Chapter XX: Venial and Mortal Sins.
CHAPTER XX: ON VENIAL AND MORTAL SINS
Some sins are venial, and some are mortal.
§ 90. Sixteenth. Some sins are venial through accident, even though by their nature they are all mortal (or, more correctly, death-bringing). A great conflict has arisen between us and the Scholastics and Papists in this matter. They claim that some sins are venial by their very nature. Let us listen to their own words that this might be rightly understood. Thomas ([ST,] 1.2., q. 77, art. 8):
A sin is said to be venial in three ways: (1) On the basis of its cause, that is, because it has a cause for pardon [veniae], which diminishes the sin, and thus a sin of ignorance is called venial. (2) On the basis of its outcome, as every sin becomes venial through repentance, that is, it receives pardon [veniam]. (3) On the basis of its genus—an idle word, for instance.
(The entire question concerns this third type of venial sin and not the former types.) [Thomas again] (question 88, art. 1):
Sin is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, from the fact that it causes irreparable damage through the loss of some principle. The principle of spiritual life is order toward the ultimate end, and if it is lost, it cannot be restored through an intrinsic principle but only through divine power. But sins which have a disorder in regard to the things which are related to the end while the order to the ultimate end is preserved are reparable, as an error which happens in regard to conclusions is reparable through the truth of the principles. Thus a person who sins venially is not doing what the Law forbids nor is he omitting what the Law obligates him to do. Rather, he is acting outside [praeter] the Law.
Article 2:
A sin is venial in genus when the will is directed to something that contains in itself a disorder, and yet is not opposed to the love of God and of one’s neighbor, such as an idle word. But it does occur that something which is venial in genus becomes mortal on the part of the agent by reason of its object, either because the sinner has established his final end in the sin or because he directs it toward something which is a mortal sin, such as an idle word [directed] toward adultery. Similarly, it happens on the part of the agent that a sin which is mortal by its own genus becomes venial because it is an incomplete act, such as a sudden impulse toward unbelief.
Those are the words of Thomas. Bellarmine (De amiss. grat. et stat. pecc., bk. 1, ch. 3) repeats those words and divides the sins said to be venial by their own nature in such a way that he says some are venial on the basis of their genus (which have as their object something evil and disordered, but which do not conflict with the love of God and of one’s neighbor), but some are venial on the basis of the imperfection of the act. (These can be mortal on the basis of their genus, yet due to the imperfection of the act they are rendered venial—in which cases only the imperfection of the work causes the fact that they are judged not to conflict with love.) Again he establishes two genera [or classes] of venial sins of the latter type: some are called venial by virtue of their deception (which are not completely voluntary, such as sudden impulses of lust, wrath, etc., which exist in the mind before reason is able fully to consider whether or not they should be allowed; these are indeed sins, because they could have been blocked or continually driven away had reason been vigilant, and yet they are venial because they lack the full assent of the will), but some are called venial by virtue of the insignificance of their material (which are committed in a small and insignificant matter, such as stealing a single penny, which does not harm a neighbor significantly and is not the sort of thing which can destroy a friendship among equals). He explains himself in this way (ch. 9): “A sin which is venial by its own nature is distinguished from a mortal sin without any relation to the mercy of God or to the status of the reborn, and it is of such a sort that it surely deserves punishment, but not eternal punishment, and it does offend God, but not to the point of dissolving friendship.”
§ 91. They argue about the forgiveness of venial sin in various ways. Scotus ([Sent.,] 4, dist. 21) claims: “The remission of venial sin is nothing other than the payment of temporal punishment due for it.” Others state, to the contrary, that since the remission of any sin is distinguished from the remission of punishment, thus the remission of venial sin takes place through an act which is more acceptable to God than the venial sin was displeasing to Him. Hence they infer still further that it is unnecessary to do penance for venial sins. So Biel writes (Sent., 4, dist. 16, q. 5, art. 2):
For the remission of venial sin, repentance in the proper sense is not required, not actual nor habitual nor sacramental repentance, since the one who remains in venial sin until death is not condemned but will finally be saved. Rather, venial sin is forgiven through sufficient suffering in purgatory and is also consumed by a fervent act of love, like water by fire.
Article 3:
Thus such penitence is also required for venial sins, but by using the term “penitence” in a broad sense to mean the cessation of the will from the act of pleasure in the sin.
Article 4:
Venial sin is forgiven not only through an act of disgust [toward the sin] but also through every meritorious act, especially when being directed toward its remission, because every meritorious act makes satisfaction for temporal punishment; therefore, also for sin.
Same distinct., same quaest., [art.] 6:
Venial sin is forgiven through any meritorious work. Yet some works are especially designated for this and are included in this little verse: “Praying (the Lord’s Prayer), sprinkling (with holy water), eating (the Eucharist), confessing (sacramentally or by a general confession), giving (bodily alms), blessing (receiving the blessing of the bishop).” This is so because: (1) These methods especially stir up the free will to hate sin, and through such hating it is effectively remitted. (2) The prayer and merit of the church concur with these. (3) They are quite frequently directed toward the remis sion of venial sin in accord with the intent of the church or the agent. (4) The rest of the methods are reduced to these.
Those are the words of Biel. On the basis of canon law, some conclude that there are twelve ways to gain remission of venial sins, namely: worthy Communion; sprinkling of holy water; giving alms; forgiveness of injuries; prayer, especially the Lord’s Prayer; general confession; episcopal and priestly blessing, as well as the blessing of nuns; devout beating of one’s breast; extreme unction; long-suffering in scourging; and any good work. Some acknowledge eight remedies for venial sins, and these are included in the following verses:
I confess, I strike, I am sprinkled, I am bruised, I pray,
I am signed, I eat, I give—through these, venial sins I put away.
Thomas ([ST,] part 3, q. 87, art. 3) tries to prove the foundations and the sufficiencies of these remedies against venial sins in this way:
No infusion of new grace is required for the remission of venial sin. Rather, it is enough to have some act which proceeds from grace by which a person may hate sin either explicitly or implicitly, as when someone is fervently moved toward God. Therefore some things cause the remission of venial sins for three reasons: (1) Insofar as grace is shed on them, because venial sins are removed through an infusion of grace—thus the Eucharist, extreme unction, and the other sacraments. (2) Insofar as they exist with an impulse for the hatred of sins. In this way general confession, breast-beating, and the Lord’s Prayer operate for the remission of venial sins. (3) Insofar as they exist with an impulse for reverence to God and divine things. In this way the episcopal benediction, sprinkling with holy water, etc., work for the remission of these sins.
§ 92. We are greatly opposed to this Pharisaic diminishing of sins, this corruption of the Law of God, and its confusion with the Gospel, which is fabricated for the support of one’s own righteousness and is in many ways harmful to the blood of Christ, who alone washes us of all our sins [cf. 1 John 1:7]. We claim that there is no sin which is venial or worthy of pardon either because of its genus or because of the incompleteness of the act. That some [sins] are called “venial” and only some are called “mortal” is not because of the nature of the sins but because of the mercy of the Father, the merit of the Son, and the sanctification of the Spirit. This distinction does not pertain to all people in general but only to the reborn. It is not to be taken from the Law, which accuses and condemns all sins regardless of their kind and size, but from the Gospel, which demonstrates that sins of weakness and ignorance and corrupt desires [concupiscentiae] are not imputed to those who believe in Christ if they resist them, that is, if the reborn (1) acknowledge these evils which dwell in their heart; (2) grieve seriously over them; (3) ask to be covered and believe that they are covered by the merit of the Mediator as by a shade [cf. Isa. 4:6]; (4) by no means relax the reins upon them but resist them by the Spirit, crucifying the flesh along with its desires [concupiscentiae]. These four chief points are very correctly assigned to remission and mortification in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession.1
From all these it is apparent that: (1) In those who are not reborn, no sins are venial but all are mortal. (2) Venial sins are such not from the nature of the act itself but from the condition of the person who sins: if he is in Christ through faith, his sins of weakness are covered. (3) The term “mortal sin” is not suitable enough. Rather, it should be called “death-bringing,” “murderous,” and “reigning.” (4) The expression “venial sins” is not suitable enough. Rather, they should be called “sins of weakness,” “human lapses,” “corrupt concupiscence,” etc., for they are not called “venial” because they are worthy of pardon [venia] in and of themselves, but because God forgives them for those who believe and He decides to give them pardon.
That no sins are venial of themselves and of their nature.
§ 93. Therefore we prove that no sin is venial of itself and of its own nature with these arguments:
(I) Anything committed against the eternal and unmoving righteousness of God revealed in the Law is sin by its own nature. But even venial sins are committed against the eternal and unmoving righteousness of God revealed in the Law. Therefore they are mortal sins by their own nature.
(II) Anything Scripture calls sin absolutely and simply retains the true and proper nature of sin, namely, to make one guilty of death. But venial sins are called sins and debts in Scripture simply and absolutely. 1 John 1:8: “If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” James 3:2: “We all offend in many things.” Ps. 32:6: “Every saint will pray for the remission of sins.” Matt. 6:12: “Forgive us our debts.” Luke 11:[4]: “Forgive us our sins.” Therefore venial sins have the true and proper nature of sin of and by themselves, namely, to make one guilty of death. Rom. 6:23: “The wages of sin is death.”
(III) Anything to which the proper definition of sin applies, to it the proper nature of sin also applies. But the proper definition of sin—namely, that it is lawlessness (1 John 3:4)—also applies to venial lapses. Therefore the proper nature of sin applies to them as well.
(IV) Anything forbidden by the Law under the penalty of a temporal and eternal curse is a mortal sin by its own nature. But venial sins are also forbidden by the Law under the threat of a temporal and eternal curse. Deut. 27:26: “Cursed is he who does not abide in all the things which are written in the book of the Law,” which is repeated in Gal. 3:10. Rom. 7:14: “The Law is spiritual,” requiring an inner and outer obedience which is absolute in every respect. He who sins in even one of the least of these does not show the due obedience required by the Law. Thus he is a transgressor of the Law and subject to its curse. Therefore venial sins are also mortal of themselves and of their own nature.
(V) Any sin of which God could demand a reckoning in the judgment, even in the reborn, and does indeed demand from the unregenerate, is a mortal sin by its own nature. But God could also demand a reckoning in regard to the venial sins of the reborn and does indeed demand it from the unregenerate. Matt. 12:36: “I tell you” (says Christ, who is the Truth), “on the Day of Judgment people will render account for every careless word they utter.” Therefore the sins which are called venial are mortal of their own nature. The major premise is certain, because the judgment of God includes not only temporal but also eternal punishment when His thunderbolt is brandished against the unregenerate. The minor premise is also obvious, but we must especially observe that Bellarmine (De amiss. grat. et stat. pecc., bk. 1, ch. 3) expressly puts “careless words” among the venial sins.
(VI) Anything to which the proper effects of sin are attributed is mortal sin by its own nature. But the proper effects of sin are attributed to venial sins. Matt. 15:19: “Out of the heart come evil thoughts,” which make a person unclean. Isa. 64:6: “All our righteousnesses are like the menstrual rags of a woman” (namely, because of inherent sin). Job 15:14: “What is man, that he should be spotless before God?” etc. Exod. 34:7 [Vg]: “No man is innocent before God.” Matt. 5:22: “Whoever is angry with his brother is liable to judgment.” Thus even if the saints resist their desires [concupiscentiis], they all pray earnestly (Ps. 130:3): “If You, O Lord, should mark iniquities, Lord, who could stand?” Ps. 143:2: “Enter not into judgment with Your servant, for no man living is justified in Your sight.” Ps. 19:12: “Who can discern his errors? Cleanse me from hidden faults.” Therefore venial sins are mortal of themselves and of their own nature; and if God were to wish to enter into judgment because of them, He could most justly reject and condemn us.
(VII) Anything Christ rejects as a Pharisaic corruption of the divine Law should deservedly be driven from the minds and schools of Christians. But the opinion that some sins are venial and so insignificant that they are not against the Law is rejected by Christ as a Pharisaic error. Matt. 5:18–19: “Amen I say to you, till heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass from the Law until all is accomplished. Whoever, then, relaxes one of the least of these Commandments, and teaches people so, will be the least in the kingdom of heaven.”
Chemnitz, that very learned man, comments as follows on this passage (Harmon., ch. 51, pp. 337ff.):
Christ teaches that the statement of the Law is so firm, so immovable, so immutable, that when heaven and earth, whose construction is considered to be utterly solid, shall have passed away, it still cannot happen that anything in the Law can pass away without all things being fulfilled to the most perfect satisfaction, even that which is considered to be least, and He sets this against the Pharisees. (They take this axiom as certain and true: the fulfillment of the Law is necessary for righteousness and eternal life. Meanwhile, they notice that it is impossible to fulfill all the tiniest commands in the Law: the inner impulses of the mind, will, and heart; certain faults in gestures or in some little word; or to fulfill it in perfect conformity with all one’s heart and mind and strength, so that no concupiscence is felt.) They imagine such a distinction that some commands of the Law are insignificant, but that some are important; that though one might not satisfy the Law perfectly in those insignificant commands referring to the inner impulses and affection of the heart, he is still just before God, provided that, as much as is in him, he keep the important commandments and external works. Since the mandates concerning the inner impulses of the heart, as very insignificant things, are minimal, God did not wish to consider anyone as wicked because of their transgression, provided that he kept the remaining big commandments concerning external works. But against this Pharisaic idea Christ sets forth one iota and one dot to deny as strongly as possible the notion that some commandments in the Law are so tiny that God cares little about them, that there must be no accounting of them in establishing the righteousness of the Law before God, even if they are unfulfilled. For the commands of God consist in words, the words consist of letters, and the letters of many dots. Therefore that Christ may show that the most perfect fulfillment of the Law is necessary, He asserts that nothing passes away, not even the dot of a letter which would be unnecessary to be fulfilled [in their opinion]; for what Matthew says is an iota passing away Luke calls a dot falling away [Luke 16:17]. The iota is a very tiny letter, the dots or vowel points are still smaller, and yet Christ declares that God holds one iota and the tiniest vowel point in the Law in such esteem that before it passes away or falls, it must be fulfilled before heaven and earth pass away. Consequently, He is asserting that for the fulfillment of the Law He requires all things to be fulfilled unto the tiniest dot. Hence Moses declares a curse not only on those who do not continue in the great things but who do not continue in all the things which are written in the book of the Law [Deut. 27:26]. As James 2:10 says: “Whoever keeps the whole Law but fails in one point has become guilty of all of it.”
Those are the words of Dr. Chemnitz.
The counterarguments of Bellarmine.
§ 94. Bellarmine counters (De amiss. grat. et stat. pecc., bk. 1, ch. 12): (I) “Venial sins are not sins perfectly if they are compared with mortal sins, and therefore the word ‘sin’ is not used with one meaning in reference to venial and mortal sins.”
We respond. We do not deny that there are grades of sins. But it does not yet follow from this fact that some sins are venial by their own nature, nor that the word “sin” is attributed to them merely equivocally, since to these very venial sins are attributed the name, definition, and proper effects of sin. Univocal predication is opposed to both equivocal and to that [predication] which is called ἀφ’ἑνὸς, or analogical. Therefore there is a need for a clearer explanation as to the sense and respect in which Bellarmine denies that the word “sin” is univocally predicated of mortal and venial sins.
(II) [Bellarmine says,] “These statements of Scripture are not speaking about venial sins but only about mortal sins.”
We respond. No, they are speaking about any transgression of any commandment, as the very words and the circumstances of the text show clearly.
(III) Bellarmine says, “But if these Scriptures were also including venial sins, it would follow that righteous people could not only fall but also fall out of the grace of God because of their sins.”
We respond. This is the judgment and rigor of the Law which the Gospel neither abolishes nor destroys. Rather, [the Gospel] shows us Christ the Mediator, who in our place subjected Himself to the Law and fulfilled it with His utterly perfect obedience—indeed, He even took upon Himself the punishments of our sins. The Gospel offers the perfect righteousness of Christ to truly contrite hearts and is imputed to us by faith (Rom. 5:15; 10:6; etc.). This is the miraculous consensus of the Law and the Gospel about which the apostle says (Rom. 3:31): “Do we, then, overthrow the Law by faith? By no means! On the contrary, we establish the Law.” The Gospel does not destroy the Law but shows that a transfer of the Law has taken place, for it teaches that Christ is the fulfillment and end of the Law for the righteousness of everyone who believes; it teaches that what the Law requires of us Christ has provided on our behalf and is imputed to believers by the grace of God.
Therefore only this follows from the argument of Bellarmine: that not even the reborn themselves are justified before God by the Law and by its works, because the Law observes, rebukes, and accuses their every tiny defect and slip. But the Gospel shows that those sins are not imputed for condemnation to those who believe in Christ and mortify their corrupt desires by the Spirit. It shows that the good works of the reborn are God pleasing because they are done from faith in Christ, and that meanwhile the righteousness which stands before God can be neither sought nor found in them, because they are neither perfect nor spotless if they are examined according to the norm of the divine Law.
(IV) Bellarmine goes on and tries to prove from their context that the passages deal only with mortal sins. He says: “In Deuteronomy 27, by far the most serious commandments about avoiding idolatry, incest, and homicide are put forth, which are lethal sins. Therefore the curse is being pronounced only upon transgressors of those most serious commandments. The sin of which Rom. 6[:23] speaks—“the wages of sin is death”—is one that conflicts with grace and cannot stand together at the same time with justice. In James 2[:10] he is speaking about the offense which is contrary to the Law and love. Venial sin is not of that sort.”
We respond. The statement of the curse (Deut. 27:26) is spoken against all the transgressors of the Law, not only against those who violate the Law in the greatest commandments but against those who do not continue in all the things which are written in the book of the Law. The context demonstrates that all the commandments of the Law—not only the more serious ones about not fornicating, not stealing, etc., but also the last one about not coveting [concupiscendo]—were recited, first, publicly in the ears of the people of Israel, and then the pronouncement of the curse was published against all the transgressors of the Law. Thus in Gal. 3:10 the apostle understands it as a general statement: “All who are under the works of the Law” (who seek righteousness in the works of the Law) “are under a curse, for it is written: ‘Cursed be everyone who does not abide by all things written in the book of the Law, to do them.’” The Glossa ordinaria states it very beautifully at the end of Deuteronomy 27: “This sentence includes the commandments of the Law generally: past, present, and those still to be uttered. The more general the sentence is, the more serious it is.”
For who can continue in every word of the Law without transgression, especially when Paul says, “All who rely on the works of the Law are under a curse” [Gal. 3:10]? No one except for Christ, not even the lawgiver (Moses), could escape this curse, and for this reason “Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the Law, having been made a curse for us” [Gal. 3:13]. Rom. 6:23 says that the wages of sin is death. This statement is also general and has every sin in view. But in Rom. 8:1[, 4] the apostle gives the reason why some sins do not make the reborn liable to eternal death: because “they are in Christ by faith, and because they do not walk according to the flesh” nor permit sin to rule in their hearts [cf. Rom. 6:12]. The very topic under consideration demonstrates that the apostle’s assertion is a general one, that the wages of sin is death, since both the baptized and the reborn are liable to temporal death because of indwelling sin. Rom. 8:10: “If Christ is in you, though your bodies are dead because of sin, your spirits are alive because of righteousness.” If the forgiveness of this indwelling sin were not to come to the reborn through Christ, it would hold them bound by the bond of eternal death no less than that of temporal death. Meanwhile, we freely confess that in the same place the apostle is also properly speaking about reigning or mortal sins which make a person liable to eternal death in actuality.
The statement of the apostle James is also general and has in view the respect for persons, which of itself [to us] seems to be an insignificant and venial sin, as is clear from [2:]9. Augustine (Letter 29 ad Hieron., or De sent. Jac. apost. ad Hieronym., bk. 2, ch. 11) is correct in claiming: “Therefore whoever offends in one point becomes guilty of all, because he acts against love, on which the entire Law depends.” Yet he does not deny that even sins that are less important (as they seem to us) are committed against the Law and against love, for he writes in the preceding ch. 10:
In some cases love is small; in others, it does not exist. But its extent, the sort of love which could not grow any further, must remain only a thought so long as a man lives here [in this world]. But surely that which can grow, that which is less than it should be, is of vice. Because of this vice, there is not a just man on earth who does good and does not sin [cf. Eccl. 7:20]. Because of this vice, no living person will be justified in the sight of God [cf. Gal. 3:11; Rom. 3:20; Ps. 143:2]. Because of this vice, if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us [cf. 1 John 1:8]. Because of it, regardless of how far we advance, we must say, “Forgive us our debts” [Matt. 6:12], even though all our words, deeds, and thoughts have already been forgiven in Baptism.
Chapter 15:
On the basis of this passage, St. James now speaks about works of mercy in order to comfort those whom the [previous] statement had greatly terrified. So he reminds how even the daily sins without which one does not live here are to be expiated by daily remedies, lest someone, because he has offended in one part, become guilty of all by offending in many instances; because by offending in many instances, he comes to the tribunal of the greatest Judge because of the great accumulation of guilt, gathered bit by bit, and does not find the mercy which he did not do, but rather by forgiving and giving does he merit for himself that his sins be forgiven and the promise be given to him.
Those are the words of Augustine. From all these it is clear that the threats of the Law are general. This is clear even from the passages which speak in particular about less serious sins, such as about the careless word (Matt. 12:36), about sudden impulses of anger (Matt. 5:22), about a lusting look (v. 28), and those which witness that in the midst of their course of piety the saints pray that God not enter into judgment with them (Ps. 143:2, etc.).
(V) But Bellarmine is especially industrious in perverting Matthew 5. In the first place, he points out that the statement of Christ: “Whoever relaxes one of the least of these commandments, and teaches people so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven” [Matt. 5:19], “was put forward not against those who transgress the least of the commandments but against those who relax these commandments by their own corrupt interpretation, which is no more a venial sin but a mortal crime, namely, corrupting the Word of God.”
We respond. Christ is teaching two things, namely, that a partial and mutilated obedience does not satisfy the Law, but it is necessary that all things, up to the tiniest dot, be fulfilled perfectly, to which v. 18 pertains. Meanwhile, He is also especially threatening false teachers who with this corrupt opinion lead people away to the empty righteousness of their own works, to which v. 19 pertains. Nonetheless He teaches both at the same time and excludes from the kingdom of heaven those who teach so and those who allow themselves to be led away from true righteousness by this doctrine. In the number of those teachers—or, rather, seducers—is Bellarmine himself, who in this place and others teaches utterly similar things in order to establish the righteousness of works: for instance, that God does not require that all the tiniest points of the Law be fulfilled by us at the highest level of perfection in this life, but that He is content if we do them as much as is in us lies, and that the rest pertain to the other life.
Therefore he adds another counterargument to the prior one, while not trusting this one much. He says: “If anyone argues that in this passage even those who do not observe the smallest of the commandments are being excluded from the kingdom of heaven, we can provide another solution. For ‘the least of the commandments’ can rightly be understood as the words of the ancient Law: ‘You shall not commit adultery,’ ‘You shall not kill,’ which are called the least because they perfect a person less than do those which Christ handed down by explaining and perfecting [the Law].”
We respond. In its own place [On the Gospel (Commonplace XVII), §§ 64–104] we will demonstrate that Christ did not add to the Law some commandments which were more perfect and more serious, for what can be greater perfection than to love God with all one’s heart, all one’s soul, and all one’s might, and his neighbor as himself [cf. Matt. 22:34–39]? How, then, can one say that this commandment is least? In addition, by the power of the truth, Bellarmine himself is forced to confess (De justif., bk. 4, ch. 3): “In this passage Christ is not handing down some new precepts but is clarifying the old Law against the corruption of the Pharisees.”
Therefore Bellarmine does not allow this solution, but adds a third: “Christ called those commandments ‘least’ which He added beyond the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees: for instance, not lusting after another’s wife, not hating enemies, not divorcing a wife except for fornication, not marrying another while the first is still alive, etc. He calls them the ‘least’ not because they are unimportant and insignificant, but in order to speak modestly about His own statements or even because the violation of them is less a sin than the violation of the earlier ones.”
We respond. How would Christ call those commandments “least” which are precepts of the Law itself? He is considering only the corruptions of the Pharisees, how they imagine a kind of distinction among the commandments of God, as if some were so tiny and insignificant that God cares little about their transgression. But against them Christ sets forth the grave and serious assertion ([Matt. 5:]18–19): “Amen I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass away from the Law until all is accomplished. Whoever, then, relaxes one of the least of these commandments, and teaches people so, shall be called the ‘least’ in the kingdom of heaven”—that is, “no one,” as the ancient fathers correctly interpret it and as is concluded from v. 20.
A little later [§ 99], we shall discuss what Bellarmine adds about the degrees of the Fifth Commandment, which Christ explained, as if only this could be concluded from it: that he who becomes angry with his neighbor only departs from a perfect observance of the Law but is not considered simply a transgressor of the Law. (What a wonderful distinction: to depart from the observance of the Law, and yet not to be a transgressor of it! There is a contradiction in the predicate.2) His arguments concerning the perfect fulfillment of the command to love God above all things will be discussed in the commonplace On the Law [(Commonplace XV), §§ 193, 195].
(VI) Some draw an argument from John 13:8, where Christ says to Peter: “If I do not wash you, you have no part in Me.” [Here Christ] teaches that though the reborn may have been washed and cleansed, they still need daily remission of sins, for that is how those words are interpreted by Augustine in his commentary and by Bernard (Sermon de coena Dom.). But if the daily venial sins of the reborn, unless forgiven by Him, were to exclude them from having a part with the Lord, then surely they are by their own nature mortal sins.
To this argument Bellarmine responds lamely: “Sins of this type do not simply exclude one from the kingdom of heaven, but only temporarily. That is, while they have not been purged, they simply do not of their own nature merit eternal but rather temporal punishment.” These points should have been not merely repeated but confirmed. Christ witnesses clearly that even the reborn and the washed are not going to have a part with Him—that is, in the kingdom of heaven—without being washed and cleansed by daily forgiveness of sins.
§ 95. Here must be assigned the fathers’ statements with which they take away from us praise for our works and perfect fulfillment of the Law, about which [more will be said] in its own place [On the Law of God (Commonplace XV), §§ 181–202; On Good Works (Commonplace XX), §§ 62–81].
Basil (Quaest. comp. explic., q. 4): “No sin should be despised as small, because no sin is truly small when the blessed Paul declares this in general about all sins: ‘The sting of death is sin’” [1 Cor. 15:56].
Jerome (Dial. 2 adv. Pelagian.): “If anger and the injuries caused by talking and sometimes a joke are consigned to the judgment, to the council, and to the fires of hell, what will an appetite for disgraceful things and avarice merit?”
Augustine (De pecc. merit. et remiss., bk. 2, ch. 3): “Who could depart this life with hope of obtaining eternal salvation while this sentence continues in force: ‘Whoever keeps the whole Law but fails in one point has become guilty of all of it” [James 2:10], unless it followed a bit later that ‘mercy rejoices over against judgment’ [James 2:13]?” Confess. (bk. 9, last chapter): “Woe even to the praiseworthy in the life of men if, with mercy removed, You destroy it!” Letter 29: “When a just King sits upon the throne, who will boast that he has a pure heart? Or who will boast that he is clean of sin? What hope is there, then, except that ‘mercy rejoices over against judgment’ [James 2:13]?” Finally, he asserts in many places that daily sins must not be considered to be of little importance, since as soon as they have been gathered together, they condemn a person, unless their daily remission is obtained. (See Letter 29 ad Hieronym. Letter 108; on Psalm 118, conc. 3; on John, tract. 12; Tract. on the Epistle of John).
Bellarmine responds to the statements of the ancients in this way: he concedes that “no sin is to be despised as small and of no importance, but from this it does not yet follow that they are of their own nature mortal.” Yet if those daily venial sins of the reborn were not mortal of their own nature, the reborn would not have to be afraid of them, nor would they have to ask so anxiously for them to be forgiven. To the statements of Augustine he responds: “Venial sins do not conflict with love.” We have spoken about this subject earlier [§ 90].
Bede (on Samuel): “The sentence of the severe Judge reproves and condemns not only the fires of capital crimes, in which the work of the devil shines openly, but also small sins which perhaps appear to people as being unimportant or insignificant.”
Gerson (De vita spirit. anim., part 3, lect. 1):
By virtue of being offensive to God and against His eternal Law, every sin is deathbringing of its own condition and unworthiness, according to the rigor of His righteousness, and separates one from the life of glory. The reason is that every offense against God can be punished justly with a punishment of temporal as well as eternal death by the very judge who is God, and in fact with the punishment of annihilation. Therefore it is death-bringing of itself. The minor premise [assumtum] is drawn from the fact that no such punishment is as evil as is the actual offense. And from another fact: every penal death and annihilation must be borne rather than commit any small offense against God, otherwise offenses against God would be allowed in any case. Furthermore, regardless of the offense against God, unless it were forgiven, it would drive one away from the glory of God, it would be punished constantly and without end, and otherwise what was brought in of guilt would remain without the beauty of righteousness. But the forgiveness or remission of the offense is out of the pure liberty of God, who forgives and no longer imputes, etc.
Coroll. 1:
No offense against God is venial of itself, except through respect to divine mercy, which does not in fact wish to impute any and all offenses to death, though it could do that very justly. And thus it is concluded that mortal and venial sins, being such, are not distinguished intrinsically and essentially, but only through respect to divine grace.
Coroll. 3:
We are obligated to be grateful to God and to give thanks because He does not impute our venial sins to death, just as we are held [to be righteous] because of the forgiveness of our mortal sins.
Biel (Sent., 4, dist. 16, q. 2. art. 1) approves this discussion of Gerson, adding: “Here there is no room for verbal disputing, that is, that venial sin is not an offense nor against God, for every sin is against God.”
Almarius or Almain[us] (tract. 3, ch. 20) follows Gerson, as well as Michael Bias, according to Vasquez (In Thomam, vol. 1, disp. 142, no. 7), and also Roffensis (art. 32), the very keen adversary of Luther:
I agree with you in this, that venial sin is venial only by the mercy of God. But because we also believe that mortal sin can become venial through the mercy of God, I would like you to explain more clearly to us what distinction you yourself think ought to be made between mortal and venial sin. I do not think that you will say anything but that when mortal sin is committed, it drives grace from the soul and establishes the sinner himself within the hatred of God. But venial sin is not like that. If mortal sin is opposed to grace, then venial sin is not. Surely it is clear that there is a significant distinction between venial and mortal sin, and the gulf set between them is not narrow. I think that it is right for you to agree with us about venial and mortal sin to this point.3
The rational arguments.
§ 96. Bellarmine (ch. 14) shapes some rational arguments in favor of confirming our opinion and tries to get rid of them. Let us see what he offers.
(I) Every fault can be punished by God with temporal and eternal punishment. Therefore every fault is by its own nature mortal. Bellarmine counters: “If God were to do this, He would prove Himself to be a Lord, not a Judge.”
We respond. On the contrary, He would prove Himself to be a just Judge and the Lord, because He would be punishing the transgressor of His Law. The response of Bellarmine is just a bit short of declaring that God, in His just judgment, with His justice intact, can judge some guilty of eternal death by an absolute decree of reprobation and make this judgment without any respect to the sins!
(II) Every sin has infinite badness because it is committed against infinite good. Therefore it deserves eternal punishment of its own nature. Bellarmine counters: “Venial sin does not have infinite badness since it does not turn a person away from the highest good.”
We respond. Nevertheless it could turn one away from the highest good, if God would not forgive it mercifully for Christ’s sake. Only the hatred of God is formally the turning away from the highest good, yet even other mortal sins do in actuality turn one away from the highest good through an inordinate turning to temporal things. Venial sins would do the same thing if they were not forgiven.
(III) Venial sin could never be forgiven, since God forgives [sin only] out of unowed grace. Therefore it deserves eternal punishment by its own nature. Bellarmine counters: “By accident it is not remitted, due to an adjunct—mortal sin.”
We respond. On the contrary, God could refuse to remit even venial sins alone which were unconnected with mortal sin, since He remits these out of grace and undeserved mercy. For even though He has promised their forgiveness to those who believe, yet that promise is still purely free, and does not depend on our worth or merits but solely on the mercy of God, who promises and fulfills that promise, and this mercy comes to us in and because of Christ.
The antithesis of our adversaries: that some sins are venial by their own nature.
§ 97. The Scholastics and Papists argue that some sins are by their own nature venial, as we have seen earlier [§§ 90–91], but they do not agree with each other in every detail.
(I) Bonaventure (Sent., 2, dist. 42, q. 2, no. 47) denies that “God is offended by venial sin.” Bellarmine (De amiss. grat. et stat. pecc., bk. 1, ch. 9) concedes that “God is offended by venial sin, but not to the point of dissolving friendship.”
(II) Biel (Sent., 4, dist. 16, q. 5, art. 2) says: “For the remission of venial sin, repentance, properly speaking, is not required, nor actual nor habitual nor sacramental repentance. Yet among the remedies for venial sins are numbered contrition and confession.” And more recent writers order us to expiate those sins or make satisfaction for them with fasting, scourging, sprinkling with holy water, etc.
(III) Some claim that venial sins must also be confessed to a priest, but some deny this. Bonaventure claims that everyone is bound to the confession of venial sins by command of the church through [Ius canonicum,] c. Omnis utriusque sexus. But Biel does not approve of this and claims that this chapter is speaking only about mortal sins. He also adds a most outlandish reason: “No one is bound to confess those sins unto whose contrition he is not bound; but for venial sins there is no need of contrition.”
Thomas (Sent., 4, dist. 17) quotes the opinion of some that “if someone does not have mortal sins, then he is bound to confess venial sins.” Richard agrees with him in the same distinction, but the contrary is claimed by Scotus, Durandus, and Petrus de Palude. (See the Summa angelica on the word Confessiones, no. 1, q. 28.)
§ 98. Our business will be with Bellarmine (De amiss. grat. et stat. pecc., bk. 1, ch. 4; De notis eccles., bk. 4, ch. 9), who connects us with Jovinian and Pelagius. They removed the distinction and the grades of sin, but that is not at all done by us, for we retain the distinction between venial and mortal sins in the reborn and acknowledge that there are grades of sin. Therefore what he argues in chs. 5 and 6 does not touch us, nor what he supplies in ch. 7, for we do not say that all the sins of the elect are venial, but we do say with Augustine (Confess., art. 12) that when sins against conscience are allowed in, faith and the Holy Spirit are lost. More will be said about this in the article on faith [On Good Works (Commonplace XX), §§ 134–44].
In ch. 8, Bellarmine tries to prove three things against us: (1) “It is false that those sins are venial which are not imputed to us.” He uses an argument such as this: “Scripture teaches that the remission of venial sins must be sought from God. Therefore they have not been covered.”
We respond. On the contrary, we invert this argument. Because Christ commands us to pray on behalf of our daily sins [Matt. 6:12] and promises to listen to our prayers, therefore they have been covered and forgiven for those who ask in faith. If those sins were not forgiven for Christ’s sake, they would make [the reborn] guilty. The praying of the reborn is certainly a constant exercise of faith and the means for its strengthening and increase. Thus these prayers and confidence in the remission of sins should not be set against each other. Rather, the faith which claims with certainty that our daily sins of weakness are forgiven us for Christ’s sake exerts itself through prayer and asks for the remission of sins.
(2) “It is also false that only venial sins are those which exist along with faith, for it would then follow that sacrilege, homicide, adultery, theft, etc., would be venial.”
(3) “Finally, it is also false that mortal sins do not exist along with faith.”
We respond. This will be discussed in On Justification [Commonplace XIX, §§ 184–94; On Good Works (Commonplace XX), §§ 134–44], and the contrary will be demonstrated clearly.
On the basis of Scripture. Matthew 5[:22]: “Whoever is angry with his brother will be liable to the judgment.”
§ 99. Thus Bellarmine (in ch. 9) approaches the pinnacle of the controversy and tries to prove that some sins are venial by their own nature. His first class of arguments he takes from Scripture. (I) Matt. 5:22: “Whoever is angry with his brother will be liable to judgment; whoever insults his brother will be liable to the council; and whoever says ‘You fool!’ will be liable to the hell of fire.” “Here Christ establishes three levels of anger and juxtaposes them to three levels of guilt.” Bellarmine applies this as follows:
According to the witness or judgment of Christ, manifest insulting makes a person guilty of the hell of fire and is thus a mortal sin. Anger expressed vocally but not reaching the evil of insulting makes him liable to the council; that is, it is unclear that it deserves hell, but it is worthy either of that punishment or of a lesser punishment.
Therefore some sins are discovered to be of lesser significance than to deserve the hell of fire. For why would a council be forced to determine whether some fault had to be punished with the hell of fire if all faults deserved the hell of fire? Therefore there are some faults which, according to divine judgment, should be punished only with temporal punishment. Again, anger which erupts with no overt external sign does not make one liable to the council but to judgment; that is, it is unclear whether or not it deserves any punishment.
We respond. This is a very ugly corruption of the text; we will demonstrate it in this way. In the preceding verses [Matt. 5:18–19] Christ had taught that not any fulfillment but only the perfect fulfillment of the Law was required for someone to enter into the kingdom of heaven, and that no difference should be established among the divine commandments such that some were very tiny and unimportant, whose observation the Lawgiver would not require so scrupulously nor rigidly, provided that obedience to the Law would be shown in the most important commandments. Rather, they all must be fulfilled quite perfectly up to a single iota and to the tiniest point.
In the Hebrew manner, He clarifies this general teaching with examples of some commandments and refutes the Pharisaic corruptions of them. In v. 21 He recites the words of the ancient tradition, that is, of the Pharisaic corruption of the Fifth Commandment peddled under the specious form of “ancient tradition”: “You have heard that it was said to the men of old: ‘You shall not kill, and whoever kills will be liable to the judgment.’” From this it is clear that the Pharisees had so corrupted the interpretation of the Fifth Commandment that only he who committed homicide by an external work was guilty of the wrath of God and of eternal judgment before the judgment of God, just as in a civil case only external homicide was punished by death according to the forensic laws of Moses. Against this corruption, Christ sets forth the true explanation of the divine Law ([Matt. 5:]22): “I say to you, whoever is angry with his brother will be liable to judgment; whoever calls his brother ‘Raca’ will be liable to the council; and whoever says ‘You fool!’ will be liable to the hell of fire.” Here He demonstrates the four grades of sin by which one violates the Fifth Commandment about not killing.
(1) “Whoever is angry with his brother.” By the word “angry,” He means all the inner impulses of the mind, will, and heart which conflict with the love of one’s neighbor.
(2) “Whoever calls his brother ‘Raca.’” Since this grade is set in the mind between interior affections and manifest insulting, it is concluded that under the expression “Raca” (a term, no doubt, that was common at the time in every mouth) are included all the signs and gestures of an angry mind.
(3) “Whoever says ‘You fool!’” That is, whoever displays the affections of an angry mind through obvious insulting and cursing.
(4) “Whoever kills.” That is, whoever harms the body or life of his neighbor with an external work.
Christ teaches that the Fifth Commandment of the Decalogue is violated by each and every one of these grades. Not just he who kills his neighbor but even he who is angry at him is pronounced liable to judgment. But as was said above, Christ has in view the corruption of the Pharisees, who were teaching that only the external and quite serious sins, which were considered capital in forensic judgment, were liable to a curse before the judgment of God. But with this explanation of His, Christ shows that no pronouncement concerning the magnitude of sins and the wrath of God against sins in the presence of the judgment of God should be made on the basis of the form of human judgments or on the basis of forensic laws, but rather on the basis of the genuine meaning of the Decalogue, according to which even he who transgresses the Fifth Commandment merely with the inner impulses of anger becomes liable to the judgment of God.
But because Christ declares the judgment of God concerning the magnitude and punishment of sins with the words “judgment,” “council,” and “hell,” which are used in the Mosaic state [politia], the following words from Paul Fagius (on Deuteronomy 16) should be observed, which are quoted by Dr. Chemnitz (Harmon., ch. 51, p. 345):
In the administration of the Mosaic commonwealth, the judges were divided into three orders. (1) Triumvirs sat in court, making judgments on cases which had to do with obvious law, such as the punishment for homicide. (2) In every city of Israel there was a small council [synedrion] consisting of twenty-three judges. They would pass judgments on cases which had any element of controversy. (3) At Jerusalem there were seventy-two judges who would hear the most important cases, and this supreme court was called the synedrion, [pronounced] by the Jews “Sanhedrin.” Therefore these words—council, judgment, and hell—here mean not civil penalties but capital punishments which would have been aggravated and more harsh according to the nature of the sins. Yet all were capital. Thus Christ transfers them from their forensic use to a description of the judgment of God against sins and concedes that just as all sins are not equal, so also punishments before the judgment of God will not be equal in every way. Yet at the same time, in opposition to the Pharisees, He demonstrates that if sins have not been forgiven, they would all be liable to the judgment of eternal punishment, even those which we consider very tiny sins.
All these are the words of the most learned Dr. Chemnitz, from which we can readily refute the corruption of Bellarmine. You see:
(a) Claiming that some sins against the Fifth Commandment are such that it is unclear as to whether or not they deserve any punishment would obviously conflict with the aim and intent of Christ, who with His explanation of the Fifth Commandment refutes the Pharisaic dream that some are but tiny little commandments.
(b) Here the word “judgment” means not human but divine judgment, which embraces not only the examination and evaluation of the case but also that which is explained in Scripture in this way: that he with whom God enters into His judgment is not justified (Ps. 143:2).
(c) In Gal. 5:20, anger is listed among the works of the flesh, and there is added: “Those who do such things will not possess the kingdom of God” [v. 21]. In Col. 3:[8–]9, anger is assigned to the old man. 1 John 3:15: “Anyone who hates his brother is a murderer, and he does not have eternal life abiding in him.” Therefore with what effrontery, with what gall, does Bellarmine assert that it is unclear whether or not anger which reveals itself with no visible sign deserves any punishment?
(d) Christ Himself explains ([Matt. 5:]25) what He means here by the word “judgment” when He says that such a person will be “handed over to the judge, and the judge will give him up to the guard,” and in Luke 12:58[–59]: “He will be thrown into prison, and he will not come out from there until he has paid the very last penny.” Therefore in God’s judgment, unless forgiveness has been given in this life, even the very last penny of our debts has this nature: if God wishes to enter into judgment with us, He could lock us up in an eternal prison.
(e) Indeed, the general statement which is added to all the commandments, and thus also to the Fifth Commandment, shows the character of God’s judgment against sin (Deut. 27:26): “Cursed is he who does not continue in all the things which are written in the book of the Law.”
(f) If being “liable to judgment” has the sense that it is unclear whether or not such a sin deserves any punishment, it will follow that even a murderer sins venially, as is clear from [Matt. 5:]21.
Luke 6[:41]: Some sins are compared to specks.
§ 100. (II) In the second place, Bellarmine presses the point that in Matt. 23[:24] and Luke 6[:41–42] “Christ compares some sins to things very insignificant in their nature, namely, to gnats and specks, but [He compares] others to very important things, such as camels and beams. Between these there is a distinction on the basis of the nature of the thing.”
We respond. We do not deny that some sins are more serious than others, as can be concluded from these passages. But the following is what should have been proved: that the lesser [sins], which are so called in comparison with others, are of their own nature venial or worthy of pardon [venia]. This cannot be concluded from these passages. In Matthew 23 Christ is rebuking the Pharisees because in very tiny matters they want to appear to possess a good conscience, yet all the while they sin and err securely, with conscience dulled, in the most important matters. (See Augustine, Quaest. evang., bk. 1, ch. 35.)
In Luke 6 Christ rebukes those who, though equipped with more eyes than any Argus4 in observing the less important errors in others, are yet more blind in observing their own and do not see the burden that is on their back. But what does this have to do with the present question, in which the matter at hand is not the comparison of sins, as to whether some are more serious than others, but the true and proper nature of the sins which seem small and trivial to us?
(III) Bellarmine adds in the third place: “ ‘The very last penny’ in the last verse of Luke 12 means minute and most insignificant sins for which satisfaction must be made in the prison of purgatory; as also in 1 Cor. 3:12 ‘wood, hay, and stubble’ must be understood as the same venial sins.” This shall be examined in its own place, namely, the treatise On Purgatory [On Death (Commonplace XXIX), §§ 253–69]. It is certain that doctrines can be neither established nor proven from parables or allegories, unless Scripture itself adds the explanation. The parable of Christ in Luke 12 does not categorically posit that after the judgment a debt can somehow be paid, nor does it assert that a debtor will at some time be freed from prison, but rather it describes the rigid and highest law or most exact payment of the debt on the basis of the hypothesis that no one can be freed from that prison without paying every debt and, indeed, the very last penny of it. And Christ is clearly here discussing irreconcilable hatred toward one’s neighbor, of which Bellarmine says, “I do not think it is venial sin.”
First Corinthians 3 does not deal with venial sins but with human opinions built upon the foundation of faith, concerning which there will be more in its own place [On Death (Commonplace XXIX), § 269]. The saying of James 1[:14] about concupiscence enticing one to sin was explained earlier [§ 72].
Finally, Bellarmine brings up two passages of Scripture “which speak more mildly about some sins than [the Scriptures] usually speak about mortal sins.” In Matt. 12:36, Christ asserts that one will only have to “render an account for a careless word,” but those who do iniquity He clearly casts away from Himself. In Eph. 5:3–4 the apostle lists six types of sins: fornication, impurity, greed, filthiness, foolish talk, foul language; but in v. 5 he adds this concerning the first three only: “Those who commit such acts do not have an inheritance in the kingdom of God.”
We respond. From these and similar passages only this can be proved: that there is some difference among sins so that some are committed by the reborn, and yet do not actually exclude them from the kingdom of heaven; but that some, if they are committed by the reborn, cast out faith and the Holy Spirit. This we do not deny. But it can never be proven from these passages that any sin at all is of its own nature and genus venial or worthy of pardon [venia]. If we were to render an account in judgment for a careless word, who would stand? Through faith in Christ we are freed from that rigor of divine judgment, for “he who believes in Christ will not come into judgment” (John 5:24). But who can patiently bear hearing it said that voluntary shamelessness and foul speech are numbered among the venial sins which by their own nature are worthy of pardon [venia], when a shameful and improper word wounds the soul of a neighbor more deeply than a sword wounds his body? The apostle states clearly that evil talk grieves the Holy Spirit ([Eph.] 4:29–30).
From the fathers.
§ 101. The things which Bellarmine produces from the Council of Mileve, Origen, Chrysostom, and Augustine are not opposed to our position, for they prove only this: that there are grades of sin, that there are some venial sins, that in very trivial matters sin often creeps upon the reborn and at times upon the incautious, that through these sins they do not stop being righteous, that this life of ours is not led without trivial and small daily sins, etc. None of these points are denied by us, but what was to be proved was that some sins are venial and worthy of pardon [venia] by their own nature, something which clearly does not occur in their sayings.
From rational argument.
Therefore let us listen to the rational arguments which Bellarmine (ch. 11) supplies.
(I) “If venial sins were mortal by their own nature, absolutely all sins in unbelievers would be mortal. The latter is absurd. Therefore also the former.”
We respond. But, on the contrary, it is of the most certain truth that all the works of unbelievers are sins. Matt. 7:18: “A bad tree cannot produce good fruit.” John 3:36: “The wrath of God remains upon him who does not believe in the Son.” Rom. 14:23: “Whatever does not proceed from faith is sin.” Titus 1:15: “To the corrupt and unbelieving nothing is pure, but their very minds and consciences are corrupted.” Heb. 11:6: “Without faith it is impossible to please God.” What pleasing and acceptable thing can be offered by enemies? What fruit can be expected from the wild olive? Thus even though some works of unbelievers may, according to the external5 appearance, seem to be very good and their acts seem to be exceedingly good in their genus or (as others speak) of their substance—such as covering the naked, helping those in peril, etc.—yet before God they are sins, because they are done in the oldness of the letter, not in the newness of the Spirit, by a person who has not yet been reconciled to God. They are not done out of faith in Christ, nor are they ordered to the true end, that is, to the glory of God. Those who have not yet been reborn are dead in their sins. Therefore, as there is no spiritual life in them, so also spiritual working must not be expected from them.
This opinion is approved by Ambrose, Augustine, and Anselm, as we shall see in its own place [On Free Choice (Commonplace XIV), § 104]. Hence the Glossa ordinaria on Romans 14 writes [a summary] from them: “All the life of unbelievers is sin.”
“But,” says Bellarmine, “a believer is bound to be more interested in perfection than an unbeliever. Therefore he offends God more seriously in the same kind of sin. Luke 12[:47]: ‘The servant who knows the will of his master,’ etc. Heb. 10[:29]: ‘He who has despised the Son of God is worthy of worse punishment,’ etc.”
We respond. It is certain that the reborn, by perpetrating mortal sins against conscience, offend God more seriously than do unbelievers or those who have not been reborn, who have experienced only the light of knowledge but not a very great surplus of divine blessings. But it cannot be inferred from this that some sins of unbelievers are by their own nature venial, for the fact that some sins in the reborn are venial is not due to the nature of the sin but solely on the basis of the grace of God, who is merciful and does not impute sins. Therefore in the unregenerate and unbelieving all sins without exception are and continue to be the sort of sins which they are of their own nature, that is, mortal. Where there is true faith in Christ which is effectual through love, there man lives spiritually. He does not lose this spiritual life through any sins of ignorance and weakness, provided he acknowledges them, bemoans them, clings to Christ, and mortifies the desires [concupiscentias] of the flesh by the Spirit. But faith and spiritual life are lost through sins committed against conscience; through them the Holy Spirit is driven out. Spiritual life has no place in the unregenerate and unbelievers, for they are dead in their sins, and the wrath of God remains upon them. Therefore such a distinction between sins has no place in them.
(II) “A sin is venial not because God does not impute the guilt of eternal death to it, but rather the reason why God does not impute the guilt of eternal death to it is because it is venial. In fact, something is called ‘venial’ if it is worthy of pardon [venia].”
We respond. On the contrary, some sin is venial not because it is worthy of pardon by its own nature but because God does not impute it to those who believe in Christ and who mortify sin. There is no better explanation [for the use] of the word than this: nowhere does Scripture call sins “venial,” but we continue to keep that oft-used and common term, and from Scripture we add the true explanation.
Bellarmine adds: “We call some sins ‘venial’ because they are involuntary, but some are mortal, namely, those which are voluntary.” From this he tries to conclude that we are affirming in actuality what we deny verbally, that is, “that the difference between mortal and venial sins must be assigned to the very nature of sin, since voluntariness pertains to the proper nature of sin so that what is in no way voluntary is not sin at all.”
We respond. That statement of Augustine, that every sin is voluntary, must be understood as a reference solely to actual sins, and not even to all actual sins but only to sins of malice. Otherwise original sin itself will be denied, as well as sins of ignorance and weakness. It is not always the case that those sins which are voluntary are mortal and that in turn those which are involuntary are venial, since original sin in infants who have not yet been baptized is mortal, though it is involuntary. Some sins in the reborn are called “mortal” because, being committed against conscience, they drive out faith and the Holy Spirit; this does not happen through inherent sin so long as it is resisted.
(III) “Venial sin does not posit a turning away from God of its own nature, because it does not conflict with love. But eternal punishment is not owed to sin except by reason of turning away from an eternal good.”
We respond. The magnitude of sin must be judged on the basis of the Law. 1 John 3:4: “Sin is lawlessness.” Therefore anything that turns away from the Law is sin. Every sin is, by its own nature, the kind which is accused and condemned by the Law. Therefore, even though venial sins do not appear to conflict with love for God and for one’s neighbor in actuality and formally, nevertheless, because they testify that there is not as much love in the human heart as the Law demands, they are and continue to be mortal sins of their own nature, committed against the prohibition of the Law. And thus if God were to bring them into His judgment, as a consuming fire He could justly cast us away from Himself and condemn us because of them.
(IV) “Not any and every offense dissolves friendship between people. Therefore God is also not offended by venial sins to the point of dissolving friendship. He who injures a friend incautiously or in a very trivial matter is not considered to have given enough of a just cause for dissolving friendship in the judgment of prudent people.”
We respond. According to Rom. 3:20, the “knowledge of sin” comes not from reason but “from the Law.” Isa. 55:8–9: “The thoughts of God are not our thoughts, nor are the ways of God our ways. For as much higher as the heavens are over the earth, so are the ways of God higher than our ways.” The judgments of God are one thing; the judgments of man are another. In addition, even in human judgment a sin is generally evaluated according to the dignity of the person offended. He who carelessly or in an insignificant matter offends a prince is judged to have transgressed more gravely than he who offends another in an important matter. Therefore, even though venial sins do not dissolve the friendship between God and the reborn in actuality (as Bellarmine likes to say)—that is, though the reborn are not cut off from the grace of God by all sins—yet this does not happen because of the nature of the sins, but because such sins do not drive out faith and the Holy Spirit. In regard to unbelievers, it cannot be said that friendship is not dissolved by less important sins—that is, the friendship which is between them and God—because they are enemies of God.
(V) “Venial sins are not completely [perfecte] voluntary, nor are they completely against the Law. Therefore they are not completely sins, but only incompletely and in a certain respect.”
We respond. We concede that actual sins are not of the same grade as voluntary sins, but it ought not be inferred from this that they are incompletely sins, since judgment must be made concerning sin on the basis of the norm of the Law. Anything that is in any way contrary to the Law is truly and properly sin, even if it is less significant than another sin. Therefore if, in using the term “incomplete sin,” Bellarmine seeks to obtain the point that involuntary sins are not sin, truly and properly speaking, then we disapprove of that expression, because original sin is involuntary, and yet it is sin truly, properly, and completely and, in fact, utterly completely. But if he expresses the grades of sin with the expression “incomplete sin,” then we concede that some sins are more serious than others. But it does not yet follow from this that those less serious sins, which are so called in comparison with more serious sins, are not truly and properly sins, though they are lawlessness or a turning away from the Law.
Thus it is still to be proved that some sins are not against the Law. Bellarmine says: “Because of the insignificant nature of its material, venial sin is not completely against the Law, because the Law forbids stealing in general [genere] but not the theft of a single penny in particular [specie].” What a marvelous conclusion! All logic teaches that one proceeds quite firmly from genus and the whole to species and the parts. Because the Law prohibits theft in general, it also prohibits the theft of one penny in particular.
“But,” Bellarmine says, “a quite trivial theft does not harm one’s neighbor badly; therefore it does not conflict with love for one’s neighbor, nor is it completely against the Law.”
We respond. A greater theft harms a neighbor more gravely; nevertheless even a trivial theft conflicts with the love owed to one’s neighbor, which the rule of Christ demonstrates (Matt. 7:[12]): “Whatever you wish people to do to you, do to them.”
In his fourth rational argument, Bellarmine appealed to the judgment of prudent people. Therefore he should here listen to the lawyers who argue very correctly: “Theft is truly committed even in a very trivial matter, because greater and lesser do not change the species.” (See [Corpus Iuris Civilis,] Inst. [2.1], de R [erum] D [ivisione], § Gallinarum, 16; ff. [13.6], Commodati, arg. bk. 3, § 1; C. [8.28], de distract. pign., bk. 3; ff. [41.3], de usucap.; [Ius canonicum,] [causa] 14, last question [6], final c.).6 Clarus (on § Furtum, no. 23) bears witness that this is the common opinion. Wesenbecius correctly points out: “To the poor, one penny is more precious than a hundred to the wealthy.”
Therefore it is a false and fictitious distinction to say that only some sins are against the Law but that some are merely outside the Law, because every sin is lawlessness and thus against the Law. Vasquez (In Thom., disp. 143, ch. 4, no. 9): “It cannot be denied that venial sin is against a precept of the Law.”
Azorius (Instit. moral., bk. 4, ch. 8): “It must be said, as Durandus, Cajetan, and Vega have taught, that venial sin is indeed against the Law of God, something which the arguments of our” (Protestant) “adversaries have sanctioned, but it is not against a specific commandment of God regarding His friendship which must never be violated.” (Thomas Morton, Apol. Cath., bk. 2, p. 2, ch. 23, shows that this is a vain and disgusting subterfuge.)
Bellarmine goes on and argues: “Precepts about a very trivial matter are not properly and rigorously precepts if they are established concerning a matter which pertains not very much to the end of the precept, that is, to love.”
We respond. The cause of the Pharisees could not be better defended than with this rationalization, since they themselves claimed that commands about very trivial matters are not properly, perfectly, and rigorously commands. In fact, the slyness of the serpentine devil who deceived the first people could not be painted and veiled in a more attractive fashion than that the primordial law about not eating of the tree of forbidden fruit was a commandment about a very trivial matter and that it was not perfectly and rigorously a commandment whose transgression was of much concern to God. And yet the obligation of a commandment depends not on the magnitude of its object but on the majesty of the one who does the commanding. In the Law of God one must consider not so much what is said as Him who says it. Whoever is unafraid to violate a command of God in one point will dare to violate it also in another point. He who is obedient in the least will also not be negligent in the greater.
(VI) “It is most absurd to claim that a just person becomes a transgressor of the Law through a venial sin, because Scripture names some people ‘holy’ and ‘righteous’ without qualification, even when they are not without venial sins, as in the case of Zechariah and Elizabeth in Luke 1[:6].”
We respond. They were righteous before God not legally but evangelically, through faith in the Messiah, and they were demonstrating this righteousness of faith outwardly by a sincere obedience to the Law of God, about which more will be said in greater detail in its own place [cf. On the Law of God (Commonplace XV), § 194]. It is by no means absurd, but is most certainly true, that the reborn become transgressors of the Law through any sin whatsoever. “Therefore by the works of the Law is no flesh justified” [Rom. 3:20]. “That which was impossible for the Law God provided by sending His Son” [Rom. 8:3]. “Those who wish to be justified through the Law have fallen away from Christ” [Gal. 5:4]. “If righteousness is from the Law, Christ has died in vain” [Gal. 2:21].
(VII) “Venial sins do not exclude love, but he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law (Rom. 13[:8]). Therefore venial sins do not remove the fulfillment of the Law, nor are they properly against the Law.”
We respond. Not every kind of love is the fulfillment of the Law, but only perfect love. Therefore since love in this life is not perfect and absolute in every detail, it is impossible to seek and claim in it a righteousness that avails before God. Although venial sins in the reborn do not directly and formally conflict with love for one’s neighbor, nevertheless they do conflict with the love of God, who gave the Law against which we trespass through our venial sins and which we ought to fulfill with an utterly perfect love of God and our neighbor.
§ 102. This concludes our discussion on venial sins ([namely,] concerning whether they are venial by their own nature or instead by the grace of God who does not impute them for the sake of Christ), a controversy which Bellarmine calls “not trivial,” because the thorny question of our justification before God is illumined quite a bit by it.
In regard to mortal sins, a serious controversy is also roiling as to whether through them the reborn cut off faith and the Holy Spirit and lose grace and eternal life. The Augsburg Confession, art. XII [7], answers affirmatively to this on the basis of the Word of God. We shall refer the discussion of this to our treatise On Justifying Faith [(Commonplace XIX), §§ 184–94; On Good Works (Commonplace XX), §§ 134–44].
Whether there are seven mortal sins.
Certainly many Scholastics limit the mortal sins to the number seven, and for the sake of memory they include them in the word “SALIGIA,” which signifies “pride” [superbia], “avarice” [avaritia], “extravagance” [luxuria], “wrath” [ira], “gluttony” [gula], “envy” [invidia], “sloth” [acedia]. But the Jesuit Toletus (Instruct. sacerd., treatise De pecc. mortal.) teaches truly: “These are more correctly called ‘capital’ rather than ‘mortal,’ since there are indeed many more mortal sins.”
In Gal. 5:19–21 the following are numbered among the works of the flesh: “adultery, fornication, impurity, extravagance, idolatry, sorcery, enmity, strife, jealousy, wrath, quarrels, dissension, heresies, envy, murder, drunkenness, carousing”; and it is added: “Those who do these and similar things shall not obtain possession of the kingdom of heaven.” Augustine (Speculum, preface to Romans): “Some think that there are only three death-bringing crimes: idolatry, murder, and fornication, where adultery and all sexual activity except with one’s wife are certainly meant—as if all the sins there are besides these three, which separate us from the kingdom of God, are not death-bringing sins!”
1 Cf. Ap IV [II] “Justification” and [III] “Love and the Fulfilling of the Law.”
2 A “contradiction in the predicate” (ἀντικείμενoν ἐν πρoσκειμἐνῳ) occurs when the predicate in a proposition cancels the subject or introduces a contradiction (Micraelius, Lexicon Philosophicum, s.v. “πρoσκείμενoν ἐν ἀντικειμένῳ” [!]).
3 In Preuss’s edition, this last sentence is printed as being in Gerhard’s words. Cotta prints it as the end of the quotation from Roffensis.
4 In Greek mythology, Argus Panoptes (Aργoς Πανόπτης) was a giant who had a hundred eyes.
5 Read externam with Cotta instead of aeternam.
6 In his references to imperial law and canon law Gerhard does not clearly show where one reference stops and the next begins. The laws referenced here state that the theft even of small items or amounts is still a crime. For the bibliography of imperial law and canon law, see the Works Cited List on Corpus Iuris Civilis and Ius canonicum (below, pp. 355, 359).