The Constitution of Personhood
BONAVENTURE'S TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY
Ill. THE CONSTITUTION OF PERSONHOOD
It is on the basis of the emanations that one is lead to speak of relations in God, and eventually of persons. But, in what sense is the term person applicable to God ? Augustine had found difficulty in using such a word, fearing it would do violence to the unity of the divine nature. Because of the nature of the problem, theologians over the centuries have attempted to find more serviceable definitions of person and a clearer articulation of the way in which we might conceive of the constitution of the persons in the trinity.
The Boethian definition conceived of a person as "'an individual substance of a rational nature.'! This definition would have an extensive influence in Western theology despite the obvious difficulties contained in it. If it were applied without qualification to God in a trinitarian framework, it would seem to lead to a form of tritheism.
Thus, while the definition is widely accepted by theologians, it is generally accepted only with considerable criticism, as is clearly the case with Aquinas.®? Richard of St. Victor formulated a definition which seems to avoid some of the problems inherent in the Boethian definition. The Boethian individual substance is replaced by the notions of incommunicable and singular existence. Recognizing the impossibility of defining the infinite yet recognizing the need of saying something, Richard defines a divine person as an incommunicable existence of the divine nature.** Theologians following the Augustinian inspiration will tend to see the divine persons as constituted by relations, while Richard will see them as distinguished per originem.>4 After some etymological reflections on the Latin word persona and the Greek word prosopon,3> Bonaventure expresses a distinct preference for the Victorine definition in speaking of God, seeing it as a correction of the Boethian definition.** But if person refers precisely to that which distinguishes the three, is it possible to use the term commonly of all three ? The term certainly expresses incommunicability, and in this sense it points to the lack of com31 Tiber de Persona et Duabus Naturis 3, 1-5 (PL 64, 1343).
337 Su Loe Leqeueo an 1-4:
33 De Trin. IV, c. 18 (PL 196, 941); IV, c. 21 (PL 196, 944-945); IV, c. 22
(PL 196, 945). Richard argues that the Boethian definition applies only to created persons; the term individua substantia is at the center of his critique. His own definition is presented with a clear recognition of its inadequacy. "Non inconvenienter fortassis dicere poterimus, quod persona divina sit divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia."
34 De Trin. IV, c. 15 (PL: 196,939).
35 I Sent. d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (I, 405).
36 T Sent. d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4 (J, 441).
INTRODUCTION
monness.37 But Bonaventure attempts to establish a level of commonness distinct from that of the essence, yet sufficient to enable him to say that the predication implies more than an ens rationis.
He argues that though it is true that the term person signifies incommunicability and therefore implies a lack of commonness, yet this incommunicability is a positive quality more than a privation.
Mote specifically, it implies a similarity of relationship to the essence. Therefore, person is more than a mere ens rationis since it refers to something real in God. Because of the similarity of relation between each person and the divine nature, the term may be used analogously of all three,38 just as it may be predicated analogously of God and of creatures.3® While in God all exists with absolute simultaneity, theology as reflective thought which seeks to understand the inter-relationship between the various predications made about God is intimately tied to the human experience of temporal relations. As the theologian seeks to understand the logical relations involved, those things which are really simultaneous appear in temporal language which creates the impression of prior and posterior in God. Therefore, it is inevitable that the question of the constitution of the person should arise. Generally, theologians following the Augustinian tradition tend to identify person with relation in such a way that relation is the constitutive principle of person. This is clearly the case with Aquinas, for whom relation has a dominant role to play. this insight never assumes the centrality which it has for Aquinas.
Though Bonaventure's position is not fully clear, he seems to favor the origins or processions over the relations as constitutive of the persons. In this regard, he reflects the view of Richard, for whom the persons are distinguished per originem.*! The question of the constitution of the persons is particularly problematic in the case of the first person. If the persons are constituted by relations, and if relation arises from procession, must not the first procession logically presuppose a person who _ actively generates ? But if so, then the first person is prior to the 'relation by which He is said to be constituted. Bonaventure's approach to this problem reveals both the centrality of the concept of primacy and his inclination to see the persons as constituted per originem. He understands the SOL Sent d. 25,a 2. qi 1), resp; (; 442-443).
SSalibid.
89 I Sent. d. 25, a. 2, q. 2, resp. (I, 444-445). eGistohr; 'op. cit., ps1 1202122) ALD emlirin. IV, c. 13 ff; V per totum (PL 196, 938 ff.); also, Stohr, op. cit., p. 114-120.
BONAVENTURE'S TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY
innascibility of the first person to have both a negative and a positive meaning. Precisely in as far as He is not from any other, He is the fruitful source of all others. Therefore, logically prior to His full and actual paternity which is the active relation to the Son that constitutes Him as Father in the full sense, He is Father already in an inchoative sense in as far as His personal property of being fecund source of all others has a logical priority to any actual emanations.*
RELATIONS, PROPERTIES, NOTIONS
based..on.the two emanations. They are active ve generation, oy which the Father generates the Son; passive © generation, which _is the Son's relation to the Father; active spiration, by which the. Father -and_the Son together breathe forth. the Spirit; and passive spiration, which is the Spirits relation to the Father and the Son. Intimately related to these are the concepts of property and notion, which Bonaventure uses in both a broad and in a natrow sense. In the broad sense, they are virtually synonymous and are used interchangeably. Hence, we find such combibinations as: proprietas relativa; notio, scil. personalis proprietas, etc.
The term xofion is used to designate the relations in as far as they provide the basis for making known something about the three persons, the term notion being derived from the Latin verb snnotescere. Since all four of the relations can be seen in this way, there are at least four notions. But since the Father is distinguished by innascibility, which is not formally identical with paternity, we can conclude that there are five notions in all: innascibility, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration."4 As they relate to our knowledge about God, the notions make possible a knowledge not of the essential divine attributes but of the personal qualities of the three persons.
In this sense, they are related to what theology calls the personal properties. Yet something that is common to several persons cannot
42 Brevil. 1, 3 (V, 212). This is treated more fully below in the discussion of the person of the Father. Stohr (op. cit., p. 123) sees this as an inconsistency in Bonaventure's thought and attributes it to the Seraphic Doctor's unwillingness to place the concept of paternity higher than that of primacy. It is possible to see this in another way, for it can be interpreted as the most fundamental instance of the dialectical structure of Bonaventure's thought. The dialectical structure of the coincidence of opposites is grounded in the very mystery of the Father.
On the coincidence of opposites, cf. E. Cousins, "The Coincidence of Opposites in the Christology of St. Bonaventure," in: Franciscan Studies 28 (1968) VI, p. 27-46.
48 Brevil. 1, 3 (V, 212).
" Ibid.
INTRODUCTION
be seen as a personal property in the strict sense. Therefore, active spiration, which is common to the Father and the Son, is not a property. This would leave four properties, as the Sentence Commentary indicates.*® On the other hand, the Breviloquium speaks of three properties indicated by the names: Father, Son, Holy Spirit.*
Thus, even though innascibility is proper to the Father, He is more clearly known in a positive and fuller sense through paternity; that is, through the actual generation of the Son. For this reason, paternity stands parallel to Sonship and to passive spiration as the most characteristic properties.
Since the personal properties are more than mere logical concepts, and are really distinct among themselves and yet not totally identical in all respects with the divine persons, there are three modes of predication concerning God: the essential mode, the personal mode, and the notional mode. The essential mode of ptedication is that by which we speak of God in terms of His divine nature and its essential attributes; the personal mode is that whereby we speak of God in terms of properties that truly distinguish the persons from one another; the notional mode, while distinguishing the persons, is broader than the personal mode since it involves predications that express relations among the persons. A brief example may help to clarify these three modes of predication. It is commonly said in Christian theology that God is love. Bonaventure distinguishes three ways in which love is predicated of God in a trinitarian context. As an essential predication, it designates that love which pertains to the very nature of God and which is predicated of all three persons. As a personal predication, it designates that person who is love that is produced from perfect liberality. As a notional predication, it refers to the concord of will between the Father and Son whereby they breathe the Spirit from perfect liberality.47 Viewed in another way, essential predications speak of the divine nature in response to the question guid; personal predications speak of a determinate person in response to the question quis; notional predications refer to the persons in an indeterminate way in response to the question qui. It would be a violation of logic to cross the lines between these three modes of predication and would lead to confusion.
" I Sent. d. 26, a.u., q. 1, resp. (I, 452); and, q. 4, fund. 2, and resp. (I, 460).
46 Brevil., loc. cit.
47 I Sent. d. 10, a. 2, q. 1, resp. (I, 210); Brevil. 1-4 (V, 212); I Sent. d. 32, a. 1, q. 1, fund. 1 and resp. (I, 557-558). Also, W. Principe, "St. Bonaventure's
Theology of the Holy Spirit as Love between Father and Son," in: Cord 24 (1974) 7, p. 235-256, esp. p. 245-246; and "St. Bonaventure's Theology of the Holy Spirit with Reference to the Expression 'Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu
Sancto,'" in: Bonaventura IV (Grottaferrata, 1973-4) p. 243-269.