10: On Modal Propositions without a Dictum
On Modal Propositions without a Dictum proposition is necessary, or for it to be the case that a proposition is contingent or true or impossible or known or unknown or believed, and so on for the others—it would take too long to examine all of them in detail.
However, with respect to a necessary proposition it should be noted that a proposition is called necessary not because it is always true, but because it is true if it exists and cannot be false.
Hence, the mental proposition 'God exists' is necessary, not because it is always true—for if it does not exist, it is not true—but because if it exists, then it is true and cannot be false. Similarly, the spoken proposition 'God exists' is necessary, and yet it is not always true—for when it does not exist, it is then neither true nor false. But if it is uttered, then it is true and it cannot be false, unless the signification of the terms is altered.
Something analogous should be said of an impossible proposition, namely, that it is a proposition which, if it exists, is false— and yet it is not false unless it is a proposition. And the same holds, mutatis mutandis, for a contingent proposition. But in order for a proposition to be known or believed, etc., more is required. However, what is required pertains to the Posterior
Analytics and to other books.® 10: On Modal Propositions without a Dictum With respect to modal propositions without a dictum of a proposition, which are altogether equipollent to propositions with a dictum in the sense of division, it should be noted that such propositions are not interchangeable with the first type discussed. In fact, one can be true even if the other is false, and conversely. For example, in Aristotle's opinion 'That every man is an animal is necessary' is true in the sense of composition,
On Modal Propositions without a Dictum while 'Every man is necessarily an animal' is false.! Likewise, in Aristotle's opinion 'That every truth is true is necessary' is true, and yet 'Every truth is necessarily true' is false. And so it is with many others.
For this reason it should be noted that for the truth of such propositions it is required that the predicate under its proper form belong to that for which the subject supposits, or to a pronoun referring to that for which the subject supposits. Thus, it is required that the mode expressed in such a proposition be truly predicated of a non-modal proposition in which the very same predicate is predicated of a pronoun referring to that for which the subject-supposits—just as it was explained in the case of pasttense and future-tense propositions.? For example, for the truth of 'Every truth is necessarily true' it is required that each proposition be necessary in which the predicate 'true' is predicated of anything for which the subject 'truth' supposits. That is, it is required that each proposition like the following be necessary:
'This is true', 'That is true', referring to something for which the subject supposits. And since it is not the case that each such proposition is necessary, 'Every truth is necessarily true' is simply false.* Similarly, by means of 'A being which creates is possibly not God' it is not asserted that 'A being which creates is not God' is possible, since in that case this de possibili proposition would be true. Rather, it is asserted that this is possible: 'This is not God', referring to that for which 'being which creates' supposits in 'A being which creates is possibly not God'. And this is simply impossible, since 'being which creates' supposits for God, in 'A being which creates is possibly not God'. And, surely, 'This is not God', referring to God, is impossible. Similarly, by means of 'A being which creates is necessarily God' it is asserted that 'This is God' is necessary, referring to that for which 'being which creates' supposits in the de necessario proposition in question.
And this is true. Therefore, that de necessario proposition is true. But it is not necessary. Rather, it is contingently true, since on the assumption that God ceased to create, it would then be false—just as its non-modal counterpart, namely, 'A being which creates is God', would be false.
On Modal Propositions without a Dictum And there is nothing improper in the fact that a true de necessario proposition is contingent, as is clear in the above example.
And just as a true de necessario proposition can be contingent, so too a true per se proposition can be true accidentally and contingently. For example, 'A being which creates is per se God' is true, and yet it is true accidentally. and contingently. And so it is with many others. Still, despite the fact that these propositions are true, propositions like 'God is necessarily a being which creates' are false and propositions like the following are true: 'God is contingently a being which creates', 'God is able not to be a being which creates', 'God is possibly a being which does not create', etc. This is so because no proposition in which the predicate 'being which creates' is predicated of a pronoun referring to that for which the term 'God' supposits is necessary. Rather, it is contingent. For every proposition like 'This is a being which creates' and 'That is a being which does not create', referring to God, is contingent.
Similarly, it should be said that the following propositions are all false: 'God possibly assumes a human suppositum', 'God is possibly united to a human suppositum', 'God possibly performs a meritorious act by himself', 'God possibly makes a white thing without whiteness', and others of this kind. For each proposition in which one of the above things is predicated of a pronoun referring to that for which the subject supposits is simply impossible.
For 'A suppositum is assumed' is impossible, since this follows:
'A suppositum is assumed; therefore a suppositum depends upon another'—and further, 'therefore a suppositum is not a suppositum'. But it is implied that it is a suppositum. Therefore, 'A suppositum is assumed' is impossible. Similarly, "This.is united to a suppositum', referring to God, is impossible. And, likewise,
'God performs a meritorious act by himself' is impossible, since this follows: 'God performs a meritorious act by himself; therefore a meritorious act is performed only by God; consequently, it is not performed by the will of the person whose act it is, and, consequently, it is not a meritorious act'.
Despite this fact, however, the following propositions are true, unless some logical or grammatical reason prevents it: 'A suppositum is possibly assumed by the Word', 'A suppositum is possibly
On Modal Propositions without a Dictum united to the Word', 'A meritorious act is possibly performed by God alone'. For by means of these propositions it is asserted only that a proposition in which the predicate is predicated of a pronoun referring to that for which the subject supposits is possible— and this is true. For in the proposition 'A suppositum is possibly assumed' the subject 'suppositum' supposits for this human nature, since this human nature, in virtue of the fact that it does not depend on or require the support of another, is now truly a suppositum. And so 'suppositum' truly supposits for this nature, just as 'white thing' in 'A white thing is running' truly supposits for Socrates if Socrates is white. But if that human nature is being referred to, then 'This is assumed by a divine suppositum' is a possible proposition. Therefore, 'A suppositum is possibly assumed' is true, just as 'A white thing is possibly black' is true. For 'This is black', referring to something for which 'white thing' supposits, is possible—and yet 'A white thing is black' is impossible.
Likewise, in the same sense all propositions such as these are true: 'A man is possibly assumed', 'A thing caused by a created agent is possibly caused by God alone', 'A thing seen by Socrates and Plato is possibly seen by Socrates alone', and so on. And yet these propositions are impossible: 'A man is assumed', 'A thing caused by a created agent is caused by God alone', 'A thing seen by Socrates and Plato is seen by Socrates alone', and so on.
Second, it should be noted that such propositions de modo are related to their singulars in exactly the same way that nonmodal propositions are. Therefore, it is impossible for such a universal proposition to be true or necessary or contingent unless each of its singulars is true or necessary or contingent.
Similarty, just as a non-modal proposition can be impossible despite the fact that each of its singulars is possible—as is clear in the case of 'Both of these are true', referring to two contradictory contingent propositions—so too sometimes, although rarely, a de modo universal proposition can be impossible while each of its singulars is possible. This is clear in the case of 'Both of these are necessarily true', referring to the proposition
'Socrates was in A' and 'Socrates was not in A'. The universal proposition in question is impossible, and yet each singular is