2: What is Required for the Truth of a Singular Non-Modal Proposition
Required for the Truth of a Singular Non-Modal Proposition rates was white', etc.; and some are future-tense, e.g. 'A man will be white', etc. Some propositions are present-tense in form but equivalent to past-tense or future-tense propositions, e.g. 'This is future' and 'This is past' and others like them.
Another division is this. Some propositions are such that both of their extremes are in the nominative case, and some are such that one of their extremes is in an oblique case. Sometimes the oblique case occurs in the subject, as in 'Hominem videt asinus',® and sometimes it occurs in the predicate, as in 'A donkey belongs to a man'.'
2: What is Required for the Truth of a Singular Non-Modal Proposition Now that the foregoing classifications, which are not subordinated to one another, have been given for propositions, we must see what is required for the truth of propositions. We will first discuss singular non-modal present-tense propositions whose subjects and predicates are both in the nominative case and which are not equivalent to hypothetical propositions.
On this point it should be noted that for the truth of such a singular proposition which is not equivalent to several propositions it is not required that the subject and predicate be really identical, or that the predicate be in reality in the subject or that it really inhere in the subject, or that the predicate be united to the subject itself outside the mind. Thus, for the truth of 'This is an angel' it is not required that the common term
'angel' be really identical with what is posited as the subject, or that it be really in that subject, or anything of this sort. Rather, it is sufficient and necessary that the subject and predicate supposit for the same thing. And, therefore, if in 'This is an angel' the subject and predicate supposit for the same thing, the proposition will be true. Thus, it is not asserted that this thing has
Required for the Truth of a Singular Non-Modal Proposition angelhood or that angelhood is in it—or anything of this sort.
Rather, it is asserted that this thing is truly an angel—not, indeed, that it is the predicate, but that it is that for which the predicate supposits.
Similarly, by means of propositions like 'Socrates is a man' and 'Socrates is an animal' it is not asserted that Socrates has humanity or animality. Nor is it asserted that humanity or animality is in Socrates, or that man or animal is in Socrates, or that animal is part of the quidditative concept of Socrates. Rather, it is asserted that Socrates is truly a man and is truly an animal.
Nor, indeed, is it asserted that Socrates is the predicate 'man' or the predicate 'animal'. Rather, it is asserted that he is a thing for which the predicate 'man' or the predicate 'animal' stands or supposits. For both of these predicates stand for Socrates.
From this it is clear that, literally speaking, all propositions such as these are false: 'Man is of the quiddity of Socrates',
'Man is of the essence of Socrates', 'Humanity is in Socrates', 'Socrates has humanity', 'Socrates is a man in virtue of humanity'—and many other such propositions which are considered true, it seems, by everyone. Their falsity is obvious. For I take one of them, namely, 'Humanity is in Socrates', and I ask: what does 'humanity' stand for? Either for a thing or for an intention, i.e. by means of this proposition it is asserted either that a real extramental thing is in Socrates or that an intention of the soul is in Socrates. If it supposits for a thing, then I ask: for which thing? Either for Socrates, or for a part of Socrates, or for a thing which is neither Socrates nor a part of Socrates. If for Socrates, then the proposition is false, since nothing which is
Socrates is in Socrates—for Socrates is not in Socrates, even though Socrates is Socrates. And in the same way humanity is not-in Socrates but is Socrates, if 'humanity' supposits for a thing which is Socrates. On the other hand, if 'humanity' stands for a thing which is a part of Socrates, then the proposition is false, because anything which is a part of Socrates is either matter or form or a composite of matter and form—and just one human form and not another—or it is an integral part of Socrates. But humanity is no such part, as is clear inductively. For humanity is not an intellective soul. For ifit were, then real humanity would have remained in Christ in the tomb, and Required for the Truth of a Singular Non-Modal Proposition humanity would have been really united to the Word in the tomb, and, consequently, he would really have been a man—which is false. Similarly, humanity is not matter. Nor is humanity the body of Socrates or his foot or his head, and so on for the other parts of Socrates. For no part of Socrates is humanity—rather, it is only a part of humanity. As a result, 'humanity' cannot supposit for a part of Socrates. If it supposits for a thing which is neither Socrates nor a part of Socrates, then, since such a thing could only be an accident or some other thing which is not in Socrates, 'humanity' would supposit for an accident of Socrates or for some other thing which is neither Socrates nor a part of Socrates—and it is clear that that is false. If, moreover, 'humanity' supposits for an intention of the soul, then the proposition is clearly false.
For an intention of the soul is not in Socrates. And so it is clear that 'Humanity is in Socrates' is false no matter how it is understood.
One can argue in the same way with respect to all the other propositions noted above. For if man or humanity is of the essence of Socrates, I then ask: what does 'man' or 'humanity' supposit for? Either for Socrates, in which case it would be asserted that Socrates is of the essence of Socrates—which is not true. Or if it supposits for a thing other than Socrates, then it supposits either for a part of Socrates—but this cannot be, since no part of Socrates is a man or humanity—or for something else which is neither Socrates nor a part of Socrates—but it is clear that no such thing is a man or humanity unless it is Plato or John or some other man. And it is manifest that no man other than Socrates is of the essence of Socrates. On the other hand, if it supposits for an intention of the soul or for a spoken word, it is clear that in that case it is not of the essence of Socrates. And so it is obvious that all such propositions are literally false.
Now someone might claim that humanity is in Socrates and is of the essence of Socrates, and that, nevertheless, it is neither
Socrates, nor matter, nor form, nor an integral part—rather, it is a common nature which enters into a composition with the individual difference of Socrates. Hence, it is a part of Socrates but neither matter nor form.
I argue against this view at length in several places, namely, Required for the Truth of a Singular Non-Modal Proposition in my commentaries on the first book of the Sentences, on the book of Porphyry, and on the Categories.! At present I will offer some arguments against it.
The first is this. If humanity were something different from singular things and of the essence of singulars, then the same thing, while remaining unchanged, would be in many singular things. And so the same thing, while remaining naturally unchanged, would be in many distinct places without a miracle.
But it is obvious that this is false.
Similarly, in that case the same thing, while remaining unchanged, would be damned in Judas and saved in Christ. And so there would be something miserable and damned in Christ—which is absurd.
Likewise, in that case God would not be able to annihilate an individual unless he annihilated or destroyed every individual of the same genus. For when something is annihilated, nothing of it remains and, as a result, such a common nature does not remain.
Consequently, no individual in which it is remains, and so each individual would be annihilated or destroyed.
Further, I take that humanity which you posit in Socrates and in every other man, and the donkeyhood which you posit in every donkey. And let that humanity be called A, so that A stands just for that humanity; and let that donkeyhood be called
B, so that B stands just for that donkeyhood. Then I ask: are A and B just two things, or more than two things, or not more than one thing? It cannot be said that they are not more than one thing. For in that case necessarily either they are one thing, or neither A nor B is a thing, or A is not a thing, or B is not a thing. It is clear, even according to those who hold this position, that the first answer cannot be given. Nor can the second answer be given, since these same people deny it when they claim that humanity is a real thing and, likewise, donkeyhood. Nor can the third answer be given, since there is no more reason for claiming that B is not a thing than for claiming that A is not a thing, and conversely. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to say that A and B are more than one thing. Further, it cannot be claimed that they are more than two things. For if they are more than two things and if they are not more than two universal things, then
Required for the Truth of a Singular Non-Modal Proposition they are more singular things. And, as a result, they are not distinguished absolutely from singular things. Therefore, the only remaining alternative is that they are two things and no more.
Consequently, each of them is one in number, since each will be one thing in'such a way that it is not many things. And this is what it is to be one in number, namely, to be one thing and not many. For that ought to be the description of being one in number. For if this were to be denied, I might just as easily claim
_ that Socrates is not numerically one thing even if he is one thing and not many things.
Hence, it is the opinion of the Philosopher as well as the truth that the predicate 'is one in species' or 'is one or the same in genus' is never predicated except of an individual or individuals, each of which is one in number. Thus, 'Socrates and Plato are one in species' and 'Socrates and this donkey are one in genus' are true. And nothing other than individuals is one in species or in genus. And so it is the case that that humanity which is posited in every man is one thing and not more than one thing and, consequently, that it is one in number. From this it follows that numerically one thing would be in every man.
Moreover, I think that in other places I have sufficiently responded to arguments which seem to contravene the view I have set forth.
Nor does it help to claim that the humanity of Socrates is only formally distinct—and not really distinct—from Socrates.
For such a distinction should not be posited in creatures, although it can in some sense be posited in the divinity. This is so because among creatures it is impossible to find any numerically one thing which is really more than one thing and is each of those things, as is the case with God. For in God the divine essence is three persons and it is each of those persons, and yet one person is not another. For to say that the essence and a person are formally distinguished, in the true sense, is nothing other than to say that the essence is three persons and a person is not three persons. Similarly, I understand the proposition, 'The essence and the Paternity are formally distinguished' to mean nothing other than the proposition 'The essence is the Filiation and the Paternity is not the Filiation and yet the es-