The Foundations
THEMES IN THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
I. THE FOUNDATIONS
Bonaventure speaks of the existence of God and the existence of the trinity as the foundations of all certain knowledge, the first in relation to reason, the second in relation to faith.
Is the existence of God beyond doubt for the human mind ?
Bonaventure had treated this question in the Sentence Commentary* where he had set out the same basic position as that found in the Disputed Questions, though the latter treatment is far more elaborate.
In his own way, Bonaventure here reveals his allegiance to the Augustinian tradition which maintained that, in some way, the existence of God is per se notum or self-evident. The Anselmian form of that tradition appears as a constant thread running through many variations. The necessary existence of that "being than which no greater can be conceived" appears in numerous variations.
With elaborate care, Bonaventure works out three approaches in favor of the position, arguing: 1) that it is a truth universally impressed on all human minds; 2) that it is a truth proclaimed by all created beings; and 3) that, at the level of logic, it is a truth whose non-existence is inconceivable. These arguments reveal much of Bonaventure's personal theological concerns. Concerning the first approach, he draws arguments from authors commonly cited by Medieval theologians, including John Damascene, Hugh of St. Victor, Boethius, Augustine, and Anselm. Together with these theological authorities, the authority of Aristotle is appealed to for arguments of a more philosophical tone. One notices here the presence of themes particularly dear to the Seraphic Doctor: the desire for the true and the good, for wisdom, happiness, and peace.
These are brought to bear as data of common human experience which have great significance for our understanding of ourselves and hence for our knowledge of God's existence.
The underlying anthropology is alluded to in the fourth argument which deals briefly with man as an image of God. This question is more fully developed in the Sentence Commentary.® Bonaventure comments on two triads which had been introduced into trinitarian theology by Augustine. Augustine himself had seen a certain diffe culty with the triad: mens - notitia - amor, since the members are not coordinate. Bonaventure seems to be acutely aware of this difficulty,® and yet he finds it possible to interpret this triad as an image of the "1 Sent. d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2 (I, 153-155).
5 I Seat. d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 & 2 (1, 80-87) and a. 2, q. 1-3 (1, 88-93). ee Vocecita(l. oo):
INTRODUCTION
trinity in as far as it reveals "order, equality, and consubstantiality."'
Order is found in that the mind is like a parent, knowledge like a child, and love is that which proceeds from both as a unifying bond. Equality is seen in that the mind knows itself in a way that corresponds to its being; and it loves itself to the degree that it knows itself. The knowledge and love are consubstantial with the mind. Even while Bonaventure discusses this triad, he employs little of the Augustinian psychological interpretation, but prefers to locate the analogy in terms of the structure of order, equality, and consubstantiality. In this style of interpretation, the term mens can be given a meaning more akin to Bonaventure's own understanding of the Father who is the fontal source of all else. The mens, from which flow knowledge and love, is like the Father from whom flow the Son and the Spirit, and all of created reality.®
Of greater significance for Bonaventure is the triad: memory intelligence - will,? which appears also in the Breviloquium and in the Itinerarium.© The human spirit may be seen as an image of God in as far as these three powers, though basically of one nature, manifest the elements of distinction, order, and origin when they express themselves in act. Again, though the triad is drawn from Augustine, the analogy which is found in it departs significantly from that of the psychological theory of Augustine. It appears to be reshaped in terms of Bonaventure's own trinitarian views.
The fact that man is an image of God has great significance in treating the question of the human knowledge of God's existence.
For anything to be an image of another, it must possess a nature that is similar to that of which it is the image.!! As regards man, his existence as an image of God is conceived in dynamic terms.
He is structured in such a way that he is ordered to perfection and fulfillment only in the knowledge and love of God. That structure which is reflected in the faculties of memory, intellect, and will must be actuated in knowledge and love by a personal turning to God who is present to man preconsciously in human memory.! In as 7 Ibid. (1, 91).
® M. Schmaus, "Trinititstheologie in Patristik und Mittelalter. Die psychologischen Ternare Augustins und ihre Abwandlung bei Bonaventura," in: Begegnung: Beitrdge zu einer Hermencutik des theologischen Gespréachs. Heinrich Fries
Festschrift. Ed. M. Seckler, O. H. Pesch, J. Brosseder, W. Pannenberg (Gras, 1972) p. 465-476. waledé#inde 55) p. 2, a. le quat-3) (1. 60-07):
10 Brevil. 2, 9 (V, 226); Itin. 3 (V, 303-306).
OE VenE der, Dy 15 as 15) Ge Que 82-84), 18 Ttin, 3, 2 (V, 303-304). For Bonaventure, the term memory has a much wider range of meaning than in modern usage; in this regard, the Seraphic Doctor is dependent on the views of Augustine. In describing three operations of memory,
THEMES IN THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
far as the finite spirit is shaped by the objects to which it turns, when it turns to God, it becomes like Him to the highest degree.
Man is an image of God in terms of these faculties in as far they have God as their ultimate object. Bonaventure recognizes another level of actuation when the soul reflects upon itself. Since the soul is an image of God, when it reflects upon itself, by being conscious of itself, it becomes conformed to that of which it is the image.
Hence, the image of God resides in these same faculties in as far as they have the soul itself as an object. But when the soul turns to lower creatures in such a way as to remain with them, it has turned to that which is neither God nor an image of God but only a vestige.
In as far as it allows itself to be conformed to such vestiges, it looses its quality as an actual image. Surely the structure of the three faculties remains, but to the degree that they are not formed by God or by His image, they are no longer an express image. Thus, while the structure remains, the fitting actuation of the structure is not present.
Such an analysis makes it clear that when Bonaventure speaks of man as an image of God, he has in mind the basic dynamic of the human person by which the finite spirit is orientated to God as to that mystery in which it will find fulfillment and repose. The @ priori functions involved in Bonaventure's concept of memory, and the entire epistemological structure make it clear how he can argue in favor of the position that the existence of God is indubitable. But despite all that has been said concerning the triads, still, in Bonaventure's view, reason alone cannot move from the triadic structure to an express knowledge of the trinity. The perfect understanding of the image is given not to reason but to faith alone. The first series of arguments comes to an end with an argument from the soul's self-awareness and the immediacy of God's presence to the soul, a typical concern of the Augustinian tradition.
The second series of arguments (n. 11-20) represents a lengthy metaphysical reflection following the lines of the Bonaventurean method of reduction. Similar examples may be found in the J¢znerarium and in the Collations on the Hexaemeron.!
This sort of development may be seen as an indication of how, Bonaventure clarifies how it is that certain a priori elements are present in memory.
In the background stands the Platonic anammesis theory, though it is clearly modified to serve the purposes of a Christian theologian. The Bonaventurean theory of memory makes it clear why this dimension of the human person can be seen as the locus of a sort of preconscious contact with God.
131 Sent..d. 3) Dp. 2, an 2, q. 3, resp. (J; 93).
14 T#in, 5, 2-8 (V, 308-310).
18 Hex, 10, 15-18 (V, 379).
We?
INTRODUCTION
in Bonaventure's view, the reality of God is somehow involved in all human cognitive activity. The most fundamental fact that we know about any object is that it exists. As a positive state, being is the basis of the possibility of any knowledge. So crucial is the concept of being, that one cannot even affirm the non-existence of anything without moving through the positive concept of being. Being, therefore, is prior to all else and is that by which we know all else.
But this must be being as first, absolute, and unlimited; it must be pure being. But such being is never found as an object of knowledge in the world. The beings which we encounter in the world are limited in many ways. They are dependent, relative, mixed of potency and act. Now, since a limit cannot be recognized precisely as a limit unless in some way we transcend it, it follows that whatever may be the form of limit we are confronted with in creatures, we do not fully understand it unless we reduce it to the pure, actual form of the positive attribute which is necessarily prior to the defective, limited form in which it appears in creatures, just as pure, actual being is necessarily prior to all limited forms of being. Thus, as nonbeing can be known only through being, and as privations can be known only through positive qualities, so every form of limitation must be reduced to the positive attribute which is necessarily prior.
Here is the core of the arguments presented by Bonaventure; all ten reflect the same structure. And they lead to the philosophical affirmation of being as absolutely first, a se, etc. Since all creatures manifest the limits pointed out here, they all manifest the existence of God as the necessary, absolute, perfect, prior being.
The third series of arguments (n. 21-29) clearly bears the marks of Anselm's ontological argument.
Distinguishing between the logical order and the order of real existence outside the mind, we can see the possibility of conceiving of a being than which no greater can be conceived. But if real existence outside the mind is greater than existence in the mind alone, then the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived must contain within it the note of real existence outside the mind. For if it contained only the note of mental existence, then the concept of a greater being would be possible. If God is identified with that being than which no greater can be conceived, then the concept of the non-existence of God is self-contradictory; for it cannot be thought coherently. The Anselmian approach finds further confirmation in arguments drawn from Augustine and Boethius.
The final arguments of the series are further applications of what has been said concerning the priority of being, here seen explicitly as the foundation for the most basic principles of logic without which the human mind cannot think and which we must
THEMES IN THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
employ even in the act of denying them. These principles (identity, contradiction, and excluded middle) are the self-evident, irreducible principles of all coherent human thought. But they are unintelligible except in the light of the first being. Hence, the very principles that make coherent human thought a possibility lead to the conclusion that God exists necessarily.
We have dwelt at some length on the above arguments because they reflect numerous concerns which are truly characteristic of Bonaventure's personal theological style. Following the framework of the Scholastic disputation, Bonaventure now presents fourteen arguments against the thesis he is defending. These arguments are not drawn from philosophers or from heretics, but like the arguments in favor of the thesis, these also appeal to Scripture and to such respected theologians as John Damascene and Richard of St. Victor.
Most of the negative arguments reflect specific problems raised against the Anselmian and Augustinian arguments given above.
From many perspectives, therefore, there seems to be sufficient reason to deny the thesis, particularly since — beyond the logical questions involved — the thesis seems to empty faith of any meritorious significance.
The materials contained in the response and in the answer to the objections are an extension of what Bonaventure had already written in his Sentence Commentary.® He first clarifies what is meant by the term indubitable and indicates the sources that can give rise to doubt. Something is said to be indubitable if there are no grounds for doubt. But such grounds may arise either from some deficiency in the process of reasoning or from a deficiency in reason itself. The first possibility refers both to the object known and to the knower.
Here a truth may be doubtful if the reason for its evidence is not found in the truth itself, nor in its demonstration, nor in the intellect of the knower. None of these are applicable to the question of God's existence since in Himself He is most evident, and since all creatures proclaim His existence, and since man himself is an image of God and is orientated toward God by a natural desire which, together with knowledge and memory, directs man from the core of his being to God as to that reality in which the created spirit finds its true beatitude.
If there is doubt about the existence of God, it can arise only from subjective causes; from some deficiency in the finite subject.
In the Sentence Commentary, Bonaventure refers to this as blindness or ignorance.!? This deficiency is explained in the Disputed Questions
16 I Sent. d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, resp. (I, 154-155).
17 I Sent. d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, resp. (I, 154) which refers not to the question of God's existence, but to His nature.
INTRODUCTION
in three ways. It can mean a lack of the proper understanding of the term God; it can also refer to a conclusion drawn from inadequate evidence; or it can refer to the failure to reduce the objects of sense experience fully to spiritual realities. None of these deficiencies jeopardizes the evidence which Bonaventure has explained above.
Therefore, for the mind that correctly understands God to be that being than which no greater can be conceived, it is impossible to doubt God's existence.
In summary, the existence of God is an indubitable truth. All of man's nature; his yearning for truth, goodness, and happiness; his knowledge of his own limitations and the limitations of all other beings in the world cry out the existence of the perfect Truth and Goodness that is God, the perfect Light that illumines our minds.
Human blindness may present an obstacle to the full and deeper knowledge of God in this life, but it remains true that the existence of God is the foundation of all human certitude.
As the existence of God is the basis for all certain knowledge available to human reason, so the existence of God as trinity is the basis of all knowledge of faith. After treating of the existence of God, Bonaventure now turns to the other pillar of his development.
In the fundamenta, fourteen positions are given in favor of the thesis that the dogma of the trinity is both congruous for the human mind and its knowledge obligatory for human salvation. Here arguments are drawn from Scripture,1® from the theological tradition (e.g. the Athanasian Creed, and Augustine), and from theological reasons to indicate that the doctrine is obligatory in nature. The arguments for the congruity of the doctrine revolve around the idea that, though the dogma does not stand in contradiction to reason, yet it does transcend reason. It is fitting, so the arguments say, that the finite mind should be orientated to truth that is greater than itself.
In as far as the mind is open to Mystery which it cannot grasp, it is liberated from the necessity of making either itself or the world around it bear the weight of ultimacy. It can, therefore, subject itself in faith to the Mystery with fitting religious dispositions.!9
189Mi 235019 MEIGS e/a Ssn25:
19 TIL Sent. d. 23, a. 1, q. 1 (III, 470-472). Here Bonaventure elaborates on faith as the guiding light of all virtues. It is a virtue because in it is found uprightness of life in accordance with justice. Justice is nothing other than vo/untatis rectitudo, and faith is that habit by which our intellect voluntarily comes into the captivity of Christ. Such captivity of the intellect to a truth beyond itself and greater than itself is not a denial of human nature, but is an essential component of an upright life in which alone man's nature can find fulfillment. In ad 4 Bonaventure argues that what may appear rational from one viewpoint may seem irrational from another. It we were to accept a truth only because of the com-
THEMES IN THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
This will be developed more extensively by Bonaventure in his own response.
The arguments against the thesis attempt to show first that such a doctrine is contrary to reason, and that, for this reason, it is not fitting for man to believe it (§ 1-8). Like the former, these arguments also appeal at times to Scripture,2° at times to Augustine, and at times to theological reasoning. The arguments (§ 9-13) go on to show that the dogma is impossible for the human mind, and that therefore we are not obliged to believe it on any basis whatsoever.
Finally, the question of the motive of faith is raised, the opposition seeing no adequate clarity on the issue.
Bonaventure's response argues that, as the foundation of the entire edifice of Christian faith, the doctrine is fitting, necessary, and worthy of belief. In speaking of the trinity as the foundation of faith, Bonaventure seems to contradict what he says elsewhere concerning Christ as the starting point for theology."! Is his theology centered around the trinity or around the person of Christ ? To answer that question, it is necessary to distinguish between the order of reality and the order of human knowledge. In terms of the order of knowledge, to which theology belongs, the Christian religious experience centers around the community's experience of Jesus
Christ. From this perspective, theological methodology is Christcentered; for it is from the historical revelation in Jesus that Christians come to discern the nature of reality. Yet, through reflection it becomes clear that, for Bonaventure, the mystery of Christ would be impossible without the mystery of the trinity. Indeed, without the trinity, there would be no creation, to say nothing of the incarnation. Such statements refer not to the order of knowledge but to the order of reality. Thus, while methodologically, Bonaventure's theology begins with the person of Christ, the prior condition in which the reality of Christ is grounded is the reality of the trinity.
In this sense, it is the trinity which is the basis in the real order for the entire edifice of faith." pelling force of an argument, then our assent would not be voluntary but necessary. Such assent would be neither virtuous nor meritorious.
WG NER 21 Hex. 1, 1 & 10 (V, 329-330).
22 The position of O. Gonzalez seems incomplete or misleading in its formulation. He writes, "El cristocentrismo bonaventuriano est4 pues en functién de un trinitarismo anterior." (O. Gonzalez, Misterio Trinitario y Existencia Humana (Madrid, 1966] p. 24). While the trinity is ontologically prior, and while
Bonaventure was heir to an already developed trinitarian theology, still in terms of the inner logic of his own methodological approach, it seems that the Christ-
INTRODUCTION
What is it that moves Christians to believe in the trinity, and what is it that makes it an obligatory belief ? Bonaventure's reply to this question is an interesting example of his use of symbolic, philosophical, and historical thought patterns. The symbol that dominates the treatment is that of the book, a symbol which Bonaventure applies to the created order as a whole, to the Sacred Scriptures, and to God Himself.28 His development may be expressed in the following schema.
Book of Creation Book of Scripture Book of Life (Efficacious) (More efficacious) | (Most efficacious) Vestige Image Big NT This life Heaven in corpoin spiritu- | Implicit Explicit Innate and Explicit & ral beings al nature |- in fig- — Sacrainfused express Witness Witness ures ments light from afar from near at|}— in words -— Express hand teachings - Memory, intelli- / gence, Appropriawill tions — Mind, | knowledge, love | God as Origin, 3-fold cause emanation, distinction Efficacious in state of inno- | Necessary because of Illumination from eternal cence but obscured by sin. | darkness of sin. light through innate light and infused light.
While these three books appear in an apparently historical framework, this should not be taken to mean that one may render the other obsolete. Rather, it seems that the three books, read and interpreted simultaneously in the light of each other, constitute the testimony mystery is the starting-point, and at the cognitive level, trinitarianism is a function of Christocentrism.
*8 For a fuller treatment of the extent to which Bonaventure uses this symbol in the whole corpus of his writings, cf. W. Rauch, Das Buch Gottes. Hine systematische Untersuchung des Buchbegriffes bei Bonaventura (Miinchen, 1961).
THEMES IN THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
to the mystery.24 What distinguishes the three books is not metaphysics but the various states in the history of grace in which man finds himself.
In its own proper reality, the order of creation is and remains a reflection of God. Every creature is a vestige of God and thus reflects His trinitarian reality in a distant and unclear way in terms of three series of attributes: measure, species, order; unity, truth, goodness; measure, number, weight. By reason of appropriations, one can recognize a distant reflection of the trinity, but not a knowledge of the three persons precisely as persons. The witness of the vestige consists primarily in its witness to a three-fold causality: efficient, exemplary, and final. Bonaventure views the material world as a medium of communication between God and man; his interpretation of its structure, therefore, is of a theological nature. The created order is the objectification of the Absolute Being's Word.
It is, therefore, a means whereby the Absolute can communicate itself to the finite spirit of man. This is the structure of the world, both prior to the Fall and after the Fall.
There is yet a deeper level at which creation reflects God as triune; namely, in man who its created in the image of God. Bonaventure here employs the two Augustinian triads: memory
intelligence - will; and mind - knowledge - love. The analogy which he derives from these, and which he sees as an express and proximate witness, is that of origin and emanation leading to distinction.
This corresponds fully with his understanding of the Father as described above. The analogy of origin, together with equality, consubstantiality, and inseparability constitute an express testimony to the triune character of God.
This two-fold witness of the created order was clear and adequate prior to the Fall. But sin, with its attendant darkness, has made it difficult to read the book. It is for this reason that the book of Scripture became necessary." But that which is revealed in the Scriptures is not something contrary to the book of nature. Rather, the Scriptures make it possible for man to read and to interpret the divine revelation which has never been deficient nor absent from % Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 43; K. Forster, "Liber vitae bei Bonaventura. Ein begriffgeschichtliches Aufriss," in: Theologie in Geschichte und Gegenwart. M. Schmaas
Festschrift, ed. J. Auer and H. Volk (Miinchen, 1957) p. 397-414; H. Mercker, Schriftauslegung als Weltauslegung. Untersuchungen zur Stellung der Schrift in der
Theologie Bonaventuras (Paderborn, 1971) p. 80.
* Brevil. prol. (V, 201-208) presents an extended treatment of how the meaning of the created order is expressed in Sacred Scripture and in the reflection on it in theology.
INTRODUCTION
the beginning of the world to the end. The book of nature is not nullified but is made legible again."® Scripture itself reflects varying degrees of explicitness regarding the trinity. The Old Testament witness, which is both in figures and in words, is understood as an implicit witness. As the most significant example of a figure, Bonaventure chooses the account of Abraham and his encounter with the three young men.?? Making use of a venerable Patristic interpretation, Bonaventure sees a figure of the trinity in the fact that, though Abraham saw three men, yet he adored but one and spoke to the three as one. The clearest example of a verbal witness is Psalm 32,6; Word and Spirit are expressly named, while the Father is implied by the term Lord.
In contrast with the Old Testament, the witness of the New Testament is explicit and is contained both in sacraments and in explicit teachings. Of the sacraments, Bonaventure singles out baptism as a clear example since it is conferred with the express invocation of the trinity ;?8 for this reason it impresses the character of the trinity in the recipient. As an example of express teaching, the text of 1 John 5 is chosen. And Bonaventure concludes that since the witness of Scripture is so explicit, the doctrine is not only credible but necessary and obligatory as well.
The first two books of themselves are but inert realities unless they are read by human persons, for only then do they come to life in the finite spirit. They must be read in the proper light, which is found in what Bonaventure calls the Book of Life.2® This term refers
367 levee: 298.20) (Vi, 339-340) 3 Ltée. dos 12 (Vy 590)s ttexe 1a, 195V, S00). i Gnmlowa.
28 Mz. 28, 19. Cf. also IV Sent. d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2 (IV, 71-73) where Bonaventure clarifies various opinions on the form of baptism, pointing out as the common and certain opinion the view holding the necessity of a fully trinitarian formula.
29 This term is found frequently in religious literature of various traditions.
In the Bible, it is found in both the Old Testament (Ex. 32, 32; Is. 4, 3; Dn. 12, 1) and in the New Testament (L&. 10, 20; Phil. 4, 3; Apoc. 3, 5; 17, 8; 20, 12; 20,
15), generally in an eschatological context. In later theological literature, the term is frequently given a Christological significance (St. Bernard, Sermo in Die
Paschae [PL 183, 279]; Hugh of St. Victor, De Arca Noe Morali 2, 8 [PL 176, 641]). The Summa Fratris Alexandri recognizes three meanings for the term:
1) the knowledge of God in as far as it is the exemplar of life; 2) the human nature of the Son of God, in as far as it is the most express example of the divine exemplar; 3) Sacred Scripture, in as far as it gives verbal witness to the exemplar
(Summa I, n. 255, p. 347). In Bonaventure, the term has a wide range of interrelated meanings all of which point to God's full and perfect knowledge in which all things in the world are known and in which the mystery of predestination resides.
Cf. Brevil. 1, 8 (V, 216); Comm. in Luc. 10, 20, n. 34-35 (VII, 263-264); IV Sent. d. 43, a. 2, q. 1-3 (IV, 896-898); Brevil. 7, 1 (V, 281); Hex. 12, 8 (V, 385); Lignum vitae 12, 46 (VIL, 84-85).
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here to God's own inner life of knowledge in as far as it is the source of illumination for the human mind in reading both the book of nature and that of Scripture. It is the conjunction of the innate light of the human mind and the infused light of supernatural faith that makes the proper reading of the two previous books possible.
Thus, the Book of Life is not a source of knowledge independently of man's experience of the world and of history; but is the light whereby that experience may be read properly. Since illumination begins already in the innate light of the mind, and is brought to completion in the infused light, it follows that reason and faith are related to one another in a very positive manner.3° Reason is subordinate to faith; but faith is the intrinsic perfection of reason. For if the task of reason is to know reality, and if reality is not fully known until it is known in trinitarian terms, then the task of reason is realized only partially until it finds its completion in faith.21 Similarly, it is the conjunction of the light of reason and the light of faith that provides the basis for the unity and coherence of theology."
It is in this context that we encounter a principle basic to Bonaventure's style of theology: God is to be thought of in the most exalted and most reverent terms, which is here presented as a truth taught by human reason itself and agreed 6n by Christians, Jews,
Saracens, and even by heretics. But to think that God is not capable of perfect self-communication is a failure to think of Him in the most exalted terms. And to think that He is capable of communicating Himself fully and perfectly but does not will to do so is a failure to think of Him most reverently. Therefore, the innate light and the infused light together lead us to think of God as both capable of such communication and as actually communicating Himself
80 The relation of nature to faith is raised in the seventh objection and in the response to it; it is treated also in II Sent. d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, ad 5 (II, 437) where
Bonaventure distinguishes two ways of understanding nature. In the first sense, it refers to all that a thing is capable of being by reason of its natural origin.
It is natural for creatures to become all that God wills them to become; they have a potency for perfect obedience to God's will. God never acts contrary to nature conceived in this sense. The second sense refers to the power in creatures whereby they run their ordinary course. When nature is thus understood, it is possible to say that God acts at times against nature and at times beyond nature.
He acts in the first way when He produces something that is normally produced by secondary causes, the manner of production being entirely different. He acts in the second way when He produces something not found in nature, or something which nature by itself is not ordered to produce (e.g. incarnation, glorified bodies).
31 TIT Sent. d. 24, a. 2, q. 2 (III, 520-521).
82 J, F. Quinn, The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy (Toronto, 1973) p. 498-499; 679.