Eternity and Trinity
V. ETERNITY AND TRINITY
but dwells only as present. But any being of this sort is eternal.® Therefore, etc.
10. Again, being is divided into eternal, aeviternal, and temporal; and the aeviternal is more perfect than the temporal, and the eternal is more perfect than both of the others. But that which is more perfect is always to be attributed to the most perfect being.
Therefore the supreme eternity is to be attributed to God.
11. Again, every being in flux must be reduced to something permanent. Therefore fluid duration most be reduced to permanent duration, therefore the present that passes into the past is reduced to a present that abides always. But such a present is not found in a defective being. Therefore it is necessary that it be found in the creative essence. It is, therefore, necessary that the divine being be eternal.1° 12. Again, what is true of the future does not begin to be true at that future time, but is true always; what is true of the past remains true forever. But the future and the past are necessarily reduced to the present. Therefore it is necessary to affirm a truth which is always present without end and without beginning. But this is the eternal truth, and it cannot be affirmed of any other being than the first principle. Therefore, it is necessary that the divine being be eternal.™
OBJECTIONS
1. Eternity is a measure; but nothing that is immense has measure; for any being that has measure is not immense. Therefore, etc.
2. Again, measure is proportionate to that which is measured; but nothing can be proportionate to the divine being. Therefore, in God there is no eternal duration.
3. Again, eternity is the lack of beginning and end." But nothing lacks that which it is. Therefore, if God is the beginning and end of all things, then the divine being does not lack these attributes.
Therefore, it cannot be eternal.
4. Again, lack of completion implies defect; principle and end indicate completion. Therefore, God cannot be deprived of these.
But eternity implies the privation of these qualities. Therefore, it should not be attributed to the divine being.
® Augustine, Lib. 83 Og., q. 19.
10 Tib, de Causis, prop. ult.
11 Anselm, Monolog., c. 18.
12 Rich. of St. Victor, De Trin. II, n. 4.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
5. Again, eternity is the lack of past and future. But God truly was and is and will be. Therefore, the divine being does not possess eternity.
6. Again, if A is past time and B is future, it is true to say that God existed in A and will exist in B; and the contrary is false. Therefore, A is truly past for God and B is truly future. Therefore, the divine being has a past and a future; therefore it is not eternal.
7. Again, that which is eternal is interminable, since according to Boethius, "eternity is the possession of interminable of life.'*
That which is interminable is circular; but that which is circular is posterior to that which is straight. But only that which is absolutely first should be attributed to the divine being; therefore eternal duration should not be attributed to Him.
8. Again, in accordance with our manner of knowing as well as with the natural order, the circumference is posterior to the center. But, what the circumference is to the center, eternity 1s to time. Therefore, time should be attributed to God rather than eternity. Therefore, if it is unfitting to attribute temporality to God, the same is true of eternity.
9. Again, where eternity is, there also is totality, which is clear from the argument of Boethius: "Eternity is the simultaneous and total possession of interminable life."!4 But where there is totality, there is the possibility of being divided and of being reduced to parts. But this cannot be attributed to God since He is supremely simple. Therefore, etc.
10. Again, continuous extension is never found without the possibility of division, therefore continuous duration is never found without true totality, and hence divisibility. Therefore, a being that is incapable of having parts does not possess real duration and is not said to be "simultaneously total;" therefore, etc.
11. Again, where there is eternity, there — by definition — is simultaneity.1° But where there is simultaneity, there is distinction, because simultaneity involves relation and relation involves distinction. But the divine being is totally without distinction. Therefore it is not eternal.
12. Again, if the fullness of simultaneity resides in the divine being, then present, past, and future are simultaneous. But in the case of those beings which exist simultaneously, that which ac8 Lib. V de Consol., prosa 6; Aristotle, VIII Phys., text. 64 ff. (c. 8) J De
Caelo et Mundo, text. 5 ff. (c. 2).
M Lib, V de Consol., prosa 6.
15 From the definition of Boethius cited in n. 9 above.
V. ETERNITY AND TRINITY
companies one accompanies the others. Therefore, if aeviternity always accompanies the divine future, it likewise accompanies the divine past. Therefore, just as it lacks an end, so it lacks a beginning. But this is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible to attribute perfect, eternal duration to God. Therefore, eternity should not be attributed to the divine being.
13. Again, either eternity adds something beyond the now of eternity, or it does not. If it adds nothing, then that which coexists with the sow of eternity is eternal. But the now of time coexists with the now of eternity. Therefore, it coexists with the whole of eternity, and therefore it is eternal. If it adds something, then eternity is composed, and therefore it is not fitting for God.
14. Again, even though the point is the beginning, middle, and end of extension, it is impossible to conceive of extension within a point. Likewise, it is impossible to conceive of duration within the now.® Therefore, if eternity involves duration, it involves something beyond the ow of eternity. Therefore, it is repugnant to the highest simplicity. Therefore, it is impossible that it exist in the most simple being of God.
15. Again, the divine being, power, knowledge, and will or foreknowledge are measured by the same measure. But the divine foreknowledge is not measured by eternity since God ceases to foresee some beings. Therefore, neither is the divine being measurable by eternity.
16. Again, the divine being and operation are measured by the same measure, because in God, substance, power, and operation are one and the same. But if the divine being is measured by eternity, so also is the divine act of creation. Therefore, God creates eternally and from eternity; for this reason an eternal creature is produced.
But this is false; therefore that from which it follows is false.
17. Again, all truth is measured by time, by aeviternity, or by eternity. But the fact that the world was to be created was true in God before the creation of the world. Therefore, it was measured either by eternity or by time. But it was not measured by time, for time did not exist then. Therefore, it was measured by eternity.
But this truth ceased to be true. Therefore, it is evident that eternity has an end. But the divine being has no end. Therefore, it is not possible to attribute eternity to the divine being.
18 Aristotle, [V Phys. text. 103 ff. (C. 11), and VI, text. 24 ff. (c. 3).
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
CONCLUSION
The divine being is eternal, because it is both simple and infinite.
Response. The divine being is eternal in that it is both simple and infinite. Because it is infinite, it lacks beginning and end; for, if it had either of these, in that respect it would have termination and limitation; and thus it would not have supreme immensity.
Because it is simple, it lacks both prior and posterior which necessarily include diversity and some composition. Therefore, supreme simplicity involves total simultaneity; supreme immensity involves total interminability; and when both of these attributes are joined together, they constitute eternity. For eternity is nothing other than the "simultaneous and total possession of interminable life." And since these two qualities — namely, immensity and simplicity — are found together in no other being but God, therefore the quality of eternity cannot be communicated to any being other than God.
Furthermore, since these two qualities are beyond our ability to imagine or to appreciate, therefore eternal duration cannot be understood correctly by anyone who does not first lay aside his imagination.
These two attributes must be joined together if we are to understand the most infinite and simple duration of the divine being, and thus also its true permanence which lacks beginning, and interpolation or expansion, and division.or termination; indeed, it has no succession whatsoever. And this sort of argument arrives at a necessary conclusion because of the union of these two attributes, however much it may seem to our imagination that they are contrary to one another.
Something similar to this can be found in God. Just as God, being both simple and immense, is totally present in distant places and even though these places are distinct from one another, still
He who is present in them does not for that reason lack supreme unity and simplicity; so also because of its immensity, the divine being, which is eternal is present to different moments of time; even though these moments are distant from each other and are spread apart, yet, because of His supreme simplicity, He is not distant from Himself. And as the divine incircumscribability is present to all places and yet is not extended in them, even though they them selves are truly extended, so the divine eternity is present to all moments of time, yet it does not undergo succession in themeven though they truly have succession.
Now, in creatures — even though a complete likeness cannot be found because of their deficiency — yet a certain limited likeness can be found which can lead us to understand the eternity of the
V. ETERNITY AND TRINITY
divine being if we abstract from the defect by means of our intellect.
In a certain way, this likeness can be noticed both in the image and in the vestige. For in the soul — which is the image of God— there exists the recall of past things, the knowledge of present things, and the foreknowledge of future things.17 These exist in the soul simultaneously in such a way that those things which occur in succession in distinct moments of time are united and bound together in the soul, which is a spiritual substance; yet because the soul is limited and receives from some being outside itself, it lacks that perfect simultaneity. But God receives nothing and is in no way limited; and therefore it is necessary to undezstand all things as present to Him without beginning or end. And this is to understand eternity.
In time, which is the vestige of eternity, present, past, and future truly exist in such a way that what was future later becomes present and then past, because it is rooted in mutable and fluid being, or in movement itself. Therefore, if the present is understood to be rooted in immutable and stable being which has neither beginning nor end, that would be understood to be eternal.
So, if one proceeds by correct reflection from creatures to the creator by removing all imperfection and retaining every perfection, it is possible to achieve a certain understanding of the eternity of the divine being. However, as long as we are in the flesh, this will not be a perfect understanding; since, while we live here "we have no knowledge without succession and time'';!® and therefore it is very different from eternity unless by chance it is elevated to a higher level by a special gift; as Augustine says, "when we comprehend something eternal in our mind, we are not in this world.'"'!® Therefore, it is clear that the divine being is indeed eternal; and it is clear what the necessary reason for this is, and how our thought can arrive at this. The arguments that prove that the divine being is eternal must be conceded.
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1.2. To the opposing objection that eternity is a measure, it must be said that, even though in terms of our manner of knowing, eternity is predicated as a measure, yet in reality and truth, it indicates nothing other than the being of the divine substance; and as that being is immense, so also is eternity immense. Therefore, it is
17 These are integral parts of prudence according to Cicero, II Rhet., c. 54.
18 Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminisc., c. 1.
19 De Trin. IV, c. 20, n. 28.
St. Bonaventure, Disputed Questions
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
said to be equal to itself not because of a common term — since that which is immense has no term — but because of the lack of mutual excess. And thus our response to the first and second objection concerning the nature of measure becomes clear, since those arguments proceed from that sort of measure which is distinct from the thing measured, which both terminates and is terminated, and hence can have meaning only in reference to a finite being. All these things are excluded from the divine eternity. Yet it is not false to speak of measure in terms of our mode of knowing in as far as our knowledge represents the divine being in the mode of duration; and that duration — even though infinitely exceeding every creature — neither exceeds nor is exceeded with respect to the divine being itself.
3. To the objection that eternity includes the lack of beginning and end, it must be said that in as far as beginning and end are taken in the definition of eternity, they are identical with the initial and final term in the duration of a being. But such terms do not exist except in a being that begins and ceases to exist. Therefore, when 1 say that God is beginning and end, the notions of beginning and end are used equivocally. Hence, there are two weaknesses in the argument; first, because God is beginning and end with respect to things outside Himself, and second, because He is beginning and end in the order of causality. Therefore, when it is said that eternity is the lack of beginning and end, beginning and end are understood as internal to God and in accordance with the reason of duration.
4. To the objection that the lack of beginning and end implies a defect because each of these has the nature of a completing part, etc., it must be said that beginning and end, in as far as they indicate a terminus, involve limitation and defect, even though they seem to signify completion. Therefore, on the contrary, even though their absence seems to be a privation for our manner of knowing, yet it is a positive reality on the part of the thing; for a duration which lacks beginning and end is true in such a way that it contains nothing of non-being within itself.
5. To the objection that eternity is the lack of past and future, it must be said that past and future are attributed to something in two ways; either as a disposition in the thing known or in the knower himself. Likewise, when it is said that something has happened in the past or that it will happen in the future, this can be understood in two ways; either in the mode of when-ness and inherence, or in the mode of simultaneity and coexistence. Therefore, when it is said that eternity is the lack of past and future, it must be said that this is true in as far as past and future include the disposition of a being which is said to have existed in the past in such a way that
V. ETERNITY AND TRINITY
when the being is measured, there remains in it an affection or a certain disposition which is called when, according to what is said elsewhere, namely, that "when is contained in every being that begins to exist."° Moreover, when it is said of God that He was and will be, the past is not a disposition in the thing known, but in the knower. And this is not predicated by reason of commensuration, when-ness, and inherence, but by reason of duration, a certain simultaneity, and coexistence. Hence, all those statements are improper in a certain sense. We speak of eternity hesitantly in terms of various moments of time because our mind does not rise up to an understanding of eternal things unless it is led through time as long as we are wayfarers.
6. To the objection that it is not said of God that He did exist in the future, nor that He will exist in the past, it must be said that this is not because there is any succession or variation in the divine being, but because of the connotation of coexistence in the past or future; in which there is variation to the extent that the past cannot be said to be future and future cannot be said to be past. Hence, while the future is not predicated of the past nor the past of the future, this is not because past and future refer to another being or another mode of being in God, but only in the created being.
7.8. To the objection that eternity is identical with interminability, it must be said that this does not do justice to the full reality of eternity, since eternity involves not only interminability, but also simultaneity. And just as in the mode of interminability, it includes a certain intelligible circumference lacking beginning and end, so in the mode of simultaneity, it includes the simplicity and indivision of the center-point.24 Both of these are affirmed together with respect to the divine being because it is simultaneously simple and infinite. Therefore, eternity is understood as a circle, and it includes no posteriority, neither with respect to the circumference nor with respect to the center. Thus we can clarify our response to the objection from time which assumes the function of a center-point with respect to interminable eternity. This argument, like the previous one, proceeds from an insufficient base, since it considers eternity only in as far as it is the measure of immense being, while it ought to be considered simultaneously that it is the measure of the simple and indivisible, and these are properties which can in no way be found in the measure of time.
9. To the objection that where eternity is found, there also is totality, it must be said that the totality which is affirmed in eternity
20 Gilbert Porret. in lib. Sex Principiorum, c. De quando.
31 Alan of Lille, Theolog. Regul., regula 7.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
does not refer to the quantity of weight, but to the quantity of power in which the reality of greatness and immensity stands together with perfect simplicity. Therefore, it does not follow that where there is totality, there is divisibility. This is not true except of that sort of whole which is truly quantitative and in which necessarily there are distinct parts since such a totality involves true quantity.
Or, it can be said that the phrase 'otal and simultaneous is used with respect to perfection rather than with respect to the distribution of some integral whole into parts."
10. To the objection that continuous extension is never found without the possibility of division, it must be said that there is no parallel because extension always involves parts outside of parts, and hence corporality, quantity, and the possibility of division," while duration refers to undivided being which is found not only in composite beings but in simple beings as well.
11. To the objection that eternity involves simultaneity, it must be said that simultaneity is included in eternity not because of the condition of con-duration and co-existence of diverse beings capable of duration, but rather because of the lack of succession in the continuity of a being which endures. Hence, eternity is defined as total and simultaneous because in it there are no elements which succeed one another, and not because there are various and diverse realities existing simultaneously in it. Hence, simultaneity refers to nothing other than the supreme, simple, and undivided presence, and this involves no intrinsic diversity.*4 12. To the objection that if in God past, present and future are identical, then the creature which, in its own way is measured by the divine future ought also to be measured by the divine past, it must be said that there is no parallel; and one cannot be inferred from the other. The reason for this is that, while in God to have no beginning and to have no end are identical, there is a great difference between these in the creature. For since the creature is produced from nothing, it is essential to it that it have a principle and a beginning. But it is not repugnant to the created nature that it have no end or termination; nor is the opposite of this essential to the creature, because the tendency of the creature is to the contrary.
But it does not follow from this that if the creature can be compared to God with respect to the future, it can also be compared to Him with respect to the past. Just as it does not follow that since justice
™ Aristotle, V Metaph., text. 30 ff. (IV, c. 25 ff.). Cf. above, Q. 4, a. 1, resp. and ad 2.
*° Aristotle, De Praedicam., c. De quanto.
*4 Boethius, V De Consol., prosa 6.
V. ETERNITY AND TRINITY
and immensity in God are identical; and since the creature can be assimilated to God's justice, it can also be assimilated to His immensity; so also the kind of argumentation given above makes neither proper inferences nor correct conclusions.
13. To the objection that eternity either does or does not add something beyond the ow of eternity, it must be said that as in eternity there are both simultaneity and interminability, or simplicity and immensity so the sow of eternity signifies that duration in terms of simple simultaneity, while eternity does so in terms of interminable immensity. Just as interminable immensity adds nothing in reality beyond the indivisibility of the divine simplicity and simultaneity, but only in terms of our knowledge, so also eternity adds nothing beyond the now of eternity. Just as it does not follow that the creature comprehends the most simple God, and therefore that it comprehends
God as immense, so also it does not follow that if something coexists with the now of eternity, then there is something that coexists with interminable eternity. Those qualities which are identical in God correspond to distinct and varied qualities in the creature, as is clear in the case of goodness and wisdom; and of justice and mercy, according to the treatment given above.*>
14. To the objection that even though the point is the beginning, the middle, and the end of extension, it is impossible to conceive of extension within the point itself, it must be said that there is no parallel, for while the point is the beginning of extension, yet it does not possess the entire essence of extension nor is it a constitutive part thereof. But the now is the entire essence of duration, not only in things eternal and aeviternal, but also in temporal duration as well. The reason for this is: extension possesses all its parts simultaneously; and "a point is a substance in place,"'6 hence, it necessarily involves position in matter. And therefore, since it is indivisible, it cannot be the essence of a divisible whole nor a constitutive part thereof, since any part of a continuum is continuous. But it is different in the case of duration, for here there never is anything but that which is present and indivisible, even in the case of successive duration. Therefore, it is not surprising that the essence of duration can be included in the now especially in the case of a being in which there is no difference between being and essence, as is the case in eternity.
15.16. To the objection that the divine being and power, knowledge and foreknowledge are measured by the same measure it 2 Q, 3, a. 1, resp. and 6 ff.
26 Aristotle, J Poster., c. 23 (c. 27); J De Anima, text. 68 (c. 4), and V Metaph., text. 12 (IV, c. 6).
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
must be said that this is true with reference to the principle significate but not with reference to the connoted significate. From this the response to the following objection from creation is clear. For the intrinsic act is eternal as is the substance; but the effect is temporal since it is a creature.
17. To the objection that before the creation of the world it was true that the world would be created in the future, it must be said that this proposition, though it is but one, nonetheless implies a double truth. For if, before the world came to be, it is said that the world is to be created in the future, this is not true except in the sense that, in some way, the world has some reality in its cause; and in this sense, the proposition is true with eternal truth. Further, it is not sufficient that the world have being only in its cause; indeed, for the proposition to be true, it is necessary that at some time the world have existence outside of its cause. And since, before the world came to be, its being was not yet created but was to be created, therefore it is not true with created truth, but with the truth of that which is yet to be created. And since when a thing begins to exist as a created thing, it ceases to be something to be created in the future, therefore that proposition which signifies a thought that is true from eternity ceases to be true not because of a termination in eternity, but because of a beginning in time, since something temporal should be understood together with the eternal. And with this the response to the present question is clear.
ARTICLE II
VPHEIRER Tage LRINLY
CAN EXIST TOGETHER WITH ATERNIGY
Next it is asked whether the trinity can exist together with eternity. It seems that they are incompatible.
OBJECTIONS
1. Wherever eternity exists, there is total simultaneity;! but where there is total simultaneity, there is no order; where there is no order, there is no emanation; where there is no emanation, there can be no plurality of persons. Therefore, if there is supreme and true eternity in the divine being, it is impossible that there be a true trinity or plurality of persons.
1 From the definition of Boethius.
V. ETERNITY AND TRINITY
2. Again, "a cause is anything from whose being another follows" ;? namely, the effect. But it is certain that the effect does not follow from the cause because of diversity, since they can exist simultaneously; therefore the effect follows the cause because of production. Therefore, where there is production, there is something antecedent and something consequent. But where these exist, there is not true eternity. Therefore, etc.
3. Again, if there are three persons in the trinity, either they are equally first, or they are not equally first. If they are equally first, then one cannot proceed from the other, and hence they cannot coexist in the same nature. But if they are not equally first, then they are not simply and equally coeternal. Therefore, the same conclusion follows as above.
4. Again, every corruption necessarily supposes a final term;? therefore, every production or emanation posits an initial term. But the trinity cannot exist without emanation or production, and therefore it cannot exist without some sort of beginning. But this is incompatible with eternity. Therefore, etc.
5. Again, eternity is interminable duration.4 Therefore, if there is an eternal trinity in God, there must be an interminable production or emanation of persons. But production or emanation without a term is never perfect because it never terminates in a being that is produced. Therefore, either the trinity is not perfect or it is not eternal.
6. Again, in God existence and perdurance are absolutely identical. Therefore it is the same thing to have a principle of being and a principle of duration. But there can be no true trinity unless one person possesses the principle of existence by production. Therefore, this cannot be unless it possesses a principle of duration. But this is incompatible with eternity.® Therefore, etc.
7. Again, person is not greater in power or actuality than essence. But the divine essence cannot produce another essence coeternal with itself; therefore neither can a person produce another person coeternal with itself. Therefore either there is not a trinity of persons in the divine essence, or the supreme eternity is not found there.
8. Again, every being is either created or uncreated. Likewise, every being is either of itself or of another. But every created being
2 Aristotle, [7 Phys., text. 37 (c. 3); JJ Mesaph., text. 6 ff. (I, brevior, c. 2);
V Metaph., text. 2-4 (IV, c. 2); Avicenna, Metaph., tr. 4, c. 1.
3 Aristotle, V Phys., text. 7 (c. 1).
4 Implied in the definition of Boethius.
5 Rich. of St. Victor, De Trin. Il, c. 4.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
is of another; therefore every uncreated being is of itself. But everything eternal is uncreated; therefore everything eternal is of itself.
There is, therefore, nothing eternal that is of another. But there can be no trinity unless one person proceeds from another. Therefore, where there is trinity, there is not eternity.
9, Again, whenever any power, whether finite or infinite, projects itself into some act with the full totality of its power, it is impossible that it project in another act at one and the same time. But in the act of generating, the paternal power fully projects the immensity of its total power, since the Son is as great as the Father. Therefore, it cannot produce another person in the very same act. Therefore, if it produces a third person, this will be either before or after the generation of the Son. But this cannot be in the fullness of eternity.
Therefore, either there is no trinity in God, or there is no true eternity.
10. Again, wherever there is production, there one being receives existence from another. But nothing receives what it already possesses. Therefore, if the Son is produced by the Father, He receives existence from the Father. Therefore, He did not possess that existence before He received it. But whatever receives an existence not previously possessed receives a beginning of duration; and no such being is eternal. Therefore, eternity cannot coexist with production, and hence neither can it coexist with the trinity.
11. Again, eternity expresses presence; whence the eternal is always present according to its own proper nature. But emanation in God, and above all generation in the proper sense, is more properly expressed in terms of the past than in terms of the present; since it is more proper to say that the Son was always generated and was always born than to say He is generated and born.® Therefore, it seems that these two things cannot exist together. Therefore, if the trinity cannot exist without true production, it cannot exist together with true eternity. But against this there are innumerable authorities both in the Old and in the New Law.? But it is shown from reason.
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. "Relative terms naturally exist simultaneously."'® Father and Son are truly relative terms, as are Spirator and Spirit. Therefore, they are simultaneous by nature. Therefore, if any of the persons is
® Gregory, X XIX Moral., c. 1, n. 1.
7 ChyOml, a..2 above.
8 Aristotle, De Praedicam., c. de his quae ad aliquid.
V. ETERNITY AND TRINITY
eternal, it is necessary that all the persons be eternal, since they are simultaneous by nature. What follows from this is evident; namely, that because of His supreme simplicity, relation in God cannot be an accident, nor something added from elsewhere. Therefore, it is necessary that the three persons be absolutely simultaneous.
2. Again, the mind of the Father has always existed and known simultaneously because His being is identical with His knowledge and does not precede His knowledge either by nature or by any duration. But to know in one's mind is to draw a word from oneself.
Therefore, the Father simultaneously exists and generates the Word.
But the Word cannot be except as a Word that is pleasing and loved ;® and therefore it is united to the lover. Hence, if the divine knowledge exists together with eternity, so also eternity exists together with the trinity.
3. Again, it is proper to the perfection of a power to produce its acts readily. Hence some powers produce acts in an imperceptible time,!° and others do so in an instant; and others do so simultaneously with their duration and with posteriority in accordance with their nature. And all this is found in creatures. Therefore, if the divine power is supremely powerful and absolutely exceeds any created powers, it is capable of producing and actually does produce in such a way that whatever is produced is simultaneous in nature with the one producing.
4. Again, the Father can communicate deity and omnipotence to the Son, otherwise, it would not be the Son. But deity is itself eternity, and God could not exist if He were not eternal. Therefore, the first person can communicate eternity to the others; therefore the trinity and eternity can exist together.
5. Again, the uncreated light has greater power to produce brightness than does the created light. But created light never exists without brightness therefore neither does the uncreated light. Therefore, if the brightness is the person that is produced, it is clear, etc.
6. Again, the trinity exists together with immensity, and immensity necessarily includes eternity.11 Therefore, even more so, a true and perfect trinity exists together with true and perfect eternity. Therefore, there is no repugnance between them.
7. Again, the trinity exists together with supreme equality."
But equality exists not only in terms of power, but also in terms of ® Augustine, De Trin. IX, c. 10, 11, n. 15 ff. Cf. Q. de Sci. Christi, q. 6, resp.
(V, 34-35).
10 Aristotle, JV Phys., text. 127 (c. 14).
11 Cf. Q. 4, a. 2 above.
13 Cf. Q. 2, a. 2, fund. 10 above.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
duration, in which nothing can be equal to the eternal unless it is coeternal with it. Therefore, if the trinity exists together with supreme equality, it exists together with eternity as well.
8. Again, whenever a power and its act are identical, if the power can be eternal, the same is true of its act, especially when nothing extrinsic or created is connoted. But in the Father, the ability to generate is identical with the act of generation; and the same is true of the ability to spirate. Therefore, if it is necessary that the Father has the power to generate eternally, then it is necessary to admit that He has generated eternally.
9. Again, where being and relation are absolutely identical it is necessary that they be measured by the same measure. But, indeed, the being of the Father is identical with His relation to the Son, and vice versa; since in God there is no composition.!4 Therefore, if being is eternal, so also is the mutual relation of the persons.
10. Again, in the created image, essence and power exist simultaneously; and each of the three powers exists at the same time with the others, as is manifestly clear in the human soul. Therefore, since the harmony among the divine persons is greater, all the more will each one be coeternal with the other; — as perpetuity is related to the image, so eternity is related to the creative trinity. Whence,
"from the perpetuity of things, the eternal Creator is clearly shown."
Therefore, the eternity of the trinity can be clearly inferred from the perpetuity of the image.
CONCLUSION
The trinity of persons necessarily exists together with eternity.
Response. The trinity and eternity necessarily exist together; and this conclusion is drawn from the essential properties, from the emanations of origin, and from the personal relations.
From the perspective of the essential properties, I say that the trinity exists together with the highest unity, simplicity, and immensity of essence, as has been shown above;!* therefore, the being of the divine persons is one, most simple, and immense. But eternity refers to the essence, which in the trinity is not numbered, composed, or limited. It follows, therefore, that in the three persons, there is true eternity because of immensity; there is the highest eternity because of absolute simplicity; and there is one eternity because of 18 Aristotle, J/J Phys., text 32 (c. 4).
14 Cf, Q. 3, a. 2 above.
16 Cf, Q. 2, 3 and 4.
V. ETERNITY AND TRINITY
unity of essence. Therefore, eternity does not exclude the trinity, since the trinity necessarily includes eternity. The same conclusion can be drawn from the emanations of origin, in terms of the one producing, and the one produced, as well as in terms of the mode of production. Because of its supreme likeness, the one produced possesses full equality; because of the natural diffusion or communication, the production is fully necessary. Therefore, if the person producing is eternal, it is necessary that the act of producing be eternal, as well as the person produced and the mode of production.
It is clear, therefore, that the trinity and eternity are not only not mutually repugnant, but are marvelously harmonious and necessarily exist together.
The same conclusion can be drawn from the personal relations.
For the divine persons are distinguished by their relations; I say, not by extrinsic relations but by intrinsic relations; not by accidental relations but by permanent ones; not by relations that diminish, but by ones that are most fulfilling. Since an intrinsic relation, which is not accidental but perfect, coexists together with its supposite, and since a relation and its correlations are simultaneous in nature, relations of this sort include the highest simultaneity in the divine persons. They involve no limitation because they exist together with the highest infinity. And since nothing else is required for eternity other than simultaneity together with absolute interminability, and supreme interminability together with absolute simultaneity, the trinity necessarily coexists with eternity, and eternity with trinity, since the trinity does not exclude but includes eternity.
Whence, Augustine writes in the eleventh book of The City of God, chapter 28: "God, in whose image we were created, is true eternity and eternal truth, and eternal and true love. And He is Himself the eternal, true, and beloved trinity."1® As eternity is not repugnant to love and truth, so it is not repugnant to the trinity, and not vice versa. Therefore, the arguments which demonstrate this must be conceded.
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1. To the first contrary objection that where there is eternity, there is total simultaneity, it must be said that the simultaneity of eternity excludes the order of prior and posterior, but it does not 16 XJ, 28. The original text would read in translation: "It is, therefore, because we are men, created to the image of a Creator, whose eternity is true, His truth eternal, His love both eternal and true, a Creator who is the eternal, true, and lovable trinity, in whom there is neither confusion nor division..."
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
exclude the order of origin. But when it is said that the trinity includes order, this is understood not of the order of priority and posteriority, but of the order of origin and natural emanation, according to what Augustine says, that "there is an order not by which one is prior to another, or one is posterior to another, but by which one proceeds from the other."??
2. To the objection that the effect follows the cause not by reason of diversity but by reason of production, it must be said that neither of these by itself is a total, sufficient, and perfect cause; but both must be taken together. Therefore, the effect follows the cause because it emanates from it in such a way that it differs essentially from the cause. And because of this, it is not as perfect as the cause, nor is it equal to the cause in duration and in full equality of power.
But the case is different in the divine production where the one producing and the one produced possess one and the same essence and therefore total equality in duration as well as in power.
3. To the objection that the persons are either equally first or they are not, it must be said that, in terms of the negation of prior and posterior, they are equally first, but in terms of the order of origin, they are not equally first. But it does not follow from this that they are not equally coeternal because — as was shown above — the excellence of these emanations, which are supremely perfect by reason of simplicity and immensity, includes the coeternity of the persons producing and the persons produced.
4. To the objection that corruption implies a final term, it must be said that there is no parallel, because corruption always involves a defect and a movement from the complete to the incomplete; but generation does not; for one sort of generation takes place by the eduction of something from potency to act, and because of its imperfection, this sort necessarily involves an initial term; but there is another sort of generation which takes place through the most actual communication in accordance with the total perfection of the producer and of that which is produced, and of that from which it is produced, and of the mode according to which it was produced.
It is this sort of generation which is attributed to God; and since it involves no imperfection, it includes no initial term.
5. To the objection that eternity is interminable duration, it must be said that the term of a production can be understood in two ways: in the one principal sense, namely, as the actual reality produced; or in another related sense, namely, as that which is not produced anew. And this related meaning is found in those beings in which there is a distinction between the process of being produced
17 Lib. IT Contra Maximinum Arian., c. 14, n. 8.
V. ETERNITY AND TRINITY
and the product of the process. Therefore, when it is asked whether Or not generation in God has a term, it must be said that if term is understood in the first sense, it has a term because the Father generates the Son in such a way that the Son is begotten. But it is not true if ferm is understood in the second sense, since the Son is always begotten and is always generated, because in Him the process of being produced and the product of the process are identical because of the perfection of the supreme simplicity and actuality.
6. To the objection that in God existence and perdurance are identical, it must be said that the principle of duration can be understood in two ways; in one way, relative to the production and communication of duration; in another way, relative to the beginning of duration. If principle is accepted in the first sense, the Father is not only the principle of being for the Son but the principle of duration as well; for just as He gives Him being, so He gives Him eternal being. But if it is taken in the second sense, it is not true and the argument is not conclusive because of the different meaning of principle.
7. To the objection that person is not greater in power and actuality than the essence, it must be said that there is no parallel since the divine essence cannot produce another essence either from its own self or from another being that would be coeternal and equally first with itself. Therefore, it must produce from nothing. Hence, it is necessary that the essence produced in this way should have being after non-being, and that it should begin to exist when it moves from non-being to being. But the case is different in the production of one person from another person, because the person producing and the one produced possess one essence and one nature. Therefore, because of the one and undivided essence it is not necessary that the production of one person from another should involve a beginning.
8. To the objection that every being is either created or uncreated, and likewise every being is either of itself or from another, it must be said that to be from another can be taken in two ways; either to be essentially from another, or to be personally from another.
Taking it in the first sense, as essential difference, it corresponds to the division of being into created and uncreated which form two essentially different extremes. In the second sense, it does not correspond to this division. If we pass from one meaning to the other, a figure of speech emerges because of the change in the mode of predication as we move from essence to person.!§ And such a mode of predication does not apply to God.
18 Aristotle, J Elench., c. 3 (c. 4); cf. Q. 2, a. 2, ad 7 above.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
9. To the objection that when an infinite power projects itself into act with the totality of its power, it cannot project itself into another act at one and the same time, it must be said that this is true when such a power acts totally in terms of the productive power and the mode of production. But the minor is false, because, even though the Father produces the Son in accordance with His immense power, yet He generates Him and He does not spirate
Him. Therefore, in accordance with the other mode of production which takes place by spiration together with the Son, there is a production of another person since those two productions are not mutually exclusive but are naturally united. As is clear in the case of the mind, the actual consideration of the intellect does not impede but rather contributes to the fact that the affections are turned to the good that is known and seen, so also the generation of the Word proceeding from the mind does not stand in the way of the breath of love which embraces both.
10. To the objection that wherever there is production, there one being receives existence from another, it must be said that there is a type of production in which there is a distinction between the process of being produced and the product of the process; and there is a type of production in which these are completely identical.
Likewise, reception can be taken in two senses. In one sense, fo receive and to have received are different; in the other sense, they are fully identical. The first meaning corresponds to the first type of production; the second meaning corresponds to the second type of production. The objection is true relative to the first, but not relative to the second; and it is in this way that the Son receives being from the Father. For He always has received and always receives, because the Father always generates and has always generated, as may be clearly concluded from the foregoing.
11. To the objection that eternity expresses the present while generation is explained better in terms of the past, it must be said that the eternal generation is always most actual and most complete.
While the actuality of any act is better expressed in terms of the present, completion and perfection is best expressed in terms of the past. Hence, the eternal generation cannot be adequately expressed in any temporal terms, though it is necessary to use temporal terms to express it since it is beyond all time and possesses whatever perfection can be expressed by temporal language. Hence, because of its perfection, it is fittingly spoken of in terms of the past; and because of its actuality, it is fittingly spoken of in terms of the present; because of its continuation and indefectibility, it is fittingly spoken of in terms of the future. Since all these are one in that generation, it cannot be sufficiently explicated through any word. It
V. ETERNITY AND TRINITY
is not surprising that the sound of temporal words is inadequate to express the most quiet silence of that eternity and of that eternal generation, which is better understood than it is expressed; which, in the present, is believed rather than understood; and which will be better seen in the future than it is believed now, for as our Savior says: "This is eternal life; that they know You who alone are true
God, and Him whom you have sent, Jesus Christ."19 In no way can we arrive at this unless our intellect be more fully elevated beyond the changes of time, and beyond the fog of our phantasms to the freedom of that supercelestial quiet.
19 Jn. 17, 3.
QUESTION VI
WHETHER THE TRINITY CAN EXIST TOGETHER
WITH SUPREME IMMUTABILITY
Next the question is asked, whether the trinity can exist together with supreme immutability. And two questions are asked in reference to this. The first is, whether the divine being is immutable; the second is, whether the trinity and supreme immutability can exist together.
ARTICLE I
WHETHER THE DIVINE BEING IS IMMUTABLE
Concerning the first question, we proceed as follows. That the divine being is immutable is shown in the following ways.
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. First, by authority, Malachy 3 writes: "I the Lord do not change."! The Glossa writes: ""He says this lest it be thought that there is any element of changeability in God.'? The Psalm says:
"You will change them, and they will be changed; but you yourself remain the same." The Glossa says, immutable.
2. Again, the same thing can be shown by reason as follows. The divine being is simply and universally first. But immutable being is prior to the mutable, because the mutable must be reduced to the immutable.* Therefore, if it is universally and principally first, then it is universally immutable. amv erseno:
2 Glossa ordinaria, found in Strabo and Lyranum, according to Jerome.
The following citation is Psa/m 101, 27.28. The Gloss is found in Peter Lombard and Lyranum (interlinear).
* Aristotle, VIIJ Phys., text. 33 ff. (c. 5); and X/I Metaph., text. 35 ff. (XI, c. 7).
VI. IMMUTABILITY AND TRINITY
3. Again, the divine being is the ultimate, to which all other beings tend as to their supreme end.' But other beings find their rest in the highest and final end; they can find rest in no being which is not entirely immutable in itself. Therefore, the same conclusion follows as above.
4. Again, as the philosophers say and as reason convinces us, the divine being is absolutely and in every way necessary.5 But anything that undergoes any change in some way lacks necessity with respect to that in which it is changed. Therefore, if the divine being is necessary it is immutable.
5. Again, the divine being is most perfect. But whatever is most perfect cannot be improved nor can it be defective. But anything that changes either acquires something or loses something.®
Therefore, the divine being cannot be changed in any way.
6. Again, the divine being is most simple. Therefore, it has nothing of an accidental nature." But, in everything that undergoes change, either something is added, or something is removed. Therefore, mutability cannot exist with simplicity. Therefore, it is necessary that the opposite be true. Therefore, the divine being is immutable.
7. Again, the divine being is immense. But whatever is changed is changed either into a better state, or into a worse state, or into an equal state. But that which is immense cannot be greater or less, nor can it have an equal. Therefore, it is absolutely immutable.®
8. Again, the divine being is eternal, as is clear from the foregoing.® But, in some way, there is a prior and a posterior in every change. But in no way can this be found in eternity. Therefore, no change can be found in eternity. It remains, therefore, that the divine being is entirely immutable.
9. Again, every change is either a movement to being, or a movement away from being, or a movement within being, because everything that undergoes change either receives being, or loses being, or moves from one state of being to another, or moves from one mode of being to another.!° But God is pure being itself, since
He exists of Himself as pure act. Therefore, He can be changed in 4 Boethius, De Hebdomadibus, sive Quomodo Substantiae, etc. Aristotle. XII Metaph., text. 52 (XI, c. 10).
; 5 Avicenna, Metaph., tr. 1, c. 8 & tr. 8, c. 4ff.; Algazel, J IH Oe, N88. Pay Ee
De esse possibili.
6 Aristotle, VJ Phys., text. 40 (c. 5).
7 As shown in Q. 3, a. 1 above.
8 Rich. of St. Victor, De Trin. Il, c. 3.
SCE On 5, ay tsiqs.4, ant above:
10 Aristotle, V Phys., text. 7 (c. 1).
St. Bonaventure, Disputed Questions
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
none of these ways; and no other types of change are possible.
Therefore, He is immutable.
10. Again, every change is either substantial or accidental. But God is not changed substantially, since He is incorruptible; nor is
He changed accidentally, since there are no accidents in Him.
Therefore, He admits of no changeability whatsoever.
OBJECTIONS
1. Wisdom 7 writes: "Wisdom is mobile beyond all motion."
It is certain that this speaks about uncreated wisdom. Therefore, if she is the most mobile of all, it seems that the divine being is the most changeable among all changeable beings. If you say that this refers to wisdom as a cause, then the objection can be raised that a being which is mobile both causally and formally is more mobile than one which is mobile in only one of these ways.
2. Again, there is a hierarchy among creatures according to their degree of mobility, because the highest element is more mobile than the lowest;!8 and the first heaven is more mobile than the other spheres; and the glorified body is more mobile than the heavens; and spirit is more mobile than the glorified body. But every perfection should be attributed to God. Therefore, etc.
The same conclusion is shown by reason in seven ways.
3. First, on the basis of relation. Every being to which something accrues from time is mutable. But the divine being is of such a sort, since in relation to time it is called Lord, Refuge, and King. Therefore, it is changeable. If you say that "there is no change in relation'!
Ambrose argues to the contrary in the following way: If the Father became Father from a state in which He was not the Father, He would be changed. Yet, to be Father includes a relation. Therefore, this does not hold.
4, Again, names of this sort either designate something that is identical with God, and in this case they do not begin; or they designate something created, and in this sense they are not predicated of God; or they say nothing, and in this sense it is no more proper to predicate them of God than of any other being; or they signify something added to God, but this necessarily supposes movement.
Therefore, etc.
1 Aristotle, V Phys., text. 1 ff. & XI Metaph., c. 10 (X,.c. 11).
12 Verse 24.
For example, fire is more mobile than earth.
M4 Aristotle, V Phys., text. 10 (c. 2); Ambrose, J De Fide, c. 9, n. 59.
VI. IMMUTABILITY AND TRINITY
5. Again, this can be shown also in terms of action. Everything that becomes an agent after being a non-agent, moves "from rest into act."!5 But anything of this sort is changed and altered in some way. But God is of this sort. Therefore, etc.
If you say that this change is on the part of the creature, the objection can be raised to the contrary that the fact that the creature is produced does not cause God to produce; but rather the contrary.
Therefore, the cause of this change is to be affirmed first of all in God.
6. Again, any agent that performs a multiplicity of actions in such a way that distinct acts are performed at distinct moments of time necessarily undergoes change. But God is such an agent because at one time He produces, and at another He conserves; at another He spares and at another He punishes. And no one of these actions is identical with the others. Therefore there is some change in God.
7. Again, the same thing can be shown on the basis of mission.
Every true mission and descent is a true change. But, according to the Scriptures, the Son of God was sent into the flesh and descended from heaven.!® And this cannot be attributed to His human nature.
Therefore, He is changed and changeable in His divine nature.
8. Again, in as far as He is man, the Son of God is something.
But it is impossible that He should acquire a quality that He did not previously possess without undergoing change in Himself, just as something acquires a whiteness which it did not previously possess. This is all the more true relative to the acquisition of a substance. Therefore, if the Son of God was made man, it is necessary that that hypostasis was changed.
9. Again, the same thing can be shown on the basis of indwelling.
Whatever begins to exist and ceases to exist in another is changed at least accidentally. But by grace, God begins to exist in the penitent person and ceases to exist in the sinner; and by His essence, He begins to exist in a nature that is generated and He ceases to exist in a nature that is corrupted. Therefore, etc.
10. Again, if one thing exists inseparably in another, when the latter is moved so is the former necessarily moved because, as the Philosopher says, ""when we are moved, etc."17 But by reason of His essence, God is present in every creature, and in no way is
He separated from them. Therefore, He is moved necessarily when the creature is moved.
15 Aristotle, JJ De Anima, text. 45 (c. 4).
16 Rm. 8, 3; Gal. 4, 4; Jn. 3, 13; Eph. 4, 9.
DUST sHapics (cm
4(G: V7):
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
11. Again, the same thing can be shown on the basis of power as follows. Whoever is capable of doing something at one moment but is not capable of doing it later possesses a power that undergoes change. But before He created the world, God could create it; but now He cannot. Therefore, etc. If you say the ability to create is not an absolute power; on the contrary; it follows that whatever the Father can do, the Son can do. But the Father can create; therefore the Son also can create. Furthermore, this is no explanation since the same thing follows from any other sign of the divine will, however great or of whatever sort. If you say that the inference should be: ''He could have created," the same thing is truly said of a blind man; namely, "he could have seen."
12. Again, whatever God can do is possible. But, if He can do now whatever He could have done, then whatever was once possible for God is possible now. But this is false in regard to anything that is accidentally impossible; and, according to the Saints and Doctors, such things are impossible for God. Therefore, the same conclusion follows as above; consequently the divine power is changed.
13, Again, the same thing can be shown on the basis of knowledge, since a person who ceases to know something undergoes some change in his knowledge. But God knew that the world was to be created; but now He does not actually know this, for it is completely false. Therefore, etc.
14. Again, it follows necessarily that if God knows something, then it is true.1® Therefore if He now knows actually whatever He did know, then everything that was true is now actually true. But this is false; so also is that premise false from which the conclusion is drawn. It remains, therefore, that the divine knowledge is changeable.
15. Again, the same thing can be shown on the basis of the will. As Augustine says, "The will is the proximate and immediate cause of things.""1® But when the cause is posited, the effect is posited also. Therefore, the divine willing does not precede its act of production in duration. Therefore when He begins to produce, He begins also to will. Therefore, etc.
16. Again, any person who wills something which he is capable of not willing is necessarily changed. But God wishes to save a certain wayfarer. Hither it is possible or it is impossible for Him not to will this. If it is impossible, then that man cannot be damned, or the will of God would be frustrated. If He is capable of not 18 Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XI, c. 10, 3.
19 De Trin. Il, c. 4, n. 9; De Gen. contra Manich. I, c. 2, n. 4.
VI. IMMUTABILITY AND TRINITY
willing this; but anyone who is capable of not willing something after willing it can undergo change. Therefore, etc.
17. Again, it is impossible that any voluntary agent whose operation is in conformity with its will should will one of a pair of contraries and effect the other; and vice versa. But at one time God puts to death, and at another He gives life.29 And He does many other incompatible actions. Therefore, it is necessary that His will desires one thing at one time, and the contrary at another time. But any will that operates in this way undergoes change. Therefore, the divine will is changeable. But the divine will is identical with God's being. Therefore, etc. If you say that the reason for this lies in the effect; this is of no significance since God does not will something because it happens, but rather the reverse. It remains, therefore, that mutability arises in principle from the divine will.
CONCLUSION
The divine being is utterly unchangeable.
Response. Without doubt, the divine being is completely unchangeable. And it is necessary to affirm this, even though we cannot understand it perfectly; wherefore, all agree in affirming it. Indeed, all men who think correctly — not only the Saints but the philosophers as well — affirm that the divine being is immutable in as far as it is most simple, immense, and eternal.
In as far as it is most simple, it is immutable in its form; in as far as it is immense, it is immutable with reference to place; in as far as it is eternal, it is immutable with reference to time. But all movement and change can be reduced to one of the above-mentioned differences, according to Augustine and Hugh."! Therefore the divine being can in no way be compatible with movement or change.
Again, in as far as it is simple, it is immutable in itself, for it possesses nothing which is not of its own essential being, because
"there is nothing accidental, but only subsistent truth," as Hilary says.22 In as far as the divine being is immense, it is not changeable from one place to another; for it cannot be transferred in place because it is present everywhere in its totality. In as far as it is eternal, it cannot be changed together with another, because it remains stable while other things come and go.
Finally, in as far as it is most simple, it can be changed neither
2051 S775 23 0;
21 I Sent. d. 37, p. 2, dub. 2; Hugh of St. Victor, J De Sacramentis, p. 3, c. 15;
Lib. VII Erudit. Didasc., c. 19.
22 De Trin. VU, n. 11.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
in relation nor in operation because neither of these includes anything diverse or accidental in itself; therefore the divine being is not changed nor is it composed by the addition or loss of such things.
Since it is immense, it is changed neither because of mission nor because of indwelling, because its mission and indwelling is not realized by becoming circumscribed nor by undergoing a local change; rather, it is realized through presence and manifestation.
Since it is eternal, it is changed neither in will nor in power, nor in knowledge, since whatever God knows, wills, and can do He knows, wills and can do eternally. Since there is no changeability in eternity, neither is there changeability in God's knowledge, will and power.
As is apparent to anyone who has studied the matter, the divine being is unchangeable in every way. And everyone admits this.
As the understanding of eternity requires that one understand God to be both simple and immense, so the understanding of immutability requires that one understand simultaneously the supreme simplicity of God together with His eternity and immensity. Because
He is simple, nothing is accidental to Him; because He is eternal, nothing is added to Him and nothing is lost; because He is immense, everything that is proper to perfection is fitting for Him. Therefore, without undergoing any change in Himself, He is capable of producing and not producing; willing and not willing; foreseeing and not foreseeing; listening and not listening, as befits His supreme perfection. And as He can produce many things, though He Himself is one; and temporal things, though He 1s eternal; and finite things, though He is infinite; and beings that are composed, though He is simple, so He can produce things capable of variation and change, though He Himself remains unchangeable.
And this is what Hugh says in the first part of On the Sacraments:
"That which is naturally innate to every rational soul should be held firmly; namely, that God is immutable. He cannot be increased since
He is immense; nor decreased since He is one; nor changed in place, since He is everywhere; nor changed in time, since He is eternal; nor changed in knowledge, since He is most wise; nor changed in affection, because He is the most good." From this it appears how and why we understand that God is unchangeable in His being.
To understand the objections, it must be noted that whatever is said of God with respect to creation signifies the divine essence primarily while it connotes something in the creature. This can happen in two ways; either actually or habitually. In terms of the principal significate, it is God Himself, who is neither changed nor multiplied ; and who neither begins nor ceases. That which is connoted or co- % Lib. I, p. 3, c. 13.
VI. IMMUTABILITY AND TRINITY
known is some reality that is or can be created. From this perspective, there is beginning and end, and variation, but in different ways in accordance with the diverse modes of connotation. Since that which is predicated of God connotes the creature in act, it can begin and end, and it can inhere or not inhere without change in God but not without change in the creature. This is evident when we say that God conserves something. Since this connotes something which is capable of being created and connotes it in habit or in terms of aptitude, then there cannot be a beginning, but there can be an end; and it can inhere or not inhere without change in God or in the creature. The reason for this is the connotation of the future.
But the future never begins to be future, as Anselm says; but it does cease to be future when it becomes the present.24 And indeed it is possible that a future contingent would not come into existence, and this would involve no change since such a contingent designates nothing actual in reality.
If one grasps this, it is clear that two opposite predicates can be attributed to God without any change in Him. But there are certain predicates which demand a change in the creature, as in the case of temporal qualifications; and there are other predicates which do not demand change. Therefore, it can be understood in what sense it is necessary to affirm that the divine being is absolutely immutable. Hence the arguments that prove this should be conceded.
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1. To the contrary objection that wisdom is more mobile than all other mobile things, it must be said that a thing can be said to be mobile in three ways; either by reason of efficient causality, or by reason of representative exemplarity; or by reason of an inherent variation. Wisdom is said to be supremely mobile in the first and second ways, because these are perfections; but not in the third way, since this involves imperfection. Or it can be said that since anything which is mobile in terms of place is made present in many places by its movement; and the more quickly it is moved, the more quickly it is made present at many places. So it is that since the divine wisdom is most present to all, it is said to be the most mobile of all mobile things not because it passes from one place to another, but because it is present to all. This is what Dionysius says in chapter 9
On the divine names: "In a religious sense, God is considered to be moved, not according to transfer, or change, or alteration, or change of mode or place; not in reference to straight or circular movement,
*% Monolog., c. 18.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
nor in reference to movement combining both; nor in reference to intelligible, or animal, or natural movement. But God acts by means of His substance; and He contains all things and is completely provident in reference to all things; and He is present to all in their movement; guiding the movement and operations of all existing things."%5 2. To the objection that there is a hierarchy among creatures according to their degree of mobility, etc. it must be said that there are some qualities that befit creatures in greater or lesser degrees in such a way that no imperfection is implied; such as unity, goodness, and truth. And with such qualities, the highest degree is to be attributed to God to whom every perfection is fitting. There are other qualities that involve some perfection together with imperfection, such as mobility which involves a certain actuality together with possibility.26 And because of the imperfection inherent in such qualities, they cannot and ought not be attributed to God in the proper sense, neither in the superlative degree nor in any lesser degree.
3.4. To the objection from relation, that God receives something from time, it must be said that in predicates of this sort, as was touched on in the solution, one must distinguish the principle significate from that which is connoted. The principal significate, indeed, refers to God and is therefore eternal and immutable; but that which is connoted refers to the creature, and is therefore temporal and mutable. The fact that those predicates are said to begin or to cease is not to be referred to God, but is to be referred to the created effect. And the point of the objection is clarified, since words of this sort indicate something that is God and something that proceeds from God. It is by reason of the former that they are predicated, not by reason of the latter. It is by reason of the latter that they begin and end, not by reason of the former; since in order that a composite whole be temporal or contingent, it is sufficient that it possess temporality or contingence in any of its parts.2?
5.6. To the objection from action, that a being which is not an agent becomes an agent, it must be said that there is one sort of agent that acts of itself and another sort that acts through something other than itself. The first sort of agent cannot be changed in acting since it neither receives nor loses anything in its action because its action is identical with itself. But the above proposition is true
% Paragr. 9.
*© Cf. a. 2, arg. 2 of this question. Concerning this solution, see also Anselm,
Monolog., c. 15.
27 Cf. Q. 7, ad 3 below.
VI. IMMUTABILITY AND TRINITY
with respect to the second sort of agent which is not identical with its action. However, God is an agent in the first way and not in the second since, by reason of His simplicity, He is identical with His action.
And if you should object that if He is identical with His action, then just as He does not begin to exist, so He does not begin to act; it must be said in response that He does not begin to act by reason of His own intrinsic act which is identical with Himself, but by reason of the extrinsic effect which is the creature, which has a beginning and is diversified according to the variety of creatures.
From this the response to what follows concerning the plurality of actions is clear. A plurality of incompatible acts are attributed to God not because of a plurality of intrinsic acts but because of the plurality of connoted effects. For since the intrinsic act is God
Himself, it is one and immutable, and eternal; but since the extrinsic effect is created, it is multiple, changeable, and temporal — taking time in the broad sense.?8 And this involves no change in the divine being.
7.8. To the objection based on mission, that every mission and descent is change; it must be said that in reference to God, mission is not taken in the proper sense but in a metaphorical sense; and in God it refers to nothing other than the emanation of one person from the other and the manifestation of this in a created effect.
Therefore, as God — Father, Son, and Holy Spirit — is present to all times and places according to essence, power, and presence, even though He dwells in heaven in glory and there manifests
Himself in clear light, when He begins to manifest Himself in the lower creatures, it is as though He begins to be present where
He had not been present; and for this reason He is said to be sent and to descend, not because of any change or new condition on His part, but only because of the revelation and manifestation made to us and realized in us.
If one objects that the Son of God began to be man, and that man refers to some reality that exists in Him; it must be said in response that an is predicated of the Son by reason of the union of the two natures in one hypostasis. Therefore, since the union is spoken of in terms of relation and can be attributed to someone in a new sense without any change in him but solely because of a change in the other term of the relation, as is clear in the relation of right to left;2® it follows that the Son of God, without change in 38 Time is understood as it is the measure of the duration of any creature, not only the corporal but the spiritual as well.
29 Boethius, De Trin., c. 5.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
His eternal person, began to be man solely by reason of a change in the nature He assumed, which was simultaneously formed and united to the Word. And as the Word is not changed in the formation of that nature so He is not changed in the assumption of the nature that has been formed.
9.10. To the objection based on indwelling, namely, that God begins to exist in the penitent by grace; it must be said that one being is said to exist in another in two ways; either in such a way that it somehow depends on the other and is limited and defined by the other ; and since in this way it begins to exist in the other, it is changed with that beginning, and it is moved in the movement of the being in which it exists, as is clear with the existence of the universal in the particular, and of form in matter, and of that which is localized in place, and of an accident in its subject. But God exists in the creature by essence and influence in such a way that He does not depend on the creature, nor is He limited and defined by the creature.
Therefore, when He begins to dwell in another, this is not because of a change in Himself, but only because of a change in the creature or in the intermediate influences by reason of which God is said to begin to dwell in the creature; namely, by influencing the creature through a new grace.
Likewise, while He is present in the creature, yet He is not moved with the movement of the creature, as is the case with those things of which the Philosopher says, "When we are moved, those things which are in us are moved," since He does not depend on the creature and is neither limited nor defined by it. Hence, as a ray of light is in the air and yet is not moved with the movement of the air, and as the soul is present totally in each part of the body and yet is not moved with the movement of the individual parts because it is not limited by any part, so also we should understand the matter at hand. Thus, the response to the present objection becomes ciear.
If one objects that it does not seem intelligible that one being should exist inseparably in another and yet not be moved with the change of the other, it should be said that we can understand this if we understand God to be simultaneously most simple and-immense. Since He is immense, He is within as He is without.®° Since
He is most simple, He is in no way distant from Himself however great may be the local distance and separation among the beings in which He is present. Therefore, however much those beings in which God is present are thought to be changed, in no way can
God be said to be mutable, neither in reality nor in thought. For in every movement and change we must understand that something
30 Gregory, IJ Moral., c. 12, n. 20.
VI. IMMUTABILITY AND TRINITY
is acquired and something is lost; and therefore, there must be some distance between the extremes. Since God is simultaneously infinite and simple, in no way can this be said of the divine being neither of itself nor accidently. Therefore, the images of our phantasy are deceptive in this case.
11.12. To the objection from power, namely, that He cannot now do what He could do in the past, it must be said that to be unable to do now what one could do in the past can be taken in two ways; either because of some defect introduced in the productive power itself, or because of a change in the condition of that which is possible. For that which is possible and true can be made impossible
— by a change in reality; just as before I read something, it is true that I have not read it; but after I have read it, this is no longer possible. It is said to be zmpossible by accident. As Augustine says in Against Faustus, this is impossible for God since such a possibility corresponds not to power but to impotence, because it is against the highest truth to bring it about that something which has existed should not have existed.*! Therefore, since the divine power remains always uniform, everything of whatever sort and whatever quantity that He could do, He can do now in as far as He exists of Himself.
However, because many true things become false and many possible things become impossible, in as far as this arises on the part of the effects, it follows that He cannot now do everything that He could have done because not everything that was possible still remains possible; this comes about not because of a change in the efficient power, but because of a change with respect to the possible effects.
From this the response becomes clear to what follows concerning that which is impossible by accident.
And if you object that the divine power does not in any way depend on the possible since it can produce all things from nothing, it must be said that this is true not because of dependence but because of connotation, since when it is said that God can produce some beings, at the same time it is insinuated that such a being is possible for Him and hence that there is nothing in it repugnant to the divine power, wisdom, and goodness that would stand in the way of its being produced in reality without doing violence to the full perfection of the divine power.
13.14. To the objection based on knowledge, it must be said that when God is said to know something, this can be understood in two ways: either that He has knowledge of some being, or that He judges that being to be true. In the first way, God's knowledge does not connote the existence of truth in the object known. And 31 Lib. XXVI, c. 4 ff.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
in this sense, whatever He knew, He still knows for He has knowledge of all those things which He has known from eternity. In the second way, God's knowledge connotes truth in the object known. And in this sense, He does not presently know everything that He has known just as He does not now do everything that He has done. And this is true not because of a change on the part of the knower, but only on the part of the object known.
From this, the response becomes clear to the next objection concerning the truth of that which is known; since the divine knowledge posits truth in the object known when it is taken in one sense but not in the other, as is clear from the foregoing distinction.
15. To the objection based on the divine will, it must be said that a proximate and immediate cause can be taken in three ways: in terms of substance, or of disposition, or of act; by reason of substance when no other causing substance comes between the cause and its effect; by reason of disposition, when no new disposition is added to it in the production of the effect; by reason of act, when the cause is conjoined to the act itself. But the divine act can be taken in two ways; either as interior or as the efficient cause of an external effect. The divine will, therefore, is the proximate and immediate cause of beings that are to be produced by reason of substance, disposition, and intrinsic act, but not by reason of external efficiency except in reference to that time for which He wills it. And this is true of the divine will because it is supremely
Omnipotent and free. Therefore, even though from eternity He willed to produce the world, yet He did not will the production of the world to take place in eternity but only in time. Therefore, He produces in time while undergoing no change in His will; and the effect has a beginning while the cause does not. The objection concerning the proximate and immediate cause is understood of the proximate and immediate cause according to the three-fold distinction given above.
16. To the objection that God, who can will something, is capable also of not willing it, it must be said that the divine will connotes relation and order in reference to something in the future, and that future reality can either exist or not exist without change, as was said above in the principal solution. Therefore, with respect to future contingent things, God can be said either to will or not to will with no change in His will.
17. To the objection that God is a voluntary agent of such a sort that His operation is conformed to His will, etc., it must be said that there are two types of voluntary agents. There is one
32 0. de Sci. Christi, q. 1, ad 1 ff. (V, 5).
VI. IMMUTABILITY AND TRINITY
sort whose will is determined with reference to an object which is willed in such a way that the agent is not entirely sovereign with respect to all its effects, but at one moment it wills one thing, and at another moment, something else. And the objection is true with reference to a voluntary agent of this sort. There is another sort of voluntary agent whose will transcends all those beings which its providential wisdom disposes. As an agent of this sort at one and the same time disposes all those things which are produced successively in such a way that the disposition itself is not changed with the change in the object produced, so also the will, which is fully consonant with that disposition, remains unchanged. Hence, as the divine art and the divine counsel, by which a diversity of things are commanded and come to be, remain always unchanged in themselves, so also the divine will remains always unchanged even though those beings which proceed from it are changed, since at one and the same time, in an eternal and immutable act, it directs its glance as art, reason and exemplar, word and wisdom, and other similar things, to all those things which are eternally produced. No change is caused in these by the change in the external being, for God is in no way dependent on external beings, even though all things depend on His wisdom and will and power as on the cause that is most noble, stable, and sufficient; a cause that is primary and supreme.
ARTICLE II
WHETHER THE TRINITY AND SUPREME
IMMUTABILITY CAN EXIST TOGETHER
Next the question is raised whether the trinity and supreme immutability can exist together. It seems that they are incompatible.
OBJECTIONS
1. It is impossible that there be species without genus.' But generation or production is a species of movement or change.
Therefore, wherever there is generation, there is change. But the trinity does not exist except by reason of the fact that one person proceeds from another by way of generation. Therefore, etc.
1 Porphyr., De Praedicab., c. de communitatibus et differentiis generis et speciei.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
2. Again, generation in creatures involves relation and change; indeed, it involves change in a more essential and fundamental
_ way than relation. But there can be no generation in the supreme trinity without relation, otherwise there would be no true distinction.
Therefore, for the same reason and for an even greater reason, generation cannot be admitted without change.
3. Again, it is impossible both in thought and in reality that anything should undergo corruption without change. But generation or production is directly opposed to corruption since, as the former is a movement to being so the latter is a movement to non-being.?
Therefore there can be no generation without change; so also in the case of the divine persons.
4. Again, if one thing follows as a consequence from another, this is not changed when one and the same quality is added to each of these terms. Now, from the proposition: "'there is generation in time," the consequence follows: "there is change in time." Therefore for the same reason, or for an even stronger reason, eternal generation implies eternal change. Therefore, it does not exist together with immutability.
5. Again, Augustine says the following: If the Holy Spirit could be generated, He could undergo change.* Therefore, generation in God implies change. But this cannot exist together with its opposite.
But its opposite is supreme immutability. Therefore, etc.
6. Again, if there is production in God, it is either by necessity or by will. If it is by necessity, then supreme liberality and power does not exist in God. If it is by will, then the one who is produced could also not be produced; and therefore He could not exist; hence He could undergo change. Therefore, the same conclusion follows as above.
7. Again, that which is repugnant to any being because of its imperfect state is all the more repugnant to the state of perfection.
But in the creature, there is only a certain degree of immutability.
Yet in perpetual and incorporeal substances there can be no plurality such as would result from the production of like from like.* Therefore, neither is this found in God.
8. Again, whatever is repugnant to a cause is repugnant to its effect as well. But the reason why a generative power is given to creatures is "because they are greatly distant from the first cause and they are corruptible." Therefore, if the highest immutability
2 Aristotle, 7 Phys., text. 7 (c. 1).
3 Alex. of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 4, m. 1; Bonav., I Seat. d. 7, dub. 4.
4 Rich. of St. Victor, De Tria. IV, c. 14.
VI. IMMUTABILITY AND TRINITY
is repugnant to corruption, it is also repugnant to production by generation. The minor is proved by the Philosopher.®
9. Again, it is impossible for God to produce a being from a substance distinct from Himself without a change in His substance.
But God is capable of acting in reference to others only as He is capable of acting upon Himself or in reference to Himself. Therefore, He cannot produce from His own substance without a change in His own substance. Therefore, if the trinity exists by reason of production, etc.
10. Again, nothingness is more distant from the concept of changeability than is being. Therefore the production of a being from nothing is more distant from changeability than is the production of one being from another being; for nothingness is in no way capable of change.® But it is impossible for a being to be produced from nothing without mutability. Therefore, likewise when something is produced from another being.
11. Again, in terms of the cause of knowledge, form is more simple and prior to the supposite, just as nature is to person." But it is impossible for a form to be produced from something without change in itself as well as in that from which it proceeds. For a similar reason, it is impossible that a supposite or person be produced without change.
12. Again, a whole is related to another whole in the same way as a part is related to a part. But if the Father produced the Son from part of His substance, then the substance would be changed necessarily in reference to that part. Therefore, when He produces totally, it is necessary that His substance be changed totally. Therefore, etc.
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. In the trinity, the production of one person from another person exists together with supreme simplicity as is clear from the above.® But where there is supreme simplicity, there is complete invariability and immutability. Therefore, the trinity and the sort of emanation that befits it is not repugnant to immutability.
2. The emanation of one person from another person exists together with supreme actuality. But where there is supreme actuality, there is total immutability, since "movement 1s the actuality
5 Lib, II De Generat. et Corrupt., text. 59 (c. 10).
® Aristotle, JV Phys., text. 67 (c. 8).
7 Cf. Q. 2, a. 2, conc. above.
SIO Saraaee.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
of a being in potency,"® and whatever is changeable is in some way in potency. But whatever accompanies the antecedent, necessarily accompanies the consequent. Therefore, etc.
3. Again, there can be no variability in the highest eternity, since every movement involves something that is prior and something that is posterior, either in time or in nature.1° But the trinity of persons and their production exist together with eternity; and therefore with the highest immutability.
4. Again, "there is no movement in a relation." But relation constitutes the trinity and the plurality of persons, as Boethius says:
"Relation unfolds the trinity."!2 Therefore, for this reason it is impossible to affirm change or movement there. Hence, it exists together with the highest immutability.
5. Again, in that being for whom to be produced is simultaneous with having been produced, there is no prior or posterior, neither in duration nor in nature nor in reality. But this is found in every change. Therefore, etc.
6. Again, it is possible for God to produce creatures without change in Himself, because He produces of Himself.1* Therefore, in like manner, the Father can produce a person without change in His person or nature. For the same reason, the Son can be produced without change. Therefore, production does not demand that there be change in this case.
7. Again, God knows Himself without any change in Himself.
But, in knowing Himself, He speaks; and in speaking, He generates the Word. Therefore He must generate the Word without any change; and for the same reason He must breathe the Holy Spirit.
Therefore, etc.
CONCLUSION
The trinity of persons exists together with supreme immutability.
Response. The trinity of persons which exists in God by way of emanation of one from the other exists together with the highest immutability. There are two reasons for this; namely, supreme éternity and supreme simplicity. The supreme eternity is incompatible with any change; while supreme simplicity is incompatible with any possibility of change. Therefore, if the trinity exists together with simplicity and eternity; and if there is no change where there
® Aristotle, JI] Phys., text. 6 (c. 1).
10 Aristotle, JV Phys., text. 99 & 131 (c. 11 & 14).
1 Aristotle, V Phys., text 10 (c. 2) & XJ Metaph., c. 11 (X, c. 12).
12 De Trin., c. 6.
18 Cf. a. 1, ad 5 & 6 above.
VI. IMMUTABILITY AND TRINITY
is eternity and nothing capable of change where there is simplicity ; and if every sort of mutability is excluded where these are excluded, then the trinity and supreme immutability necessarily exist together.
And this becomes clear in the following way. Where there is eternity, there is nothing that begins and nothing that follows; therefore, there is no beginning, no succession, and no defection.
Moreover, all change can be reduced either to the movement from non-being to being, or to the movement from being to non-being, or to a movement from one being to another being.!4 But a change to being does not take place without a beginning; a change from being does not take place without a defection; and a change in being cannot be realized without some sort of succession since it does not take place without variation. Therefore, eternity excludes every change; hence, it exists together with the trinity. Therefore in the excellence of the trinity, eternity excludes any change.
Because of its simplicity it contains nothing capable of change.
For there exists in the trinity the highest simplicity of nature and person, and of each of these in relation to the other. By reason of this simplicity of nature, there can be no division in that from which the production arises. Because of the simplicity of person, there can be no composition in the being produced. Because of the simplicity in both, there can be no separation from the productive principle.
From this it follows that there is nothing mutable in God, neither that which is produced, nor that which produces, nor that from which the production arises. In view of the fact that nothing is lost from the principle, and nothing new is introduced by that which is produced, and there is no division in the indivisible fundament from which the production is understood to arise, neither materially nor causally, but substantially; there is nothing there that could undergo change.
Therefore, if the supreme trinity is understood to exist in highest simplicity and eternity, it must also necessarily be understood to coexist with total immutability.
Furthermore, since actual immutability united with highest simplicity and eternity demands the highest actuality, and the highest actuality is realized in the full conversion of being upon itself in knowledge and love; and since understanding includes a word, and love includes a union; just as it is not repugnant to but actually consonant with the immutability of the first principle that it know
4 Aristotle, V Pahys., text. 7 (c. 1).
18 At this point, all the manuscripts except one (i.e. Florence, bibl. Nation., cod. D. IV. 27) break off. The Florence Manuscript continues the text in a different but apparently contemporaneous hand.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
and love itself, so also it is not repugnant to but consonant with His immutability that He generate a Word and breathe forth Love.
Both of these befit Him immutably and actually at all times. Therefore, if immutability is correctly understood, it not only does not exclude but it includes the most blessed trinity because that which is supremely immutable is necessarily simple, eternal, and actual in accordance with the fullness of unlimited and perfect actuality.
Therefore, the arguments in favor of this are to be conceded.
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1. To the first contrary argument, that where there is generation there is change, it must be said that this is true with respect to creatures where generation consists in the passage from being in potency to being in act and where, as a consequence, there is change because that which is generated is now in a different state than it was in before. But in God the case is different since the divine generation is one of absolute actuality on the part of the principle and of the term, and of the production itself, and of that from which the production emerges. Hence, while in this case there is no acquisition of new being, yet there is the reception of true and actual and eternal being; therefore, even though there is a true production, yet there is no true change.
2. To the objection that generation involves change and relation, it must be said that if those qualities found in creatures are to be attributed to the Creator, they ought to be attributed in as far as they contain something of perfection but not in as far as they involve any imperfection. But movement and change always imply imperfection while relation frequently implies perfection, especially that relation which implies origin without any dependence in the most noble beings. And thus it is found in that eternal production.
3. To the objection that corruption cannot be understood without change, it must be said that there is no parallel, since corfuption involves the loss of being, which indeed cannot be understood except in reference to being which was possessed previously.
Hence, it necessarily includes change, and change cannot take place except in a being that is mutable and variable by reason of the imperfection which change implies. But generation is the communication or acceptance of being through consubstantiality. And this is possible with reference to the most perfect and most actual being because it involves no imperfection, as corruption does. For corruption is not the contrary of this sort of generation, but only of that sort of generation found in the creature which in a certain
VI. IMMUTABILITY AND TRINITY
way is both followed by and preceded by corruption. "For the generation of one being is the corruption of another," as the Philosopher says.16
4. To the objection that, since generation in time implies change in time, therefore generation in eternity implies change in eternity, it must be said that that mode of inference holds where there is no particular determination of being standing in the way; but such is not the case here, since eternal generation is of a different sort than temporal generation, as has been said; for it does not arise from a being in potency as does a temporal generation.1? Therefore, it does not follow that if movement accompanies the one, it must also accompany the other; rather, the opposite is true.
5. To the objection that if the Holy Spirit were generated He would be changed, it must be said that the argument follows not because generation is identical with change, but because the consequence that follows from an inconsistent principle will itself be inconsistent.18 If one supposes that the Holy Spirit receives being by way of spiration, which is really distinct from generation, then one necessarily assumes that He passes from one mode of emanation to another mode that is really distinct. Thus one necessarily implies change not because these modes of origin or emanation include movement or change, but because the passage from one to the other cannot be conceived of without movement. And since change is not admitted in the divine being, it is impossible that the person who is produced by spiration should be generated. And therefore, even though the Father generates and spirates, yet He is not changed, because both generation and spiration exist together in the person of the Father, and there is no movement from one to the other.
But these two modes cannot simultaneously befit one and the same person produced, and therefore if — even though it is impossible — this is thought to be realized in one of those persons, for the same impossible reason, movement is affirmed because a change in the mode of production is affirmed.
6. To the objection that production in God is either necessary or voluntary, it must be said that in God production is necessary in a certain sense and voluntary in a certain sense, as appears more clearly in the question dealing with necessity.1° For the production does not take place by necessity of coaction but of immutability ; and not by reason of a will that chooses, but by reason of a will
16 Lib. I De Generat. et Corrupt., text. 20 (c. 3); IJ Metaph., text. 7 (I brevior, ee Aristotle, IV Phys., text. 114 ff. (c. 12).
18 Aristotle, VII Phys., text. 36 (c. 5).
19 Cf, the following question, a. 2.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
of eternal acceptance through which the producer finds pleasure and delight in the most perfect production. Therefore, it does not follow that in God there can be variation of mutability or limitation of power, because He who is produced is produced necessarily, freely, and with power at the same time.
7. To the objection that immutability in a creature excludes generation, as is clear in the case of the angel, therefore, also in God; it must be said that this does not follow because, in generating, the creature cannot give its entire substance since it lacks the highest simplicity, actuality, and communicability; therefore it is impossible that something be generated of its substance without undergoing change. But the case under discussion is different, as has been said,?° because in God the person who generates does not give a part of His essence but the whole of His essence which is supremely simple and perfect. It can be said, however, that a spiritual creature possesses an intrinsic generation which is the generation of a word by the mind; among all created things, this bears the greatest likeness to the eternal generation.
8. To the objection that the cause of generation and corruption is greatly distant from the first cause, it must be said that this is not the entire reason. For, if man had remained in the state of innocence, he would not have undergone corruption, but he would have generated. Hence, that generation arises more from the supreme perfection, fecundity, and actuality of the first principle than from the need to fill up any lack arising from corruption in the productive principle itself. Therefore, the Philosopher is speaking of the cause of generation in terms of the state of fallen nature but not in general terms and in accordance with that most perfect generation which is the origin of every production. For the Author of beauty has established all these things,24 and He who grants the power of generation to. others cannot Himself be sterile; according to what is said in the final chapter of Isaiah.
9. To the objection that God cannot produce a being from a substance distinct from Himself without change in His substance, it must be said that there is no parallel. Since the creature is mutable and not completely simple, when it is affirmed that some being is produced from it, it is also affirmed that the creature itself undergoes change; since in this case there cannot be total identity between that which is given and that which is received and the intermediate
80° QF2; a: 2, resp. & ad 3.
21 Wisdom, 13, 3.
LN Hite (fey, Bp
VI. IMMUTABILITY AND TRINITY
act. But in God, it is entirely the reverse as has become clear in the previous reflections.
10. To the objection that there can be no production out of nothing without some change, it must be said that there is no parallel, for no being can be produced from nothing without receiving being after non-being from a principle that is essentially distinct from itself. Whence, while nothingness of itself is not mutable, yet the eduction by virtue of which something which previously did not exist becomes a being necessarily involves a beginning and a change. But such is not the case in that production by which one person is produced from the eternal substance of another person who produces eternally, since in that case there is no new being received, nor does anything begin to be. Hence there is no change.
11. To the objection that form cannot be produced without change, therefore neither can the supposite, it must be said that there is no parallel for the production of a form involves a substantial difference between the one producing and the one produced; for nothing produces itself.?8 And therefore, since the form is produced, it is necessary that it be produced by another form which, while it is other, is yet truly the productive cause and is naturally prior to the form that is produced. Therefore, in such a production, change is necessarily included. But such is not the case in the production of a supposite or of a person in as far as there is one nature and essence in both, and therefore they are simultaneous realities. In such a case, there is neither change nor movement, because there is neither prior nor posterior, nor anything new.
12. To the objection that a whole is related to the whole as a part is related to a part, it must be said that in God, properly speaking, there is neither part nor whole, in the sense that a whole is understood to contain a plurality of parts.24 And it does not follow that if a being produced in part involves a change in part, then similarly a thing produced from the entire substance would posit a change in reference to the whole, since — as was previously touched upon — a production in part involves a division, and it affirms the loss and the acquisition of something, which necessarily includes change.
But a production from the whole substance involves nothing of this sort, but rather excludes all elements which would include movement as was shown in the main argument. For there is neither division in the principle producing, nor composition in the being produced, nor anything new in the production, nor any variation with respect to any of the above.
% Aristotle, JJ De Anima, text. 47 (c. 4); II Poster., c. 17 (c. 14).
*% Aristotle, 17 Mesaph., text. 30 ff. (IV, c. 25 ff.).
St. Bonaventure, Disputed Questions
QUESTION VII
WHETHER THE TRINITY CAN EXIST
TOGETHER WITH NECESSITY
It is asked next whether the trinity can exist together with supreme necessity. Two questions are raised with regard to this. The first question is whether the divine being is supremely necessary.
The second question is whether the trinity and supreme necessity can exist together.
ARTICLE I
WHETHER THE DIVINE BEING
CS SUP REM EY
EC Pad ail The question is asked, therefore, whether the divine being is supremely necessary. It seems that such is the case.
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. Whatever is immutable and eternal is supremely necessary.} But the divine being is of this sort. Therefore, etc.
2. Again, it is necessary that everything of nobility and perfection be attributed to God in the highest degree. But it is certain that necessity is more perfect than knowledge. Therefore, etc.
3. Again, whatever exists in such a way that it is impossible for it not to exist or to be conceived of as not existing is necessary in the highest sense. But the divine being is of such a sort.? Therefore, etc.
4. Again, whatever possesses being of itself and through itself and according to itself, is entirely necessary. But such is the divine being, since it is first. Therefore, etc.
5. Again, it is impossible that there be necessity in an effect ErGin@. 5. a.nleccaqOmauleabove:
2 As shown above, q. 1, a. 1.
VII. NECESSITY AND TRINITY
except by reason of the cause. Therefore, if necessity is not in God, then there is no necessity in any being. Therefore, nothing is necessary. But if nothing is necessary, then nothing is impossible; therefore all things are possible. Therefore it is possible for one thing to both exist and not exist at the same time. But this is absurd.
Therefore, etc.
6. Again, it is impossible that there be necessity in a composite being except by reason of a necessity existing in a simple being.
Therefore if the most simple being lacks necessity, it is impossible that necessity be affirmed in any complex or any composite being.
But it is absurd that no argumentation should be necessary. TherefOLes etc:
OBJECTIONS
1. Every necessary being is determined to exist in one way and not in another; whatever is determined in some respect is finite.
But the divine being is infinite, therefore, etc.® 2. Again, nothing that is indifferent to opposites is necessary; but the divine power, will and activity are indifferent to opposites; therefore they are not necessary. But the divine power, will, and activity are identical with the divine being. Therefore, the divine being is not necessary.
3. Again, no changeable quality can be attributed to a being that is immutable. Therefore no contingent quality can be attributed to a being that is supremely necessary. But something contingent is attributed to God. Therefore, etc.
4. Again, just as impossibility is repugnant to power, so necessity is repugnant to will. But the divine power is of such a sort that all things are possible to it, and in no way can impossibility be attributed to God.® Therefore, since the willing of God is most perfect, it seems that no necessity is allowed in the divine being.
; 5. Again, if a cause is necessary, so is its effect." But God is the first and highest and immediate cause of all things. Therefore, if there is necessity in God, than all things are necessary.
6. Again, to the degree that a being is more contingent, to that degree it is more indifferent; and the more indifferent it is, the 3 Aristotle, [17 Metaph., text. 9 ff. (III, c. 3) & IX text. 17 (VIII, c. 8).
4 Aristotle, J Poster., c. 3 ff.
5 Aristotle, 7 Metaph., text. 6 (IV, c. 5) & IX text. 3 & 10 (Vile Za GceS) Seem leis ; 7 Aristotle, XI Metaph., c. 7 (X, c. 8). Concerning the minor, cf. Augustine,
Dewi rink Vlercie4 a1y.09:
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
more it is common; and the more common it is, the more simple it is.8 Therefore, the more contingent a being is, the more simple it is. Therefore that which is most simple is most contingent; therefore it is not necessary.
7. Again, whatever is necessary can be the object of knowledge just as whatever is probable can be the object of opinion.® But everything that can be known is either the principle of a demonstration or a conclusion that is demonstrated. But the divine being is neither of these. Therefore, etc.
8. Again, the more a being is necessary, the more certain it is; and the more certain something is, the more it is known.1° But the divine being is hidden to the highest degree. Therefore, etc.
9. Again, just as a person is moved in vain if he desires the impossible, so also he is moved in vain if he fears the necessary."
Therefore, if the divine majesty is necessary, then in no way is it to be feared. But this is false and absurd. Therefore, etc.
CONCLUSION
The divine being is necessary with the most perfect necessity of immutability.
Response. In order to understand the preceding matters, it must be noted that there are three types of necessity; one which is entirely extrinsic, one which is partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic, and one that is entirely intrinsic. That necessity is entirely extrinsic which takes its origin from a principle that is exterior to it and allows of no cooperation." And there are two types of this, one in relation to natural works and the other in relation to voluntary acts. So there are two types of necessity; namely, one of coaction and one of violence.
That necessity which is partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic is one that in some way arises from an intrinsic principle but is related to something outside either after the manner of a principal mover, or after the manner of a term that brings to rest. Thus, there are two types of necessity; namely, that of inevitability and that of indigence.!8
® Aristotle, XJ Metaph., c. 1 (X, c. 1).
® Aristotle, J Poster., c. 26 (c. 33); for the minor, ibid. c. 2 ff. oi Aristotle, J Poster. c. 2; I Phys., text.
2. & IV Metaph., text. 8 ff. (III, 73); 1 Aristotle, JT Rhet., c. 3 (c. 2) & c. 23 (c 19); V Polit., c. 11 (c. 9).
18 Aristotle, IJ Ethic, c. 1; V Metaph., text. 6 (IV, c. 5).
8 For necessity of indigence, cf. Augustine, Lib. 83 Oq., q. 22.
VII. NECESSITY AND TRINITY
That necessity is entirely intrinsic which is in a being by reason of its proper nature. And this is the necessity of immutability and independence. Such necessity is found after a fashion in the creature, but it cannot be found in an absolute sense except in the creative essence. For it is that alone which does not admit any dependence.
And all other beings necessarily depend on it since they are created.
This sort of necessity must be affirmed in the divine being because it exists in itself and of itself. Now, because it exists in itself, it lacks any principle of composition or any sustaining principle. Therefore, it can neither be changed nor cease to be. Since it exists of itself, it is not produced or created by another; therefore it can neither depend nor begin. Therefore, it possesses the highest and most perfect necessity, which excludes all change and dependence, all inevitability and indigence, all coaction and violence which express a defective necessity; on the other hand, it affirms the highest permanence and stability, the highest sufficiency and liberty. For, since it exists by itself, it is permanent and most stable; since it exists for its own sake, it is the alpha and omega. Therefore, other beings, whether necessary or contingent, have their existence from it and because of it. Just as all mobile things emanate from one first immobile being and are reduced to it,!® so all contingent things flow from one necessary being and are reduced to it. Therefore, necessity is found in the divine being, which is the origin and completion of all being, life, and understanding. And all things, whether they be necessary or contingent, cry out that the first principle is necessary. Therefore the arguments in favor of this should be conceded.
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1. To the objection that whatever is determined in some respect is finite, it must be said that there are two types of determination.
One is by way of limitation; this 'sort is realized by the addition of one thing to another, as disposition is added to the incomplete potency of matter. There is also a type of determination by way of perfection, as the highest good is ordered to do the good since it cannot be deficient and cannot do evil. In the first sense, determination is repugnant to infinity, but in the second sense it is not.1é
Indeed, this sort of determination is in harmony with the sort of necessity found in God, but the first sort is not.
4 Apoc. 1, 8; Aristotle, J Metaph., c. 3 (c. 2).
16 Cf. Q. 1, a. 1, arg. 13 & 20 above. Lib. de Causis, prop. 18.
16 Cf, Q. 3, a. 1, ad 4 & q. 4, a. 1.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
2. To the objection that nothing that is indifferent to opposites is necessary, it must be said that the divine power, willing, and activity are said to be indifferent to opposites, not in and of themselves, but because of indifference in the effect to be produced.
Hence, that indifference does not include any changeability in the divine power; but it affirms one power which is most simple and omnipotent in relation to all opposites so that it cannot be restricted to any particular one of them.1? And this is more consonant with necessity than repugnant to it.
3. To the objection that contingent qualities cannot be attributed to a being that is supremely necessary, it must be said that when something is predicated contingently of God, there is included in that predicate both a principle significate and something that is connoted. The principle significate is nothing other than God; that which is connoted is an effect. By reason of the first, the predicate necessarily inheres in that being for which the predication is proper; by reason of the second, it is said to inhere contingently, and hence contingence is not affirmed in God, but rather it is produced by God. In predications of this sort, only those predicates which include the fullest degree of necessity are attributed to the divine being. But if it is said that an entire proposition is contingent, namely, that "God saves Peter," that is because the entire statement is of such a nature that the whole is named from its less perfect part, so that a proposition which contains one false part is called false, and a proposition which contains one contingent part is said to be contingent. The reason for this is that it is easier for a being to be destroyed than for it to be established.18
A habit and its designation ought not be mixed with privation. But the designation of a privation proceeds in the opposite way, since some positive quality and habit is necessarily included in the concept of a privation.
4. To the objection that necessity is repugnant to will as impossibility is to power, it must be said that this is true of that necessity arising from outside such as the necessity of violence and coaction. But, as is clear from the foregoing considerations, it is not true with respect to intrinsic necessity such as the necessity of immutability.
5. To the objection that if a cause is necessary, so is its effect, it must be said together with Augustine, in the fifth book of the City of God, that some causes are made and nothing more; some
17 Cf. Q. 6, a. 1, ad 11 ff. above.
18 Aristotle, VII Topic., c. 3 (c. 4); IT Ethic., c. 6; Ps.-Dionysius, De Div.
INom., c. 4, § 31.
VII, NECESSITY AND TRINITY
are made and make as well; and some only make.!9 Those causes he calls natural which are only made and are determined to one course.
Those causes which are made and also make are free choice and will.
Those causes which are only productive are identical with divine providence itself. He says that natural causes are produced but do not produce, not because they do nothing but because they act according to their innate nature, having no dominion over their acts as does a cause that possesses free choice. Such causes produce only one sort of effect which is like the cause itself. The objection is true concerning this sort of cause. But it is not true of a productive cause whose power is capable of either producing or not producing by reason of the dominion which it possesses over its action and the consequent effect. Just as such a cause is not changed because of the mutability and difference of the effects, so also it is not said to be contingent because of the contingence of its effects.
6. To the objection that the more indifferent a being is, the more common it is, it must be said that commonness is of two kinds; namely, one by reason of abstraction, and one by reason of indenomination.When it is said, therefore, that the more indifferent a quality is, the more common it is, this must be understood in terms of commonness by reason of indenomination; in this way we say that there is only one subject for the contrary qualities. This is true above all in those qualities of which one does not have a determinate cause in the subject.*° But when the objection goes on to say that the more common a thing is, the more simple it is, this is understood of commonness by reason of abstraction. Hence, it does not follow from this that contingent beings include simplicity; rather it follows that those beings which exclude the highest simplicity include mutability. Hence, the highest simplicity can be found only in that being which is supremely necessary. Since the divine being is most simple, it is necessary that it be not contingent but necessary.
7. To the objection that whatever is necessary can be the object of knowledge; and that every object of knowledge is either a principle of demonstration or a demonstrated conclusion, it must be said that there is a necessity within the genus; and there is a necessity beyond the genus. And the latter is of two kinds; it is either beyond a determinate genus, or absolutely beyond every genus.*? That necessity which is absolutely beyond every genus 1s found in God alone, who is above and beyond every class of being since He cannot
19 Ch. 9, n. 4, Cf. above, Q. 2, a. 1, ad 8 & 9; q. 6, a. 1, ad 11 ff.
20 Aristotle, De Praedicam., c. De oppositis; Lib. LI Topic., c. 3 (c. 7).
4 Aristotle, 7 Metaph., text. 21 (IV, c. 16).
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
exist in a genus — neither of Himself, nor by reason of appropriation.
Such necessity precedes and transcends all demonstrations, since it cannot be contained in any definition.?? Therefore, when it is said that whatever is necessary is either a principle of demonstration or a demonstrated conclusion, it must be said that this must be understood in reference to necessity within a determinate genus, or in reference to necessity which can be appropriated to a determinate genus; as are the common axioms of the mind which enter into a demonstration in as far as they are appropriated. Hence, the argument is not correct in concluding that the necessity of the divine being is limited to a determinate genus.
8. To the objection that the more necessary a being is, the more certain it is, it must be said that something can be said to be more certain or more known than another in two ways; either absolutely, or in reference to us." Therefore, the first proposition is true if it is understood in reference to a greater absolute certitude, but not in as far as it is understood of certitude in reference to us, since those things which are most certain and most clear in themselves seem to us to be obscure because of the weakness of the created intellect. Therefore, the Philosopher says that "as the eye of the bat is turned toward the light, so our eye is turned to the most obvious things of nature."?4 Nonetheless, even though the divine being in the fullness of its clarity is hidden to us as long as we are wayfarers, yet it is most certain and indubitable to us that God exists, as has become clearly apparent in the preceding questions.
9. To the objection that the necessary is not to be feared, as the impossible is not to be desired, it must be said that that which is necessary in outcome or in effect should not be feared because fear is of no avail when something must happen in a determined way. But that being which is necessary because of its own intrinsic stability and which can assign us to eternal glory or to eternal punishment; this being, I say, is greatly to be feared both because of the grace that can be acquired, and because of punishment that can be avoided, since such a necessity does not exclude the liberality of the will and the justice of equity, as will become more clear in the following question.
** Avicenna, Metaph., tr. 8, c. 4; Boethius, in lib. Quomodo Substantiae in e0...;
Aristotle, I Poster., c. 7.
*8 Aristotle, J Poster., c. 2 & I Phys., text. 2 ff.
™" IT Metaph., text. 1 (I brevior, c. 1).
*% Q. 1, a. 1 above. The Quaracchi editors argue from this reference that the present question is as genuine as the question cited, which Olivi expressly attributes to Bonaventure.
VII. NECESSITY AND TRINITY
ARTICLE I
WHETHER THE TRINITY
AND SUPREME NECESSITY EXIST TOGETHER
Next it is asked whether the trinity and supreme necessity exist together. It seems that they are incompatible.
OBJECTIONS
1. Augustine to Orosius: "The Father generated the Son neither by necessity nor by will."1 But whatever is repugnant to generation is repugnant to the trinity. But necessity is of this sort. Therefore, etc.
2. Again, any agent which dominates over its actions is more perfect than one which does not.? But in the trinity, there cannot be a production except in the most perfect mode. But that which produces necessarily cannot dominate over its actions. Therefore, there can be no necessary production in God.
3. Again, any communication which arises from benignity is more perfect than one which arises from necessity. Therefore, in God either there is no communication of His nature at all, or there is no communication arising from necessity. But there can be no trinity without communication. Therefore, etc.
4. Again, whatever is necessary is absolute. But anything that has a relation to something distinct from itself cannot be entirely necessary, as Avicenna would say.' But it is impossible for the trinity to exist unless it has reference and relation to some being. Therefore for the same reason it is impossible that the trinity exist together with necessity.
5. Again, no being that receives its existence from another can be necessary in the highest degree since it has its being and continued existence from outside itself so that it is not necessary in itself. But the trinity cannot exist unless there be some person there who is not from itself. Therefore, it is not compatible with the highest necessity.
6. Again, no being that can be thought not to exist is supremely true.5 Similarly, no being that can be believed not to exist is supremely
1 Or, Quaest. 65 Dialog. (among the works of Augustine) q. 7.
* Cf. preceding questions, so]. ad 5.
3 Hilary, De Trin., Ill, n. 3.
; :
« Metaph., tr. I, c. 7, & tr. 8, c. 4 ff. The minor in Boethius, De Trin., c. 6.
5 Cf. Q. 1, a. 1 above. That necessity presupposes truth is explained below in the response in as far as the true is identical with being.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
necessary; for that which is necessary presupposes that which is true. But without doubt, the trinity can be thought not to exist.
'Therefore, etc.
7. Again, that which is repugnant to evidence is repugnant to certitude; and that which is repugnant to certitude is repugnant to necessity. But a trinity in unity is repugnant to evidence since it seems in no way to be intelligible. Therefore, it is repugnant to supreme necessity.
8. Again, nothing that is entirely necessary is perfectly worthy of ptaise.? Therefore, if the person of the Father necessarily produces the person of the Son and that of the Holy Spirit, it is not worthy of praise in either of these. But nothing is more worthy of praise in God. Therefore, no praise of God is fitting. But this is to speak impiously. Therefore, etc.
9. Again, nothing that is simply voluntary is absolutely necessary. But the production of the persons in God is realized simply through the will; therefore, it is not through necessity. The major is proved because things that are necessary exist naturally, and nature must be distinguished from will. The minor is proved since that sort of production is delectable, acceptable, and pleasing in the highest degree. Therefore, it is supremely voluntary.
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. Whatever is necessary is immutable, and vice versa. But the trinity exists together with supreme immutability, as is clear in the previous question.' Therefore, etc.
2. Again, whatever is supremely one is absolutely necessary, and vice versa. But the trinity exists together with supreme unity.®
Therefore, etc.
3. Again, there is a greater bond of unity in the production of one person from another than in the production of splendor and light. But these are necessary. Therefore, etc.
4. Again, it is impossible that the omnipotent should not possess supreme power; on the contrary it is absolutely necessary that such power be found in Him. But the supreme power is shown in the production of persons. Therefore, etc.
5. Again, any act which has God as principle and end is fully necessary. But the production of one person from another is such an act. Therefore, etc.
§ Aristotle, VI Topic., c. 3 (c. 6).
7 Aristotle, JJ Eudem., c. 7 (c. 6).
8 Cf. above, Q. 6, a. 2.
® Cf. above, Q. 2, a. 2.
VII. NECESSITY AND TRINITY
6. Again, that which is not distinct from the supremely necessary being is absolutely necessary. But the trinity is the entire divine essence. Therefore, etc.
CONCLUSION
The divine being as necessary and most liberal stands together with the trinity of persons.
Response. The divine being is necessary and nevertheless most liberal. And the holy trinity itself exists together with necessity and will if these are properly understood. As was said above concerning necessity,'° not every type of necessity is fitting for the divine being nor for the blessed trinity, but the necessity of immutability and independence is; similarly, not every mode of willing is fitting for God. The will may be considered as adventitious, that is, as beginning to will after not willing; such a will is not found in God, neither with respect to Himself nor with respect to creatures, because of the immutability and necessity of God. There is also the antecedent will, and this is found in God, not with respect to Himself but with respect to the creature which it precedes by nature and by eternity. Thirdly, the will as concomitant and accepting is found in God both with respect to Himself and with respect to the creature; for the divine will approves and accepts every good, whether created or uncreated, whether contingent or necessary.
Therefore, while necessity and will are understood in three ways, it is the third form of each that befits the most high trinity; namely, the accepting will and the necessity of immutability; the accepting will, I say, because of the supreme charity in the producer and the supreme goodness in that which is produced, both of which necessarily include in themselves the will of complacency. And the necessity of immutability is found in God because of the indifference of essence and the independence of the person. Since in the three persons, the essence is entirely identical, there is one quiddity or entity, and one truth; and hence one necessity. Since the first person possesses its being of itself, it is absolutely necessary, hence, so are the second and the third persons. Again, since the essence is identical in the three persons, the distinctive relation of the trinity does not involve a relation to something outside itself. Therefore there is no dependence of one person on another; therefore they all exist equally and unchangeably. Therefore, if one is necessary, all
10 Cf. previous question.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
are necessary. Consequently, as was shown already, these three exist together; namely, trinity, necessity, and will. And there is no repugnance among them, but the highest harmony, just as the supreme unity, truth, and goodness exist in harmony.
That unity is highest which exists in many but is undivided, and this implies a trinity. That truth is highest which is infallible and most certain, and this implies necessity. That goodness is highest which is both lovable and loving; and this implies will. Therefore, the highest unity, truth, and goodness necessarily require that trinity, necessity, and will exist together. Therefore, since in the triune God, necessity is simultaneous with will, and will is simultaneous with necessity, it follows that He is the highest good by reason of His essence. Since in Him the supreme pleasure exists because of will, and the supreme security exists because of necessity, and the supreme happiness exists because of both of these, it follows that He is supremely beatifying through His influence, since our affection rests only in that good which is supremely lovable," and our mind rests only in that which is supremely infallible and certain; and therefore we can be beatified only in a being that is both necessary and voluntary, which by nature is capable of being loved most fervently and known most certainly, and possessed most securely. Therefore, since the most blessed trinity is not only beatific but also beatifying, it follows that it is supremely consonant with that most perfect necessity, and in no way repugnant to it. And similarly with the most liberal will. Hence, the arguments in favor of this are to be granted.
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1. To the first contrary objection from the authority of Augustine and Hilary, it must be said that the teaching of both of these authorities is to be understood of necessity in the first and second sense, but not in the third, as is apparent from the above.
2. To the objection that any agent that dominates over its actions is more perfect, it must be said that this is true of an action that is distinct from the agent. But concerning that sort of action which, because of its supreme simplicity, is fully identical with the agent, the above proposition neither is nor can be true; for nothing u Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XXII, c. 30, n. 5.
1* In the objections above, the authority of Hilary is appealed to. This may be expanded by I Sens, d. 6, q. 1, arg. 2 ad oppos. where Bonaventure writes:
"Item, Hilarius in libro De synodis (n. 58, X XV): non naturali necessitate ductus
Pater genuit Filium: ergo non fuit ibi necessitas naturalis; nec necessitas alia, ut videtur: ergo, etc."
VII. NECESSITY AND TRINITY
can be dominated over by itself. Therefore, the production in the divine persons is by way of supreme simplicity in which there can be no real distinction between the producer and the production; therefore the allegation of the above mentioned proposition cannot be maintained.
3. To the objection that any communication which arises from benignity is more perfect than one that arises from necessity, it must be said that this is true of that necessity which excludes benignity. But such is not the necessity which is affirmed in God; for this is understood as the necessity of communicating a gift essentially different from the giver; but this is not the sort of communication found in the emanation of the divine persons. Therefore, the argument is not valid since it is defective in two ways.
4. To the objection that whatever is necessary is absolute, it must be said that perfect absoluteness does not exclude an intrinsic relation, since such a relation, being indifferent by essence, implies no dependence; hence it is not repugnant to necessity. It is such a relation that exists in the divine persons. But if the absolute excludes relation, this is with respect to beings outside itself and essentially different from itself. Hence, while certain words used to speak of God express a relation between God and created things, that relation is not real on the part of God but only in terms of our manner of knowing for which there corresponds a real relation on the part of created beings.!8 The previous argument holds concerning this relation.
5. To the objection that no being that receives its existence from another can be necessary in the highest degree, it must be said that this is true with respect to a being that is essentially distinct from another, and when it has being that is distinct from the being of the giver. For it cannot be fully necessary since it depends on another being and on another nature that is essentially distinct. But such is not the case with the divine persons, since the person produced does not differ in essence from the person who produces, nor does it have another being. Since it has one and the same being and essence, and one essential truth, it follows that no dependence obtains here, but the producer and the produced together possess the same firm necessity and the same necessary firmness.
6. To the objection that no being that can be thought not to exist is supremely necessary, it must be said that this is true when that necessity is clearly evident, but not when it lies hidden. Hence, while the most blessed trinity can be both believed and thought not to exist now because it has not yet been revealed to us as it is,
18 Cf, Q. 3, a. 1 & a. 2, ad 16 above.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
yet when it will have become clear to us as it is, then in no way will it be possible to think of it as not existing. The fact that now it can be believed or thought not to exist is not because of any lack of certitude or truth in itself, since it exists always and everywhere and supremely; but it is because of a lack of light on our part.
7. To the objection that whatever is repugnant to evidence is repugnant to certitude, it must be said that just as there is evidence that is real and evidence that is subjective, so also there is certitude that is real and certitude that is subjective. Therefore, when it is said that that which is repugnant to evidence is necessarily repugnant to certitude, this is true with respect to objective evidence and certitude, but it is not true of subjective evidence and certitude, since — as was already shown — something that is most certain in itself can be hidden for us. Furthermore, however much the trinity may seem to be repugnant to certitude, it is nonetheless very consonant with certitude since the Father declares Himself in His
Word, and the Father and Son manifest themselves to us most certainly through the Holy Spirit.1° Hence, while the imagination is incapable of understanding the trinity, nevertheless the illumined power of reason sees that only the trinity as trinity is the fullest reason for the knowledge of all truth; for it is by the illumined reason that whatever truth we know is retained in our memory; and being held by our memory, it is understood more clearly; and being understood, it pleases us and is loved by us.
8. To the objection that whatevet is necessary is not fully worthy of praise, it must be said that there are two types of praise. There is one in which honor and dignity add some increase to the one ptaised; and such praise involves progress from an imperfect to a perfect state. This properly befits those wayfarers who could sin but do not do so, and who are fittingly praised and rewarded by God.1¢ There is another sort of praise by which the good itself is said to be commendable in as far as it is good. This is more fitting to something which is good by essence than to something which is good by participation; it is therefore more fitting for the unchangeable than for the changeable good; more fitting for the necessary than for the contingent. With this sort of praise God the Father is
141/935 20 Ci OM, an leabove:
18 Jn. 16, 13 ff., & 17, 1 ff. For Augustine's view on Plato, cf. De Civ. Dei, Vill, c. 4.
1° Eccli. 31, 9 ff., Augustine, Enarrat. in Ps. 134, n. 3.
VII. NECESSITY AND TRINITY
praised in the production of the Son; and the Father and the Son in the production of the Holy Spirit, in their mutual love and in the diffusion of all good with respect to every creature.
9. To the objection that nothing that is simply voluntary is absolutely necessary, the response is clear from what has been said in the principal argument. Therefore, it is not necessary to delay over these things any further.
QUESTION VIII
WHETHER THE TRINITY CAN EXIST
TOGETHER WITH SUPREME PRIMACY
Finally, it is asked whether the trinity can exist together with supreme primacy. It seems that it cannot.
OBJECTIONS
1. Because primacy in essence excludes every other essence. Therefore, it is impossible that there be two first essences since it would necessarily follow that neither of them would be first.1 Therefore, if primacy in essence excludes a plurality of essences, for the same reason, primacy in person excludes a plurality of persons. Therefore, it is impossible that primacy should coexist with the trinity in God.
2. Again, primacy in causality excludes plurality, since it is necessary that there be only one first cause."
3. Again, the final being relates to active production in the same way that the first being relates to passive production. But the last, in as far as it is last, does not admit of an active production that would produce a being from its substance; therefore neither does the first admit a passive production. Therefore, it is impossible that something should be supremely first and yet should have being that is produced. Therefore, it excludes perfect primacy.
4, Again, either those three persons are equally first or they are not equally first. If they are equally first, then one does not produce the other any more than the reverse. If they are not equally first, then the highest primacy does not exist in all the persons,
5. Again, either they are equally principle or they are not. If they are equally principle, then that which makes one to be principle of the other is true of the reverse. If they are not equally principle, then the nature of principle does not exist in them equally; hence neither does the nature of primacy.
1 Cf. Q. 2, a. 1, arg. 6 above.
* Cf. I Sent. d. 2, q. 2, arg. 4 ad oppos.
VIII, PRIMACY AND TRINITY
6. Again, unity is prior to plurality both in reality and in thought.?
Therefore supreme primacy is appropriate only to a being in whom there is unity without plurality. But the trinity includes true plurality.
Therefore, it excludes perfect primacy.
7. Again, the more a being is prior, the mote it is the fontal cause of production. Therefore, whatever is produced emanates necessarily from that being which is absolutely first. Therefore, if it is impossible for a person to emanate from itself, it is impossible for a person that is produced to exist together with perfect primacy.
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. To be first is the same as to be principle.4 Therefore, that which is first from eternity is principle from eternity. But a being is principle in the fullest sense when it is active as principle and produces by way of a perfect production. Therefore, if the reality of perfect primacy exists in God from eternity, then the truth of intrinsic production is found there as well. But this is realized in the trinity. Therefore, etc.
2. Again, the more a being is prior, the more powerful and actual it is. Therefore, the first principle is necessarily most actual and most powerful. But the act of the first principle, in as far as it is principle, is to be active as principle. Therefore, if it is necessary to affirm the highest actuality and power in the first principle because it is first, then it is necessary to affirm the truth of an eternal production, and hence the completion of a perfect trinity.
3. Again, that which is absolutely equal is prior to that which is unequal, both in reality and in our mind.* Therefore, it is impossible to understand the production of a being that is unequal unless one first understands the production of something that is equal.
Therefore, if the production of the creature is a production of something unequal, the production of an equal cannot be realized except in the holy trinity. Therefore, the production of every creature necessarily presupposes the eternal trinity.
4, Again, that which can be understood to have existed from eternity is prior both in reality and in thought to that which can be understood to have existed from eternity neither in reality nor in thought. But the production of one being from another can be
® Aristotle, JJ De Caelo et Mundo, text. 22 (c. 4).
4 Aristotle, J Poster., c. 2.
5 Lib. de Causis, ptop. 1.
; * Aristotle, JJ De Caelo e¢ Mundo, text. 18 (c. 3); VI Topic., c. 4 (c. 9).
St. Bonaventure, Disputed Questions
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
understood to have been eternal while the production of something from nothing cannot have been eternal." Therefore, the production of one being from another must necessarily be understood as prior to the production of creation in accordance with perfect primacy.
But this cannot be conceived except in the uncreated trinity. Therefore, etc.
5. Again, the act of the first principle is above all to be active as principle or to produce. Therefore, since that which is principle is prior to that which is produced by the principle,® then the act of being principle or the production from the active principle is prior to the being that is produced by the principle. Therefore, if the production of the principle exists only in the divine trinity, it is necessary that if that principle be first, it be also a trinity.
6. Again, the first principle, in as far as it is first, is most simple and most spiritual. Therefore, it is necessary that it be intellect.®
But every intellect that acts as principle does so through a word and a gift of love that is intrinsic to it. Whatever is a principle by way of word and love first conceives the word and breathes love before it produces an exterior effect. Therefore, it is necessary that if the first principle produces the being of something extrinsic to itself, it must first be productive within itself.1° But this twofold production demands that God be a trinity. Therefore, it follows necessarily that if the first principle is first, it is also a trinity.
7. Again, being a principle in a natural and intrinsic manner is prior to being a principle in a voluntary and extrinsic manner.
But a voluntary and extrinsic production corresponds to the first principle. Therefore, a natural and intrinsic production necessarily corresponds to it. But this is nothing else than to affirm the trinity.
Therefore, etc.
8. Again, the perfect is prior to the imperfect both in reality and in our mind; that which is complete is prior to that which is diminished; unity is prior to multiplicity; the simple is prior to the composite; the infinite to the finite; act to potency; the immutable to the mutable; the eternal to the temporal; the necessary to the possible. Therefore, if every creature that is produced is imperfect, lacking in the highest unity, composed, finite, and in potency, in some way it is temporal, variable, possible, lacking in actuality and supreme necessity. It is necessary, therefore, that before the proYale Sentads 1) py 15 ay ly gaz
8 Aristotle, JJ Poster., c. 17 (c. 14).
® Aristotle, XJ Mefaph., text. 39 (XI, c. 7); the major is shown in Q. 3, a. 1 above; cf. also, Augustine, De Trin., IX, c. 7, n. 12 ff.
1° Supply: Word and Love as that which is produced within.
1 Aristotle, VIII Phys., text. 75 (c. 9); also Q. 1, a. 1, arg. 12 ff. above.
VIII. PRIMACY AND TRINITY
duction of the creature there be a production of something most perfect, supreme, undivided, most simple, most infinite, eternal, immutable, and necessary. This cannot be through the production of something distinct in essence. It is necessary, therefore, that it be through the production of a person who is one in essence with the person producing, and equal in power, wisdom, and goodness.
But this is to affirm the most blessed trinity.
CONCLUSION
Primacy not only does not exclude the trinity, but includes it.
Response. For a proper understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that primacy not only does not exclude the trinity, but actually includes it in as far as the first principle is a trinity by the very fact that it is first. This is shown in the following way.
Supreme primacy in the supreme and highest principle demands the highest actuality, the highest fontality, and the highest fecundity.
For the first principle, by virtue of the fact that it is first, is the most perfect in producing, the most fontal in emanating, and the most fecund in germinating, [Therefore since the perfect production, emanation and germination is realized only through two intrinsic modes, namely, by way_of nature pee OT eae that is, by way of the SE TAeaae of lover therefore the highest perfection, fontality, and fecundity necessarily demands two kinds of emanation with respect to the two hypostases which are produced and emanate from the first person as from the first producing principle. Therefore, it is necessary to affirm three persons. And since the most perfect production is not realized except with respect to equals, and the most fontal emanation is not realized except with respect to coeternals, and the most fecund germination is not realized except with respect to consubstantial beings, it is necessary to admit that the frst principle includes within itself thiee_hypostases that ate, coequal, coeternal, and consubstantial. The primacy of the first
BaapIS-themtore, demands the most perfect trinity in order, origin, and distinction; of coequality, coeternity, and consubstantiality; it demands also the highest unity, simplicity, immensity, etetnity, immutability, and actuality. Therefore, it requires a trinity in the first principle together with the above-mentioned essential qualities.
Therefore, since the first principle, by virtue of the fact that it is the first being, is supremely one; and for this reason it is supremely
18 I Sent. d. 19, p. 1, q. 2, ad 3.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
simple and immense; and for the same reason it is eternal, unchangeable, and necessary as may be gathered from the above;* and again, by the mere fact that it is the first being, it is most perfect in producing, most fontal in emanating, and most fecund in germinating, and this with respect to things that are equal, coeternal, consubstantial, distinct, original, and ordered, it follows that the first principle, because it is first, exists eternally with the fullness of all these perfect qualities. For this reason, it is in this principle, in as far as it is first, that all beings and all knowledge come to rest.
For this reason, Rachel, the symbol of the contemplative life, is interpreted to mean "the principle is seen,"14 because he who contemplates this, in as far as it is the first principle that he contemplates, finds the rest and the final end of his desires, which are not brought to their end unless the first principle is clearly contemplated as both three and supremely one. Those arguments in favor of this conclusion are to be granted.
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1.2. To the first contrary objection that primacy of essence excludes plurality, it must be said that there is no parallel; since a plurality of essences which are essentially different cannot be ordered to one another except in terms of prior and posterior. But a plurality of persons — since they have one essence and one being — can be ordered to one another in such a way that, even though the reality of origin is found among them, yet no posteriority is involved. This sort of plurality, therefore, does not destroy the supreme primacy since it includes no posteriority, which would be directly contrary to primacy.
From this, the answer to the following objections from causality becomes clear, since it is the order of essentially distinct causes that is seen in the relation of posterior being to that which is first; but this is not found in the origin of the persons.1®
3. To the objection that an active production does not befit a final being, it must be said that there is no parallel, since the final being cannot be related to another that would be identical with itself, nor, because of its imperfection, could it produce another being equal to itself in all things. Therefore, in this case, it is necessarily
13 Qg. 2-7.
14 Augustine, J De Consensu Evangelist., c. 5, n. 8; Adversus Faustum AXII, c. 52 ff.; Jerome, De Nom. Hebraic., de Genesi.
18 Cf. Q. 5, a. 2, ad 2 & 7 above.
VIII. PRIMACY AND TRINITY
contradictory that it be last and simultaneously productive, because it would then have some being posterior to itself.
But the case is different in terms of the principle, since active and passive production are not repugnant here since the highest perfection is found both in the one who produces and in the one produced ; and no posteriority intervenes to diminish the perfection of absolute unity.
4. To the objection that they are either equally first or not, it must be said that first involves the lack of something prior; in another way, it means the lack of origin. Therefore, if a being is said to be first because there is nothing prior to it, then those beings which have nothing prior or posterior to themselves would be equally first.
But if a being is said to be first because of the lack of origin, that is, because it does not take its origin from another, in this sense, primacy resides principally in the person of the Father; and for this reason, the fontal-fullness for the production of all the persons is found in Him. Hence, because innascibility includes this property, the notion of the Father is said to be a property. But this would not be the case unless it simultaneously involved perfection and the cause of manifestation; also, it would be predicated in a relative sense.1¢
5. To the objection that they are either equally active as principle or they are not, it must be said that they are equally principle in the order of essence but not in the order of person; for the Father is principle of two persons; the Son is principle of one; and the Holy
Spirit is principle of none. Therefore, since that primacy which is proper to the first principle in the order of essence is found equally in all three persons, the trinity exists together with supreme primacy; because, just as "not to be able to generate" involves no impotence in the Son, so "not to exist from oneself, but from the Father" involves no posteriority and therefore does not diminish the perfect primacy.??
6. To the objection that unity is prior to plurality both in reality and in thought, it must be said that this is true with respect to that plurality which results from the aggregation of unities. But it 1s not true of that plurality in which plurality is identical with the oneness of three, since in them there is one truth, one light, one cause of knowledge on the part of God Himself.1* The fact that we come to know unity before trinity comes from the deficiency of our knowledge.
18 Cf, Q. 5, a. 2, ad 3 & 6; and I Sent. d. 28, q. 1 ff.
WEVA IA Ch WG Gb Ze 18 Cf, Q. 2, a. 1, ad 2, & a. 2, ad 16 above.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
7. To the objection that the more a being is fontal, the more it is prior in producing, it must be said that — as we have already seen — the first being may be understood in two ways; by way of the lack of essential anteriority, and by way of the lack of personal origin. Thus, it includes a two-fold fontality depending on whether it refers to the lack of essential anteriority or to the lack of personal origin. When it is taken to mean the lack of essential anteriority, it includes fontality with respect to the effects and essences to be produced. Thus, since this condition is equally fitting to all the persons, it is equally proper to all of them to possess the nature of fontality in the production of created beings, since they are not three but one principle of creation. But in as far as it involves the lack of personal origin, it befits only that person who is innascible; namely, the Father in whom resides the fullness of fontality for the production of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.
And, in a certain way, this sort of fontality is the origin of the other fontality. For, since the Father brings forth the Son, and through the Son, and together with the Son brings forth the Holy
Spirit, God the Father through the Son and with the Holy Spirit is the principle of everything created; for if He did not produce them eternally, He could not produce through anything in time; and therefore He is rightly called the "Fount of Life'! by reason of this production within the trinity. ""As He has life in Himself, so He grants to the Son to have life in Himself," etc.2° Therefore it follows that eternal life consists in this alone, that the rational spirit, which emanates from the most blessed trinity and is a likeness of the trinity, should return after the manner of a certain intelligible circle — through memory, intelligence, and will — to the most blessed trinity by God-conforming glory.
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INDICES of Biblical Citations and of Authors and Works
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INDEX OF BIBLICAL CITATIONS
(The references are first to chapter and verse in italics and then to the pages of this book in regular type. The order of the biblical books is that which corresponds to the order of appearance in a modern bible.)
Genesis 78:2, 78, 130.
Exodus 3:14, 13; 15:18, 203; 20:2, 138; 32:32, 78.
Deuteronomy 6:4, 136, 138; 6:13, 136; 19:15, 128; 32:39, 138.
1 Samuel 2:6, 229.
1 Kings (3 Kings) 8:27, 184.
Psalms 4:7, 118, 131; 13:7, 113; 32:6, 78, 130; 35:10, 266; 80:70, B38 3692 5,2135507 01 527,224 19726, "131:
Wisdom 7:24, 226; 11:23, 190; 13:3, 244.
Ecclesiasticus (Wisdom of Sirach) 37:9, 258.
Isaiah 4:3, 78; 7:9, 14; 40:15, 190; 40:17, 190; 66:9, 244.
Daniel 12:17, 78.
Malachy 3:6, 224.
Matthew 78:16, 128; 19:17, 33; 28:19, 74, 78, 122, 130.
Mark 16:16, 74, 122.
Puke 9257, 241; 10:20, 18; 18:19,°32, 33.
JORnatess 190201 6901303-13,°227; 3716, 135; 5729, 51, 1235 5226, DO6GaIFe17 4125-81516, 5971-16213, 258;
16:14, S149 1721,.298;
1723,730, (223:
Romans 7:79, 20; 1:20, 118, 203; 2:14, 127; 8:3, 227; 10:16, 130.
1 Corinthians 13:12, 75; 8:4, 114; 13:9, 121; 13:12, 125.
2 Corinthians 3:78, 130; 10:5, 124, 132; 13:7, 128.
Galatians 4:4, 227; 4:6, 57.
Ephesians 4:9, 227.
Philippians 4:3, 78.
1 Timothy 6:76, 115.
Fitus$1.27,5139.
Hebrews 7:3, 195; 2:3, 132; 17:6, 115.
1 Peter 7:79, 137.
1 John 3:2, 258; 4:8, 33; 4:16, 33; 5, 78; 5:7, 130, 150.
Apocalypse 1:8, 161, 249; 3:5, 78; 17:8, 78; 20:12, 78; 20:15, 78.
INDEX OF AUTHORS AND WORKS
Alan of Lille, De arte, 111; Theol. Reg., 211.
Albert the Great, 18.
Alexander of Hales, 18, 21-24, 33. Summa, 17, 18, 20-23, 32, 56, 78, 89, 238. Disputed questions, 21. Glossa, 21, 23.
Algazel, Phil. 160, 225.
Ambrose, 126. De fide, 226. Expos. in Ps. 118, 126.
Anselm, 18, 19, 22, 28, 69, 72, 73, 81, 112, 114, 118, 119. Contra insip., 112, 119; Monologion, 112, 161, 162, 167, 205, 231, 232.
Proslogion, 112, 114.
Aristotle, 24, 34, 44, 62, 69, 89, 108. Analytica poster. 36, 108, 113, 115, 119, 126, 144, 148, 213, 245, 247, 248, 252, 261, 262. Analytica prior., 148. De anima, 110, 150, 152, 162, 163, 213, 227,
245. De caelo et mundo, 206, 261. De generat. et corrup., 142, 163, 239, 243. De memoria et reminisc., 209. De praedicam., 193, 212,
216, 251. De soph. elench., 147, 173, 178, 187, 188, 221. Ethics, 110, 248, 250, 254. Metaphysics, 44, 89, 108, 110, 111, 126, 139,
140, 149, 15091 G690.713.187, 204, 212.213; 215, 224, 225 2226:
240, 243, 245, 247, 248, 249, 251, 252, 262. Perihermeneias, 113, 119, 153. Physics, 34, 89, 110, 111, 113, 147, 165, 168, 189, 206,
207, 2155 217; 218; 224, 225° 226,°238,. 239, '240, 241, 243.7248; 252, 262. Politics, 248. Rhetoric, 248. Topics, 124, 139, 142, 148,
1702275250. 0251 5 254 261:
Athanasius, 74, 122, 184.
Auer, Iohann, 77.
Augustine, 13,14, 15,.18, 19, 25, 41, 45, 47, 69, 70523; 74,075,595; 1085109, 112) 214, 118," 1225 1245 1264 128: 1432155. 16572:
189, 190, 204. Confessions, 109, 159, 182, 201. Contra Faustum, 126, 235, 264. Contra Maximinum, 220. De beata vita, 204. De civitate
Dei, 109, 160, 185, 204, 219, 228, 250, 256, 258. De consensu evangelist., 264. De Gen. contra Manich., 228. De moribus Manich.,
143. De natura boni, 191. De trinitate, 108, 109, 122, 129, 155, 166, 172, 174, 175, 189, 190, 209, 217, 228, 247, 262. De utilitate credendi, 124. Enarrat. in Ps. 68, 155. Enarrat. in Ps. 134, 258. Hypognosticon, 122. Lib. 83 Quaes., 124, 126, 128, 129, 163, 205, 248.
Quaest. 65 Dialog., 253. Soliloquia, 112, 204.
Averroes, 111. De anima, 111. Physics, 186.
Avicenna, 110. Metaphysics, 110, 160, 180, 215, 225, 252, 253.
AUTHORS AND WORKS
Bernard of Clairvaux, 78. De consideratione, 150, 154.
Boethius. 19,575,695 91, 108, 113, 143, 214. "De consolatione, 108, 143, 150, 206, 212, 215. De differentiis topic., 151, 161. De hebdomadibus (ot Quomodo substantiae), 111, 185, 204, 225, 252. De persona et duabus naturis, 37, 150, 152. De trinitate, 149, 155, 157, 175,
186, 233, 240; 253.
Bonaventure, passim. Brevil., 24, 28 et passim. Comm. in Joan., 51.
Comm. in Le., 18. De reductione, 27. Epistola de tribus quaestionibus, Zo. Perr mesrnn a7 9.42), 202-31, 95; 30, 43,.47, 52, 54, 71, 75,80,
84. Itinerarium, 20, 25, 33, 35, 67, 68, 70, 71, 80. Lignum vitae, 78. Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi, 171, 175, 180, 194,
196, 201, 236. Ouaestiones disputatae de trinit., 24, 26 ff., 35, 36, 43, 45, 62, 68 ff. Sentence Commentary, 23, 24 et passim.. Sermo de trinitate, 26, 66. Sermo I: De triplici testimonio, 26.
° Bougerol, J., 25.
Brady, I., 14.
Brosseder, J., 70.
Copleston, F., 14.
Cousins, E., 39, 42.
VetKesnon. 175-11, 18,22, 23,24.
WesVinck, Ji, 25:
Woucet-Vs> 21:
Dumeige, G., 19, 20.
Forster, K.,, 771:
Francis of Assisi, 24, 32.
Gilbert Porretanus (de la Porrée), Liber sex principiorum, 211.
Gonzalez, O., 19, 20, 24, 75, 77.
Gossmann, E., 15, 22.
Gregory the Great, 16, 19. Homiliae in evangelia, 16, 125, 12751415 151. Moralia, 189, 216, 234.
Hayes, Z., 23, 27.
Hellmann, A. J. W., 53.
Hilary of Poitiers, 141. De ¢rinitate, 14152297, 253.7256:
Hirschberger, J., 14.
Hugh of St. Victor, 15, 69, 78, 95, 108, 121. De sacramentis, 108, 121, 229, 230. Didascalion, 229.
Imle, F., 18.
Isidore, Etymolog., 180.
INDICES Jerome, 126. De nom. Hebraic., 264.
Joachim of Fiore, 63.
John Damascene, 22, 69, 73, 108, 114, 117, 151. De fide orthodoxa, 108, 114, 151, 184, 185, 204.
John of Rupella, 21.
John Sarracenus, 23.
Kaup, J., 18.
Liber de causis, 36, 42, 111, 140, 160, 170, 175, 187, 189, 194, 205, 249, 261.
Macrosius, 134.
Mercker, H., 77.
Pannenberg, W., 70.
Resch OF Ee 0; Peter Lombard, 18.
Plato, 62.
Plotinus, 14.
Porphyry, De praedic., 176, 237.
Prenticessh-oDPrincipe, W., 40.
Pseudo-Dionysius, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 33, 45. De caelest. hierarch., 142. De div. nom., 142, 156, 231, 232, 250.
Quinn Fo. 25,472.
Ratzinger, J., 23, 63.
Rauch, W., 76.
Ribaillice, Ji a9, 20, 29.
Richard of St. Victor, 13, 15-22, 24, 25, 28, 33, 35, 37, 73, 111, 114, 132. De trinitate, 15-17, 21, 37, 38, 111, 114, 133, 139, 140, 145,
152, 176, 185, 196; 200, 203, 204, 205, 215, 225, 238.
Rist, J. M., 14.
Salet, G., 19, 20,. 29.
Schachten, W., 64.
Schindler, A., 14.
Schmaus, M., 14, 18, 70.
Seckerl, M., 70.
Stohr, 18, 38, 39, 56.
Sullivan, J. E., 14.
Szabo, T., 18.
AUTHORS AND WORKS
Thomas of Aquinas, 17, 18, 37, 38, 41, 45.
Thomas of Vercelli, 23.
Tullius (Cicero), 126. Rhetoric, 126, 209.
Villalmonte, A. de, 18, 29.
Volk i 7).
Wiegels, M., 31.
William of Auvergne, 18.
William of Auxerre, 18.
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