7: On Past-Tense and Future-Tense Propositions
On Past-Tense and Future-Tense Propositions Now with respect to signs which are said to be distributive over accidents it should be noted that such terms as 'any kind of? and others of this type are not properly signs. Rather, they are equivalent to a phrase composed of a sign and other terms.
For example, 'any kind of' is the same as 'having from among every species of quality some one quality'. Thus, it is proper for some sign to be added to it. For it is proper to say 'Anyone of any kind is running', in the same way that it is proper to say
'Anyone who has some one quality from among every species of quality is running'. And in such a case it is clear what is necessary and sufficient for the truth of such a proposition.
Such signs are not used very much in theology, so I mention them only in passing.
7: On Past-Tense and Future-Tense Propositions Fourth, we must examine pastand future-tense propositions.
It should first be noted that any pastor future-tense proposition in which the subject is a common term, or a demonstrative pronoun with a common term, or a discrete term which introduces some composite thing, must be distinguished. For the subject can supposit either for that which is such-and-such or for that which was such-and-such, if the proposition is past-tense; or it can supposit either for that which is such-and-such or for that which will be such-and-such, if the proposition is futuretense. In either case, if the proposition is affirmative, it is required that the predicate under its proper form, i.e. the very same predicate, be truly predicated—by means of a verb of the appropriate tense—of that for which the subject supposits. Thus, it is required that a proposition in which the predicate is predicated of a pronoun referring precisely to that for which the subject supposits was true at some time (if the proposition is pasttense) or will be true at some time (if the proposition is futureOn Past-Tense and Future-Tense Propositions tense). For example, if the proposition 'A white thing was Socrates' is true and if 'white thing' supposits for that which is white, then it is not required that 'A white thing is Socrates' was true at some time. Rather, it is required that 'This is Socrates' was true, referring to that for which the subject supposits in 'A white thing was Socrates'. Hence, if Socrates is now white for the first time, then 'A white thing was Socrates' is true, as long as the subject is taken for that which is white—and yet 'A white thing is Socrates' was never true. Rather, 'This is Socrates', referring to Socrates, was true. And since 'white thing' in 'A white thing was
Socrates' supposits for Socrates, this latter proposition is true.
Similarly, 'A being which creates was from eternity God' is now true, and yet 'A being which creates is God' was not true from eternity. Rather, this was true from eternity—or would have been true if it had been formed: 'This is God', referring to that for which 'being which creates' supposits in 'A being which creates was from eternity God'.
Similarly, 'A boy will be an old man' is true, and yet 'A boy is an old man' will never be true. Rather, 'This is an old man' will be true, referring to that person who is nowa boy. And the same holds for other such propositions.
Hence, there is this difference between present-tense propositions and pastand future-tense propositions: in a present-tense proposition the predicate stands in the same way that the subject does, unless something added to it prevents this; but in pastand future-tense propositions there is a variation, since the predicate does not simply stand for those things of which it is truly predicated in a past-tense proposition and a future-tense proposition.
For in order for such a proposition to be true it is not sufficient that that of which the predicate is truly predicated—whether by means of a past-tense verb or a future-tense verb—be that for which the subject supposits. Rather, it is required that the very same predicate be truly predicated of that for which the subject supposits in the manner asserted by means of such a proposition. For example, assume that Socrates is now white and that he has been white for this whole day but not before. In that case 'Socrates was white yesterday' is false, and yet 'white' is truly predicated of Socrates and, likewise, it was truly predicated of Socrates. But On Past-Tense and Future-Tense Propositions since it was not predicated of Socrates yesterday, the past-tense proposition 'Socrates was white yesterday' is now false.
Likewise, if Socrates is now white for the first time, then 'Socrates was white' is false—and yet Socrates was that of which 'white' is now truly predicated. But since 'Socrates is white' was not true, it follows that 'Socrates was white' is now false. And the reason for this is that the predicate names its form in the way explained previously.! But it is not so with the subject, since for the truth of a past-tense proposition it is not required that some proposition be true in which the predicate—or that for which the predicate supposits—is predicated by means of a present-tense verb of that subject. For example, if Socrates is now white for the first time, then 'A white thing was Socrates' is true, and yet no presenttense proposition in which the predicate 'Socrates'—or that for which it supposits—is predicated of the subject 'white thing', was ever true before. For these propositions were never true: 'A white thing is Socrates', or 'A white thing is this', referring to that for which the predicate supposits in 'A white thing was Socrates'.
Nevertheless, some proposition was true in which 'Socrates' is predicated of a pronoun referring precisely to that for which the subject supposits in 'A white thing was Socrates'. For in 'A white thing was Socrates' the term 'white thing' supposits for Socrates, who is now white. And 'This is Socrates', referring to Socrates, was true before.
From these remarks it is clear that 'A being which creates was always God' should be conceded. For a proposition in which 'God' is predicated of a pronoun referring to that for which 'being which creates' supposits in 'A being which creates was always God', was always true—or would have been true if it had been formed. For 'This is God' was always true. Still, 'A being which creates is
God' was not always true, since before the creation of the world it was false. And 'God was always a being which creates' is simply false for the reason just stated. And the same holds for many other precisely similar propositions. And future-tense propositions should be dealt with in the same way, mutatis mutandis, ulat past-tense propositions have been dealt with.