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On_ Propositions with Conjunctions or Adverbs it can be either a categorical proposition or a hypothetical proposition. Or else it must be distinguished as amphibolous, since it can be either categorical or hypothetical. And perhaps this latter distinction is clearer and more proper. Still, whether such a proposition is distinguished with respect to composition and division or with respect to amphiboly, the point remains the same. Hence, when the conjunction 'or' occurs in such a proposition, the proposition must be distinguished, since it can be either a disjunctive proposition or a proposition with a disjunctive extreme. For example, the proposition 'Every man will be saved or damned' should be distinguished, since either it can be a disjunctive proposition, in which case it is equivalent to 'Every man will be saved or every man will be damned'—which is false; or it can be a proposition with a disjunctive extreme, in which case it is equivalent to 'The whole phrase "'will be saved or damned" is truly predicated of everything contained under "man"'-~this is true and so the original is true.
It should be noted that when sucha proposition is singular, then the disjunctive proposition and the proposition with a disjunctive predicate are equipollent. But this is not the case when the proposition in question is universal, as is clear from the above example.
Similarly, when the conjunction 'and' occurs in such a proposition, that proposition has to be distinguished. For it can be either a conjunctive proposition or a proposition with a conjunctive extreme. For example, the proposition 'Three and two are five' has to be distinguished. If it is a proposition with a conjunctive subject, it is true. If it is a conjunctive proposition, it is false.
The same holds for such a proposition when it contains the conjunction 'if'. Such a proposition must be distinguished, since it can be either a conditional proposition or a proposition with a conditional extreme. For example, the proposition 'Everything possible, if it is necessary, is true' must be distinguished. For it can be a conditional proposition, in which case it has this sense:
'If everything possible is necessary, then everything possible is true'—which is true. If it is a proposition with a conditional subject, then it is equivalent to this: 'The predicate "'true'' is truly predicated of everything of which the whole phrase '"'posOn Propositions with Conjunctions or Adverbs sible, if it is necessary" is truly predicated'. And this is false. For the whole phrase 'possible, if it is necessary' is truly predicated of the proposition 'A donkey is a man'. For this is true: 'That you are a donkey is possible, if it is necessary'—whether it is a conditional proposition or a proposition with a conditional subject. And yet 'That you are a donkey is true' is not true.
The same holds for a causal conjunction. A proposition in which it occurs must be distinguished. For it can be either a causal proposition or a proposition with a causal extreme. For example, the proposition 'Every man is receptive to God since he has a rational soul' must be distinguished, since it can be either a causal proposition or a proposition with a causal predicate. However, these two senses are always or frequently interchangeable.
Similarly, when a temporal adverb occurs, the proposition in question must be distinguished. For it can be either a temporal proposition or a proposition with a temporal extreme. For example, the proposition 'Everyone damned, while he was on earth, sinned' must be distinguished, since it can be either a temporal proposition or a proposition with a temporal predicate. If it is a temporal proposition, then it is equivalent to 'While everyone damned was on earth, everyone damned sinned'—which is false, since the two parts have never been true at the same time. If it is a proposition with a temporal extreme, then it is equivalent to this: 'The whole phrase "'sinned while he was on earth" is truly predicated of everyone who is damned'. And this is true, since each of its singulars is true.
The same thing holds for an adverb of place. This is clear from the proposition 'Every man was running where he was debating'.
For assume that every man was running in the same place in which he was debating, but that different men were in different places. Then it is obvious that the proposition in question is true if it is a proposition with a local predicate and false if it is a local proposition.
It should also be noted that the distinction in question is not only applicable in the cases just mentioned. Rather, exactly the same distinction can also be posited when the pronouns 'who' and 'which' are placed between two terms. For example, the distinction applies to the proposition 'Every man, who is white,
On Propositions with Conjunctions or Adverbs is running'. For in the sense of division it is equivalent to a conjunctive proposition, namely, 'Every man is running and he is white'. In the sense of composition it. is asserted that the predicate 'running' is truly predicated of everything of which the whole phrase 'man who is white' is truly predicated.
These remarks about propositions should be sufficient for the time being.
NOTES 1: On the Classification of Propositions in General 1. A de inesse proposition is in general a proposition without a mode or modal term. However, this characterization is somewhat inexact, since in order for a proposition to be modal, the mode in question must, as Ockham indicates below, be asserted to be true of a whole proposition.
In Summa Logicae (hereafter: SL) II-1, chap. 41, Ockham gives the following more precise characterization of a modal proposition: "'.
. it should be noted that not every proposition which contains such a mode is a modal proposition. Rather, in order for a proposition to be modal two things are required. First, it is required that the mode not be just a part of one extreme. For this reason propositions such as the following are not modal: 'That which is known by me to be an animal is white',
'That which per se builds is hot', 'That which is possibly running is a man who is sitting', 'Something which is possibly impossible is true'. The other requirement is this: in virtue of the form of the proposition the mode is asserted to belong to some non-modal (de inesse) proposition, although it is not always asserted that it belongs to the non-modal counterpart of the modal proposition in question. For example, by means of 'A white thing is possibly black' it is asserted that some proposition is possible in which 'black' is predicated of something which is white—although it is not asserted that the proposition 'A white thing is black' is possible."' Thus, a de inesse proposition is one which is not modal according to the above account of modal propositions. Literally, such a proposition is one in which a predicate
. other than a mode is asserted to be (or not to be) in a subject which is other than a proposition—in the sense of 'be in' or 'inhere in' explicated by Ockham in SL I, chap. 32. (The first part of the Summa Logicae is found in English translation in Michael J. Loux, trans., Ockham's Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae (Notre Dame, Ind., 1974).) Another common translation of the Latin 'de inesse' is 'assertoric'.
2. Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, chaps, 2-3, 25a1-25b25.
3. See below, chap. 29.
4. See SL I, chap. 5. A concrete term in the first mode is normally a term that primarily signifies a subject in which there inheres the accident or form primarily signified by that term's abstract counterpart. Thus, on Ockham's view 'white' is a concrete term in the first mode, since it signifies white things, i.e. things in which whiteness inheres. However, this relation may be reversed. That is, a concrete term in the first mode may primarily signify an accident which inheres in the thing which is primarily signified by that term's abstract counterpart. Ockham gives the term 'fiery' as an example of this sort of concrete term in the first mode. For 'fiery' signifies an accident of that which is signified by its abstract counterpart, namely, 'fire'.
5. The Latin term 'isti', translated here by 'they', is a demonstrative pronoun in this context. Like 'they', it can also be used as a relative pronoun, as in (3) below.
Notes 6. Perhaps the best English translation of this sentence is 'A man a donkey sees'. But this sentence, unlike its Latin counterpart, is syntactically ambiguous. This ambiguity disappears when the subject and predicate differ in grammatical number, as in 'The men a donkey sees'.
7. An alternate translation of this sentence is 'A donkey is a man's', which preserves the copula found in the Latin but is somewhat awkward,
2: What is Required for the Truth of a Singular Non-Modal Proposition 1. See Ockham, Scriptum in Librum I Sententiarum: Ordinatio, dist.
I-III, ed. Stephen Brown and Gedeon Gal (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1970), dist. II, ques. 6. The book just cited constitutes the second volume of the critical edition of Ockham's theological works, Also, see Ockham, Expositio in Librum Porphyrii de Praedicalibus, chap. 1, and Ockham, Expositio in Librum Preedicamentorum Aristotelis, chap. 8. Both of these works appear in the second volume of the critical edition of Ockham's philosophical works (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1978). The first of these works is edited by Ernest A. Moody and the second by Gedeon Gal.
2. See Ockham, Scriptum in Librum I Sententiarum: Ordinatio, dist.
3: What is Required for the Truth of an Indefinite Proposition and of a Particular Proposition 1. The opinion referred to here is the one according to which propositions which have the term 'God' as subject are indefinite rather than singular.
. with something which pertains to a sign'. But Ockham frequently uses the term 'signum' ('sign') to refer to quantifiers rather than to signs in general.
4: On Universal Propositions 1. See below, chap. 6.
2. See SL I, chap. 69.
3. Ockham apparently has in mind here the work of William of Sherwood, namely, his Introductiones in Logicam, the section on appellation, and his Symeategoremata, the chapter on the term 'omnis' ('every'). Both of these works have been translated by Norman Kretzmann, the first in William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic (Minneapolis, 1966) and the second in William of Sherwood's Treatise on Syncategorematic Words
4. This solution is alluded to by Peter of Spain in his Summulae Logicales, tract XII.
5. See SZ I, chaps. 63 and 72.
6. The reference here is again to William of Sherwood.
7. The case alluded to is one in which the only animals are men.
8. See above, chap. 1.
6: On Universal Propositions in which the Sign Distributes over Integral Parts, e.g. the Sign 'Whole'
1. Although 'whole' will be used here to translate the Latin term 'totus', no single English expression seems to have both the categorematic and syncategorematic functions of 'totus'. 'Whole' captures the former, while 'each part of' captures the latter.
2. In this example and the ones which follow, the Latin sentence containing a syncategorematic use of the term 'totus' will be left untranslated.
The English meaning of the sentence in question will in each case be captured by the translation of the sentence which Ockham claims to be equivalent to it.
3. The subjective parts of a given whole are such that the name of the whole (e.g. 'man') is truly predicable of each of them. This is not necessarily the case with integral parts (e.g. feet, hands, etc.). For more on this distinction and reference to some medieval texts in which it is discussed, see Alfred J. Freddoso, '"Abailard on Collective Realism," Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978), pp. 527-538.
7: On Past-Tense and Future-Tense Propositions 1. See SZ I, chap. 72. Ockham emphasizes the importance of this point below, in chap. 24. Again, in SL III-1, chap. 43, he characterizes this notion in the following way: "The predicate names its form, the subject does not. That is, .
. for the truth of a modal proposition in the sense of division it is required that the expressed mode agree with a proposition in which that predicate—or another signifying exactly the same thing—is predicated of a pronoun referring to that for which the subject supposits. However, it is not required that such a mode agree via predication with a proposition in which that subject—or another signifying exactly the same thing—is the subject with respect to the predicate or with respect to a pronoun referring to that for which the predicate supposits.
. In short, then, this is the difference between a term occurring in the subject position and a term occurring in the predicate position: if the proposition is modal, then for the truth of such a proposition it is required that such a mode agree with some proposition in which the very same predicate, or some other signifying exactly the same thing—I mention this because of certain trivial objections which can be made against some of the things I previously said— is predicated. But it is not required that such a mode agree with any proposition in which the very same subject—or another signifying exactly the same thing—is the subject."" Ockham then notes that similar considerations apply to past-tense and future-tense propositions.
9: What is Required for the Truth of Modal Propositions 1. See note 1, chap. 1. In what follows modal propositions containing the modes 'necessary', 'possible', 'impossible', and 'contingent' will be reNotes ferred to, respectively, as de necessario, de possibili, de impossibili, and de contingenti propositions. Thus, 'A being which creates is necessarily God' is a de necessario proposition, even though it is only contingently true. On the other hand, 'God exists' is necessarily true, but it is not a de necessario proposition. Thus, the classification of a proposition as non-modal or as a modal proposition of a given type is independent of its being a necessary or possible or impossible contingent proposition.
2. In Engtish the dictum of a proposition is normally formed by prefixing 'that' to the proposition in question. Hence, 'that every man is an animal' is the dictum corresponding to 'Every man is an animal'. However, in some cases the best English translation of a Latin dictum is by means of a phrase equiform with the translation of the corresponding Latin proposition itself. See, e.g., below, note 7, chap. 17.
3. An alternate reading is used here. The text has 'false' rather than 'future' contingent propositions. But the former does not preserve Ockham's point, since no contradiction is engendered by the assertion that all false
Propositions are false. On the other hand, since at least one future contingent proposition has another future-tense contingent proposition as its contradictory, a contradiction is entailed by the assertion that all future contingent propositions are false.
4. See SL III-3, chap. 33.
5. The subordinate clause alluded to here is the dictum. Ockham makes this point in Latin by distinguishing the subject of the indicative verb from the subject of the infinitive.
6. See SL III-1, chaps. 30, 51, and 64.
10: On Modal Propositions without a Dictum 1. In Posterior Analytics 1, chap. 15, 34b 16-17, Aristotle appears to affirm the assertion that a man is necessarily an animal. Ockham himself denies the truth of both 'It is necessary that every man is an animal' and 'Every man is necessarily an animal'. For the dictum of the former was false before God created human beings, even though the conditional 'If a man exists, an animal exists' was true. Moreover, on Ockham's view 'Every man is necessarily an animal' is true only if 'This is an animal' is necessary, no matter which presently existing man is indicated by 'this'. But no such proposition is necessary, since every man only contingently exists and hence is only contingently a man and only contingently an animal. See below, chap. 11 and SZ III-2, chap. 5.
2. See below, chap. 7.
, 3. Here an alternate reading is used. The text has ".
. each such proposition is true... ." But it is clear that 'necessary' is more appropriate than 'true' in this context.
4. The necessity involved here is the necessity of the past. See footnote 4 of chapter 24 below.
11: On Propositions which, though Categorical in Form, are Equivalent to Hypotheticals 1. See above, chap. 1.
2. See SL I, chap. 10.
3. It is not entirely clear what Ockham meant by the qualification which occurs at the end of this sentence. Perhaps it has something to do with the case of the connotative term 'quantity' which is discussed at the end of this paragraph.
4. See SL I, chap. 44.
5. See SL II, chap. 4.
12: On Propositions in which Negative, Privative, and Infinite Terms Occur 1, The second part of this conjunctive proposition does not imply that any donkeys exist, since it is a negative proposition. See above, chap. 3.
2. Aristotle, Topics VI, chap. 6, 143b 15-16. See SL III-3, chap. 9, for more on this point.
14: On Affirmative Propositions in which There Occur Privative Terms which are not Equivalent to Infinite Terms 1. Anselm, De Casu Diaboli, chap. 11. This work is found in English translation in Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson, trans., Anselm of Canterbury, vol. II (Toronto, 1976), pp. 127-177.
2. The 'other' terms referred to here are positive terms, e.g. 'man', 'animal', 'white', etc., which might occur in the nominal definition of a figment term.
3. Taking as paradigmatic the exponential analysis given in chapter 12 for the proposition 'A donkey is a non-man', it appears that the second exponent of 'A chimera is a non-being' should be 'That thing is not a being' rather than the affirmative proposition 'That thing is a non-being'.
15: On Categorical Propositions which Contain the Pronoun 'Who'
1. See SL II-4, chap. 7. The relation in question is not personal when the antecedent (or relative) pertains to signs while its counterpart pertains to things which are not signs. For example, if 'A white man is a man and it differs conceptually from man' is to be true, then, according to Ockham,
'white man' in the first conjunct supposits personally, while 'it' in the second conjiinct refers back to 'white man' taken materially or simply.
For the second conjunct is equivalent to 'The term '"'white man" is distinct from the term "'man"'.
16: On Reduplicative Propositions 1. According to the editors of the critical edition, a reader of one of the manuscripts suggested in a marginal note that Ockham denied the truth of the conditional proposition in question because by the power of God a certain man, namely, Christ, can exist without a color (in the Eucharist).
2. According to the physical theory which Ockham has in mind here, whiteness is a color which dilates or extends one's vision, whereas blackness is a color which contracts or constricts vision.
Notes 17: On Exehusive Propositions 1. See SL I, chaps. 44-45, and Expositio in Librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, chap. 10.
2. Here 'intrinsic' has been used instead of 'extrinsic', which appears in the text, since the former seems to accord better with the point Ockham is making. In one manuscript 'exclude' is changed to 'include'. But this does not help, since in that case terms designating formally inhering accidents would be excluded—just the opposite of what Ockham intends.
3. This should be taken to mean that what is asserted is that there is some man who is white and such that no accident distinct from whiteness is truly predicable of him.
4. See SL I, chap. 70.
5. The editors of the critical edition note that this dubious sounding inference is valid on the assumption that there is only one accident. They also note that one of the transcribers wrote in the margin of his manuscript that 'This does not follow' would have been more correct than 'This follows'.
6. See below, chaps. 21-29.
7. This translation is somewhat awkward. However, it has the advantage of preserving the ambiguity which Ockham is discussing. This is one case in which the dictum of a proposition is best rendered in English without the use of the term 'that'.
8. When the parts of the dictum are disconnected, then the modal proposition in question is being taken in the sense of division. When the parts are connected, then the proposition is being taken in the sense of composition.
9. The proposition in question is being taken in the sense of division and has the following sense: 'Only a white thing is possibly running'. This proposition is false for the reason which Ockham gives below.
19: On Propositions in which the Verbs 'Begin' and 'Cease' Occur 1. See Norman Kretzmann, William of Sherwood's Treatise on Syncategorematic Terms, chapter on 'begins' and 'ceases'; and Philotheus Boehner, ed., Walter Burleigh: De Puritate Artis Logicae, Tractatus Longior (St.
Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955), III, Il, chap. 4. Successive entities (entia successiva) are those whose parts do not all exist at the same time, e.g. days, years, etc., while enduring entities (entia permanentia) are those whose parts all exist at the same time, e.g. animals, human beings, etc.
2. Aristotle, Physics IV, chap. 13, 222a 10-12.
3. The Latin sentence here is "Petrus incipit esse talis, qualis Paulus est."
Ockham is here contrasting the strict sense of the Latin expressions 'talis ... qualis' and 'similis'.
4. A designator 'hoc aliquid' is generally a term from the category of substance, or a proper name or demonstrative pronoun referring to an individual substance, e.g. 'man', 'Socrates', 'this (man)'. Such designators signify a thing at all the times at which it exists.A designator 'quale quid', on the other hand, is a descriptive.phrase involving a term from one of the accidental categories, e.g. 'this white thing'. Some such designators may signify an individual at some of the times at which it exists and not at others. It seems, moreover, that Ockham would extend the notion of a Notes designator 'hoc aliquid' to substantival terms from the categories other than substance, e.g. 'number', 'motion', etc. See above, chap. 11.
5. The properties of a thing, i.e. those of its essential characteristics which are not part of its definition in the strict sense (see SL III-2, chaps. 32-33), are predicated: of it per se in the second mode. On the other hand,.the parts of a thing's definition (whether these parts are explicit or implicit) are predicated of it per se in the first mode. Thus, a man is per se in the second mode risible, while he is per se in the first mode rational and an animal and sentient, etc. For a more precise characterization of this distinction, see SZ WI-2, chap. 7,
21: On the Conversion of Non-Modal Present-Tense Propositions 1. Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, chap. 2, 25a 1-26.
2. Porphyry, Jsagogue, chapter on the properties of genera and species.
An English translation of this work is found in O. F. Owen, ed. and trans., Aristotle's Works, vol. II (London, 1902), pp. 609-633.
3. Aristotle, Categories, chap.
22: On the Conversion of Past-Tense and Future-Tense Non-Modal Propositions 1. See above, chap. 21.
2. The indefinite proposition in question here is proven false by citing the truth of this singular proposition apparently because, as Ockham hints below, the term 'being which creates' supposits in a present-tense non-. modal proposition for just one thing, namely, God.
3. Whether it is possible to assign a first and/or last moment of existence to an enduring entity is, of course, a disputed metaphysical question.
Aristotle discusses it in Physics VIII, chap. 8, 263b 9ff.
24: On the Conversion of de necessario Propositions 1. See above, chap. 9.
2. See above, chap. 21.
3. Aristotle, Prior Analytics 1, chap. 3, 25a 27-36.
4. Once I go to Rome, no one can afterwards bring it about that the proposition 'I have been to Rome' is false. Hence, this proposition, though logically contingent, is in some sense necessary. This type of necessity is sometimes called per accidens necessity. But given that 'I have been to Rome' is per accidens necessary, its negation, 'I have not been to Rome', is per accidens impossible. So before I go to Rome, the proposition 'I have not been to Rome' is true, but after I go to Rome it becomes per accidens impossible. But granted this, it is still not clear how this example proves that the conversion under discussion is not valid. For its consequent is false only if there is some true proposition which is necessarily impossible. But 'I have not been to Rome', before I actually go to Rome, is only possibly impossible and not necessarily impossible. It seems clear that the conversion which Ockham has in mind here is: 'Nothing impossible
Notes is possibly true; therefore nothing true is possibly impossible'. But it is hard to see how one can correctly translate the antecedent and consequent that he actually gives—whether they are taken in the sense of composition or the sense of division—in such a way that the resulting inference is equivalent to the one just mentioned.
5. See note 1, chap. 1.
6. See above, chap 7, and SL I, chap. 72.
27: On the Conversion of de contingenti Propositions 1. See SL WiI-1, chaps. 4 and 16. The major premise of this syllogism may be translated as either 'He should want to capture the warriors' or 'He should want to be captured by the warriors'. The ambiguity in the Latin is syntactic. The minor premise is translated as 'He should want to be victorious'. The conclusion, then, means either 'therefore he who should want to be victorious should want to capture the warriors' or 'therefore he who should want to be victorious should want to be captured by the wartiors'. If the major premise is understood in the first way and the conclusion in the second way, then the argument is invalid. Likewise, if the major premise is understood in the second way and the conclusion in the first way, the argument is invalid.
2. 'Pendere', accent on the first syllable, means 'to value or esteem', while 'pendere', accent on the second syllable, means 'to hang'. The syllogism is translated as follows, where the blanks are to be filled by the translation of 'pendere': 'He wants to *; he does not want to ; therefore he who wants to does not want to *_ If 'pendere' is used in two different senses in the premises but in the same sense in both of its occurrences in the conclusion, then the argument is invalid.
3. The English translations of these two syllogisms express valid arguments. The first is: 'Socrates is white; Socrates is an animal; therefore an animal is white'. The second is: 'This man is healthy; this man is a substance; therefore some substance is healthy'. However, in the Latin there is a disagreement in grammatical gender in each of the conclusions. In the conclusion of the first argument 'animai' (neuter) is matched with 'sanus'
(masculine). In the conclusion of the second argument 'substantia' (feminine) is matched with 'sanus' (masculine), 4. For more on the fallacy petitio principii see SL Il-2, chap. 12. The problem here is that it is impossible that someone know the premises and not know the conclusion. So the syllogism is not probative, i.e. does not constitute a proof of the conclusion, since the premises cannot be epistemically prior to the conclusion. This is so even though the syllogism is valid.
5. See SZ III-1, chap. 4.
6. These reductions are illustrated in SZ III-1, chap. 11.
28: On the Conversion of de contingenti Propositions through Opposite Qualities 1. Ockham here uses 'Contingit ..
.' to mark the sense of division, whereas he had earlier used '.
. . est contingens' to mark the sense of Notes composition. This difference is difficult to capture in translation, since both locutions are used with an infinitive plus accusative construction.
29: On the Conversion of Modal Propositions which are not Conceded by Everyone to be Modal 1. See above, chap. 9.
2. See above, chap. 21.
31: On the Conditional Proposition 1. SL IlI-3 constitutes Ockham's treatise on consequence or inference, 33: On the Disjunctive Proposition 1. Aristotle, De Interpretatione, chap. 9, 18a28-19b4.
36: On the Local Proposition 1. There is some confusion about what Ockham means here. In some manuscripts "for the same place or for different places" is replaced by "for the same place and not for different places,' thus making the contrast between temporal and local propositions more pronounced. The editors of the critical edition claim that if a local proposition is negative, then it is required that each part be true for a different place. But this seems mistaken, since this condition is at best sufficient, For 'It is not the case that Socrates is sleeping where Plato is debating' is also true if either of the parts is false. On the other hand, if one or both of the parts is a negative proposition and the whole proposition is affirmative, then it is still required that each part be true for the same place. For example, in order for 'Socrates is not sleeping where Plato is debating' to be true, 'Socrates is not sleeping' must, it seems, be true for the same place at which Plato is debating.
2. See Ockham, Expositio in Physicam Aristotelis IV, and Scriptum in Libros Sententiarum: Reportatio, II, ques. 10. Neither of these works is as yet available in a critical edition. to nen MEE Index Adams, Marilyn McCord: 15,70 nn. — 'both': 95, 102-103
14,16&17, 71 nn.19&33, 72 Brown, Stephen: 69 n.1, 70.8, 72 nn.40,45,46&51, 73 n.59, 74 n.51, 198 n.2.1 n.76
Buridan, Jean: 45 adverbial determinations: 46, 157Burleigh, Walter: 202 n.19.1
158, 160, 184 'all', two senses of: 101-102 'alone', two senses of: 132 cause: 126-128, 189-190 Anselm: 122, 201 7.14.1
'cease': 2, 146-152, 164 Aristotle: 15, 24, 35, 53, 80,81,90, common nature: 1, 4,10, 11, 88-90 99,110, 111, 112, 118, 120, consequence, 136, 147, 152, 156, 157, 165, '4s' of: 98-100 166, 183, 188, 197 .1.2, 200 theory of: see inference n.10.1, 201 1.12.2, 202 n.19.2, contingency: 43, 172 203 nn.21.1,21.3,22,3&24.,3, conversion, 205 n.33.1 accidental: 155-156, 162, 167, ascent to a term:
21, 26, 151 170-171, 172, 180-181 Ashworth, E.J.: 74 n,74 contrapositional: 155 of de contingenti propositions:
172-179 'become': 152-154 of de impossibili propositions:
'begin': 2, 146-152, 164 170-171 being, of de necessario propositions: enduring (ens permanens): 146, 164-168 162,202 7.19.1 of de possibili propositions: 168merely past and merely future: 4,
31, 34-39, 41, 69 n.3 of exceptive propositions: 164 merely possible: 4, 25, 36, 52-61, of exclusive propositions: 16371 n.33 successive (ens successivum): 146, of future-tense propositions: 28, 162, 202 n.19.1
158-162 Bergmann, Gustav: 70 7.10 of modal propositions not always Boehner, Philotheus: 14, 15,70 conceded to be modal: 180nn.8,13&14, 71 n.19, 72.51,
7T4n. 76 of past-tense propositions: 28, 158Boethius: 3, 123 Index conversion (continued) exponential analysis: 2, 61-62 of present-tense propositions: expository syllogism: 174~177, 154-158 182~183 of propositions with 'begin' and extreme of a proposition: 6, 21-23, 'cease': 164
70 n.9, 86, 108, 117, 194-196 of reduplicative propositions:
162-163 simple: 1$5-156, 162, 165, 170fallacy, 171, 172, 181 of accent: 174-175 through opposite qualities: 172 of accident: 151, 174-176 178-179 of amphiboly: 174 copula: 10, 12, 79, 198 7.1.7 of composition and division: 174~ of consequent: 176, 187, 189 demonstrative pronouns: 7, 12-13, of equivocation: 174
20, 26, 29, 32-34, 47, 49-50, of figure of speech: 150
69 n.7, 81-82, 84, 105, 139, of ignoratio elenchi: 174-175 149, 160-161, 169, 173, 175ofpetitio principii: 174-175, 204 n.27.4 descent under a term: 20-21, 26, of relative and absolute: 36, 174139, 144, 149, 151 dici de omni: 99, 101 first moment of existence: 163, 203 dictum ofa proposition: 39, 44, 46n22.3
47, 49, 58-59, 70.8, 109, form, predicate names its: 31-32, 111, 165, 200 nn.9.2&9.5, 105-107, 112, 168, 199 2.7.1
202 n.17.7 formal distinction: 1, 90-91 Frege, Gottlob: 11 equivocality, of de contingenti propositions Gal, Gedeon: 69 n.J, 70 2.8, 717.29, without a dictum: 173
198 1.2.1 of de possibili propositions withGeach, Peter T.: 70 7.11, 71 out a dictum: 50, 169 nn. 18&23, 74 nn.77&78 of modal propositions with a dictum: 39, 44, 46-47, 108-109 of pastand future-tense proposi- 'hoc aliquid': 150, 202 n.19.4 tions: 31-34, 39,47, 105-107, | Hopkins, Jasper: 201 n.14.1
158-159 essentialism: 48-49 'every', whether three appellata are implication, strict vs. material: 66 required by: 97-100 impossibilia: 54, 64, 123 'except', two senses of: 143, 146 impossibility: 45, 73 n.60, 111, 187, exclusion, 188, 190, 192 of a greater number: 136-137 individual difference: 88-90 of an incompatible common term: inference, theory of: 27-28, 66,
722.39 of anything extrinsic: 135-136 inferior, logical: 92-93, 126, 139, proper vs. improper: 132-133 144, 151-152, 153, 157 Index infinite domains: 24-25, 27-28, operation of being, 'is' of: 98-100 72 n.33
Owen, O.F.: 203 7.21.2 intentionality: 37, 72 n.45
'is': two alleged senses of: 98-100 parts, essential (matter and form): 87-88 Kretzmann, Norman: 72 nn.40,49& infinitely many: 24-25, 27 .
51, 73 n.59, 198 n.4.3, 202 integral: 24-25, 27, 54, 87-88, n.19.1
95, 103-105, 116, 133 subjective: 95-96, 104, 199 7.6.3
Peter of Spain: 198 .4.4 language, Plantinga, Alvin: 64, 74.75 mental: 3, 7-8, 62 Porphyry: 89, 157, 203 n.21,2 spoken: 3 possibility: 168, 187, 188, 190. written: 3 predicate, last moment of existence: 162, names its form: 31-32, 105-107, 203 0.22.3
Leff, Gordon: 74 .79 of A'- proposition: 21-22 Loux, Michael: 20, 25, 27, 34, 70 of E'- proposition: 22-23 n.8, 71 nn.19,20&32, 72 of I'- proposition: 23 nn.38&42, 73 n.53, 197 n.1.1 ofO - proposition: 21~23 predication, in quid: 118
Matthews, Gareth: 21, 22, 71 Ockham's theory of: 1, 3-16, 19, nn.19,21&27 modal propositions, primary and other theories of: 10-14, 70n.10 derived forms of: 47, 49, 51 per se: 118, 131, 203 n.19.5 modes: 43, 80-81 Priest, Graham: 71 nn.18,19,22&23 Moody, Ernest: 74 n.76, 198 1.2.1
Mullick, Mohini: 74.76 priority, logical: 126-128, 131, 190 priority of analysis rule: 23 pronouns, necessity, demonstrative: 7, 12-13, 20, 26, logical vs. per accidens: 46
29, 32-34, 47, 49-50, 69 7.7, of propositions: 44-46, 73 n.60, 81-82, 84, 105, 139, 149, 160110-111, 187, 188, 190, 192 161, 169, 173, 175-177, 197 per accidens: 46, 200 n.10.4, nds 203 1.24.4 relative: 83-84, 197 n.1.5 negation, propositional vs. terminal, proper names: 12-13, 29, 32, 33, 47, 63-64 49-50, 81, 160-161, 173 175- 'neither': 98, 102-103 nominal definition: 4-5, 14-15, propositions, 63-64, 115-116, 119, 199, 123 A-: 17-18, 33, 38, 51-52 non-being: 36-37, 54, 97-98, 121, A! -: 18, 22-23 affirmative: 9-10, 15, 18, 32, 38, Normore, Calvin: 71 n.19, 72.39
48, 50, 56, 62, 64, 66-67, 92, 'now', two senses of: 147
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" ĝNŮழĆɌɍዦ$ćŮ>E X" X X" X Ď ! < Ů Ɩ 4/Ů ® ? Ɩa 4: Ů 30j < %û ' n;Uû J )+Ů " BŮ 2 -^ Ů H 56 Ů i Ů - Ů Ɩ ¯ Õ Ɩ <Ɩ Ï ď) ! ĐĀ+ Ð 6 Ů E Ů ° Ɩ Index with a causal extreme: 195 of propositions with 'who' or with a conditional extreme: 194- 'which': 124-125, 196 sense of division, with a conjunctive extreme: 23, of modal propositions: 39, 44,
46-58, 109, 111-115, 165with a disjunctive extreme: 194
167, 168, 170-171, 173, 178, with a local extreme: 195
182, 202 nn.17.9&17.10 with a temporal extreme: 195 of propositions with conjunctions with 'become': 152-154 or adverbs: 193-194 with 'begin' or 'cease': 2, 65, of propositions with 'who' or 146-152, 164 'which': 193-194 with connotative terms: 2, 13, sign, 115,118 particular: 16-17, 26, 81, 93, 145, with figment terms: 62, 64-65, 198 1.3.2
122-124 universal: 16-18, 26, 33, 81, 92, with infinite terms: 18, 36, 95-105, 116, 198 7.3.2
62-64, 119-121 signification, with one extreme in an oblique as a psychological notion: 3-4 case: 86, 108, 117, 139, 157 primary: 4-8, 10; 69 n.3, 707.9, with privative terms: 121-122 116, 132 with relative terms: 115-118 secondary: 5-6, 12, 64, 69 nn. with 'who' or 'which': 124-125, 3&4, 116 195-196 simplicity, divine: 42-43 sophisms: 97-98, 128, 137 Spade, Paul Vincent: 5, 24, 69 nn.
'quale quid': 150, 202 7.19.4
2,4,5&6, 70 n.9, 71 nn.19,22, quantification, Ockham's theory of:
19-28, 71 nn.18&21 subject, does not name its form: 31, 199 n.7.1 superior, logical: 92-93, 126, 139, "Read, Stephen: 71 nn,18,19,22&23 144, 151-152, 153, 157 reduplication, supposition, to express cause: 126-128 as a primitive notion: 3, 6, 15-16, to express concomitance: 12670.17 confused and distributive: 20-21, relative pronouns: 83-84, 197 n.1.5
23, 139-141, 144, 149-151 Richardson, Herbert: 201 n.14.1 determinate: 20, 23, 139-140, Russell, Bertrand: 2, 62 149-151 fourth mode of common: 22-23, 71 n.23
Scott, T. K.: 71 n.19, 73 2.57 in modal propositions: 50-61 sense of composition, in past-tense propositions: 31-39, of modal propositions: 39, 44, 105-107 58-60, 109, 111, 165-166, material: 6-8, 10, 70 nn.8&9, 83168, 170, 172, 179, 180-181 85, 93-94, 121, 201 2.15.1 of propositions with conjunctions merely confused: 21, 139-140, or adverbs: 193-194 144,149
Index supposition (continued) Trentman, John: 69 n.2, 70 n.11 modes of common personal 'true': 14-15 (MCPS): 19-28, 65, 71 nn.
Turnbull, Robert: 70 7.13, 71 2.19
19&21 Tweedale, Martin: 70 n.JJI personal (significative): 6-10, 15, 64-65, 69 7.7, 70 n.9, 84-85, 91, 93-94, 121, 150, 159, 201 universals: 1-2, 4,6, 10-12, 69.1, n15.1 simple: 6-8, 10, 707.9, 83-85, 'unless', two senses of: 143
93-94, 121, 201 n.15.1
Swiniarski, John: .71 nn.19,21,23&24 'whole', two senses of: 103-105, 199 nn.6.1&6.2 terms, William of Sherwood: 198 nn. absolute: 3, 4, 12, 15 4.3&4.6, 202 n.19.1 abstract: 10, 117, 197 2.1.4
Wolter, Alan: 74 7.70 categorematic: 2-4, 6-7, 62, 64, 69 2.7 collective: 118 common (general): 3-4, 12-13, 17, 19, 22, 31, 32, 47, 49, 50, 51, 81, 93, 105, 118, 139, 145, 156, 158, 161, 169, 173 concrete: 4-5, 81, 117, 197 n.1.4 connotative: 2, 3, 12-13, 115118, 119, 122, 150 discrete: see singular figment: 5, 12, 62, 64-65, 122~ general: see common infinite: §, 12, 18, 36, 54, 62-64, 119-121 mental: 3, 7-8, 10, 70 7.8 negative: 5, 119-121 of second intention: 1 privative: 5, 119, 121-122 relational: see relative relative (relational): 5, 115-118, singular (discrete): 4, 17, 19, 26, 32, 83, 105, 156, 169 spoken: 3, 7-8 syncategorematic: 2, 7, 12, 96, transcendental: 5 written: 3, 7-8 theology: 2, 127, 174, 184 Philosophy: Logic . er ae | an $19.00
In this work Ockham proposes atheory of simple predication, which he uses in explicating the truth conditions of progressively more complicated kinds ° of propositions. His discussion includes what he takes to be. the correct semantic treatment of quantified propositions, past tense and future tense propositions, and modal propositions, all of which are receiving much attention from contemporary philosophers. He also illustrates the use of exponential analysis to deal with propositions that prove troublesome in both semantic theory and other disciplines, such as metaphysics, physics, and theology. This type of analysis plays an essential role in his substantive philosophical and theological works, and in many cases then can hardly be
'understood without a prior acquaintance with this section of the Summa.
An introduction by Alfred J. Freddoso clarifies and summarizes Ockham's theory, discusses certain philosophical problems which it engenders, and proposes new interpretations for parts of it. The essay will be helpful both to those interested in Ockham asa historical figure and to those interested in his substantive systematic contributions to logical theory.
Alfred J. Freddoso is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame; Henry Schuurman is Professor of Philosophy at the King's University College inEdmonton, Alberta.
"[W]ell executed and a valuable addition to the small number of Ockham works available in English." ~ The Philosophical Review
Also from St. Augustine's Press William of Ockham, Ockham's Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae.
Edited and translated by Michael J. Loux Cover photography copyright © by Geoffrey Fingerhut.
; ISBN: 978-1-58731-605-0 $19.00
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