Chapter IX: The Freedom of Choice Left After the Fall, § 108.
CHAPTER IX: ON THE FREEDOM OF CHOICE LEFT AFTER THE FALL
A consideration of freedom with regard to its objects.
§ 108. Furthermore, that it may be understood that much better in what sense and respect we denied the freedom of choice in the previous discussion, it is proper to discuss the subject more clearly here as an appendix. We are engaged (as was said) in the consideration of freedom which is evaluated with respect to its objects. Therefore, so that we may understand which and what sort of freedom of choice remains left in man, let us distinguish its objects.
The object of free choice is either something earthly and humble which is below the human senses and reason and does not exceed its comprehension and has no need for supernatural light, or it is something spiritual or sublime which is above reason and exceeds the natural powers and needs the illumination of the Spirit. From this, there arise two kinds of action. One of them pertains to earthly life; the other, to spiritual life.
§ 109. Again, the first kind is twofold and regards the things that pertain both to animal life taken narrowly, and then those that pertain to human life. To the former class belong the things that we have in common with brute animals and that pertain to the enlivening [vegetans], sentient, and locomotive power. To the latter class belong the things that belong properly to humans and that pertain to human life, such as all the arts, both mechanical and liberal; the moral virtues; philosophical knowledge; etc.
§ 110. The second kind, which regards spiritual and divine life, contains the things that have been ordained for the kingdom of God and for the Christian life. From this also two types of actions arise, for they are either external, involved in the external exercise of religion and meeting the eyes and the external senses, such as hearing and reading in the Word of God, entering a [Christian] temple, etc.; or they are internal and spiritual, truly God-pleasing, as, for instance, assenting to the Gospel, knowing God truly, living according to the Spirit, etc.
§ 111. With the exception of the spiritual actions of the second type, we say that in all the rest there survives in man some freedom of choice, which, beyond experience, the apostle confirms: “When the Gentiles do by nature,” that is, with their natural powers, “the things which are of the Law” (Rom. 2:14) without the renewal of the Spirit. (Observe here how carefully the apostle is speaking. He does not say that the Gentiles do the Law and show perfect obedience to the Law, but that they do the things which are of the Law, that is, things which are in some way in harmony with the external works commanded by the Law.) He also says that even before his renewal he was “blameless according to the righteousness which is in the Law, my behavior without complaint” (Phil. 3:6). Augustine rightly argues (De civ. Dei, bk. 5, ch. 15): “God rewards external discipline even in the unregenerate with temporal rewards.”
§ 112. Augustine sets forth this same distinction between the objects of free choice, from which also the Augsburg Confession (art. XVIII [1–3, 8–9]) expresses this clearly in these words: “In regard to free choice, they” (our churches) “teach that the human will has some freedom to effect civil righteousness and to select things subject to reason, but without the Holy Spirit it does not have power to effect the righteousness of God or spiritual righteousness because ‘the natural man does not perceive the things which are of the Spirit of God’ [1 Cor. 2:14]. But this is worked in hearts when the Holy Spirit is received through the Word.” And later: “They condemn the Pelagians and others who teach that without the Holy Spirit and solely by the powers of nature we are able to love God above all things, and also that we are able to do the commandments of God with respect to the substance of the acts. For though our nature can effect external works in some way—for it can restrain our hands from theft and murder—nevertheless it cannot cause inner movements such as the fear of God, trust in God, patience, etc.”
§ 113. Augustine (De hypogn., bk. 3) sets forth the same distinction: “We confess that in all people there exists a free choice possessing the judgment of reason. This is not fit to begin and finish the things that pertain to God without God, but merely [operates] in works of this life.” But later he declares what these are: “The good things which spring from the good of nature include wanting to work in the fields; wanting to eat and drink; wanting to have a friend or clothes; wanting to build a house, take a wife, raise cattle, learn a skill, and whatever good thing which pertains to this present life. And the evil things: such as wanting to worship idols, commit murder or adultery, steal the property of others, blaspheme God, live disgracefully, learn how to do evil, get drunk, live in excessive luxury, and do whatever is illicit or unuseful.” The same (De fide ad Petrum, ch. 32): “Hold very firmly and by no means doubt that a person whom neither illiteracy nor any weakness or adversity prevents can either read the sacred words of the Law and the Gospel or hear them from the mouth of a preacher, but no one is able to perceive what he hears bodily also with his heart and to be willing to do the commands of God except the person whom God has anticipated with His grace and to whom God has given good will and virtue.”
For what end some freedom has remained in man.
§ 114. But the remnants of freedom left in man after the fall must be acknowledged regardless of their quality because, even though the human nature was stripped of the true gifts of the intellect through the fall, God wanted something of His gifts to be left in the mind from which it could be known what God is and what kind of a God He is, and so that there could be the pedagogy to Christ [cf. Gal. 3:24], which does not exist in devils. Dr. Chemnitz (Loc., part 1, De lib. arb., ch. 2) writes: “Look upon the deformed people, the delirious, the mad, and the like, and you will see how great a good it is that the use of reason is granted even unto those who are not reborn.”
Hindrances of the freedom that still remains.
§ 115. But it was carefully added that “some freedom of choice survives in external actions, in works of the present life” (as Augustine says), “in civil righteousness and exercises of the flesh” (as the Apology of the Augsburg Confession [XII 142 (VI 45)] says), because there are very many impediments which obstruct this freedom quite a bit, and these are both external and internal.
The external hindrances.
§ 116. We can assign the external [hindrances] to the class either of efficient [cause] [efficiens] or of object. There are two external hindrances of the first class: First, God Himself, with the powerful hand of His providence by which He controls human affairs, just as He does all other things, restrains the desires of human wills so that they are not always able to reach the point they wish to reach. He thus places “His hook in the nose of Sennacherib and His bit in his mouth and turns him back on the way by which he came” (Isa. 37:29). He restrains Jeroboam “so that he is unable to draw back his extended hand” (1 Kings 13:4). The Lord disposes; ours is only to propose. “The way of man is not in himself; it is not in man’s power to walk and to direct his steps” (Jer. 10:23). That is, the plans and efforts of man are useless unless assisted and directed by God. An outcome is always in the hand of God. Thus in James 4:13[–15] those who say, “Today or tomorrow we shall go into the city,” and do not add “if God wills” are rebuked.
§ 117. The second external hindrance in the class of effecting [cause] is that of the tyranny of the devil, who “is effectual in the children of unbelief” (Eph. 2:2) and by whom reprobate people “are captured to do his will” (2 Tim. 2:26). In fact, the apostle also “hastened to see the faces” of the Thessalonians with great desire, “but Satan hindered” him (1 Thess. 2:17–18).
The external hindrance in the class of objects is the heap of toils and perils which often puts various delays upon the judgment of the mind and the selection of the will. The varied and multiple crowd of toils makes it so that someone
Divides his mind now here, now there,
Snatches it in various directions and
Involves it in all things.1
Internal [hindrances].
§ 118. There are also two internal hindrances of freedom: (I) The weakness of the intellect and will [is a hindrance] because the natural powers still left in the mind and will of man are wretchedly weakened, and the indolence and dullness of the powers of the soul, which have been greatly debilitated by original sin, place many different hindrances on the human will. For this reason we often make errors in our plans, even if we apply all the strength of our mental powers and have intended a good end. “A man’s steps are ordered by the Lord; how, then, will man comprehend his way?” (Prov. 20:24) That is to say, the human mind does indeed have left to it the gift of choice in civil matters, but how can a person foresee and be careful of everything so as not to wander in his choosing?
(II) The vehemence and force of his affections is often so great that, like a torrent, they snatch up the will with themselves and overturn the judgment of reason, and then “the chariot is dragged by the horses, and their running heeds not the reins.”2 Thus Medea says this:
I desire one thing, but my mind persuades another.
I see and approve of better things, but I follow worse.3
And hence the Philosopher [Aristotle] (Eth., 7, ch. 3) also argues that “people often do the things that they know are depraved.”
1 Vergil, Aeneid 4.285–86 (LCL 63 [1999], p. 440).
2 Vergil, Georgics 1.513 (LCL 63 [1999], pp. 134–35).
3 Ovid, Metamorphoses 7.19–21 (LCL 42 [1999], pp. 342–43).