Simplicity and Trinity
INTRODUCTION
capable of being distributed among various subjects while remaining fully identical with itself. Such is the unity of the divine nature which — from its own immanent richness — gives rise to a plurality without multiplying the nature.*® Thus, it is not only non-contradictory, but pre-eminently fitting that the one divine nature, precisely because it is one in the highest degree, should give rise to multiplicity within itself such as is found in the trinity.
The coexistence of unity and plurality in creatures darkly foreshadows that pre-eminent realization of unity and multiplicity in God. But this sort of unity can no longer be understood in the monadic sense so common in Greek philosophy. It must now be understood as a unity of love which is more perfect than a mere unity of nature. But love, of its very nature, must involve a plurality.
Therefore, if the unity of love is the most perfect unity, and if God is the most perfect being, then there must be an intrinsic plurality in Him, since there is nothing outside of God that is supremely lovable. Therefore, the metaphysical concept of unity which appears first of all at the philosophical level finds a new and deeper meaning at the level of theological reflection. Through reflecting on the metaphysical implications of Christian revelation, it is possible to transcend the limitations of the purely philosophical vision of reality.
Il. SIMPLICITY AND TRINITY
There are three ways in which a being may be related to composition. First, it may itself be the result of composition in which prior elements are united to form something new; the composite is that being which results from the union. The second type of relation to composition becomes clear from the same example, for the prior elements are related to the composite as parts thereof. The third type of relation consists in the capacity or potentiality of entering into composition.
In none of these ways can composition be attributed to God.
As that being who is absolutely prior to all else, God transcends all actual and even potential composition. Since there is nothing prior to Him, He is simple in the fullest and most proper sense. In God there is no real distinction between essence and existence, nor between faculties and activities. Though we attribute many different qualities to God, these are not separate and really distinct realities in God, but constitute one undivided divinity.
Thus, the affirmation of God's simplicity raises the question of the validity of human knowledge about Him. The fact is that human
36 Hex. 11, 8 (V, 381).
THEMES IN THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
knowledge attributes a multiplicity of qualities to God. If those concepts truly reflect something about the nature of God and are not merely logical constructs, then it would seem that God cannot be simple in Himself; for if He is, then our knowledge seems to be deceptive. On the other hand, if our concepts do not correspond to something real in God, then they appear to be mere logical fictions.
This problem shows the need for a more precise analysis of knowledge. Bonaventure understands knowledge not as mere simple apprehension, but as a process whereby an object of knowledge is reduced to two dimensions: 1) that which is; and 2) that by which it is. But any such act of reduction must take into account: 1) the knowing subject; 2) the object known; and 3) the means whereby the object becomes known to the subject. All human knowledge of God is the product of a finite mind from a limited viewpoint. Such knowledge cannot comprehend the infinite nature of God. Even though God is immense and simple in Himself, we can know Him only by means of images and concepts drawn from our experience in the world. Such experience can do no more than reflect partial glimpses of the divine reality. Therefore, while our knowledge can be truly a knowledge of God, still it will unavoidably find expression in a multiplicity of different images and concepts each of which is limited and perspectival.
Therefore, even though the object of our knowledge in this case is absolutely simple in itself, yet the limits of the human subject and the means of knowledge make it unavoidable that we know that which is simple as though it were composed. This does not totally nullify the validity of our knowledge but simply points to its limitations. For example, we conceive of God as having an intellect and will. Our tendency is to conceive of these as two really different spiritual faculties which are really distinct from each other and from the divine nature. There is a real basis for conceiving of God in this way, for to know is not formally identical with to love and to enjoy; so our concepts express something real in God. But to speak of a real basis for our concepts is not the same as saying that intellect and will are really distinct entities and really distinct from the nature of God. It would be more accurate to say that God is fully in act as pure spiritual being. But the act of spiritual being is carried out in the loving enjoyment of that which it knows. While a cognitive relation is formally different from a volitional relation, they are intimately interrelated as two intrinsic dimensions of one spiritual activity. Thus, nature, intellect, and will are at root one in God; and while there truly is knowledge and love in God, they are not present as separate entities. So, we know God in a multiplicity of concepts which seem to imply many distinctions. Such distinctions,
INTRODUCTION
however, arise from the limits of the human mind rather than from the divine nature.
But how can this absolute simplicity be related to the mystery of the trinity ? In answering this, it is necessary to distinguish various ways in which beings can be said to be distinct, and different types of divine attributes. Bonaventure distinguishes three ways in which persons may be said to be distinct: 1) they may be distinct because of their origin; 2) they may be distinct because they possess different qualities and properties; 3) they may be distinct for both of the above reasons. The second and third cases refer to angels and to human persons respectively, while the third refers to God in whom the persons are distinguished in origin only. But the mode of origin is not something really distinct from the person; it is identical with the person in as far as it views the person in terms of that which constitutes him in his individual personal character. There is, therefore, no composition in the person itself. Bonaventure argues further that there is no real distinction between person and essence, nor between person, property, and essence. At every level, there is total lack of composition in God, and hence there is perfect simplicity.
More difficult is Bonaventure's analysis of the divine attributes and modes of being. The modes of being are either absolute or relative. The absolute modes of being in God are identical with the divine essence. There is, therefore, no real distinction between essence, existence, and absolute modes of being in God.
But more subtle distinctions must be made with reference to relation and the relative modes of being. In any relation, we must distinguish between the esse in and the esse ad; the former refers to the inherence in a subject, the latter designates the ordering of one being to another. As relation is applied to the trinity, Bonaventure says consistently that the esse in passes over into substance; i.e. there is no subject of inherence distinct from the relation. The esse ad, on the other hand, does not pass into substance; it remains as a pure directedness to another. It is the esse ad, now seen as a subsistent relation, that provides -the basis for speaking of three different modes in which the divine nature is possessed by the persons. The esse Of the three persons is identical, but the manner in which each possesses divine being differs in accord with their relation to origin.
The Father possesses the divine nature completely from Himself, and in no way from another. The Son possesses the divine nature as that which is communicated to Him from the Father. The Spirit possesses it as that which is communicated to Him by the Father and the Son.
These relative modes of being, also known as persons, involve no addition of new entities to the nature; but each is identical with