace by the merit of their believing; that the obedience of faith is prior to grace; that the will of man of itself produces the help of divine grace; that the beginning of faith and of conversion is of us and that the increase is of God.
The Scholastics.
§ 51. The Scholastic writers went beyond the true limits of Scripture and clearly stand in the footsteps of Pelagius, for they argue: “Out of the powers of free choice man can prepare himself for the grace of God” (though Scripture nevertheless asserts that the good will of man is prepared by God). “He does the Commandments of God so far as the substance of the act is concerned” (though the Law of God requires not only external but also internal obedience). “A man not yet reborn does not sin in doing the works of the Commandments without faith and the Holy Spirit and by his choice alone” (yet everything which is not of faith is sin). “A man existing in mortal sin without faith and the Holy Spirit can avoid and beware of any [other] mortal sin, lest he commit it again” (yet to those who are not reborn all sins are mortal, and due to the impediments of their freedom it is not universally and always true that a man not yet reborn can avoid any sin which conflicts with external discipline even in external matters). They have introduced congruous merit, and some of them even claim that a person can love God above all things out of his purely natural powers.
Alexander of Hales (part 2, q. 69, second to last article): “God gives grace necessarily by the necessity of His immutability to the one who does what in him lies.”
Thomas ([ST,] 1.2., q. 114, art. 6): “By congruous merit anyone can earn first grace for another, for it is congruous according to the proportion of friendship that God fulfill the will of man in the salvation of another, because he himself is fulfilling the will of God.”
Biel (Sent., 2, dist. 27, q. 1, art. 4): “A soul can merit first grace congruously with [every] obstacle removed and with a good movement called forth toward God out of the freedom of choice.” [Biel] (Sent., 2, dist. 28, q. 1, art. 2) forms from Scotus and Occam the following propositions: “Of its own natural powers and without grace, free choice can bring forth a morally good act, avoid any new mortal sin, and fulfill the divine Commandments as far as the substance of the act is concerned.” Sent. ([bk.] 3, dist. 27. q. 1, art. 3, doubt 2): “The human will of a pilgrim can love God above all things out of its own natural powers.” He says that this proposition is in harmony with the opinion of Scotus, Occam, [and] Pierre d’Ailly, which he tries to prove in this way: “The will can conform itself to every dictate of right reason. But to love God above all things is a dictate of right reason, for reason dictates that among all things that are to be loved there is something to be loved most. Also, an erring person can love a creature above all things; therefore he can love God, too, for it would be very strange if the will could conform itself to an erroneous dictate and not a right one. Also, out of his pure natural powers a man can want God to be God; but now, such a man wants the greatest good for God.”
Scotus adds the line of reasoning “about a strong politician who prefers to die rather than to flee the republic with disgrace and abuse.” Sent. (bk. 4, dist. 14, q. 2, art. 2): “A movement of free choice is required as a brief disposition for the justification of a wicked person. To these two movements of free choice—namely, hatred against sin and the will’s [movement] toward God—there correspond two things which are from God who justifies, that is, the infusion of grace and the expulsion of sin.”
The Papists.
§ 52. Some Papists openly follow the opinion of the Scholastics, but some, with greater subtlety. For the more recent Jesuits seem to shrink from the harsher words of their predecessors, though meanwhile they retain the heart of their errors. Their public position stands in the decrees of the Council of Trent (session 6, canon 2), which speak as follows: “If anyone says that divine grace is given through Jesus Christ solely for this, that a person may be able more easily to live righteously and to earn eternal life, both of which he could accomplish through his free choice without grace but with hardship and difficulty, let him be anathema.” Canon 3: “If anyone says that a person can believe, hope, love, or repent as is necessary for the grace of justification to be given to him without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His assistance, let him be anathema.” Canon 4: “If anyone says that the free choice of man, moved and excited by God, does not cooperate in assenting to Him who stirs and calls, disposing and preparing itself to obtain the grace of justification, and that it cannot disagree if it should so want but, like something inanimate, does nothing at all and is merely passive, let him be anathema.” Canon 5: “If anyone says that the free choice of man after the sin of Adam was lost and extinguished or is a matter of title alone and, in fact, is a title without a subject, and, finally, a fiction foisted by Satan upon the church, let him be anathema.”
With these words the Council of Trent deceitfully twists the true status of the controversy, because the question here is not about the will itself nor about the freedom of the will from compulsion nor about every sort of will in external matters nor about the freedom of the renewed will, but rather about the power to effect spiritual actions, that is, whether it has this power of itself so that it can cooperate with prevenient grace before renewal. This is something the Council of Trent does not deny, for Andrada explains its intent in this way:
Of course, free choice cannot accomplish spiritual actions without the inspiration and aid of the Holy Spirit, but that does not happen in such a way that the mind and will, such as they are in man after his first birth before conversion, do not at all have any power, might, or capabilities which are necessary to begin and effect spiritual actions. Instead, this happens in such a way that those natural powers and capabilities, though neither destroyed nor extinguished, nevertheless are so caught up in sins’ snare that man cannot by his own power extricate himself from them. It is like a person who is held bound by iron fetters and has an inherent and innate power to walk, but though he may have it, he cannot use it so that it produces an action unless his bonds, which repress and check his movement, first be broken.
(In this way his powers for good would not be lost but only impeded.) He also uses this illustration:
If, when you see some wooden material burning, I were to ask you what the efficient cause of the burning is, you would say that it was necessarily fire along with God as the Author and Patron of nature, who supplies fire with the power to burn and conspires with it to operate. Thus, since the motion of free choice depends on the grace of God no more than the burning of straw depends on divine power, why is it that you strip free choice of the dignity and name of efficient cause?
(In this way a general union with God would be established as quite necessary for the exertion of the powers of free choice but not the special action of grace.) To explain the same thing he uses the illustration of a “sick man whose powers have been broken, weakened, and attenuated by his ailment, when the physician strengthens and encourages his powers which are still left, though they may have been weakened, and restores them if any have been lost.” (In this way a person who is not yet reborn is established as weak but not dead to good.)
Censura Col. (f. 35): “Human choice has great significance not only in moral duties and actions but also in matters pertaining to salvation.” (In this way the necessary distinction between civil and spiritual righteousness is destroyed.) Folio 37: “To this extent God is always present with His grace if He sees a mind prepared and ready to receive Him, if He discovers that it is not reluctant.” (In this way congruous merit is established.) Folio 48: “God placed reason and freedom of choice1 ahead of the desire for sin and concupiscence, and sin is subjected to its command with such subjection that it is scarcely of any importance.” (In this way the wretched slavery of sin is denied in those who are not yet reborn.)
Costerus.
§ 53. Costerus (Enchirid., ch. De l. arb.) at times speaks handsomely, for instance:
Not only can the sinner not be freed from sin by his own powers, but he also cannot rise up again from [sin], nor feel grief over sin, nor dispose himself for grace and the remission of sins, nor develop a devout attitude toward God, nor speak with devout affection about Christ as His Redeemer without divine moving and without prevenient grace. So great is the blindness of man’s intellect and so great the hardness of his will and heart that, except merciful grace should come first, illumine the mind, and move the affections, he will never really repent or turn back to God. For His mercy’s sake, God works in us without us to move our heart and illumine our mind.
But he quickly explains how he intends all this to be understood when he attributes “the power to receive divine inflowings to the powers of the human will,” when he compares “the powers of free choice” in the unregenerate to “a man who has fallen into a pit and is sleeping securely,” and the Holy Spirit with “a friend who has compassion on him, rouses him from sleep, tells him what he is going to do, and extends to him a hand or rope. So, when that fellow heeds the advice of his friend, he grasps the rope, holds on, and renders in accordance with his powers whatever may lie within him, not just suffering [to be acted upon] but also cooperating, until he is finally pulled out of the pit and is illumined by sunlight.”
Thus, according to the opinion of Costerus: “Free choice, that it may be drawn out of the dark pit, not only undertakes, endures, and is moved, but it also cooperates with and prepares itself for grace.” He compares a sinful person “with a man half-dead. As he desires and struggles as hard as he can for help, a friend comes near with a light to put him on his horse.” He compares him with “a lad who is attracted by an apple, or with a son who is enticed by his father with little gifts and compliments, to learn his letters.” He compares the Holy Spirit with “a guide who carries a lamp out in front and drags the weak person along by the hand.” In fact, he writes clearly that “the will of man after the fall has retained such freedom that it can accept or not accept the grace which has been offered it, that it cooperates freely with grace once it has accepted it, that the grace of God and free choice are the cause of spiritual freedom.”
Bellarmine.
§ 54. Bellarmine also writes quite handsomely: “Free choice, by its powers alone, cannot will and make itself to be prepared for grace.” (Yet here he leaves something to it, for since it cannot do anything by its own powers alone, therefore it can do something when helped by grace.) He denies (bk. 6, ch. 13) that “free choice has of itself any potentiality or, at least, proximate potentiality2 for acts of piety, but rather it receives this from God through prevenient grace.” (Yet here he appears to leave a remote potentiality to it.) In the same chapter he writes clearly: “As a stone does not of itself have the power to cooperate if it should perhaps be turned into flesh, so also free choice does not of itself have the power to cooperate for its own conversion. Yet it can receive the power to act through prevenient grace from God, which a stone cannot do.”
We can say here what Augustine once said about the Pelagians: “These words would be received without scruple, if they were not said by those whose meaning is known.”3 For how sincerely can Bellarmine treat this important point of heavenly doctrine when he argues elsewhere that the corruption of [human] nature has come solely from the loss of a supernatural gift because of sin; when he defends the merits of human works; when he establishes dispositions for justification; when he contends for the idea that the fight between the flesh and the Spirit in man arises out of his purely natural state when the restraint of original righteousness is removed?
Accordingly, [Bellarmine] writes clearly (bk. 6, ch. 15): “Before all grace there still exists in man free choice not only for natural and moral works but also for supernatural works and works of piety.” This he later explains as follows: “Before grace there is in man a remote and imperfect potentiality to do works of piety.” But the words about a remote potentiality labor under an ambiguity which must have a necessary explanation. For if “remote potentiality” means the passive capacity and aptitude by which man, whose will has been endowed with natural powers to will and not will, can be converted and be capable of justification through grace (such a potentiality or capacity is not in an unreasoning log nor in demons persistent in evil), then we concede that such a remote potentiality for conversion survives in man. But if the expression “remote potentiality” means an active faculty by which man’s will of itself and of its own powers asks for grace or applies itself to grace which is at hand and prevenient and can cooperate by assenting to it—which power indeed is said to exist before grace and be remote, but which comes forth into action and becomes near [rather than remote] though still imperfect by prevenient, moving, stirring, and aiding grace—then we deny that such a remote potentiality survives in man.
It is certain that Bellarmine takes the term “remote potentiality” in the latter sense from the fact that he writes: “Choice is free, but its freedom is as though bound and hindered; but it is freed and turned loose when the proximate potentiality to work is granted to it through the grace of God. We experience something similar in the potentiality to see. For even if the sensible sight is absent, man has the potentiality and freedom to see; yet the potentiality is remote and the freedom bound until the sight is received, the potentiality perfected, and it can come forth into actuality.” But if this comparison has a point, the “remote potentiality” must surely then mean an active potentiality in man’s free choice for works of piety, which is in it naturally and of itself and needs nothing else but the application of its object.
The quaint moderation of Erasmus.
§ 55. Erasmus must also be assigned to this class with his quaint moderation in his learned discussion. He argues that there exists in man something, however weak and feeble it may be, by which he can prepare himself for grace and apply himself to it. [Here also must be assigned] the Synergists of our time who did upset the churches of the Augsburg Confession not a little. According to the Formula of Concord (art. II, negation 4), they claimed: “Unregenerate man with regard to his free choice is indeed too weak to make the beginning of his own conversion, turn to God by his own powers, and obey the Law of God with all his heart. Yet if by the preaching of the Word of God the Holy Spirit lays the foundations for conversion and offers His grace to man in the preached Word, then the will of man by its own natural powers can confer something to its conversion, though this may be very insignificant, weak, and inactive; can help its conversion; and can cooperate in completing it.”4 Therefore, when the Synergists claim three causes of conversion—namely, the Holy Spirit, the Word of God, and the human will—though this could with difficulty be explained in such a way as not to provide kindling wood for synergism, it must be rejected as not really agreeing with the “pattern of sound words” [2 Tim. 1:13]. Theodore Beza (Quaest. et respons., bk. 1, f. 621) says, “People cooperate with first grace,” yet elsewhere he writes the contrary.
1 Read rationem & arbitrii libertatem with Cotta instead of rationem libertatem.
2 Thomas Aquinas describes “proximate potentiality” as “being on the point of having” something (ST, part 2.2., q. 65, art. 1, response to 1). For example, a fully grown, healthy man can fight in the army with proximate potentiality, whereas a young boy can fight in the army only with remote potentiality (after he has grown into a man). See Deferrari, Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas, s.v. “potentia” 4.o.
3 See below, § 136.
4 Cf. FC Ep II 11.