Unity and Trinity
INTRODUCTION
in this way, and hence to think of Him as a trinity.** Having established this foundational truth, Bonaventure indicates briefly how other doctrines of faith may be related to it.
In summary, the three books described by Bonaventure are best seen as a unity; the distinction between them is based on differing situations in the history of grace.84 For those who existed prior to the coming of Christ, an implicit faith was possible as was fitting to their place in the history of revelation; but after Christ, the doctrine of the trinity must be believed with explicit faith since it has been revealed with such explicitness. Such faith does not stand in opposition to reason, but is in harmony with the whole of the created order and is obligatory because of the promulgation of the Gospel. That which makes it possible for us to believe is the innate light of reason brought to completion in this life by the infused light in as far as the latter leads our intellect into obedient conformity to the eternal light of God Himself. Stimulating and supporting us in this faith is the witness of Scripture, the example of the Saints and the teaching of the Doctors. The final consummation of this faith is to be hoped for in heaven where we will stand in the presence of the Light itself, no longer needing the mediation of the opaque world of our historical experience.
Il. UNITY AND TRINITY
The affirmation of the unity of the divine nature may clearly be derived from the witness of the Old Testament. Bonaventure here takes up the same question from the perspective of reason.
The treatment found in the Disputed Questions is considerably more extensive than that found in the Sentence Commentary.*
83 Brevil. 1, 2 (V, 210-211) and I Sent. d. 2, q. 4 (I, 56-58). In the latter, Bonaventure argues that there are three and only three persons in the trinity from beatitude, perfection, simplicity, and primacy.
34 This situation of grace is referred to in the tenth objection and the corresponding answer. Further light is shed on the question in III Sens. d. 25, a: 1, q. 2, ad 6 (III, 541). There Bonaventure argues that God's grace is present to all men, In history prior to Christ, because of the distortions introduced by sin, no one was bound to an explicit faith in Christ or in the Christian revelation.
Yet, some knowledge of Christian reality was available to human beings even then from the dictates of nature, from instruction given by persons of particular religious sensitivity, and from divine inspiration by God "who offers Himself to all who seek Him in humility." This is completely consistent with Bonaventure's understanding of the Verbum increatum, incarnatum, and inspiratum. Cf. Itin. 4, 3
(V, 306); Brevil. 4, 1 (V, 241); Hex. 3, 2-32 (343-458).
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THEMES IN THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
Arguments against the numerical unity of God can be drawn from the facts of religious and philosophical history. Polytheism is a common phenomenon in the cosmic religions; and metaphysical dualism is a recurrent temptation of philosophy. Indeed, the very arguments which are intended to persuade one of the numerical unity of the divine nature seem capable of proving the very opposite.
Certainly, then, if it is reasonable to affirm the unity of God, it cannot for that reason alone be seen as a necessary truth of reason. And if we assume, for the sake of argument, that it is a truth capable of philosophical proof, how could it remain an issue of faith ?
_Bonaventure's approach to these questions is shaped to a great extent by the mian concept of God as "that being than whic greater can bec rved; ich can be seen lurking t = —ground Of each of the particular arguments dealing with the attributes of the divine being. The attributes singled out here are: omnipotence, wisdom, goodness, influence, and causality. The analysis of the individual arguments reveals a common structure which, in each particular case, is filled with content drawn from the definition of the respective attribute. The general structure may be expressed as follows. If there were a multiplicity of separate beings, each of which possessed a divine nature, then the following would have to be reckoned with: either they agree totally in all their essential qualities, or they differ totally, or they agree in part and differ in part. Now, if they are in total agreement in all essential respects, then they are not really distinct but are numerically one and the same.
If they differ totally, on the other hand, it would be a logical contradiction to say that each of two beings could be a "being than which no greater can be conceived." Therefore, if we begin by saying that one of these is God, we cannot logically make the same predication of the other. On the assumption that these beings differ totally, therefore, only one of them can logically be said to be God.
The logical middle between total conformity and total difference is partial agreement and partial difference. In this case, each of the beings would possess qualities not possessed by the other together with qualities possessed in common. This would mean that each of these beings is composed of diverse parts, namely, those things possessed in common and those things not possessed in common.
This would do violence to the simplicity which must characterize the divine nature. Hence, neither of such beings would be truly divine. The only logical possibility for Bonaventure is that the divine nature can be one alone. The whole analysis rests heavily on the Anselmian definition _of God.
The same definition provides the key to why polytheism can and does occur so frequently. The basic problem is that of deter-
St. Bonaventure, Disputed Questions
INTRODUCTION
mining the proper meaning and logical function of the word God.
If this word is taken to signify anything less than the "being than which no greater can be conceived," then it is easily possible to conceive of it in the plural. This, in fact, is what is involved in the case of those religions where anything that seems to transcend human ability and human control is readily designated as a god.
What Bonaventure describes here seems to be nothing other than the '"God of the gaps" made famous in the various secularist theologies of the twentieth century. Only in this sense can the term God be used in the plural; and in the final analysis, we are dealing with various forms of idolatry, for one is investing ultimate meaning in that which is not ultimate. But if the term is used in its proper sense, the unicity of God is seen by Bonaventure to have a self-evident quality which may be placed in parallel with the self-evident character of the foundational principles of logic. While it is self-evident to reason from one perspective, it is a matter of faith from another perspective. There is no formal contradiction in this. Indeed, it is hat one might expect if one's metaphysical vision is such that it encompasses a fundamental harmony between the truth accessible to reason as such and the truth made known through the Christian revelation. Bonaventure's metaphysical vision allows for such a harmonious relation, even while recognizing the distinct functions of philosophy and theology.
The rich diversity of beings in the world, extensive as it is, is not sufficient reason for affirming a plurality of divine causal principles. It is at this point that Bonaventure's aesthetic sense appears in the argument. The world reveals an immense variety of beings; but this is not mere random difference. Rather, it is a multiplicity and differentiation which yet coheres in order and inner relatedness to form a unified cosmos. In brief, the world is not a random collection of diverse beings; it is a cosmos in the original sense of the word — an orderly, harmonious unity of multiplicity. If God is ptimal goodness, wisdom, and power, He is so in such richness and fullness that no single creature could sufficiently manifest the richness of the mystery of being. While God has given total and full expression to that richness in the inner-trinitarian processions, if He should freely choose to communicate Himself to something other than
Himself, then it appears more fitting that He would do so in a way that would be apt to manifest both the concentration of the riches of being in one, and the fertility and fruitfulness of such being in its immense productiveness. So it is, in Bonaventure's thought, that the world, which is one and multiple, is in its entirety but a symbol of the divine nature which is supremely unified and unique in itself and simultaneously infinitely rich in being within itself, and thus is
THEMES IN THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
the boundless source from which flow all forms of being in the world.
At this point, it begins to appear that Bonaventure's concept of unity is verging into the direction of trinitarian thought. God must be one and supremely unified in His being, but that unity is not a static quality. It is conceived more as a dynamic power that holds multiplicity in a dynamic and harmoniously unified order. In shaping his concept of unity, Bonaventure moves from the coexistence of unity and plurality at various levels in the created world.
There is a sense in which unity and multiplicity are compatible in the created world. His examples can be understood only with some definition of nature and person in mind. Nature is taken to refer to the form by which a being is what it is, whereas person is understood to be an incommunicable supposite. Thus, in a purely formal sense, the concepts of nature and person are different concepts. Therefore, in a formal sense, there is no incompatibility in the fact that one should be used in the singular while the other is used in the plural.
The coexistence of plurality and unity can be seen in the relation between a species and the individual beings in the species; while the species is one the beings in the species are multiple. Furthermore, in an individual person, the presence of multiple natures does not destroy the fundamental unity of the person, as in every human person we find both a spiritual nature and a corporal nature. The mystery of the Incarnation reveals even greater complexity since it contains in one being three different natures: both the created spiritual and corporal natures, and the uncreated nature of the divine
Word as well. If there is no logical incompatibility in such a relation between natures and person, neither is there any formal contradiction in the reversal of the terms such as is found in the trinitarian dogma.
Not only is there no contradiction involved in the dogma, but the fundamental implication of the trinity points to a positive perfection. In common philosophical understanding, unity is taken to be a transcendental quality of being. But in the world of created beings, each concrete individual is but a limited concretization of the species. As such, it is unique and unrepeatable. The species is not wholly realized in any one of them, and no individual is simply a repetition of another. The full possibilities of any created nature are realized only in a multiplicity of really distinct unities, each of which involves a multiplication of the nature. In the case of creatures, each is characterized by a unity which remains unimpaired only in as far as it is totally immanent to this numerically unique individual.
Such a unity is, in Bonaventure's view, but a weak reflection of an even more perfect unity of being; namely, a unity which is