Infinity and Trinity
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the nature, though the relative modes stand in distinction to each other. Hence, while the relative modes do not provide sufficient grounds for speaking of composition, they do proves grounds for speaking of distinction.
The distinction resides in the persons and not in the nature.
While nature and person are really identical, person is really distinct from person. Therefore, it is possible to make statements about the persons that cannot be made in the same sense of the nature. This provides the basis for distinguishing three modes of predication:
1) the essential mode, whereby things common to all three persons are predicated; 2) the personal mode, whereby things proper to one person are predicated; 3) the notional mode, whereby one predicates things that pertain to the persons, but not exclusively and properly to one. While the possibility of these different modes of predication is based on the real distinction between the persons and the distinction between the modes of possessing the one divine nature, the possibility of distinguishing the essential properties is based not on the reality of God but on the manner of human knowledge.
The distinction between esse ad and esse in is a helpful key for understanding what Bonaventure says about the properties and their relation to the essence and the persons.' Parallel to the way in which esse in passes into substance, the property can be seen as identical with person secundum modum essendi. Yet, in terms of the modus se habendi, the property is distinct from the person.3'? From this position, the relation between property and essence becomes more clear; for person and essence are really identical. In relation to the essence, the property is only a mode of being which is really identical with the essence. Yet, parallel to the enduring status of the esse ad which constitutes the person and not the essence, the property differs from the essence in this relative aspect. The properties of the persons, relative to the divine nature, are modes of being. And, since in God being is radically identical with the modes of being, we can speak of distinction but not of composition.
IV. INFINITY AND TRINITY
At the beginning of his response in the first article of the question on infinity, Bonaventure, speaks of the need to be aware of how words function in dealing with the question of the infinity of God.
Here perhaps more than anywhere else in the Questions the arguments 37 I Sent. d. 33, a.u., q. 1, resp. (I, 572-573) carries out this parallel in express terms, and concludes: "'...proprietas est persona et in persona, quia idem est per essentiam sive modum essendi, differt tamen quantum ad modum se habendi."
INTRODUCTION
are based on word forms and are therefore dependent on the forms of the Latin language.
The presentation in the Questions is particularly difficult without the background that has been worked out in the Sentence Commentary.*®
There Bonaventure distinguishes various meanings of finis and of negation. Since both terms admit of two meanings, the following schema emerges which clarifies various possible meanings for the adjective forms: finite and infinite. finis — - as completion. When /izis is understood as completion, a being is called infinite (= non-finite) to the degree that it lacks its completion (= finis). Understood in this sense, the term can be applied to the categories of matter, substance, and all other categories of being, but not to God who transcends the categories. as limit or boundary. The meaning of fins is clarified by analogy with the perimeter of a field (= terminus = finis). If the cognate adjectival form is drawn from this finis meaning, it applies to a being which has no boundary limiting it (= terminus), or which has no end (= status). negation - privatively. In a privative sense, a negation signifies that a being whose nature it is to possess a certain quantity of being in fact does not realize the full potentiality of its nature. /nfinite in this sense means incomplete, or lacking in perfection. As such, it can be applied to creatures but not to God. negation - negatively. This refers to a being which, by nature, should have no limiting boundary and in fact does not.
This applies only to God in His supreme immensity.
Thus, while the term infinite can be applied to creatures, it is always in the sense of a defect or a privation.3® Finis may be viewed from yet another perspective which is pointed out by the Quaracchi editors*® and which appears in Bonaventure's response to the objection: "Infinitum non finit."41 In this sense, finis signifies that because of which something else exists. Relative to this meaning, the cognate form finite designates a being that is ordered to another as its end
(= finis). Corresponding to this, infinite indicates a being which is dis38 T Sent. d. 43, a.u., q. 2, resp. (I, 769-770).
Oa (Semsaid.<35,4a.U.) G.e5,eadeets (11612), 40 T Sent. d. 43, a.u., q. 1, scholion (I, 767).
41 1 Sent. d. 43, a.u., q. 2, ad 4 (1, 770).
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orientated from its end. It is in reference to this understanding that the objection is raised that a being which is infinite cannot be the end of another; hence if God is said to be infinite, He cannot be the end or completing goal of creation. If infinite is taken to mean the lack of perfection as described above, the objection is true:
"Infinitum non finit." But if infinite is understood to mean the denial of any limitation whatsoever, it is God — infinite in Himself — who is by nature the completing end of all created reality which finds its full and completing rest in Him (= status).4
As the term infinite is applied to God, it is a further specification of what has already been said concerning the unity and simplicity of the divine nature. To the extent that a being is simple, it is unified in itself and its power is more concentrated. And the more its power is concentrated, the more effective it can be and the fewer limits it has. Therefore, if God is supremely simple, His power is unified in the highest degree; and hence He is unlimited in power. But since, in God, being and power are really identical, if power is unlimited, so is being. Therefore, God is infinite both in His being and in His power. Indeed, it is that supremely unified and simple being that is the center and source of the divine power. God is infinite not in the sense that He lacks something which pertains to the fullness of His being, but rather in the sense that there is no limiting boundary to His being and His power. As such, He is supremely simple and unified, and hence supremely first; He is that being in whom all creatures have their end and goal.
If God is infinite, He is so in all respects. And if this is true, and if it is also true that there is a plurality of persons in God, then it seems that the number of persons must be infinite as God is infinite.
All of the objections raise this problem in various ways. Hence, the main direction of Bonaventure's argument is to show the compatibility between the infinity of God and the fact that there are three and only three persons in God. The arguments of the first article have already shown that infinity as it applies to God involves an unlimited weight or number. Infinity, as a divine attribute, signifies not a deficiency but a fullness that knows no superfluity. Thus, in reference to the trinity, infinity means that the number of persons is neither deficient nor superfluous. The arguments given in the Questions ate basically no different from those of the Sentence Com421 Sent. d. 43, a.u., q. 2, ad 4 (I, 770). The analysis of infinity and its applicability to God borrows heavily from the Summa Fratris Alexandri (I, q. 6, m. 1) and remotely from Aristotle (III Phys., text. 63-66 [c. 6]; VII Metaph., text. 40
(VI, c. 11]). The many ways in which the term may be understood are deeply rooted in the Aristotelian understanding of matter and form, and only against that background does the significance of a number of the arguments emerge.
INTRODUCTION
mentary, though some new dimensions are brought out in the Questions.
The main arguments are based on the full perfection of God conceived in relation to His nature as productive Good; He is not only productive, but is productive in the most perfect way. As we have seen above, there are only two perfect modes of production; that of nature and that of liberality. Any imperfect types would not be found in God. Either these two modes of production are found most perfectly in God, or they are not perfect. If they are in God, and if God is perfect in all that He is, then they must be perfect in Him.
The natural production proceeding from a being that is by nature the highest good would necessarily be the full and perfect self-communication of primal goodness. Though this self-communication expresses all the possible ways in which goodness can communicate itself, it does so in an immanent emanation which is but one Word.
If all the possibilities were not expressed in it, then the production would not be perfect; if all the possibilities are expressed in it, then more than one would be superfluous. Similarly with the second emanation, it is the full and perfect act of pure liberality in which the lovers — seeking nothing for themselves — reach out to the other in pure liberality. From the pure, spiritual love between the two comes forth the personal love that is the Spirit. If the Spirit is not perfect, personal love, then the love of the Father and Son is defective; if the Spirit is perfect, personal love, then a multiplicity is superfluous. It is in the Spirit that the circle of divine love is closed.
There can be no other perfect modes of emanation; and there can be no further immanent emanations in these two modes without implying imperfection in God.
It is in these two immanent emanations that all of God's actions ad extra are grounded. That there is some truth in the objections can be seen in the fact that when the self-expression of God reaches beyond the one immanent Word to the world of creation, it takes the form not of one creature but of a rich multiplicity of creatures which, in their very richness, express something of the inner fecundity of God. Yet, because the immanent Word bears the weight of the fullness of the divine fecundity, the world is liberated to be itself; it need not bear the weight of such total perfection.
The work of God ad extra finds its goal not simply in the existence of creatures, but in the indwelling of God in His personal creatures. For Bonaventure, the divine indwelling is mediated from the Father through the two persons who are produced; it finds its fullest rvalization in that the human person truly returns to the Father from whom it comes in the most radical sense. Since this relation between the soul and the Father is mediated through the
THEMES IN THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
two persons who emanate immanently and through their visible missions in history, the impossibility of an infinite number of produced persons appears in the doctrine of grace. For if there were an infinite number of produced persons, and if the soul returns to the Father through the produced persons, then it would be necessary for the created soul to traverse the infinite. Since this is a clear impossibility for Bonaventure, it follows that the number of produced persons cannot be infinite.
Thus, when the question is approached from each of three perspectives — from the nature of God, from the mystery of creation, and from the divine indwelling — the conclusion is that an infinity of persons is impossible, while a trinity of persons is fully in harmony with the infinity of God.
V.oETERNITY AND*TRINIT ¥.
Boethius defined eternity as the "simultaneous and total possession of interminable life." Accepted in this form by Bonaventure, the definition is given greater clarity through its relation to other divine attributes, particularly simplicity and immensity.
As we have seen above, because God is absolutely simple, there is nothing prior or posterior in Him since these would imply some composition. On the other hand, immensity means that God has no beginning or end. Supreme simplicity implies full simultaneity, since it denies any prior or posterior; immensity implies complete interminability. When these two attributes — simultaneity and interminability — are brought together they constitute eternity. And since immensity and total simplicity are properties of God alone, so also eternity can be an attribute of God alone. Bonaventure sees this as a necessary conclusion since the two attributes which enter into it are necessary attributes of God. Necessary as it may be, it can be understood only by one who sets aside his imagination and sense-imagery and who approaches the question in terms of reason.
Yet certain analogies may help shed light on the question.
Bonaventure takes up the example of God's presence to place. As was seen above, God is supremely simple and immense. He is totally one and unified in His being and power, knowing no hint of composition; and yet He is totally present to places which are distinct and physically separate from each other without suffering violence to His unity and simplicity. A similar relation may be seen between His immensity and time. Parallel to the unity and simplicity described above, the immensity of eternity means that what we experience in a time framework as past, present, and future is concentrated and compacted into one now. In the language of time, the
INTRODUCTION
attribute of eternity is clearly parallel to what unity and simplicity say in the language of space; namely, the total concentration of all the dynamism of being.
Thus, as the simple God is present to many separate places, so the eternal God is present to the many separate and distinct moments of time. Time itself may be seen as a vestige of eternity; for present, past, future are so rooted in the fluid movement of time that what was future later becomes present and then past. If, on the other hand, the present were understood to be rooted in unchangeable and stable being, we would be approaching the meaning of eternity by negating the defects of the vestige.
A more striking example is found in Bonaventure's view of memory in the human soul. Memory is here understood much in the Augustinian sense.' It is not simply the retention of past experiences, but involves a number of @ priori functions in human knowledge.
It is particularly in what Bonaventure calls memory that the human soul is in contact with the Ideas, the first principles of reason, and with God Himself. In the present instance, Bonaventure singles out three functions of memory; namely, the recall of the past, the knowledge of the present, and the foreknowledge of the future.
Though these occur in real temporal succession, they are present to the soul simultaneously. Thus, a certain type of simultaneity is present in the soul, though, because of the soul's dependence on sense-experience, it is not a perfect simultaneity; for the soul's experience is bound up with the flow of time.
Limited as these examples are, they show the possibility of arriving at a proper understanding of eternity. Eternity is not an endless extension of time; rather, it is the fullest concentration of life in one point. Eternity is the mode of God's being as time is the creature's mode of being. lf God is necessarily eternal, how is it possible to see eternity in relation to the trinity ? The problems involved here are concerned ptimarily with the relation of production to simultaneity. Production seems to involve priority and posteriority just as cause is prior to effect. If there is no priority in the trinity, then all three persons are equally first, and hence none can proceed from another; production would seem to be impossible. But if there is priority and posteriority among the persons, then they are not equally eternal.
Bonaventure's analysis of this question revolves around three points: 1) the relation among essential attributes; 2) the proper understanding of the emanations of origin; 3) the nature of the personal relations. We have already seen how Bonaventure comes
48 Cf. note 12 above.
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to affirm unity, simplicity, and immensity as necessary attributes of God and as related to the mystery of the trinity. In the first article of the present question he has shown that God is necessarily eternal.
But if the essential attributes are fundamentally one in God, though conceived separately by us, then if there is a harmonious relation between the trinity and the attributes of unity, simplicity, and immensity, so must there be harmony between the trinity and eternity.
That there is true eternity in God is related to immensity; that there is supreme eternity is related to simplicity; and that there is one eternity is related to unity. If unity, simplicity, and immensity do not exclude the trinity, neither should eternity.
How this relation should be conceived can be seen better through reflection on the emanations which may be approached in terms of each of the three elements involved in the concept of production:
1) the person producing; 2) the person produced; and 3) the mode of production. Concerning the first, the person producing is really identical with the act of production; and in the act of production, he is totally engaged with the full extent of his power. As the person is really identical with the nature, and mode of being is really identical with being, it follows that the person in its mode of being as productive is eternal as is the nature; for they are at root one and inseparable. Simply stated, they are simultaneous. But if the person exists eternally as productive, then both the act of production and the term of production must likewise be eternal; they must be simultaneous with the eternal nature and person. Since the productive person produces with the full actuality of his power, the person produced bears the fullest conceivable likeness to its source, and hence is fully equal. And since the first production is one that flows necessarily from the nature of the supreme Good, the actual emanation can be no less eternal than the Good itself.
The emanations are the basis of the relations which distinguish the three persons. But the relations in God are not added subsequently to His being from without. On the contrary, they are intrinsic to the fullness of His being, and therefore are fully simultaneous with His nature. As relations that pertain to the fullness of being, they in no way conflict with His perfect infinity.
Though there is no prior or posterior in God, this does not mean that there is no order. There is, indeed, order; but it is the order based on origin. As origin need not be seen in terms of temporal sequence, though it is always found that way in the created world, so the order based on origin need not be a temporal order.
It is the order based on the modes in which the divine nature is possessed. In the first person, it is possessed as in no way being from another and as being totally communicative; in the second
INTRODUCTION
person, it is possessed as being communicated from another, and as being itself communicative; in the third person, it is possessed as being totally communicated and in no way communicative. This is the order of the divinity. It must be pointed out further that the common tendency to equate being from another with a cause-effect relation must be transcended. The creature is from God as from its cause. But the concept of cause is here transcended by the trinitarian concept of principle. The causal relation between God and creation involves an essential difference between them as well as a relation of total dependence of the creature on God. The trinitarian concept of principle involves neither, but only personal distinction. Principle, therefore, refers to source or origin only and not to a relation of inferiority or dependence.
Thus Bonaventure hopes to have shown that the essential components of eternity are in full harmony with the trinity. The simultaneity involved in simplicity may be seen here in the full actuality of God's nature as productive Good, which emanates eternally and thus exists eternally in four intrinsic relations founded on the two perfect modes of emanations. The simultaneity of eternity is bursting with the dynamism of goodness and life. The interminability involved in immensity is seen in the fact that these relations are not accidental features that would add to an otherwise limited deity. Rather, as intrinsic relations, they express in a fuller way the limitless nature of the divine.
In speaking of these issues, we unavoidably make use of the language of time; language that can easily conjure up the image of temporal duration in God. Bonaventure recognizes such language as both useful and inadequate. It is useful, because it can be a means of expressing God's transcendence of whatever perfection is realized in time and expressed in temporal language. On the other hand, to the positivist who may be inclined to a one-dimensional understanding of language, Bonaventure points out the highly analogical quality of such language in which the sound of time attempts to express the silence of eternity: If we are to gain any deeper understanding, it can only be by transcending the images of sense-experience and even the possibilities of reason, and allow reason to be led beyond its limitations by the light of faith.
VI. IMMUTABILITY AND TRINITY
Concerning the immutability of God, Bonaventure speaks of unanimity among all who think correctly, whether they be philosophers or theologians. The Old Testament speaks of God in these
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terms, and reason can clarify that religious claim by showing that immutability is implied in the concept of God as the absolutely first being to which all mutable being must be reduced and in whom the entire created order finds its resting-point.
The meaning of immutability is clarified by showing its relation to the necessary attributes that have already been discussed, particularly the attributes of simplicity, immensity, and eternity. When the nature of God is approached in terms of simplicity, any possibility of change would have to be viewed as a change of form. Since any change of form is impossible in a being who is absolutely simple, no change of this sort can be envisioned; as simple being, possessing nothing accidental to itself, the divine nature is incapable of change in itself. As immense being, God is present in His totality to each point of space. It is therefore inconceivable that He should be transported from one place to another; as immense, He can undergo no change in reference to place. Eternity involves a similar relation to time; God is present to each separate moment of time just as He is present to every distinct place. Hence, as eternal, He can undergo no change in reference to time. Citing Augustine and Hugh of St. Victor, Bonaventure argues that all change can be reduced to one or the other of these three possibilities: change in form, in place, or in time. Since the three attributes have already been seen as necessary qualities of the divine nature, the affirmation of immutability seems unavoidable.
But a serious objection seems to arise from God's external works, especially the works of creation, historical mission, and indwelling.
If creation means that the world of created reality begins to exist after non-existence, it seems that God must become Creator in actuality after being only potentially a Creator. It seems, further, that He performs distinct acts in succession, such as creating, conserving, sparing, and punishing. Finally, the act of creation certainly seems to imply that God enters into a relation to creation, as do other relative attributes such as those expressed in the titles Lord, Refuge, and King. All of this seems to imply change in God.
Bonaventure's response to such questions lies well within the framework of classical metaphysical concepts. He replies that change is indeed involved; but it is to be understood in terms of a nonmutual relation. The change is in the creature only and not in God.
God's action is totally identical with His being; and like His being, it neither begins nor ends. The divine action has effects in time, but eternity and time are essentially different modes of existence corresponding to the nature of God and the nature of the creature respectively. A logical error occurs when this is overlooked and God's eternal being is conceived as if it had extension in time that
INTRODUCTION
differs only in being longer than that of the creature. The difference between these two modes of existence must be respected consistently at the logical level. In Bonaventure's view, this takes the form of direct signification and connotation. In speaking of God in terms of relative attributes, our predications signify directly God who is eternal and immutable; but at the same time, they connote an effect in the order of temporal changeable beings. Thus, God Himself is eternally identical with His act; there is neither beginning nor end, nor any plurality of actions. But the external effect exists only in its proper mode of being; and hence it is multiple, mutable, and temporal. Any statements which seem to imply that God begins to do something which He was not doing before must be understood only and exclusively of the external effect.
The same problem arises but in an even more acute form when we turn our attention to the history of salvation. The New Testament seems to have no hesitation in speaking of the mission and descent of the Son of God. The effect of the mission of the Son is the incarnation, the assumption of a human nature which He did not possess prior to the incarnation. The doctrine of grace affirms the indwelling of God in human souls in such a way that the divine presence begins to exist in the repentant person just as it ceases to exist in the sinner.
But how is it possible to make such statements without affirming change in God, at least of an accidental sort ? Yet if the history of salvation obliges us to make such statements, does it not require us to affirm some sort of change in God ?
The response to such questions follows the same fundamental pattern as we have seen above. Here as elsewhere in his works,
Bonaventure emphasizes the metaphorical character of terms such as descent and mission. The Son does not embark on a space odyssey, leaving the Father for a period of time, literally coming down, and later returning to His proper abode in the trinity. Such an understanding arises from taking a metaphor too literally. It must be understood that God, precisely as a trinity, is present to all times and places. To speak of a mission of one of the divine persons is to say that the eternal emanation is made manifest in time and has a particular temporal effect. The purpose of any such mission is to deepen the reality of the indwelling of God in human souls. Thus, when we say that the Son is sent, or that He descends, this does not indicate something new on the part of God, but designates that the temporal effect of the eternal emanation has a beginning and endures in time.
Similarly, in speaking of the assumption of a human nature by the Son of God, the language of incarnation should be understood to involve a change in the created nature but not in the Word Himself.
THEMES IN THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
Finally, the indwelling of God is effected not by a change in God but by a change in the human person.
The relation of immutability to the trinity is developed largely through its relation to eternity and simplicity. Eternity, as we have seen, excludes any change; simplicity excludes even the possibility of change, since it excludes any sort of composition. Thus, if the trinity is understood in terms of supreme simplicity, eternity, and immutability, it appears that the convergence of all these attributes points to the fact that the trinity is being in its fullest possible actualization. The question of the trinity, then, is the question of being, viewed from a particular sort of religious experience. Here the deeper metaphysical dimensions come to the fore. Being at its highest and fullest actualization is realized in the two dynamic moments of knowledge and love; knowledge which gives rise to a word of self-expression, and love as a unifying power. Thus, that which we conceive of and speak of in terms of our temporal experience and categories is in reality the total, full dynamism of spiritual being at its apex of actuality. It is being that is totally luminous to itself, and fully unified within itself through the power of love.
It is in this way that God exists immutably and actually; and thus He is actually and immutably a trinity. God is always, actually and unchangeably in full conformity with what He is.
Hence, while we use the language of generation and production to speak of the origin of the Son and the Spirit, this language is analogical and must be purified of all the limiting elements which are involved in generation among creatures. Production and generation, therefore, do not involve any emergence of new being in God, but express the eternal actuality of the fecund nature of the mystery of the divine being.
VII. NECESSITY AND TRINITY
As we have seen earlier, Bonaventure distinguishes three types of necessity; one that is totally extrinsic to a being, another that is totally intrinsic, and a third that is partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic.
Each of these, in turn, includes sub-categories, the differences arising from the source of the necessity. Some types of necessity are brought to a being from factors outside itself, while others arise from a relation of one being to another upon which it depends for its full actualization. But of all the types which may be distinguished, it is only a completely intrinsic necessity springing from the very nature of the being in question that can be applied to God.
It is that type of necessity which Bonaventure calls a necessity
St. Bonaventure, Disputed Questions
INTRODUCTION
of immutability or independence. By it he wishes to say that God is in no way necessitated by anything outside Himself and is in no way dependent on others for His fullness of being. He is fully and completely self-sufficient and completely true to His own nature.
He can be in no other way than He is. Such an understanding of necessity does not conflict with the freedom of the divine will, as would be the case with the other types of necessity. It is precisely because God is fully self-sufficient in Himself that He can communicate Himself freely to others without any loss or any threat of loss.
Necessity of this sort is what is meant when it is said that God exists in and of Himself. Existing in Himself, He knows no composition of any sort in Himself; existing of Himself, He is neither made nor sustained by any other. Lacking all composition, He is incapable of change; lacking any creative or sustaining cause, He neither comes into being nor ceases to be. His being is permanent, stable, selfsufficient; it is unchangeable and independent of all others, free of all need and of all forms of coercion from without. God exists not for the sake of anything else, but simply for His own sake. He is that necessary being to which all contingent being must be reduced.
As the being that exists in and of itself and for its own sake, God is the absolute source and the fulfilling end of all else. In the words of the New Testament, He is the Alpha and the Omega.
What can this mean in relation to the trinity ? It must be recalled that for Bonaventure, the dominant category for conceptualizing
God is the category of the Good, but'the Good conceived in personal terms. As the Good that is necessarily (= necessity of immutability) in full accord with its own nature, it must be supremely communicative. But since He is Good that is supremely personal, liberality and generosity must be a dimension of the communicativeness of God. It is, therefore, precisely in the trinitarian conception of God that it becomes possible to transcend the dilemma: either necessitated or free; either totally self-sufficient or dependent on creation in order to be God. There is a sense in which necessity applies to God.
For Bonaventure, it is in the sense of the necessity of immutability and independence. As this type of necessity is seen in relation to the nature of the Good, it provides the context for understanding the Necessary (= per naturam) emanation of the Son as the necessary, immanent self-communication of the Good. As we have seen above, when this neo-Platonic viewpoint is extended through the personal category of love, the circle of divine self-communication is completed through a communication whose proximate principle is the will. Thus we see the significance of the two technical phrases used by Bonaventure to express the role of nature and will in both the divine processions: "natura, concomitante voluntate," and "'vo-
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luntas, concomitante natura." The will is present in the first procession as concomitant and approving though the procession emanates from the nature of God as Good and therefore has a prevoluntary dimension. The second procession is. immediately from the will as generous and liberal; it is a communication of fully personal love. Conceiving of God in this way places the full burden of being God in the Godhead itself; for it is there that the full communication of the Good takes place as both necessary and free.
But if God is thus conceived, it follows that any other communication is not necessary for the sake of God's existence as God. And if that be the case, then it follows that when God does in fact communicate being to creation, the created world need not be made to bear the weight of being God. As the world, it is the contingent and limited participation in being, goodness, and truth.
It need not be a perfect world or the best possible world; it is sufficient that it be a world of limited goodness that is apt for the working out of God's loving purpose.
So as the dialectical relation of necessity and will is seen in God, it becomes possible to see both the nature of God and His relation to the world with far richer theological depth. If necessity is to be affirmed of God as regards His nature as self-communicative Good, then necessity must be an attribute of all that is really identical with that nature. Since the three persons, while distinct among themselves, are really identical with the divine nature, they are necessary as the nature itself is necessary. They are really simultaneous with the nature, though generally conceived in temporal categories.
Hence, they all exist equally and immutably. And since, for the fullness of the divine self-communication, the will is required, Bonaventure can conclude that trinity, necessity, and will coexist. Not only are they not contradictory; but when properly understood, they reveal a remarkable coherence and inner harmony with each other.
The relation of necessity and will in God helps clarify in what sense God is the end and goal in which His creation is to find its beatifying rest. The intellect of the human person is carried throughout life by a constant search for truth, never to find rest from its quest unless it should find truth that is infallibly necessary; for only in such truth will it find security. But the spirit-life of humankind is not only a cognitive adventure, for cognition itself is not complete without the inner drive for union with the object known. This involves the area of affectivity and will. As the intellect does not find rest in the truths to be discerned in creatures but only in the Truth that is necessary and infallible, so the will does not come to rest in its reach for the good until it embraces the supreme Good. But the supreme Good, if it is to transcend the impersonal categories
INTRODUCTION
of neo-Platonism, must include the personal dimensions of love and will. It is only when these dimensions are taken into account that we can speak of God in terms of pleasure and happiness. Thus, through the two most basic moments of its spiritual life, the created spirit is orientated to a being that is both necessary and free, for only when the supreme security which flows from the divine necessity is united with the supreme pleasure that flows from the divine goodness and will can the human spirit find supreme happiness and fulfilling rest. Our affection rests only in that good which is supremely lovable, and our mind rests only in that truth which is supremely infallible and certain; we can be beatified, therefore, only in a being that is both necessary and voluntary. Since, as we have already seen, necessity and will exist in God only in as far as He is a trinity, it is only in a trinitarian God that the journey of the created soul will come to rest.
When we are lead to speak of necessity with respect to the trinity, it does not follow that either the fact of the trinity or its necessity must be fully evident to us. Evidence must be considered both from the objective and from the subjective side. Objectively,
God's existence as a trinity is most evident in itself. As we have seen in the first question, such a mystery is not fully evident to the human mind in the limitations of its historical existence. But when the natural light of the mind is illumined by the eternal light of God, the evidence for the trinity is such that we may speak of certitude, albeit a certitude of faith. Such a certitude transcends even the certitude of reason, and it directs the created spirit to that mystery in which alone it will find the fulfillment of its quest for truth and goodness.
VII. PRIMACY AND TRINITY
It is in the treatment of primacy that the entire development of the Quxestions finds its high-point. Not only is primacy the climax of this particular work, but it is fundamental to Bonaventure's approach to God in general and to the trinity in particular. It is, indeed, a very personal development of the Seraphic Doctor and is found in this form in none of his predecessors. In the present context, Bonaventure brings his entire lengthy discussion of the divine attributes to a close with his attempt to prove that primacy, when properly understood, demands the existence of the trinity. By the mere fact that God is the first principle, He is necessarily a trinity.
We are here at the heart and center of Bonaventure's trinitarian system from which he explains both the mystery of the trinity and the nature of God's relation to creatures. God is first not only in
THEMES IN THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
the sense that His nature is prior to all created natures, but the concept of primacy must be drawn into the very life of God where it finds its absolute roots in the person of the Father, who is source and origin of all, within and without the Godhead. The origin of all from the Father through the Son and Spirit, and the return of all to the Father through the Son and the Spirit constitutes the "intelligible circle"? of created existence which, in its own way, reflects the "intelligible circle" that is the life of God.
As the absolutely first being, God is being in its fullness. This we have seen at work over and over in the arguments of the preceding questions. A lack or privation can be known only through the corresponding positive quality which is prior not only in the logical order, but in the real order as well. To the degree that something is prior, to the same degree it is more full of the positive qualities and perfections of being. Since God is absolutely prior to all else, He is the full actuality of being in all its necessary perfections.
From this, it follows that God is cause of others to the degree that He is first; for to be first is the same as to be principle.44 To be principle with respect to the world is to be cause or source from which all emanates and to which all returns. The productive fecundity of God is in proportion to His primacy;* His absolute primacy, therefore, designates Him as the universal fountain of all origin, or in Bonaventure's suggestive terms, the fontalis plenitudo.
He is the absolute source and cause of all that exists.
Not only does primacy illumine God's nature as fountain of all created being, but — as Bonaventure argues — if God is eternal, then He is principle from eternity. But, since He is pure actuality in all that He is, He must be eternally productive as principle. But if we are not to be forced to conclude that the world is necessary and eternal, we must conclude that the primacy of God requires perfect, intrinsic production. We are, therefore, lead into the realm of trinitarianism. Primacy demands not only that God be cause of the world, but also that He be perfectly and eternally productive within Himself; for if He is eternally first, He is eternally principle, most perfect, most actual and productive prior to the production of the world. Indeed, it is precisely because He is productive within that the production of the external world is possible; for the world is not equal with God, but the production of something unequal is necessarily posterior to the production of something equal. The necessary prior condition for the production of the world, therefore, is the eternal production of another who is fully equal with God.
"4 I Sent. d. 28, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4. Also, in the present Qxestion, fundament 1.
45 T Sent. d. 2, a. 1, q. 2, fund. 4: "quanto aliquid prius tanto fecundius."
INTRODUCTION
Primacy with respect to the world, consequently, requires primacy within God Himself.
Thus far, we have seen the relation between primacy and production in God. The question of the productions may be further clarified through the basic movements of spiritual, intellectual beings which are active as principles through an inner word of knowledge and the intrinsic gift of love. Such a principle first conceives an inner word and breathes love within before it produces an external effect. The analogy may be applied to God as a spiritual principle; before He can be productive externally, He must be productive internally in this two-fold way. These two modes of intrinsic productivity may be further specified as productions per modum naturae and per modum voluntatis as clarified above. But these two immanent modes of production must have a proportionate term, which is found in the hypostatic Word and in the hypostatic Love. The divine fecundity, which lies most radically in the Father but is possessed in common by the three persons with respect to creatures, is the fount from which flow the inner-divine emanations as well.
Creation itself is but the radiation in space and time of the eternal inner-trinitarian life.
Primacy, then, is the central trinitarian concept for Bonaventure's system. As the eighth argument shows, all the necessary attributes discussed in the previous questions are brought together around this concept. That which is abolutely first is prior in all respects to that which is not first. Since creation is: the production of that which is imperfect, lacking in unity, composed, finite, in potency, temporal, changeable, lacking in actuality and necessity, such a production is necessarily posterior to a production which brings forth the perfect, supreme, undivided, simple, infinite, eternal, immutable, and necessary. A study of the previous arguments shows that, to a great extent, they are but variations on this theme. This indicates the density and compactness of Bonaventure's thought which is guided by a relatively small number of keenly perceived insights.
For centuries of Christian literary history, Rachel had been known as the symbol of the contemplative life. Reaching to that tradition,
Bonaventure can appeal to the symbolic figure of this Old Testament woman to bring his reflections to a close, and to trace in a few bold strokes the relation of the trinity to the mystery of the human person. It is not in the contemplation of an abstract, impersonal first principle that we find rest and fulfillment, but only in the contemplation of that mystery of the most holy, personal God of goodness and love. As the trinitarian life of God may be symbolized by a circle, so also human existence is a going-out from the triune God and a return to the same God after the manner of an intelligible
THEMES IN THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
circle through memory, intelligence, and will. The human soul will find its full completion and its rest in that it becomes conformed to the triune God Himself as a true similitude of the trinitarian mystery which has stamped its creation with the indelible sign of its origin.
And this is eternal life which flows from the eternal Fount of Life, sweeping like a great river through time and history and the spiritual development of humanity, and closing back on its point of origin.
He is the Alpha aud the Omega; the Beginning and the End.
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THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
ON THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY
THE TExt OF St. BONAVENTURE
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With the help of divine grace, we intend to offer some reflections concerning the mystery of the trinity beginning with two questions as a preamble. The first of these is the foundation of all certain knowledge; the second is the foundation of all the knowledge of faith. The first is whether the existence of God is an indubitable truth; the second is whether it is a truth of faith that God is a trinity.
QUESTION I
CONCERNING THE CERTITUDE WITH WHICH THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD IS KNOWN, AND CONCERNING
THEPAITA BYWHICH THE TRING Y OF THE SAME
GODAS BEIABVED
ARTICLE I
VHETHER THE EXISTENCE.OF GOD
IS AN INDUBITABLE TRUTH
In the first place, the question is raised as to whether the existence of God is an indubitable truth. There are three ways of arguing in favor of this. The first way says: Every truth that is impressed in all minds is an indubitable truth. The second way says: Every truth proclaimed by all creatures is an indubitable truth. And the third way says: Every truth which, in itself, is most certain and most evident is an indubitable truth.
The first way shows both from authority and from proofs that the existence of God is impressed in all rational minds, and it proceeds in the following manner.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. In the third chapter of the first book, Damascene writes:
"The knowledge of God's existence is naturally implanted in us.'
2. Again, Hugh writes: "God has tempered the knowledge of Himself in man in such a way that while man can never totally comprehend what God is, yet at the same time, he can never be totally ignorant of the fact that God exists."
3. Again, Boethius writes: "The desire for the true and the good is implanted in the minds of men." But an inclination toward the true and the good presupposes knowledge thereof. Therefore, there is impressed in the minds of men a knowledge of the true and the good and a desire for that which is most desirable. But that good is God. Therefore, etc.
4, Again, in many places in his work On the Trinity,4 Augustine says that the image consists in mind, knowledge and love; and the concept of image is applied to the soul because of its relation to God. If, therefore, it is impressed in the soul by nature that it is an image of God, it follows that the soul has knowledge of God implanted in it by nature. But the first thing knowable about God is that He exists. Therefore, this is naturally implanted in the human mind.
5. Again, the Philosopher says that "it would be inappropriate for us to be in possession of the most noble habits and yet to know nothing of them."> And since the truth of God's existence is the most noble truth and the one most present to us, it would be inappropriate that such a truth should remain hidden to the human intellect.
6. Again, the desire for wisdom is implanted in the minds of men since, as the Philosopher says: "By nature all men desire to know.''® But that wisdom which is most desirable is the eternal wisdom. Therefore, there is implanted in the human mind a desire for such wisdom above all else. But as we said earlier, love cannot exist unless there is some knowledge of the object loved. Therefore, it is necessary that some knowledge of that highest wisdom. be impressed in the human mind. But this is first of all to know the existence of God, who is that wisdom. Therefore, etc.
1 De Fide Orthod.; cf. also c. 1.
I De Sacram., p. 3, c. 1.
Lib. III de Consol., prosa 2.
UX ci 25 Mee oles) LS Geant 4 fect XU Vecr Semend Itt Lib. II Poster. c. 18 (c. 15).
Lib. I. Metaph. c. 1. an & © BP
I. KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
7. Again, the desire for happiness is implanted in us in such a way that no one can doubt that other men wish to be happy, as Augustine writes in many places." But happiness is found in the highest good, which is God. Therefore, if such desire is impossible without some knowledge, it is necessary that the knowledge by which we know the existence of God as the highest good be implanted in the soul itself.
8. Again, a desire for peace is implanted in the soul to such an extent that peace is sought even through its opposite, and the desire cannot be removed even from the damned and the demons, according to the City of God, 19.8 But if there can be no peace for the rational mind except in a being that is eternal and immutable, and if desire presupposes some notion or some knowledge, then a knowledge of the eternal and immutable being is implanted in the rational spirit.
9. Again, a hatred of falsehood is implanted in the soul. But every hatred takes its origin in love. Therefore, the love of truth is even more firmly implanted in the soul; and this is especially true with reference to that truth in whose likeness the soul is made.
But if that is the first truth, it follows necessarily that some knowledge of the first truth is implanted in the rational mind. The fact that the human mind has an innate hatred of falsehood is apparent in the fact that no one wants to be deceived, as Augustine writes in the tenth book of his Confessions.® In the fourteenth book of the City of God,!° Augustine shows that hatred is caused by love; for no one hates something unless he loves its opposite.
10. Again, the rational soul naturally has knowledge of itself whereby the soul is present to and knowable to itself. But God is most present to the soul and is knowable in Himself. Therefore some knowledge of God Himself is implanted in the very soul. If you say that there is no similarity here since the soul is proportional to itself whereas God is not proportional to the soul, I reply on the contrary that there is no parallel, because if proportionality were necessarily required for knowledge, the soul could never come to a knowledge of God since it can be proportioned to Him neither by nature, nor by grace, nor by glory.
These arguments show that the existence of God is indubitable for the human mind as a truth that is naturally impressed. One cannot be in doubt except in matters about which there is no certain knowledge.
2 Dewirinwmxillveno* tees ssc. 4.) fe) fay Cor 209s 205 SiGAt3s oeletiwalsor en tice at 2:
DAG, DB are Seat (GS Ht 7%
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
Again, the same point is shown in a second way as follows:
Every truth that is proclaimed by all creatures is an indubitable truth. But all creatures cry out the existence of God. Therefore, etc.
That every creature proclaims the existence of God is shown from ten self-evident postulates and their presuppositions.
11. The first is this: If there is posterior being, then there is prior being, because there is nothing posterior except it be from something prior.! But if the sum total of posterior being exists, there must necessarily be a first being. Therefore, if it is necessary to say that among creatures there is both posterior and prior, it is necessary that the sum total of creatures infers and cries out that there is a first principle.
12. Again, if there is being that exists from another, there is also being that does not exist from another, because nothing can bring itself from non-being to being. Therefore there must necessarily be a first principle of eduction, and this is found in the first being which is not educed from another. Therefore, if that being which exists from another is called a created being, and that being which does not exist from another is called uncreated being — and this is God, then every category of being infers the existence of God.
13. Again, if there is possible being, there is a necessary being since that which is possible implies indifference as to being or nonbeing. But nothing that is indifferent to being and non-being can exist except through something that is entirely determined with respect to being.!® Therefore, if that necessary being in which there is no possibility of non-existence is none other than God, and if everything else has some degree of possibility, every category of being infers the existence of God.
14. Again, if there is relative being, there is also absolute being, because the relative is never terminated except in the absolute.
But an absolute being which depends on no other can only be a being that receives nothing from another. This is the first being, and all other being is in some way dependent. Therefore it is necessary that every category of being infers the existence of God.
15. Again, if there is diminished being or qualified being, there is a being that exists absolutely, because qualified being can neither exist nor be understood unless it is understood through unqualified being. Neither can diminished being exist or be understood except through perfect being, just as a privation cannot be understood
1 Aristotle, JV Phys. text. 7 (c. 1); IJ Metaph. text. 10 (I brevior c. 2) & V text. 17 (IV, c. 11).
4 Aristotle, IJ De Anima, text. 47 (c. 4).
18 Cf. Avicenna, Mefaph. tr. 1, c. 7.
4 Aristotle, J Ethic. 6.
I. KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
except with respect to a habit.5 Therefore, if every created being is being only in part, and if the uncreated being alone is absolute and perfect being, it is necessary that any category of being infers and leads to the conclusion that God exists.
16. Again, if there is being that exists because of another, there is also being that exists because of itself, otherwise nothing would be good.!® But that which exists because of itself is none other than that being than which none is better, and this is God Himself.
Therefore since the sum total of other beings is ordered to Him, the sum total of beings infers God both as to being and as to understanding.
: ij 17. Again, if there is being by participation, there is also being by essence, since one cannot speak of participation except with respect to some essential property which is had from another, since everything that exists accidentally is to be reduced to that which exists of itself.17 But every being other than the first being — which is God — has being by participation; the first being alone has being by essence.
Therefore, etc.
18. Again, if there is being in potency, there is being in act, because a potency can be reduced to act only through a being in act, and there would be no potency unless it were capable of being reduced to act.18 If that being which is pure act and has no potency is none other than God, it is necessary that everything other than the first being infers the fact that God exists.
19. Again, if there is composite being, there is simple being, because a composite does not have being of itself.1° Therefore it is necessary that it take its origin from something that is simple.
But the most simple being, having no trace of composition, is none other than the first being. Therefore, every other being infers God.
20. Again, if there is changeable being, there is also unchangeable being, since — as the Philosopher proves — movement takes its origin from a being at rest and terminates in a being at rest.?° If, therefore, that being which is entirely unchangeable is none other than the first being — which is God — and if all others are created, and in as far as they are created, they are changeable, it is necessary that the existence of God is inferred by any category of being.
15 Averroes, IJI De Anima, text. 25.
16 Boethius, De Hebdomadibus; Aristotle, XII Metaph. text. 52 (XI, c. 10).
17 Aristotle, JJ Phys. text. 66 (c. 6.).
18 Aristotle, 1X Metaph., text. 13 (VIII, c. 8).
19 Lib. de Causis, prop. 21 ff.; Rich. of St. Victor, De Trin. V, 4; Alan of Lille, J De Arte seu Articulis Cathol. Fidei, n. 3.
20 Tib. VIII Phys., text. 33 ff. (c. 5); XII Metaph., text. 35 ff. (XI, c. 7); Lib. de Causis, prop. 18.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
From these ten necessary and manifest postulates it is inferred that all categories or divisions of being infer and proclaim the fact that God exists. But if every such truth is an indubitable truth, it follows necessarily that it is true beyond doubt that God exists.
The same thing can be demonstrated in a third way as follows.
Every truth which is so certain that it cannot be thought not to be is indubitably true. But the existence of God is such a truth; therefore, etc. The first premise is self-evident; the second can be shown in a number of ways.
21. For Anselm writes in the fourth chapter of the Pros/ogion:
"Good Lord, I give you thanks, because that which I first believed through your gift, I now understand through your illumination, so that even if I did not wish to believe in your existence, I could not fail to understand its truth."
22. Again, Anselm proves the same thing in the following way:
God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived."4 But since it is true that that which cannot be thought not to be is more true than that which can be thought not to be, therefore, if God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, God cannot be thought not to be.
23. Again, that being than which nothing greater can be conceived is of such a nature that it cannot be thought of unless it exists in reality. For if it exists only in thought, then it is not that being than which no greater can be thought. Therefore if such a being is thought to be, it is necessary that such a being; which cannot be thought not to be, exist in reality.
24. Again, Anselm writes: ""You alone are whatever is better to to be than not to be.''2? But every indubitable truth is better than a doubtful truth. Therefore being is to be attributed to God indubitably rather than doubtfully.
25. Again, Augustine writes in his So/i/oguies that no truth can be seen except through the first truth."* But that truth through which every truth is seen is the most indubitable truth. Therefore, the existence of God is not only an indubitable truth, but it is impossible to think of something more indubitable. It is, therefore, a truth of such a sort that it cannot be thought not to be. oS) Again, he proves the same thing as follows.24 Whatever can be thought of can be stated. But it is in no way possible to say that God does not exist without saying simultaneously that God does
1 Proslog., c. 3, 4 & 15; Libro contra Insipientem, c. 1 ff. ed IRI Py (eee SE ot HET IG Len teh 38}, wtb).
* Solilog. 1, c. 15, n. 27 ff., II, c. 2, n. 2; c. 15, n. 28; Anselm, Monolog., c. 18.
I. KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
exist. This becomes clear in the following way. If there is no truth, then it is true to say: "There is no truth." But if this is true, then something is true. And if something is true, there is a first truth.
Therefore, if it is not possible to say that God does not exist, neither is it possible to think it.
27. Again, to the degree that a truth is prior and more universal, to that degree it is more evident." But that truth by which the existence of the first being is affirmed is the first of all truths, not only in reality but also in our knowledge of reality. Therefore, it is necessarily the most certain and most evident truth. But the truth of the axioms or the first concepts of the mind are so evident because of their priority that they cannot be thought not to be. Therefore no intellect can think that there is no first truth, nor can it be in doubt about this.
28. Again, 'No proposition can be more true than that sort in which something is predicated of itself."26 But when I say that God exists, the existence predicated of God is totally identical with God, because God is His very existence. Therefore, nothing is more true or more evident than that proposition in which the existence of God is affirmed. Therefore no one can think that it is false or can be in doubt about it.
29, Again, no one can be ignorant of the truth that "the best is the best,"' and no one can think that this is false. But that which is best is the most complete being, and every being that is complete to the highest degree by that very fact exists in actuality. Therefore if the best is the best, the best exists. It can be argued in a similar way: If God is God, then God exists. But the antecedent is so true that it cannot be thought not-to~be. Therefore it is indubitably true that God exists.
But on the other hand, the objection is raised that it is possible to think that God does not exist, and that it is a truth that can be doubted. That God can be thought not to be is shown in the following way.
OBJECTIONS
1. The Psalm says: "The fool has said in his heart there is no God.''27 But "to say in one's heart" is to think. Therefore it is possible, at least for a fool, to think that God does not exist.
2. Again, in the third chapter of the first book Damascene writes:
% Aristotle, J Poster., c. 2; I Phys., text. 2 ff.
38 Boethius, J] Periberm. Arist., c. 4 (c. 14).
GEG ee
St. Bonaventure, Disputed Questions
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
"The pernicious evil of human nature has prevailed to such an extent that it has led some men to the most irrational and most evil abyss of perdition of saying that there is no God.'"?8 Therefore, it is possible at least for evil men to think that there is no God.
3. Again, according to 1 Cor. 8, an idol is nothing.?® Therefore, to think that God is an idol is the same as to think that He does not exist. But it is possible to think that God is an idol, and this does happen at times. Therefore it is possible to think that God is nothing.
4. Again, whatever can be signified can be thought also. But it is possible to signify the non-existence of God as happens in the statement: "(God does not exist." Therefore, it can also be thought.
5. Again, an objection is raised against Augustine's argument which proved that the proposition "there is no truth" implies that there is some truth. For if it is true that 'something is true," then this proposition has a contradictory. But no proposition entails or assumes its contradictory statement. On the contrary, it assumes it is not the case. Therefore, from the statement that there is no truth, one does not conclude that there is some truth.
6. Again, an objection is raised against the argument by which Anselm proved the existence of God from the fact that a being, than which no greater can be conceived, exists in thought. For the same reason, if someone conceives of an island than which no greater can be conceived, one can argue that such an island exists in reality.5°
If the latter argument is invalid, so is the argument of Anselm.
7. Again, the question is raised: In what sense is it said that it is impossible to think that God does not exist ? It is manifestly false if it is taken to mean that this can be thought in no sense whatever. But if it is taken to mean that it cannot be thought truly, then the same argument shows that every necessary truth is of this sort.
Again, it is shown that the existence of God is a truth that can be doubted.
8. Richard of St. Victor writes: ""We hold nothing with greater certitude than that which we apprehend by faith.''8! But there can be doubt about those things which we apprehend by faith. Therefore even more so is it possible to doubt concerning all other objécts of knowledge.
9. Again, that which is supremely hidden admits of a very great degree of doubt. But God is supremely hidden, since "He
38 De Fide Orthod. ao Verse. 4.
3° The example of the island is raised against Anselm's Pros/ogion by Gaunilo in Pro Insipiente.
SEE Dem rin: Icaes
I, KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
dwells in inaccessible light."'3? Therefore a very great degree of doubt attaches to the reality of God and all things concerning Him. If doubt is possible concerning the existence of other things, even more so is it possible concerning God.
10. Again, there is doubt about realities that are below or on a par with the soul. But such things are more accessible to the soul than those things which are superior to it. But if the truth of God's existence is beyond human understanding, it seems that there can be great doubt about it.
11. Again, in the case of God, to exist and to be just are identical.
But it is possible to doubt whether God is just. For the same reason, it is possible to doubt whether He exists.
12. Again, it is pointless for anyone to attempt to prove that about which no doubt is possible.** Therefore, if the existence of God can be doubted by no one, it is pointless to try to prove it.
But if the Saints and Doctors who attempted to prove it were not working in vain, it is clear that it must be possible to doubt it.
13. Again, no one knows the principle '""The whole is greater than its part" unless he knows what a whole is.*4 Therefore, no one knows whether God exists unless he knows what God is. But if doubts are possible concerning God's essence; they are also possible concerning His existence.
14. Again, if there could be no doubt concerning the truth of the existence of God, there would be no merit in belief. But the source of all merit is to believe that God exists, as it is written in Hebrews 11: "Anyone who comes to Him must believe that He exists, etc."85 Therefore, if this is to be reckoned as meritorious, it is also something that can be doubted.
CONCLUSION
That God exists cannot be doubted if dubitable is understood as a truth for which evidence is lacking in itself, or in its proof, or in the intellect that apprehends it. Nonetheless, doubt can arise from the viewpoint of the knower ; namely, by reason of a deficiency in the acts of apprehending, judging, and reducing.
Response. In order to understand the foregoing, we must note that a thing is indubitable by reason of the absence of anything that 53117780, 8 10; 3 The first principles, which cannot be demonstrated. Aristotle, J Poster., c. 3.
84 Aristotle, J Poster., c. 3. se Verses 0:
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
could be doubted. A thing is said to be doubtful in two ways: either because of the process of reasoning or because of a defect in reason itself. The first way involves something on the part of the knower and on the part of the object known; the second way refers only to the knower. In the first sense, a truth is said to be doubtful if the reason for its evidence is lacking either in itself, or in its demonstration, or in the intellect that apprehends it. Concerning the existence of God, certitude is not lacking in any of these ways.
Indeed, it is certain as far as the knower is concerned, for the knowledge of this truth is innate to the rational mind in as far as it possesses the nature of an image. By reason of this, there is innate to the mind a natural desire for, together with a knowledge and memory of that reality in whose image it is made, and to which it naturally tends for its beatitude.
It is even more certain in terms of its demonstration. All creatures, whether they are viewed in terms of their defects or in terms of their perfectibility, in voices most loud and strong, cry out the existence of God whom they need because of their deficiency and from whom they receive their completion. Therefore, in accordance with the greater or lesser degree of fullness which they possess, some cry out the existence of God with a loud voice; others cry out yet louder; while still others make the loudest cry.
Moreover, it is a truth that is most certain in itself, in as far as it is the first and most immediate truth. In it not only is the cause of the predicate included in the subject, but it is the fullness of being itself which is predicated and which is the subject about which the predication is made. As a union of beings that are extremely distant from each other is entirely repugnant to our mind, because no mind can think that one and the same thing both exists and does not exist at the same time, so also the division of something that is entirely one and undivided is truly repugnant. Hence to say that a being which possesses the highest degree of existence is non-existent involves a most evident fallacy, just as is the case in saying that to exist and not exist are one and the same. Thus, the existence of the first and highest being is a truth that is most evident.
Therefore, if the term indubitable is taken to mean the absence of doubt because of the process of reasoning, the existence of God is indubitably true, because — whether the intellect turns within itself or outside itself, or whether it looks above itself — if it proceeds rationally, it knows that God exists with certitude and without doubt.
But if the term indubitable is taken in the second sense namely, as the removal of that doubt which comes from the deficiency of reason, it can be conceded that, because of human weakness, it is possible that some one might doubt the existence of God because of
I. KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
a three-fold defect in the mind of the knower; that is, a defect in the act of apprehending, or in the act of judging, or in the act of fully analyzing. Concerning the act of apprehending, doubt arises when one does not correctly and fully understand what is signified by the term God, but understands it only in terms of a particular element. Thus the gentiles thought that God signified whatever was superior to man and could foresee future events. Therefore, they believed that the idols were gods and adored them as gods since they gave some true information about future events.
Relative to the act of judging, doubt arises when the argument is based on partial knowledge, as when the foolish man sees that justice is not apparent in the case of the wicked, and he concludes from this that there is no law in the universe; and from this he concludes that there is no first and highest ruler in the world who is the glorious and high God.
In like manner, doubt arises because of a defect in the act of analysis when the carnal mind is not capable of resolving beyond those things which are evident to the senses, as are corporeal realities. For this reason, some have thought that the visible sun — which holds the highest place among corporeal creatures — was God since they did not know how to resolve things further to an incorporeal substance nor to the first principles of things.
In this way, doubt may arise concerning the existence of God from the deficiency of the intellect itself that apprehends or compares, or resolves. According to this understanding, the existence of God can be doubted by some intellect if it has not sufficiently and totally understood the meaning of the term God. But for the intellect which fully understands the meaning of the word God — thinking God to be that than which no greater can be conceived — not only is there no doubt that God exists, but the non-existence of God can not even be thought. Therefore the reasons given to prove this should be conceded.
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1.2.3. Concerning the first objection raised against the Psalm and Damascene, the response is clear. The objection proceeds from that doubt which arises from the defect of reason in the mind of the fool. Obscured by darkness, he neither sufficiently resolves, nor rightly judges, nor fully apprehends the meaning of the word God.
The intellect itself, by reason of its proper condition, has sufficient light within itself to dispel such doubt and rescue itself from such
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
foolishness.3* Therefore, in this defective consideration of the foolish man, the mistake of the intellect arises more from the will than from necessity; it comes from a defect in the knower rather than from a deficiency in the object known.
From this our response to the objection about idols becomes clear. The gentile considers an idol to be God because his apprehension of God is defective. He does not conceive of God as the highest and best, but merely as whatever is capable of doing what man cannot do. From this, deceptive error and vacillating doubt arises in him. He throws himself into his error with stubbornness so that his position becomes wholly inexcusable.3? And yet, he is not entirely lacking in knowledge of God, because, even though in his perversity he desires to worship an idol, yet he has a natural instinct to worship the God against whom he fights by throwing himself into voluntary error.
4, Concerning the objection which argued that whatever can be signified can be thought also, we reply that something can be thought in a two-fold sense; either as mere thought, or as thought accompanied by assent. In terms of mere thought, that which is false can be thought of as true, and that which is manifestly false can be thought of as manifestly true. But in terms of thought accompanied by assent, only that which is true or similar to truth is thought.
The first meaning of thought is as extensive as speech. But the second meaning is not so extensive. It is of this: kind of thought that both
Anselm and Augustine speak, and in this sense it is said that God cannot be thought not to exist.
5. To the objection which maintained — against the argument of Augustine — that contradictory realities do not mutually imply each other, we reply that this is true in as far as they are contradictories. But it must be understood that an affirmative proposition contains two affirmations; one by which the predicate is affirmed of the subject, and another by which the proposition itself is affirmed as true. In terms of the first affirmation, such a proposition is distinguished from a negative proposition which denies the predicate of the subject. The second affirmation is similar to a negative proposition, because both the negative and the positive proposition assert that something is true. The contradiction arises in reference to the first proposition and not to the second. When it is stated that "there is no truth," in as far as this proposition denies the predicate of the subject, it does not infer its opposite, which is the proposition that "there is some truth." But in as far as it asserts that it is true,
86 Ps 4 7, 37 Rm. 1, 20.
I. KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
it infers that something is true. Nor is this surprising; for, just as evety evil presupposes a good, so every falsehood implies a truth. Therefore the error which affirms that there is no truth includes both parts of a contradiction, since by negating the predicate of the subject, it denies any truth whatever, but by asserting that it is true, it posits the existence of some truth. Therefore, in view of both of these affirmations it can be inferred that this is intrinsically false and unintelligible to any mind that apprehends correctly. And this is what Augustine wishes to say.
6. About the objection against Anselm's argument concerning the island than which none greater or better can be Conceived, we respond that there is no comparison, because when I speak of that being than which nothing greater can be conceived, there is no repugnance between the subject and its implication. Therefore, it can be thought of in a rational way. But when I speak of an island than which none better can be conceived, there is a repugnance between the subject and its implication. For an island is a limited being, while the implication is proper to the most perfect being.
Therefore, since there is a contradiction in the adjunct,3® it can be conceived only irrationally, and the mind contradicts itself in its own thought. Therefore, it is not surprising in such a case that one cannot infer the real existence outside the mind of that which exists in thought. But the situation is different in the case of being or of God, for whom such an implication is not repugnant.
7. Concerning the question "In what sense are we unable to think of God as not existing," our response is already clear. It is not a question of being unable to understand what the words signify,®® or of understanding what is meant by the statement: "God does not exist."' Rather, it means that it is so self-evident and so certain to the knower if he desires to think correctly, there is nothing that could separate him from this truth. It is, therefore, a truth that is supremely evident and present, which is absent to no place, time, thing, or thought. Such is not the case with other created truths.
8. To the objection that we hold nothing with greater certainty than that which we comprehend by faith, it should be said that this is true concerning the certitude of adherence, but not about the , 38 Aristotle, [J Periherm., c. 2(c. 11); Anselm, Contra Insipientem, c. 3. Adjunct refers to terms which are accidents with respect to the subject and do not combine to form a unity. When such opposite elements are present, a full logical resolution is not possible.
3® Aristotle, JJ Poster., c. 7 & 10 (c. 9).
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
certitude of understanding, as is apparent to anyone who thinks about it.4° 9, In reference to the objection that since this is a hidden truth, it is open to a great degree of doubt, it must be said that even though
God is simple and of one form in Himself, nonetheless He is in a certain way hidden and in a certain way manifest; as the Apostle implies in Romans 1: '""What can be known of God was manifest to them.''4! To some, the trinity of appropriations is manifest, but not the trinity of persons. And to others the unity of essence is manifest and not the trinity of appropriations. To yet others the trinity of God Himself is manifest but not the unity of essence. But that which is primarily manifest about God is His very existence, and in this regard, He is not hidden but manifest. Therefore, it is not doubtful but indubitable.
10. To the objection about the soul doubting things which are either below itself or on the same level with it, we reply that the objection is not valid, since, even though the existence of God of its nature is above the soul, yet it is within the soul in the form of knowledge, and outside the soul in the form of representations and persuasions which all creatures contain in themselves, since this truth is contained in and understood in every truth.
11. Concerning the objection that in God ¢o be and #o be just are identical, we respond that the conclusion does not follow, since, though these are the same in and of themselves, they are not the same in terms of the notions by which they are grasped, nor in terms of the effects in which they are reflected. Therefore, it is possible that one aspect be manifest and not the other.
12. To the objection that it is pointless to try to prove something that no one doubts, it should be said that this truth, as is clear by now, does not need proof because of any lack of intrinsic evidence, but rather because of faulty reflection on our part. Hence, arguments of this sort are exercises of the intellect rather than proofs that provide evidence and make the truth manifest as proven.
13. To the objection that no one knows principles unless he knows the terms of the principles, we reply that this is true. But the knowledge of some terms is hidden while that of others is manifest. Furthermore, the knowledge of that which is signified by a term can be more or less complete or most perfect. It is in this way that we must understand the possibility of knowing what God
40 "Certitude of adherence" pertains to the affective domain while "certitude of understanding" pertains only to the intellect (III Sent. d. 23, a. 1, q. 4 [II,
480-483]). averse: 19:
I, KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
is with perfect, full, and comprehensive knowledge; but this sort of knowledge is possessed by God alone; or the possibility of knowing Him clearly and plainly as He is known by the Blessed; or the possibility of knowing Him "imperfectly and as in a mirror,"'4? in the way that God is known to be the first and highest principle of all things in the world. Of itself, this can be manifest to all, since anyone who knows that he has not always existed, knows also that he comes from another; the same is true of all others. Since this knowledge is available to all, and since once this is known, the existence of God is known; therefore the existence of-God in itself is indubitable for all.
14. To the objection that to believe the indubitable is not meritorious, it can be said that to believe the existence of God in itself is not meritorious. It is meritorious only in as far as it is the basis for an article of faith, such as God is a trinity, which rests upon it.
It is because of the latter that there can be merit, since if this truth alone were believed, it would not produce merit. The Apostle speaks about the existence of God in as far as it is the foundation of the other articles of faith. And this foundation is innate to the nature of man, lest, if the human intellect were to know nothing of God by means of its proper nature it might excuse itself on grounds of ignorance. And this is what Master Hugh says: "Wherefore from the beginning, God willed to be neither totally manifest to the conscience of man nor totally hidden, lest — if He were totally manifest — faith would have no merit and infidelity would have no place; infidelity would be seen to be erroneous because of the evidence, and faith could not be exercised with respect to the hidden. If He were totally hidden, faith could not be helped by knowledge, and infidelity would be excused of its ignorance. For this reason, it was necessary that God present Himself even while remaining hidden, lest if He were totally hidden, He should be totally unknown; so that even as He manifests Himself to be known, He remains hidden lest He be totally manifest; this He does so that man's mind might be stimulated by what is known and challenged by what is hidden."'** sa Conloso:
48 [ De Sacramentis, Ul, c. 2.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
ARTICLE II
WHETHER IT IS _A TRUTH TO BE BELIEVED
THAT GOD IS A TRINITY
Supposing that the existence of God is an indubitable truth, it is now asked whether it is a truth to be believed that God is a trinity.
By credible, I mean that which is congruous for belief and which ought to be believed. That it ought to be believed is shown as follows.
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. The final chapter of Matthew : "Go forth, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit."! In the last chapter of Mark the following is added to these words: "'Whoever believes and is baptized shall be saved; and whoever does not believe shall be condemned.' But a truth without which salvation is impossible is most worthy of belief. The fact that God is a trinity is a truth of this sort; therefore, etc.
2. Again, in his Symbol, Athanasius writes: "But this is the Catholic faith, that we venerate one God in trinity and trinity in unity." A little before this he says: "Unless one preserves this whole and inviolate, without doubt he will perish for eternity." Therefore, if salvation is impossible without this faith, the conclusion is the same as above.
3. Again, in the third chapter of the first book On she Trinity Augustine writes: "When one inquires about the unity of the trinity, Father and Son, and Holy Spirit, nowhere is error more dangerous, inquiry more difficult, or the results more rewarding.'
But every truth in which there is danger of error together with salvation in correct thinking is a truth most worthy of belief. Since the fact that God is a trinity is a truth of this sort, the conclusion is the same as above.
4. Again, in the third chapter of the first book of the Hypognosticon Augustine writes that "no one can be saved without faith in the Mediator."* Therefore, it is necessary for salvation to believe
1 Mp. 28, 19.
2 Mk. 16, 16.
21, 3, 5. io 4.
I. KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
in the Mediator. But the Mediator cannot be known unless the distinction of persons is known; therefore it is necessary for salvation to believe in the distinction of perons. But this distinction of persons is in the trinity. Therefore it is necessary for salvation to believe the truth that God is a trinity.
5. Again, no one in whom the trinity does not dwell can be saved, for the entire trinity indwells simultaneously in man by reason of grace. But the trinity does not dwell in anyone who does not believe. Therefore, no one can be saved except in as far as he believes in the most blessed trinity. The major premiss is clear. The minor is proved as follows by what is said in John 14; that "the world cannot accept the Spirit of truth, because it neither sees nor knows Him. But you know Him, for He remains with you and dwells in you."
6. Again, it is impossible for anyone to be saved if he is not a member of Christ. But it is impossible to be a member unless one is united with Him; and such a union is impossible except through faith, hope, and charity. Therefore, no one can be saved without faith in Christ. But faith in Christ includes faith in the eternal generation, and accordingly it involves distinction in the trinity.
Therefore, without faith in the trinity, it is impossible for anyone to be saved.
7. Again, it is impossible for anyone to find salvation who does not believe that God is the creative principle. Indeed, unless one believes this about God, it is impossible for man to worship and venerate God in a proper manner. But it is more noble to be the principle of generation than to be the principle of creation, since the offspring that is begotten is more noble than the creature that is made. Therefore, no one can be saved who does not believe that God is the principle of generation, and for the same reason, that He is the principle of spiration, and therefore no one can be saved unless he believes that God is a trinity.
8. Again, it is impossible for anyone-to be saved who does not love and honor Him who is supremely worthy of love and honor. But the Son and the Holy Spirit are to be loved and honored supremely as is the Father, according to John 5: ""He who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent Him."® Therefore, no one can be saved who does not love and honor the Son and the Holy Spirit just as he does the Father. But no one loves and honors anyone unless in some way he knows and believes.
Therefore, etc.
5 Verse 17.
6 Verse 23.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
From these arguments it is clearly shown that it is necessary and is required for salvation to believe that God is a trinity.
It will now be shown that this is also fitting.
9, Rightly ordered affection clings to the highest good more than to itself. Therefore the rightly ordered intellect assents to the highest truth more than to itself. If, therefore, our intellect is to be justified in believing, it is necessary that some truth which exceeds its judgment be proposed to it. But the fact that God is one and a trinity is the first thing proposed among the truths worthy of belief.
Therefore however much it is hidden to the human mind, it is rightly and fittingly proposed for belief.
10. Again, as charity captures the affections in obedience to Christ, so faith captures the intellect.? But it would not be captive if it were not brought to assent to some truth that exceeds its judgment.
Therefore it is fitting that the first among the truths proposed for belief should exceed human understanding.
11. Again, "that which is apparent to all or to many or to the wise by the mere fact that it is apparent is rendered capable of proof."' Therefore that which is believed by many or by the wise, by the mere fact that it is believed, is rendered believable. But the fact that God is a trinity is believed by many and by the wise.
Therefore it is fitting to believe that He is a trinity.
12. Again, it is more irrational to affirm that an innumerable multitude believes the unbelievable, than to affirm that what is believed by a multitude is believable. But most certainly, a multitude believes that God is a trinity. Therefore it is reasonable to believe this.
13. Again, as we owe understanding to reason, so we owe faith to authority.® But nothing is more authentic than Sacred Scripture which is steadfast not only because of the truth it contains and because of its antiquity, but also because of miracles and prophecies.
Therefore, if the divine Scriptures testify to this trath commonly, it is fitting and reasonable to believe this truth, namely, that God is one in trinity.
14, Again, there are three classes of truths that are believable, according to Augustine: "Some things are believed and known at the same time; some things are first believed and then known by understanding; some things are believed and never known by reason, as is the case with the history of human deeds.'!° That which is believed in such a way that it can be understood by reason is we2Cor, 10, 5: emAtistotle, J \loptc..c. 1c ® Augustine, De Ustilitate Credendi, c. 11, p. 25.
10 Lib. 83 Oq., q. 48.
I, KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
more credible than that which cannot be understood. But the fact that God is a trinity is a truth of this sort. Therefore, since some of the historical facts narrated by the authentic Scripture are credible — for it is not incredible that 'Abraham begot Isaac;' indeed, it is very credible; and there are other similar cases — therefore it is credible that God is one and a trinity.
OBJECTIONS
1, Whatever is contrary to all the dictates of reason is incredible for reason. But all reason dictates the contrary of the statement that a being which is one is really a trinity. Therefore, it is incredible for reason.
2. Again, whatever is contrary to that which created nature indicates is incredible. But all created nature indicates the contrary of the fact that something which is one and not multiplied in form is multiplied in supposites. For in every created nature, when the supposite is multiplied, the form is multiplied as well. Therefore, if our intellect is led through creatures to recognize the existence of God, as is stated in 1 Cor. 13: ""We see now through a mirror and dimly,"!! since every created nature indicates the contrary of the truth that God is a trinity, this is necessarily an incredible truth.
3. Again, whatever is believed is believed either by means of reason or beyond reason. Therefore, if it is a credible truth that God is a trinity, it is so either by means of reason or beyond reason. But if it is by means of reason, it is not meritorious, since "that faith for which human reason offers a proof has no merit.' If it is believed as something beyond reason, it is irrational to believe it because anything beyond reason believed by one who has the use of reason is believed irrationally; it is not a credible truth. Therefore the fact that God is a trinity is not a credible truth.
4. Again, whatever is believed is believed either because of itself or because of something else. If the fact that God is a trinity is a credible truth, it is such either in the first way or in the second.
If it is believed because of something else, then it is not itself the object of true faith. If it is believed because of itself, just as nothing is lovable because of itself unless it is of itself adequate for our affections; therefore nothing is credible in itself unless of itself it is apparent to the intellect. But the fact that God is a trinity is not of itself apparent to the intellect. Therefore it is not a credible truth. i Verse 12.
12 Gregory, IJ Homil. in Evang., homil. 26, n. 1.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
5. Again, a virtue is consonant with nature, since as Tullius says and as Augustine agrees, '"'a virtue is a habit that is by nature consonant with reason."!3 Therefore, whatever is incredible to a natural virtue is incredible to the virtue of faith. But the fact that God is a trinity is not credible to nature itself. Therefore it is not credible to a virtue superadded to nature.
6. Again, grace is the perfection of nature, and perfection is not repugnant to a being which is capable of perfection, but rather in harmony with it. Therefore, if by nature it is not credible that God is a trinity, then neither is it credible by reason of any added grace.
7. Again, "The creator of nature does nothing contrary to that nature which cooperates with Him."!® Therefore, He who is the teacher and inspirer of nature does nothing contrary to the natural dictates of reason. Therefore, if the fact that God is a trinity is not credible through the natural dictates of reason, neither is it credible through an additional inspiration.
8. Again, a principle of scientific knowledge should be very easily known, as is clear with the principles of demonstration which are self-evident to the intellect.1* Therefore a principle of the knowledge of faith should be readily accessible to faith. But the fact that God is a trinity is not readily accessible to faith; indeed it is very difficult, as is clear in the case of those who do not yet have faith.
Therefore, it is not the first among.the truths of faith; nor is it the middle nor even the last among those truths, as is evident. Therefore, in no way is it a truth of faith.
From these arguments it appears how it can be shown that the fact that God is a trinity is neither a truth of faith, nor a truth which is fittingly believed.
Next it is shown that it is not a truth of faith that must be believed.
9. No one is obliged to that which he cannot do, since Jerome says: "Let him be anathema who claims that God has commanded the impossible.""!7 But to believe that God is a trinity is not in our power, since faith is a gift of God. But if no one is obliged to that which is not in his power, no one is obliged to believe this.
10. Again, if we are obliged to believe this, it is either because of the law of nature, or the law of Scripture, or the law of grace.
It is not because of the law of nature since that law is inscribed in 8 Cicero, Lib, IT Rhet. c. 54; Augustine, Lib. 83 Og. q. 31, n. 1.
14 Ambrose, Expos. in Ps. 118, serm. 14, n. 42.
18 Augustine, X XVI contra Faustum, c. 3.
#6 Aristotle, J Poster. c. 2, and IV Metaph. text. 8 (III, c. 3).
11 Expositio Symboli ad Damasum.
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the heart of man and is most evident to all;!8 but this truth is concealed and hidden from human strivings. It is not because of the law of Scripture, since it was a credible truth before Scripture began.
On the other hand, if it were believable only because of Scripture, then it would not pertain to all times and all persons. It is not because of the law of grace, because that faith existed before the law of grace began. And furthermore, the law of grace is not burdensome. Therefore, if it is difficult to believe this, we are not obliged to do so by the law of grace, nor by the law of nature nor by the law of the Scriptures, as we have shown. Therefore,-in no way are we obliged to believe it.
11. Again, if we are obliged to believe this truth, this is either because it is true or because it is a truth that is commanded. The reason cannot be that it is true, since we are obliged to believe everything that is true in the same way. But if the reason is that it is commanded, it must be either by a moral precept or by a sacramental precept. It is certain that it is not a sacramental precept.
Neither is it a moral precept, since all moral matters are reduced to the ten precepts of the decalogue; and no one is commanded in any of these to believe that God is a trinity. Therefore in no way are we obliged to this.
12. Again, if we are obliged to believe this, it is because it is either a truth that is seen, or one that is heard, or one that is inspired. It is not a truth that is seen, for no one in history sees this truth. Neither is it to be believed because it is heard, since only he who has heard such a truth is obliged to believe it. But if it is an inspired truth, then only those in whom it is inspired are bound to believe it. Therefore, no one is bound to it except those who believe it. But this is false, therefore the first is false.
13. Again, I ask what is it that moves the Christian to believe this truth. If you say that the divine Scripture moves you, so that if the divine Scriptures did not teach this, you would not believe it, it can be said to the contrary that even if the whole of Scripture were burned, yet neither the Church nor the Christian soul would give up faith in the trinity. Therefore, the principal reason moving us to this belief is not Scripture. If you say that you are moved by miracles, it can be said to the contrary: "That faith has no merit for which human reason offers a proof.''!® Faith such as that which comes from miracles is a faith that is forced rather than voluntary, and such faith is not meritorious. If you say it is grace that moves you, it can be said to the contrary that no one knows whether he
18 Ry, 2, "1466 uO Gregory, II Homil. in Evang., homil. 26, n. 1.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
possesses grace. Therefore, no one knows whether he ought to believe this truth. But in the case of an article of faith which we are obliged to believe, we are certain that we ought to believe.
Therefore we are not moved to believe this by reason of grace. If you say that the eternal truth itself moves you to believe this, it can be said to the contrary that only a truth which is seen can move to belief. Since this truth is not seen by the soul, it seems that the soul must be moved to believe this in some way other than by the eternal truth itself.
The question remains, therefore, if this is a truth of faith, by what are we moved and by what are we obliged to believe it ?
CONCLUSION
It is a credible truth that God is a trinity, since to believe this is fitting, obligatory, and worthy.
Response. The fact that God is a trinity is a truth of faith of such a sort that it is fitting, necessary, and worthy of belief.
To understand this, we must note that since this article of faith is the foundation of the entire Christian faith, there is a threefold testimony by which we are led, obliged, and elevated to believe it, so that that foundation might remain unshaken. This threefold testimony is the concern of a threefold book; namely, the book of creation, the book of Scripture, and the book of life. The first provides a testimony that is efficacious; the second, a testimony that is more efficacious; and the third, a testimony that is efficacious to the highest degree. The book of creation, which I call the first book because it appeals first to our senses, offers a twofold witness, since
"every charge requires the testimony of two witnesses."2° Every creature is either a mere vestige of God — as is corporeal nature — or an image of God, as is the intellectual creature. Each of these gives witness to the trinity. However, that which is but a vestige does so, as it were, from afar. Every creature has measure, species, and order; or unity, truth, and goodness; or measure, number, and weight, which by appropriation correspond to the trinity of persons, and thus give witness to the fact that God is a trinity. This is what
Augustine says in the book of 83 Questions: "For everything that exists there is one thing by which it is; another by which it is known; and another to which it conforms. Therefore, every creature manifests a threefold cause by reason of which it is; and by reason of BOR 319, 15; Ms. 18) 16-82 Gora 13. 16
I. KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
which it is this; and by which it is in conformity with itself. This cause of creation — which is its author — we call God. It is necessary therefore, that the trinity exist; and the perfect mind can discover nothing more excellent, more intelligible and more blessed."?1 From this Augustine shows that creation is a vestige which gives witness to the fact that God is a trinity.
But that creature which is an image — such as the intellectual creature — testifies to the threefold character of God, as it were, from near at hand, because an image is an express similitude. The intellectual creature has memory, intelligence, and' will; or mind, knowledge, and love; mind, like a parent, knowledge like an offspring, and love like a bond proceeding from both and joining them together. For the mind cannot fail to love the word which it generates.
Therefore, these not only indicate origin and emanation which leads to distinction among them; but they indicate also quality, consubstantiality, and inseparability, from which an express testimony is given to the fact that God is a trinity. For since He is spirit and intellect, He can lack neither a word that is begotten nor a love that proceeds. Among these there is distinction by reason of origin, and emanation of one from another; and together with this, there is equality, consubstantiality, and inseparability. This is what Augustine intended to add toward the end of the ninth book
On the Trinity, showing how testimony to the eternal trinity is given by the created image.?* This twofold witness of the book of creation was efficacious in the state of innocent nature, when that book had not been obscured; nor had the eye of man been darkened. But when the sins of man had weakened his sight, then that mirror was made dark and obscure, and the ear of our inner understanding was hardened against hearing that testimony. For this reason, divine providence saw fit to provide the testimony of another book; namely, that of the book of Scripture which was written in accord with the divine revelation which has never been deficient nor absent from the beginning of the world to the end.
This book, moreover, in accordance with its two parts, testifies in a twofold way that the trinity exists. In the Old Testament, an implicit witness is given, while in the New Testament, the testimony is explicit. The testimony concerning the trinity in the Old Testament is given both in figures and in words. The most authentic among those figures is the one which was shown to "Abraham, the father of our faith." Concerning him, Genesis 18 says that in the three men who appeared to him, he saw three but adored one, wherefore he
1 Lib. 83 Og. q. 18.
22 I Sent. d. 3, p. 2, q. 1 & 2 (1, 80-93).
St. Bonaventure, Disputed Questi---
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
spoke to the three as to one.8 In this, he himself understood the mystery of the trinity and made it known to others. That which David, the most distinguished of the prophets, said in the Psalm seems to be the most efficacious among the testimonies given in words: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the breath (= Spirit) of His mouth all their strength."'*4 Here the trinity of persons is implied in such a way that two persons are explicitly mentioned by the names Spirit and Word, and one implicitly by the name Lord. In many places, indeed in almost all the figures and words of the Old Testament, witness to the trinity is given at least implicitly.
Similarly, testimony is given in the New Testament, but explicitly both in the sacraments and in express teachings. For the first of the sacraments, which is baptism, is conferred with the express invocation of the divine trinity, according to what is written in the final chapter of Matthew. There it is written: "Teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy
Spirit." Therefore the character of the trinity is imprinted in that fundamental sacrament. Among the many words that testify to the same truth, that which was written only by the friend of the Spouse in 1 John 5 is an express statement: "There are three who give testimony in heaven; the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit.
And these three are one.'*® This testimony is so express and efficacious that it renders this truth not .only credible — i.e. congruous for belisf — but necessary as well, since it obliges us and constrains us to believe it.
But because "not all listen to the Gospel''?? and since this is a truth beyond reason, therefore the divine wisdom has provided an eternal testimony, which is the book of life. This book of life by itself and in itself explicitly and expressly gives incontestable witness to the eternal trinity to those who see God in heaven with "'unveiled faces."?* For those on earth, it provides a testimony through the influence of light, since while on earth, the soul is capable of receiving such an influence, as it is written in John 1: "The Life was light for men;'"® because that book of life is "the true light which illumines every man coming into the world."3° Illumination is
23 Verse 2.
I Vos (5s 25 Verse 19.
26 Verse 7.
27°" Rm. 10, 16. suaaor: 3. 18.
29 Verse 4.
OO ith Ws SB
I. KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
given in two ways, namely, by an innate light and by an infused light. From these two lights, concurring with the habit of faith, the argument that God is a trinity arises for our belief, and eventually every truth which pertains to the practice of the Christian religion.
This becomes clear in the following manner. By reason of that light given naturally to man by God and known as the light of the divine face,?1 human reason dictates to each individual man that we are to think of the first principle in the highest and most reverent way; in the highest way because He proceeds from no other; in the most reverent way, because other things proceed from Him.
In this there is agreement among Christians, Jews, and Saracens, and even heretics. But to think that God can and does wish to produce one equal to and consubstantial with Himself so that He might have an eternal beloved and cobeloved is indeed to think of God in the highest and most reverent way; for if one thinks that He is not capable of this, one does not think of Him in the highest way; and if one thinks that He is capable of this but does not will to do it, one does not think of God in the most reverent way. That God exists in this way and that He is to be thought of in this way,
I say, is not dictated by the innate light by itself, but by the infused light from which — together with the natural light — one concludes that God is to be thought of as one who generates and spirates one co-equal to and consubstantial with Himself, and thus one thinks of God in the highest and most reverent way. To think this of God is to honor, venerate, and worship Him in the highest degree. From this it is clear how faith in the trinity is the foundation and root of divine cult and of the entire Christian religion.
From this root, by which we believe that God is to be thought of in the highest and most reverent way, and that therefore He is both one and three, it follows as a consequence that we should believe that God is the creator of all things, that He punishes the wicked, rewards the good, and relieves those in misery. Because He is most high, His dignity requires that His deeds be great and just.
Because He is supremely compassionate, His dignity requires that He look upon the humble and lift up the fallen. And thus we believe that He became incarnate and suffered because of His supreme compassion, and that He will judge the world in His supreme dignity and equity.
From what has been said, we may infer what the root of the Christian faith is; what witness there is to it; what articles of faith flow from it; and what is the principle and first of all the articles
CE ett pete Eee el, Oe
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
of faith which pertain to the service of God; namely, to believe that God is one and a trinity. And since Jesus Christ was the highest and supreme worshipper of all, it was He who first commanded that this truth be preached clearly and openly throughout the entire world, thereby obliging all men to believe it. Therefore, while prior to His coming, men were obliged to believe in the trinity only implicitly, now after the promulgation of the New Testament, all ate obliged to believe it explicitly, so that it is a truth of faith not only because it is worthy of belief or fitting for belief from the testimony of creation; but it must be believed by reason of the promulgation of the truth of the Gospel. The promulgation of the Gospel takes its origin in the Savior, as we read in Hebrews 2 where the Apostle, in speaking of the Christian faith, says: "It was announced first by the Lord to those who heard Him, and it was confirmed for us by signs, miracles, and various works of power, and the distribution of gifts of the Spirit as He willed."
Therefore if it is asked what it is that moves us to believe this — is it Scripture, or miracles, or grace, i.e. the eternal truth itself — the answer should be that that which moves us principally is the illumination which begins in the natural light and finds its consummation in the infused light, for this leads us to think of God not only in a lofty manner but also in a reverent manner, because this illumination proceeds from the eternal light itself which takes our intellect into obedient captivity ;#4 in capturing the mind, it subjects it to God jo worship and veneration and renders it ready to believe whatever pertains to the divine honor and veneration, even though such things be beyond our reason.
This becomes clear from experience if one turns to the secret things of his own mind. There are many things that move us and support us, and in a certain way lead us to believe this. The authentic testimony of Scripture moves us as do the examples and witness of the Saints; the arguments of the Doctors, and the judgment of the universal Church move us as well as unquestionable miracles. Therefore Richard writes in the second chapter of the first book On the Trinity: "We hold nothing more unshakeably than that which we apprehend by faith; for these things were revealed by heaven to the Fathers and divinely confirmed by so many great and marvelous signs and prodigies that it would seem to be a great mental aberration to have even a little doubt in these matters. Therefore innumerable miracles and other deeds that can only be of divine origin lead to faith of this sort and do not allow for doubt. Therefore we use signs for arguments
83 Verse 3.
SeeaCor., 10.5,
I. KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
and prodigies for proof in attesting and confirming these matters.
Would that the Jews and the pagans would pay heed to the great peace of conscience with which we can stand in this matter before the divine judgment. Can we not say with full trust in God: 'O
Lord, if this is an error, we have been deceived by you since these things have been confirmed for us by great signs and prodigies such as could be done only by you.' Certainly these things have been given to us by men of the greatest sanctity and have been approved by the highest and most authentic testimony; and you yourself
'worked with them and confirmed their message with-the signs that accompanied it.' ''85
Thus, it is clear how we would respond to the four issues raised in the last objection: Namely, what is it that moves the faithful to believe that God is one and a trinity ?
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1. To the first objection which said that whatever is contrary to all the dictates of reason, etc., we reply that reason can be understood in three ways; as fallen, as innocent, and as elevated. When it is said that whatever is contrary to all the dictates of reason is incredible, if this is understood in particular of fallen reason it is false, because it is possible that something which is repugnant to fallen reason is consonant with innocent or elevated reason. But if it is understood universally of reason in all three senses, then the first proposition should be conceded as true, but the minor is false and should be denied; since — while reason dictates the opposite of the fact that God is one and three, innocent reason dictates something consonant with this, and elevated reason dictates this very truth itself, as is clear from what has been said.
2. To the objection that whatever is contrary to the indications of all created nature is incredible, we reply that created nature can refer to something in two ways: either in itself or in its cause. Created nature refers to something that is temporal, changeable, and composed, but that has a cause which is eternal, immutable, and most simple. Since in the case of creatures supposites are distinguished by matter and by the form appropriate to the matter, unity of form cannot exist in the creature together with a trinity of supposites.
Yet in the case of the Creator — in whom there is indeed no matter but true fecundity — while there is oneness of form and substance, there is distinction among the supposites by reason of origin. Now,
35 De Trinitate, 1, 2; Mk. 16, 20.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
since the creature does not in every way indicate the contrary of the fact that God is a trinity, indeed, when understood correctly, it is in conformity with this truth; therefore, it is more credible than incredible.
3. To the objection that everything that is believed is believed either by means of reason or beyond reason, it should be said that there are two ways to believe something by means of reason; either by means of reason alone or by means of reason aided by grace.
Therefore, although it may not be credible from reason alone that God is a trinity, yet it is credible for reason aided by grace and b the light poured in-from-abc What is credible ia thi believed irrationally since the grace and light infused from above do not pervert reason but rather direct it.
4. To the objection that whatever is believed is believed either because of itself or because of something else, we respond that the fact that God is a trinity is believed because of itself since it is the highest and first truth pertaining to divine cult. To the objection that whatever is credible in this way is evident of itself to the believer, we respond that this is true of that believer in whom there is no impediment and who has that disposition which makes him ready to assent to uncreated truth itself. And such is the case in what has been proposed, since the true Christian believes this truth without any further persuasion when it is proposed to him.
5.6. To the objection that a virtue is in harmony with nature, we respond that this is to be understood of political virtue.%* But, if it is understood with respect to a virtue given by grace, it is not true that such a virtue is in harmony with nature in as far as nature is fallen, but only in as far as nature is reformed and elevated; and this is effected by divine grace infused from above.
And in this way our response becomes clear to the objection about grace; namely,.that grace is the perfection of nature. Grace is the perfection of fateea siete "ines Wap Ie te ane but also in as far as it both reforms and elevates it. But in reforming and elevating it, grace does not destroy nature itself nor any part thereof, but only the defects surrounding the nature.
7. To the objection that the Author of nature does nothing contrary to nature, we respond that nature has two meanings; either the natural course of events, or the natural obedience of the creature. In the first sense, God frequently acts in works beyond nature Or even contrary to nature, as in miraculous works; but in the second sense He does nothing contrary to nature. Similarly, we should understand that our natural intelligence may be spoken
36 Macrob., I Somn. Scipion., c. 8.
I. KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
of in two ways; either in as far as it is created so as to think in accordance with its own proper light, or in as far as it is created to subject itself to the eternal light. In this last sense, nothing is dictated to us contrary to our intelligence. But in the first sense, something is dictated which — though it seems to be contrary to reason — becomes consonant with reason after the light has been infused; for what at first seemed impossible for reason or difficult to believe afterwards becomes very easy to believe to such a degree that the true believer says to the eternal Teacher: "Your testimonies are indeed worthy of belief.''37
8. To the objection that a principle of scientific knowledge is known most readily etc., we reply that the knowledge of faith is the knowledge of piety, as it is written in Titus 1.38 And even though for the mind that proceeds according to the dryness of speculation it may seem very difficult to believe that God is one and a trinity, yet to the mind filled with piety, it is very easy to think that the Highest Father should have an Only-Begotten whom He loves as Himself, and whom He gives for the salvation of man.3®
9. To the objection that no one is obliged to the impossible we reply that even though man is not sufficient of himself, yet he is capable with the divine assistance which is offered him provided he does what he himself is capable of doing. And since man is capable of doing those things which prepare the way for the possibility of faith, therefore he should be considered capable of belief; and, above all other things, he ought to be obliged to believe since neither interior nor exterior incentive is lacking, which indeed is the case in the time of revealed grace.
10. To the objection which said that we are obliged either by the law of nature, or of Scripture, or of grace, we reply that properly speaking, it is according to the law of grace that we are obliged and held to believe this truth specifically. Nevertheless, both in the law of nature and in the law of Scripture there is an obligation to believe it at least implicitly. For in every age, anyone who stubbornly denies that God is a trinity is judged to be estranged from truth and from divine cult. But above all is this the case now in the age of grace when this virtue is revealed and preached and approved expressly and in many ways. And if you raise the objection that this ought not to be, since the law of grace ought to be easy, we reply that to love one's enemy is not easy except to one who has charity;
SE Pse O25:
88 Verse 1.
39 Jn. 3, 16.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
so also to believe that God is a trinity may seem difficult to the unbeliever, but it is easy for one who has faith.
12. To the objection that we are held to believe it either because it is seen as true or because it is heard, or because it is inspired, we reply that we are held to it because it is a truth which above all pertains to divine worship and has been publicly preached. Therefore man is not excused by a lack of hearing nor by a lack of interior light, because he can do those things which precede the inspirations of faith in him.
11. To the objection that if we are obliged to believe this, it is either because it is true or because it is a truth of precept, we respond that it is because it is a truth of precept. And if you ask under which commandment, I reply under the first commandment in which it is said: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord, Your God, is one.
You shall adore the Lord, your God; and Him alone shall you serve."'49 Indeed, in this command we are obliged expressly to believe that God is one, but implicitly to believe that God is a trinity. This may be clarified as follows: because by this command we are obliged to honor God with the cult of /atria, which is here called service. But the term /o cultivate is used in spiritual matters by way of analogy with material things. In the material realm, to cultivate a field means to uncover the tender shoots that take their origin there and grow from the earth. Similarly, to give cult to God means to confess with heart and mouth and deed that He is principle in such a way that He is not perfectly honored unless we confess that He is the principle of all other principles not only as efficient cause in creation, but also as restoring cause in our redemption and as perfecting cause in our glorification. Neither is He confessed perfectly if He is believed to be principle in reference to time and not also to be the principle of all principles from eternity. Nor is
He confessed perfectly unless He is believed to be the principle of all principles who exists from eternity as the principle of another.
And this is what we believe when we believe that the Father eternally generates a Son and together with Him breathes the Holy Spirit, so that from eternity there is in God a principle that proceeds from another principle as well as a principle that does not proceed from another principle.
The perfect honor of God, therefore, necessarily means to think and to believe that He is that principle which from eternity is the principle of another principle so that the manifestation of the temporal productions may be clear. And whoever fails in any of these does not give perfect worship to God. Since this is revealed per40 Dt. 6, 4 & 13.
I. KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH
fectly and not haphazardly in the time of grace, it is necessary to believe all these things explicitly if we wish to be counted among the number of the true worshippers of God. We are obliged to this by reason of the command of the divine law itself, which bound man implicitly prior to the coming of Christ, but now obliges explicitly since this is the time for worshipping God perfectly.
From this it becomes clear why sacrifices were pleasing to God in the time of the written Law and why they pertained to divine cult in as far as they were all signs prophesying and prefiguring the repair of mankind which was effected through the sacrifice of the immaculate Lamb and the outpouring of the blood of Jesus Christ."
It is also clear why it is that in the time of grace no figurative sacrifice is offered, but Jesus Christ Himself in His flesh and blood, in as far as this is the time for worshipping God truly and perfectly; and therefore it is necessary that the truest and most perfect sacrifice be offered, which is indeed only one, namely, Jesus Christ Himself.
It is also clear why unbelievers are justly condemned. If, indeed, a man does dishonor to an earthly king by offering him only a portion of his kingdom and is therefore rightly expelled from the kingdom, all the more does he do a dishonor to the eternal majesty who denies that God is principle of all other principles of all things existing in time or that He is eternally active as principle from within, and such a man is worthy not only of being expelled from the kingdom of God, but also of being cast into the punishment of hell together with the devil and his angels.
It is also clear why we worship God in faith. For in thinking of God in this way, as the Christian faith does, we think of Him as the most high and most loving principle, who is to be both feared and loved. Because of these two things, man is recalled from evil and incited to every good. This is perfect justice, and he who possesses it is worthy of the eternal inheritance. ae ak SEE
QUESTION II
WHETHER A TRINITY OF PERSONS CAN EXIST
TOGETHER WITH UNITY OF NATURE
Supposing that it is a truth of faith that God is a trinity, it is then asked whether a trinity of persons can exist together with unity of nature. Two questions are raised concerning this matter. The first is whether the divine being is supremely one. The second is whether the highest unity of nature can exist together with a trinity of persons.
ARTICLE I
WHETHER THE DIVINE BEING IS SUPREMELY ONE
Concerning the first question, we will proceed to show that the divine being is supremely one. That. this is so is sufficiently proclaimed by faith and by the divine Scriptures, in Exodus 20: "God, your God, is one"';! and in Deuteronomy 32: "See, therefore, that I alone am God, and there is no other God beside me'';? and David in the Psalm: ""There shall be no strange God among you, and you shall not worship any foreign God."? The divine Scriptures give sufficient instruction on this matter. It is now our intention to demonstrate the same thing by arguments. For every mind that makes use of reason supposes that God is that than which nothing greater or better can be conceived; He is therefore most excellent in nature and power, in wisdom and goodness, in influence and causality. For if He suffered a defect in any of these, then He would not be the highest, and consequently He would not be God. Therefore these six qualities are supposed as true and most certain.
1 Ex. 20, 2.
BRD. 6, 4; 32,39,
3 Ps. 80, 10.
II, UNITY AND TRINITY
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. The argument from sublimity of nature is as follows. That which excels all others is more sublime than that which does not.
Therefore, if it is impossible for more than one being to excel all others, then it is impossible and even unintelligible that God should not be one.' For if we were to suppose a plurality here, it would follow that one and the same being both excels the others and is excelled by them. Therefore if several beings were God, none would be God. Therefore, either God does not exist, or if He exists, He is one.
2. The argument from omnipotence is the following. A being is truly omnipotent not only if it can do all things, but also if it is the source from which all power is derived. But to be able to do all things and to be the cause of all power can belong only to one being — if it belonged to many, it would belong to none. If, therefore, omnipotence is an attribute of God, it is impossible and unintelligible that God should not be one; because if several beings were omnipotent, each of them could annul the power of the other.
Therefore, if several beings are omnipotent,'none of them would be omnipotent.5
3. The argument from the highest wisdom is as follows.
It is proper to the supremely wise being to know all things.* Therefore, if there were several gods, either they would be mutually ignorant of each other, and thus neither of them would be supremely wise; indeed, they would be truly foolish; or they would know each other either through a species, or through the other's essence, or through themselves. If one knows the other through a species or through the other's essence, then it would be informed by receiving something from the other. If it knows the other through itself, then it would be the principle of the other; hence one of these would not be God.
Therefore, the highest wisdom does not allow that there be a plurality of gods, nor can we think of such a plurality. For if several gods are thought to exist, their wisdom would be either identical or distinct. If they have distinct wisdoms, then either one of them excels the other or both of them are imperfect. If they have the same wisdom, they would not have different natures, since each of them would be the highest wisdom. Therefore, they would not be two.
4 Aristotle, V Topic., c. 3 (c. 5).
5 Rich. of St. Victor, De Trin. I, c. 25; Il, c. 15.
® Aristotle, J Metaph., c. 2.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
4. The argument from the highest good is the following. That which is the highest good is to be loved supremely and for its own sake. Therefore, if there were several supremely good beings, either each of them would love the other for the other's sake, or not.
If not, then neither of them would be good. If yes, then each of them beatifies the other; therefore, neither would be the highest. Therefore, it is impossible that the highest good be multiplied. Indeed, this would also be contrary to reason, because each of these would either be or not be the greater good. If not, then one of them is superfluous.
If yes, then neither is the highest. Therefore, if a multiplicity of highest goods is thought to exist, they are not understood to be supremely good.'
5. The argument from influence is the following. God influences all things in a most perfect manner. Therefore, He confers the whole of being and not a part thereof.§ But if there were several gods, either one would give nothing, and hence would not be God; or each would give either part of being or nothing at all, and neither would be God; or each would communicate the same being, and then each would be simultaneously in the same effect by way of essence, power, and presence, since this is proper to the highest influence. Therefore, either one would be in the other, or both would be circumscribed, and thus neither would be God.
6. The argument from the highest causality is the following.
God is the first, ultimate, and most perfect cause; and hence He is the cause in whom all things come to rest fully in terms of efficient, exemplary, and final causality.° Therefore, if there were several gods, one would be reduced to the other, and none would be first, highest, or most perfect. Hence, none would be God.
7. The argument from all the qualities given above is the following. If there were a plurality of gods, either they would be totally identical in all these qualities, or they would differ totally, or they would agree in part and differ in part. If they were totally identical, there would not be a plurality of gods; if they differed entirely, then if one were God the other would not be God. If they agreed in part and differed in part, then they would both be composed of parts. Therefore, neither of them would be simple; hence, neither would be God.
From the above, it is argued that the divine being cannot be multiplied, either in reality or in thought.
7 Rich. of St. Victor, De Trin. II, c. 19.
8 Lib. de Causts, prop. 1.
® Aristotle, 17 Metaph., text. 5 ff.
II, UNITY AND TRINITY
OBJECTIONS
In opposition to this, arguments are raised first of all against the proofs given above.
1. The arguments do not appear to draw a true conclusion. Since the fact that God is one is a matter in which pagans, unbelievers, and heretics have erred, all of whom had the use of reason, not only can it be thought, but it can be judged and believed that there are many gods. Or if the contrary cannot be judged, then it is not an article of faith.
2. Again, the arguments do not seem to draw necessary conclusions because the same arguments can be used to prove that there are not several persons in God. This is clear for anyone who reflects further on it, whether from the sublimity of nature, or of power, or of wisdom, or of goodness, or of influence, or of causality. But if the arguments proceed from the same means to arrive at false conclusions, they do not lead to necessary conclusions.
3. Again, if by means of the arguments given above it is necessarily proved and demonstrated that God is one, then the faith seems to be emptied of merit, since "that' faith for which human reason provides a proof has no merit."!° Therefore arguments are either weak or useless.
Objections are raised against the proofs from the same attributes.
4, First, from sublimity. It is of greater sublimity to excel things of a similar nature than to excel things of a different nature; and to excel great things rather than to excel small things. Therefore, if the creature is not of like nature with God, and if creation is, as it were, nothing in comparison with God, then God is not understood to be highest and most excellent if He excels created being only.
Therefore it seems that it pertains to the divine excellence to posit a plurality of uncreated natures, and then to posit one above the others.
5. From omnipotence, the argument is the following. As Hilary says, "It is proper to perfect power that the nature in which it resides can carry out whatever the speaker has declared." And again, reason dictates that a certain degree of power can accomplish only so much; a greater degree is capable of more; and the highest degree of power is capable of the most. But God is omnipotent in the highest degree. Therefore, since it is possible for us to say that there are many gods, God can bring it about that they should exist. And since He can cause lesser things to be, He can also cause greater
10 Gregory, II Homil. in Evang., homil. 26, n. 1.
11 De trin. V, n. 5.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
things, and even the greatest things. Therefore, He can produce something distinct from Himself that would be as great as Himself.
It is, therefore, consonant with omnipotence that there be a multiplicity of gods.
6. From wisdom, it is argued that it is proper to the highest wisdom to know that which is other than itself; and the more perfect the object known, the more perfect is the wisdom. If nothing is entirely perfect except that being which is God, and if divine wisdom eternally knows something distinct from itself with a most perfect knowledge, it seems that from eternity there would be something distinct from God which, nonetheless, would be divine.
Therefore, the divine wisdom does not exclude but rather requires several divine essences.
7. From goodness, it is argued: "Goodness is diffusive to the highest degree" ;! and "many good things are preferable to fewer."
Both of these propositions are self-eviden ttruths. Since the highest diffusion of the divine being cannot take place in a creature, it must take place in another uncreated nature. Having posited this, the whole divine essence is better because of the multiplicity of goods.
Therefore, if all that is better is to be attributed to God because of His supreme goodness, it seems that the highest goodness does not exclude but rather demands the existence of many divine natures.
8. From the highest influence, it is argued that the perfect influence necessarily demands that such influence not take place without the divine essence, presence, and power. Therefore for the same reason, it cannot be multiplied without the multiplication of essence, power, and presence. Therefore, since there is a plurality of divine influences, there is also a plurality of essences.
9. From causality, the following argument is made. The first cause is the most perfect cause; it is first and immediate, and therefore cause in the proper sense. But if the effect is multiplied, it is necessary that the proximate and proper cause be multiplied.
Therefore it is necessary to affirm multiplicity in the first cause, since multiplicity is affirmed and exists in the effects caused by it.
10. Again, from all these properties an objection is raised against all the above; for the most perfect sublimity in nature and power, wisdom and goodness, influence and causality is the reason for positing a multitude in the effects that are caused. Therefore, if the same being is not to be the cause of opposite effects, it seems that 19 Ps.-Diony., De Caelest. Hierarch., c. 4, p. 1; De Div. Nom., c. 4, p. 1.
18 Aristotle, IJ Topic., c. 2.
™ Aristotle, JJ De Gener. e¢ Corrupt., text. 56 (c. 10).
II, UNITY AND TRINITY
these qualities lead us to posit multiplicity rather than unity in the efficient cause; and thus rather than favoring the proposition defended here, they favor the opposite thesis.
CONCLUSION
That God is one is a truth that is not only believable but also intelligible.
Response. The fact that God is one is a truth that is not only believable but intelligible as well since it is both necessary and certain not only from the testimony of Scripture and the illumination of grace which is received in faith, but its truth is self-evidently certain from the testimony of creation as well.
It is certain of itself, therefore, because the divine being possesses unity in every way by reason of its singular sublimity and its sublime singularity. Since God has every perfection in Himself, and this in the highest and most excellent degree, He is proved to be one not only from the sublimity of nature and wisdom, power and goodness, influence and causality, but also from all His qualities and from the noble properties which are attributed to Him in the highest way.
Therefore, all these qualities attest to the unity of the highest essence.
It is certain also from the testimony of created beings, because every creature is seen to possess unity just as it possesses a natural goodness. "Nothing can exist unless it be one," as Boethius!® and Augustine!® say, and as both sense and intellect teach us. As each creature, by reason of its goodness, proclaims that the true and highest goodness is in God, so by reason of its unity, it proclaims that the cause of all things is one in itself.
Nor does the diversity among beings run counter to this testtmony. For all the diversity among beings is comprehended within one universe, which in itself is finite and limited, and perfect. But that would not be the case unless that plurality were reduced to some being in which it comes to rest. And therefore it is necessary that all be reduced to one final end and one first principle, otherwise an infinite series would arise. Therefore, the very universe of beings testifies that God is one. Whence, as it is impossible to reasonably think of one circumference except in reference to a single center from which all lines flow and to which all are reduced as to their end, so in the one universe, we should not speak nor think of God except as one alone.
18 De Consol., Ill, prosa 11.
16 De Moribus Manich., Il, c. 6, n. 8.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
Therefore this is both necessary and evident; and it is known in such a way that no one who has the use of reason can doubt it if he knows "what it is that is expressed by this name." For if the word God signifies the first and highest principle of all things thereby encompassing the entire universe, anyone who understands this affirms as a consequence that God is one. Whence, just as principles are self-evident because they are known immediately in the knowledge of their terms,17 so for anyone who understands what is signified by the terms, it is clear without doubt that God is one.
However, many have erred concerning the number of the gods, for ignorance of the significate begets deception concerning the supposite, and this leads to the heresy which affirms a plurality of gods. Because men believe that God is that which exceeds human power or human knowledge, when they see that demons can do such things, they believe that demons are gods. And they are led into error and blindness and fall into the worship of idols. This is indeed most absurd, but it is not to be marveled at, since ''an error that is small at the beginning becomes great at the end." Philosophy can rescue us from such an error, but the Christian faith does so even more effectively; and both of these agree that the divine being is supremely one. Therefore the arguments which prove this should be conceded, because they arrive at a true conclusion through a necessary middle term.
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1. To the objection that the conclusion is false because many men are of the opinion that there are many gods, the response is clear since they use the supposite and the significate of the term
God in a way that differs from its proper meaning. Therefore, there is no contradiction. While the name God has no plural according to its proper meaning, it may have a plural when it is taken in an improper sense. So it should be understood in the present case. And the illumination of faith was necessary because of the blindness of the mind, which frequently accepts as true something which is false.
Nonetheless, it can be maintained that reason is capable of proving that God is one in as far as His unity is taken in an absolute sense; but the illumination of faith is necessary in as far as the unity is related to a plurality of persons.
2. To the objection that the same conclusion can be drawn concerning the persons, it should be said that there is no parallel
17 Aristotle, J Poster., c. 3.
II, UNITY AND TRINITY
since in all the persons there is one nature and power and wisdom and goodness and influence and causality. This would not be so if there were different divine natures; therefore a plurality of persons involves no contradiction.
3. To the objection that faith is emptied of its merit, it must be said that this would be true if assent were given only because of the arguments. However, since assent is given because of truth itself and not principally because of the arguments, merit is possible because of the assent of faith. Nothing excludes the possibility that the same matter be both known and believed in tefms of different aspects and considerations.
4. To the objection concerning sublimity in relation to great things and things of a similar nature, it should be said that there would be a point to this if something were to accrue to the divine sublimity from the subjection of others. But it is not true, since God is just as sublime in Himself and existing alone as He would be if He ruled over a thousand worlds. Furthermore, it would not add to His sublimity to have something of like nature existing in a servile condition. Thus, even though sublimity of this sort might seem, in a way, to increase His glory, in reality it would decrease it.
5. To the objection concerning power, it must be said that every word must be understood in terms of what is truly possible for a power, for certain possibilities involve weakness rather than sublimity. The possibility of having a nature equal to but different from oneself pertains to the dignity of a limited power, and therefore it is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore, even though this can be said in words, yet it cannot be attributed to God, for the extent of the divine power is not to be judged according to the degree of this possibility, but rather according to the dignity of its own proper act which is immense; therefore the power is immense.}8
6. To the objection from wisdom, namely, that it knows another, it must be said that though God knows eternally that which is other than Himself, and this is in accord with the highest wisdom, nonetheless, it is not fitting for God to know the other through the other but through Himself. But this is not possible unless the other being, which is of such a nature as to proceed from God Himself, is in God as in its causal principle. For even if evil is known by God, this is by means of the idea of the opposite good. Therefore the perfection of divine knowledge does not require that the object of knowledge be an actual being, nor that it be the highest being, since God knows earthly realities in the best and highest manner
18 Rich. of St. Victor, De Trin. I, c. 21.
St. Bonaventure, Disputed Questions
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
through Himself. The objection has its place in that sort of knowledge which takes its origin from things, but God does not have that sort of knowledge.
7. To the objection that the highest diffusion and multitude of goods pertains to the highest good, it must be said that, if highest is understood absolutely, then the highest communication within is appropriate to the highest good, but not the highest communication to something outside itself. For there ought to be but one highest good which indeed cannot be added to by a multitude of goods.
When it is said that the highest good is supremely diffusive, it should be understood that this is true in as far as Aighest refers to that which is diffusive in power and not in act. And when it is said that a multiplicity of goods is better, we reply that this is true in reference to finite goods where one adds something to the other, and where something of the good is lacking to each one and this is supplied for by a good added to it.
8. To the objection concerning influence, namely, that it cannot exist without God and therefore it cannot be multiplied unless God be multiplied, it must be said that this does not hold, and there is no parallel because it pertains to the perfection of the agent that an effect cannot exist without the presence of the agent since the effect depends totally on the agent; and that agent which acts immediately acts in a more noble manner than one which acts through another. However, this is not so in.the case of number and multitude. For it does not pertain to the perfection of an agent that it be multiplied in a multiplicity of effects, but quite the contrary, namely, that while remaining one in itself, it is the cause of diverse effects.
9. To the objection that the proximate and immediate cause is multiplied, it must be said that this is true of a cause which operates by way of nature and whose power is limited. Thus it is a cause in the proper sense, but not a universal cause. But in the production of creatures, the first cause acts by way of art and will. For this reason, it is supremely free as a cause and is limited by nothing; and it is simultaneousy a proper and universal cause because whatever perfection exists in the creature must necessarily be posited in the creative essence.
10. To the objection that these are means of proving multitude and diversity, it must be said that they prove not just any sort of diversity among creatures, but rather a diversity with order and connection and an inclination to unity; and thus a diversity in unity.
And by reason of that unity, they infer a unity in their cause. Moreover, they do not lead to the opposite conclusion because unity in the cause is not contradictory to multiplicity in the effects; as
II. UNITY AND TRINITY
is clear in that sort of unity from which infinite species of numbers proceed. So it is that the supreme wisdom and power and goodness
— though they are one — are not sufficiently manifested through one effect. Therefore, they imply a diversity in the effects caused by them. Thus our response to all the objections is clear.
ARTICLE II
WHETHER UNITY OF NATURE CAN EXIST
POUGEIAER Wilt. A. CRINITY OF PERSONS
Supposing that the divine being is supremely one, it is then asked whether the unity of nature can exist together with a trinity of persons. Their incompatability appears in the following.
OBJECTIONS
1. To be one both in form and in supposite is more perfect than to be one in only one of these. Therefore, if the divine being is one in form and not in hypostasis, it would seem that it is not supremely one.
2. Again, to be one both in substance and in property is more perfect than to be one in only one of these. But the trinity cannot exist without a plurality of properties. Therefore it necessarily involves some lack of unity. Therefore these two cannot exist simultaneously.
3. Again by reason of the definition of one,! the more a thing is undivided, the more it is one. Therefore, there must be total lack of division and total lack of distinction in that which is supremely one; and therefore there can be no plurality. Therefore, either there is no trinity there, or the supreme unity is not found there.
4. Again, that which is one both as a real unity and as a unity of reason is more perfect than that which is one only in reality.
But a trinity of persons cannot coexist with a unity of reason.
Therefore, the highest and most perfect unity is lacking. Therefore, they cannot exist together.
5. Again, there is a rule that ""T'wo things that are equal to a third are equal to each other." If that third being is simply one, it
1 Aristotle, JJJ Phys., text. 68 (c. 7).
2 Aristotle, J Elench., c. 5 (c. 6).
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
follows that either the divine substance is not supremely one, and the persons do not communicate in it, or one person does not differ from the other. But if either of these is granted, then trinity and unity are incompatible.
6. Again, there is a rule that when two things are so related to each other that what is predicated of one is predicated formally of the other, then if one is multiplied the other is multiplied also; as is apparent in man and animal, and white and color.? But formally, person is the essence. Therefore, if there are several persons, there are several essences. And thus the same conclusion follows as above.
7. Again, the syllogistic form does not err in the case of propositions that are self-evidently true and in which no accidental reality is found.4 But these propositions are self-evidently true, namely, each person is distinct; and each person is the essence.
Therefore, the essence is distinguished, and it is therefore numbered.
Therefore the essence is not one in a trinity of persons.
8. Again, there is a rule that when the object defined is multiplied, then the definition is multiplied together with its defining elements. But substance and nature are contained in the definition of person. Therefore, if there are many persons, there are many essences, substances, and natures. Therefore, the plurality of persons is incompatible with the highest unity of the divine nature.
9. Again, person is defined either by reason of substance or by reason of relation. If it is defined by reason of relation, then a plurality of persons would be identical with a plurality of relations.
If it is defined by reason of substance, then the multiplication of persons is identical with the multiplication of substance and nature.
Therefore, unity in nature is incompatible with a trinity of persons.
10. Again, when I say that the person is one and the essence is one, this refers either to the same unity or to a different unity. If it refers to a different unity, then there is a plurality of unities, and therefore, it would not be supremely one. If it refers to the same unity, then if one is multiplied so is the other, and if one is not multiplied, neither is the other. Therefore, trinity and highest unity are incompatible.
11. Again, a person is capable of producing only by reason of its nature; but there is no plurality in God except by reason of production. Therefore, if production multiplies person, in the same way it will multiply the nature. Therefore, in God plurality cannot exist together with the supreme unity of nature.
5 Aristotle, JV Topic., c. 5.
4 Aristotle, J Prior., c. 1 ff.; I Poster., c. 4 ff.
Il. UNITY AND TRINITY
12. Again, the supreme simplicity of God excludes composition not only in nature but also in person. Therefore, since unity is related to plurality as simplicity is to composition, if the highest unity exists in the divine nature, there can be no plurality, neither in nature nor in person.
13. Again, in the divine being, either there is no distinction or there is the most perfect distinction. But the most perfect distinction is that which exists by reason of the form. Since this cannot exist together with the highest unity,® it remains either that the highest unity is not found there, or plurality is not found there.
14. Again, unity and truth are convertible and are attributed to every nature. Therefore, if there is a true plurality in God, then truth is multiplied in God; there are, then, multiple truths in God and therefore a plurality of entities. Therefore there is not true unity. And thus the same conclusion follows as above.
15. Again, that the "Father generates' and that the "Holy Spirit proceeds" are two true statements if there is a trinity in God; therefore there are two truths. Therefore if a plurality of truths is repugnant to the highest unity, so also is a plurality of persons.
16. Again, the trinity is constituted either by the repetition of the same unity or by the addition of diverse unities. If it is the repetition of the same unity,® then there is no real plurality; and the result would be a superfluous triviality. If it is by addition of diverse unities, since any multiplication or aggregation of diverse unities is repugnant to the highest unity, it is clear, etc.
17. Again, all plurality can be reduced to unity. But in God nothing should be posited that is reducible to something else.
Therefore, etc.
18. Again, many properties existing in many subjects bespeak the highest distinction. Contrariwise, therefore, one property existing in only one subject bespeaks the highest unity. Therefore, if the highest unity is found in God, it follows that there is no plurality.
19. Again, God has nothing that is not of Himself. Therefore, every person that is God has whatever it possesses of itself. But only one person can be of itself. Therefore, a plurality of persons cannot exist together with the unity of the divine being.
20. Again, where there is plurality, there is diversity. And where there is diversity, there is a lack of identity. And where there is a lack of identity, supreme unity is lacking.' Therefore, etc.
But, on the contrary, objections are raised against this from authority and from reason. From authority in the following way.
5 Boethius, De Trin., c. 2.
6 Boethius, De Trin., c. 3.
7 Aristotle, V Metaph., text. 16 (IV, c. 9).
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. 1 Jn. 5: "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit. And these three are one.''®
I call that thing one in an absolute sense to which nothing else is added. Therefore, they are one in an absolute sense. Therefore, trinity does not destroy unity.
2. Again, Bernard to Eugene: "Among all the unities, the unity of the trinity holds first place."® But that which holds the highest place among many has being in the highest degree. Therefore, the unity of the trinity is the highest unity. Therefore, a true trinity stands together with the highest unity.
3. Again, a plurality of individuals is not repugnant to the unity of a species; indeed, they coexist. Therefore, if nature designates the common form and person designates the individual or the supposite,!° a trinity of persons is in no way derogatory to the unity of essence.
4. Again, a plurality of nature is not repugnant to unity of person; indeed they coexist, as is clear in the case of man. Therefore, by reason of a logical conversion a plurality of persons in God is not repugnant to the unity of essence or nature. Therefore they can exist together without diminution.
5. Again, we find one nature in one person, as in the case of the angels; and we find three extremely diverse natures in one person, as in Christ. Therefore, it seems that it is not only possible, but, indeed, very fitting to find a trinity of persons in one nature. And this is the case in God; therefore, etc.14
6. Again, that unity which can remain one in many subjects is more excellent than that unity which can maintain its unity only in one person. But the divine unity is the most excellent unity.
Therefore it must stand together with a plurality of persons. Therefore, there is no contradiction.
7. Again, as the Philosopher says: "That which generates does not generate another except by means of matter.'2 But in God, there is no matter. Therefore, the one who generates is not distinguished from the one generated. Indeed, moreover, one cannot generate oneself. Therefore, if in God there exists generation without matter, then there exists a plurality of persons without the multiplication of form.
® Verse 7.
® De Considerat., V, c. 8, n. 19.
10 Boethius, De Persona et Duabus Naturis, c. 1-3.
11 Bernard, De Consideratione. c. 9, n. 20.
2 VII Metaph., text. 28 (VI, c. 8); IJ De Anima, text. 47 (c. 4).
Il, UNITY AND TRINITY
8. Again, as Damascene says, "To generate is to produce a similar being from one's own substance." But the divine substance is not capable of division. Therefore, it is' necessary that the one who generates gives his entire substance to the one that is generated.
Therefore they cannot be distinguished according to substance. And yet they are distinguished. But neither are they distinguished accidentally because in God there is no accident. Therefore they are distinguished in person; for there remains the distinction in person together with total indistinction in nature.
9. Again, that unity is more perfect in which, together with the unity of nature, there remains the unity of love. But "love tends toward the other."!4 Therefore it includes the distinction of the lover and the beloved. Therefore, if the most perfect unity exists in God, it is necessary that He possess an intrinsic plurality for He has nothing outside Himself that is supremely lovable.
10. Again, likeness, equality, and identity include in their concepts both plurality and unity. This is clear because "likeness is the same quality existing in diverse beings.''! Therefore, since the highest likeness can exist both in reality and in the mind, and since the highest likeness and identity cannot be or be conceived except with unity and plurality, therefore either it is necessary that the highest unity exist together with true plurality, or else the highest likeness can neither exist nor be conceived. And as a result, no sort of likeness could exist or be conceived. But if these conclusions are impossible, it remains that in God the highest unity coexists with true plurality.
CONCLUSION
The highest unity and trinity in God are not repugnant to each other, but manifest marvelous concord and harmony.
Response. In God the trinity and the highest unity are not contradictory, but manifest a marvelous concord and harmony, according to what the most saving faith says. And the soul purged and elevated by faith can grasp this to some extent; in general, it is difficult and impossible to understand anything unless one first assents to it.
The Christian faith, therefore, says that the divine nature is one and supremely one, and nevertheless there are three persons, one of whom proceeds from the other and through the other; and 18 De Fide Orthod., I, c. 8.
14 Gregory, I Homil. in Evang., homil. 17, n. 1.
15 Boethius, JJ] De Differentiis Topic.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
therefore they communicate in essence and form while their properties are truly distinct. While to the non-believer these seem to be incompatible, to the believer, they seem to be not only compatible but harmonious. However, two things must be considered if we are to understand this. The first is what person and nature signify; the second is how they are related to production. The first removes any contradiction; the second shows the harmony.
It must be recognized, therefore, as Boethius says in Concerning Two Natures and One person,® that "nature is the specific difference informing a particular thing"; "person, however, is an individual substance of a rational nature"; or as Richard says, "'incommunicable existence.'!7 The difference, therefore, is that nature refers to the form itself by which each thing is what it is; while person refers to the individual or incommunicable supposite. Because they were ignorant of these definitions, heretics have said that in Christ there are two persons as there are two natures; others have said that there is one nature as there is one person. If they had known the difference between these, they would have seen how it is possible for a plurality of natures to exist with a unity of person, as is clear in any human being.!8 Therefore if a plurality of natures of itself is not contradictory to unity of person, for like reason the reverse is not contradictory — namely, the plurality of persons in a unity of nature. If it is not contradictory, then it can exist in God.
Not only do they have a different meaning, but they are related differently to production. Since it is proper to the supposite to act through the form,}® it is proper not to the nature but to the person to produce and to be produced, while it is proper to the nature to be communicated through production. Therefore, since the divine nature is entirely indivisible and without any matter, therefore it is not multiplied or numbered by division or partition. Therefore
_it is entirely one in-the produced -and-in-the-producer.But because no-one-can_ produce himself, it is necessary that there be a plurality at the level ee in the emanation of persons, the nature is communicable while the person is that which produces, emanation requires that there be plurality at the level of persons and unity at the level of nature in such a way that there is no contradiction here but rather the highest harmony.
Therefore, since the plurality does not divide the unity, nor does the unity confuse the plurality, it becomes apparent that the divine ee mimcc 3.
M0 De Trin. IV, c. 18 & 22 18 Boethius, De Persona et Duabus Naturis, c. 4, 5 & 7.
19 Aristotle, J De Anima, text. 64 (c. 4).
Il, UNITY AND TRINITY
being is singularly admirable and marvelously singular. And this is proper to it alone because of the highest simplicity which does not allow that the nature have parts nor that it be associated with matter. Therefore this is proper to it alone; and this in a most admitable way because nothing can be found that is entirely similar to this. Therefore to be one in many with no multiplication or diversification of essence is the exclusive property of the divine nature and is its singular privilege. And that which is one in the first and highest degree ought to have this privilege because it is first and highest. Therefore, it is one in such a way that it cannot be formally multiplied; and it is one in such a way that it can be neither limited nor restricted to only one supposite; it is one in a way which does not impede it from being the eternal principle with respect to that which is coequal with itself, and coeternal and most perfect. Hence no man praises the divine unity perfectly unless at the same time he recognizes the trinity, nor does anyone render perfect worship to the one God unless in faith he confesses that God is a trinity. Hence, those arguments that demonstrate this are to be conceded.
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1. To the first objection, it must be said that form is twofold.
One type of form is multiplied in many supposites,?° and in such a form perfect unity cannot coexist together with a plurality of supposites. The second type is that kind of form which is not multiplied in a plurality of supposites, and such is the form of the deity. And since such a form is in no way multiplied by reason of the plurality of supposites, therefore in it there exists simultaneously true plurality and highest unity. This is what is expressed in the name /rinity in which the unity of nature is included with plurality.
2. To the objection that it is more perfect to be one both in substance and in property, etc., it must be said that property is twofold; namely, absolute and relative. If the objection is understood of an absolute property, it is true; but if it is understood of a relative property, it is not true, since plurality in terms of a relative property does not posit diversity in the thing or in the nature, neither with respect to the essence nor with respect to existence; but it asserts only a different relation which is not incompatible with the highest unity, as can be shown by examples in the case of a point and unity.
3. To the objection that the more a thing is undivided, the more it is one, it must be said that the indivisibility in the definition
20 Aristotle, J Periberm., c. 5 (c. 7).
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
of unity excludes that sort of division which divides a whole into its parts. But the unity of the trinity is not related to the plurality of persons as is a whole to its parts because the entire deity is in each of the persons most fully and perfectly. Therefore, personal distinction does not contradict that sort of indivisibility which is to be found in the highest unity.
4. To the objection that whatever is one both as a real unity and as a unity of reason is more perfect, etc., it must be said that the word reason can be understood in two ways. In the first sense, it adds something really distinct from the essence, such as is the case with essential elements of a being. In the second sense, it does not add anything over and above the essence, but adds only a relation. If the proposition is understood in this way, it is not true, because the plurality of such reasons in no way diminishes the highest unity of the essence or nature.
5. To the objection that two things which are equal to a third are equal to each othé it must be said that this is to be understood of identity in the supposite. Hence it is that — though there is in Christ a unity of dignity that is less than the unity of trinity which is in God — nevertheless man is predicated of God, and God of man, by reason of the unity of person. However, Son is not predicated of Father, nor Father of Son, by reason of the unity of nature since the distinction of the supposites stands in the way of this.
Or it can be said that this rule is not violated if it is understood of one and the same genus of unity; but if it is applied to different types of unity, the understanding of this rule is neither correct nor sound. For it does not follow that if different things are equal to a third in generic terms that therefore the persons are numerically identical. In this case, therefore, it is to be so understood that even if essence and person are essentially one, yet it does not follow that they are personally one. It suffices that there be an essential unity between them.
6. To the objection.that in formal predication when the subject is multiplied, the predicate also is multiplied, it must be said that this is true when the multiplication of the subject takes place by addition or by formal difference. For in that case it is necessary for the multiplication of the subject that the predicate be multiplied.
But this is not the case in the present question; for the multiplication of persons is not a formal multiplication nor is it one that takes place by the addition of any absolute quality; but by reason only of origin and the respective emanation.
7. To the objection that the syllogistic form does not err in 1 Bernard, V De Consideratione, c. 8, n. 18 and c. 9, n. 20 ff.
II, UNITY AND TRINITY
self-evident propositions, it must be said that even though in God there is nothing accidental inhering in Him, nonetheless, there are various levels of predication used to speak of God, namely, predication in reference to substance and in reference to relation, so that "substance contains unity, and relation unfolds the trinity.''22
From this it follows that each of these modes of speech and predication is extraneous to the other; and this is sufficient to cause that sophism known as the fallacy of accident.
8. To the objection that when the object defined is multiplied, the defining elements are multiplied also, it must be said that this is true concerning those things that fall under the formal definition directly. But nature falls under the definition of person indirectly; and substance — in as far as it falls under the definition of person — is identical with hypostasis, which is multiplied in God without any multiplication of the essence.
9. To the objection that person is defined either by reason of substance or by reason of relation, etc., it must be said that person is nothing other than an "hypostasis distinct by reason of a property.'*3 Therefore it is predicated by virtue of an intrinsic relation and by virtue of the substance that is not common but proper. Therefore, it does not follow that there is only a plurality of relations, nor that there is a diversity of natures because of the plurality of the divine persons.
10. To the objection that when person and essence are one, they are such either by the same unity or by diverse unities, it must be said that it is neither absolutely identical nor absolutely diverse; rather it is one and the same according to a real unity, but diverse because of a distinction introduced by reason, according to what
Augustine says, "It is one thing for Him to be God, and another thing for Him to be Father.''*4 He is called Father not because there is an essential or real distinction between deity and paternity, but because Father involves a relation to another which is not included in the essence.
11. To the objection that a person is capable of producing only by reason of the nature, it must be said that production involves the person as subject and principle and as object or term. And therefore true production necessarily effects a multiplication of persons. But production involves nature as the principle of production and as the very reality which is communicated by means of the production. And since in that production the whole nature is com32 Boethius, De Trin., c. 6.
33 Cf. I Sent. d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4 (I, 441).
% De Trin., VII, c. 6, n. 11; Enarrat. in Ps. 68, serm. 1, n. 5.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
municated and nothing is lost in the communications ; therefore, even though person is multiplied, yet the nature is not multiplied.
12. To the objection that the highest simplicity excludes composition in nature as well as in person, it must be said that the highest simplicity excludes composition out of diverse elements and with another being; and therefore it can coexist neither with a composition of nature nor with one of person. But the highest unity of nature excludes only essential diversity, and therefore it is not incompatible with a plurality of persons. And thus the two cases are not similar.
13. To the objection that in the divine being there must be either the most perfect distinction or no distinction at all, it must be said that a perfect distinction may be understood in two ways, either intensively or in terms of completion. In the first sense, it should not be predicated of God; inthe second sense it is predicated of God because the less a thing deviates from unity the more perfect it is. Therefore because that plurality does not deviate from the highest unity, it follows that such a plurality alone is at the same time true and most perfect."® 14. To the objection that unity and truth are convertible, it must be said that this refers to truth in the singular and not in the plural. But when truth and plurality are put in relation to each other, and vice versa, then a single object is related not to another single object but to a plurality. Therefore,.in this case the consequence is not necessary. When one speaks of a true plurality in God, the word true is nothing else but an expression of the plurality that is in the supposites. But on the contrary, when truth is said to be multiplied, a multiplicity is implied in truth itself and in the divine essence.
15. To the objection that it is one truth for the Father to generate and another for the Holy Spirit to proceed, it must be said that if this is understood to refer to the truth of complex judgments, such as in the truth of prayer and of speech, then there are many truths and many articles of faith. But if this is understood to refer to the truth of simple terms, or to the truth of reality, then to say that the Father generates and that the Son is generated, and that the Holy
Spirit proceeds is to say nothing else than that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit exist, and that there is but one act of being in them. Thus, the truth of reality is abolutely one.
16. To the objection that there is either a repetition of the same unity or not, it must be said that it is a repetition of the same unity, not however in the same respect but in different respects.
3° Ps.-Dionysius, De Div. Nom., c. 13, p. 2-4.
II, UNITY AND TRINITY
Therefore it is not a superfluity nor an aggregation of unities.
Therefore the multiplication which is found here is not incompatible with the highest unity. It is in this sense that the statement of Boethius, On the Trinity,?® is to be understood when he says that "God is a trinity in this sense, as if one were to say three times: sun, sun, sun." There is a similarity because of the repetition of the same unity.
There is a dissimilarity because the unity of the trinity is repeated in reference to different subjects whereas the unity of the sun is repeated in reference to the same subject. Therefore, the trinity in God is real while that in the sun is not.
17, To the objection that plurality is reducible to unity it must be said that a plurality which bespeaks a defect in the highest unity is related to that unity as to its principle and cause; and this is reduced to unity by a proper reduction, which is the reduction of an effect to its cause; and there is no such plurality in the divine being.
But a plurality which does not bespeak any defect in the highest unity does not need to be reduced in this way since it is itself the highest unity. Nonetheless, in as far as in God the emanation of divine persons is affirmed from the first person as from a principle, in this sense it is not repugnant that there be a reduction to the first person as to the principle from which the others are produced.
18. To the objection that many properties existing in many subjects bespeak highest distinction or diversity, it must be said that even though, in terms of an extrinsic reason, a plurality of nature in a plurality of person seems to be quite repugnant to the highest unity, nonetheless, in reality and in terms of an intrinsic reason, there is greater repugnance in the case of a plurality of natures in one supposite which is constituted by the natures, since the supposite is made into a composite and is less one than if a plurality of natures were found in a plurality of supposites, as is clear in the nature of angels and of man. And therefore, since the highest unity is found in God, therefore unity is to be affirmed of Him in a more noble and more excellent way, as when we affirm one nature which is not multiplied in the plurality of supposites, instead of affirming one nature in only one person.
19. To the objection that whatever God has, He has of Himself, it must be said that this is true because the divine essence cannot be derived from any other principle. But from this it does not follow that whatever a person has it has of itself. Likewise it does not follow that if the essence is not produced therefore the person is
(G5 ge j
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
not produced. Thus the argument cited does not come to a true conclusion.
20. To the objection that where there is plurality there is diversity, it must be said, as is clear from the above, that a plurality which relates to form, substance, and nature does not lead to diversity in the proper sense of the word. Therefore nothing is lost from the highest unity and identity, which consists in this; namely, that three persons have the highest unity of essence and nature.
QUESTION III
WHETHER THE TRINITY CAN EXIST TOGETHER
WitheTHE FIGHEST SIMPLIGITY Next it is asked whether the trinity can exist together with the highest simplicity. In this matter two questions are raised. The first is whether the divine being is most simple. The second is whether the trinity and the highest simplicity can exist together.
ARTICLE I
WHETHER THE DIVINE BEING IS MOST SIMPLE
Concerning the first question, one can proceed to show in the following way that the divine being is most simple.
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. Augustine, in the second book of the Confessions, "Nothing more simple than you can be found."! Since it is simple in the fullest sense, therefore it is simple in the highest degree. Therefore it is most simple.
2. Again, in the thirteenth book of the Confessions, ""You alone are simple for whom to live is the same as to live in blessedness."*
Therefore in God, to be is the same as to live in blessedness. But there is no composition in that being in whom these are the same, but only highest simplicity. Therefore, etc.
3. Again, that being which is absolutely first is most simple.
But the divine being is of this sort. Therefore, etc. The proof of the major is: that which is composed is posterior to the elements of which it is composed, and that which is simple is prior to that which is composed. Therefore, the cause of the predicate is contained in the subject of the stated proposition; therefore it is self-evident.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
The minor is evident because God exists of Himself; for if He had His being from another, then He would not be God, but the other would be God. And, again, if we are to come to an end, and not to proceed into infinity, it is necessary to affirm that some being is the first of all.
4. Again, that being which is absolutely necessary is most simple.
But the divine being is absolutely necessary. Therefore, etc. Avicenna and Algazel prove the major in their Metaphysics.§ For that which is absolutely necessary is totally independent and incorruptible. But everything that is composed depends on its component parts, and in as far as it depends on them by nature, it can be resolved back into its components. The minor is evident because the more perfect of contrary qualities is to be attributed to God. Therefore since that which is absolutely necessary is more perfect than that which is possible or contingent, it is evident, etc.
5. Again, that being which is most perfect is most simple; but the divine being is of this sort, therefore, etc. The minor is evident.
The major is proved in that the quality of perfection is to be attributed in the highest degree to that which is most perfect; otherwise it would not be the most perfect. But, as is clear, simplicity is a quality of perfection. Therefore it must be affirmed necessarily that simplicity is in God in the highest degree.
6. Again, that being which is most powerful is most simple; but the divine being is most powerful; therefore, etc. The minor is evident since He is called God because He is omnipotent. The major is proved in that "the more unified a power is, the more infinite it is," according to the Liber de causis.4 Therefore the power which is most infinite is most unified, and therefore most simple.
But no power is most simple unless its substance is most simple.
Therefore, etc.
7. Again, that being for whom to be and to possess are identical is most simple.5 But God is identical with whatever He possesses ; therefore, etc. The major is clear, because if there is any composition, one of the component elements is distinguished from the other.
The minor is evident through induction and reasoning; since God has wisdom, therefore either He is wisdom or He is not; and thus it can be argued concerning the other attributes except for the relative attributes. If He is wisdom, then my position stands. If He is not, and if He is wise by reason of wisdom, then He is wise by ® Avicenna, Metaph., tr. 1, c. 8 & tr. 8, c. 4 ff., Algazel, I Philos., tr. 2, c. de esse possibile et esse debitum.
4 Propos. 17.
5 Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XI, c. 10, n. 2.
Ill, SIMPLICITY AND TRINITY
reason of something other than Himself. But, therefore, if He has wisdom from another, then He has perfection from another; therefore, He is not God, etc.
8. Again, that being which is most perfect is most simple; but the divine being is of this sort. Therefore, etc. The minor is clear because no attribute is more consonant with the divine being than perfection. The major is proved because that which is itself perfection, totally and completely and according to itself, is more perfect than that which contains something perfectible within it.
But everything that is composite. or capable of being composed has something perfectible within it. Therefore it is impossible that any being possess the highest perfection unless it be most simple.
Therefore, the same conclusion as above.
9. Again, that being which is composed is mutable. Therefore, from the negation of the consequent,® whatever is immutable is simple, and whatever is absolutely immutable is absolutely simple.
But the divine being is totally immutable, because it can be changed neither to something better, nor to something equal, nor to something worse, since it is entirely the highest good. Therefore, the divine being is most simple.
10. Again, to the degree that a thing is simple, to that degree it is one. But the divine being is one in the highest degree, as has been shown in the preceding arguments.' Therefore it is necessary that the divine being is absolutely most simple.
OBJECTIONS
1. Anselm says, whatever corresponds to God corresponds to Him in the highest degree.® But the divine being differs from created being; therefore it must differ in the highest degree. But, the greater the number of differentiating qualities, the greater is the distinction between beings, and the more they are composed. Therefore, it is necessary that the divine being be composed in the highest degree.
2. Again, that being which is entirely abstracted from a supposite is more simple than concrete being. But the divine being is not abstract but concrete with a supposite, because in the divine being there is true deity and a true hypostasis possessing deity.
Therefore, etc. If you say that these are only logically different, either there is something real that corresponds to reason or there is not.
® Boethius, J/J De Differentiis Topic.
7 Q. 2, a. 1 above.
8 Monolog., c. 16.
11.
St. Bonaventure, Disputed Questions
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
If there is something, then the conclusion follows. If there is not, then it is entirely pointless and false.
3. Again, whatever perfection is found in the creature is to be attributed to the Creator as well.? Now, in the case of the creature, the more it is composed, the more it approaches perfection, as is clear in man who is the most perfect of the creatures in the universe, and who is also the image of God. Therefore, it is evident, etc.
4. Again, among ordered forms, that form which arises from some addition is more actual, as is clear in generic and specific forms, because the form of the species is more actual. But that which exists because of an addition is composed. Therefore, composition attests to greater actuality and completion. Therefore, since the divine being is most actual and most complete, it is composed in the highest degree.
5. Again, the properties of the divine being are unity, truth, and goodness. Therefore, either truth is identical with the substance or not. If they are entirely the same, then truth is no more a property of substance than the reverse; which is absurd. If they are not entirely identical, then the property adds something; therefore there is some composition.
6. Again, either truth and goodness are identical, or they are not. If they are identical, then the vestige of goodness is a vestige of truth, which is false. If they differ in some way, then that in which they exist is in some way composed. If you say that they differ only logically, then it is asked what is the basis for distinction.
7. Again, acts are diversified by reason of their objects.1° But the soul is turned to God as the truth by means of knowledge, and as the good by means of love. If therefore those are formal objects, and if those acts are formally different, it is evident, etc.
8. Again, in the divine being there is power, wisdom, and will.
Therefore either I say something more by these three qualities than by one of them, or I do not say more. If not, then he who says that God has power only, does not detract from God, which is false.
But if I say something more, then that is totally in God. Therefore, there is composition.
9. Again, either power is identical with knowledge, or it is not.
If it is not, then there are diverse realities in the divine being. If they are identical, then to know is the same as to be able. But God knows evil; therefore He can do evil. But this is absurd. Therefore the contrary is true. Therefore it seems that God is composed.
® Anselm, Monolog., c. 15.
10 Aristotle, JJ De Anima, text. 33 (c. 4).
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10. Again, the divine will places limits to its power, for God does not do all things which He knows and can do, but only those things which He wills to do. However, no being places limits on itself. Therefore, power, wisdom, and will are different from one another. Therefore, the divine nature is composed.
11. Again, that which is completely simple cannot be shared; neither to a greater nor to a lesser degree. But the divine being is shared to a greater and a lesser degree not only by wayfarers but also by the blessed, who participate in His life and contemplate
Him in Himself. Therefore, it is impossible that the divine being be entirely simple.
12. Again, that which is completely simple does not have a multiplicity of operations, because "the same being, which remains always identical with itself, is ordained to the same effect."!! And again, a multiform action is either identical with the agent itself
— in which case the agent is not simple — or it is not identical with the agent — and in this case also the agent would not be simple.
But God does carry out a multiplicity of operations; namely, He creates, He governs, and He remunerates. Therefore, etc. If you say that these differ only by reason of the effect, it can be replied that the action does not flow from the effect, but the contrary.
Therefore, this diversity takes its origin in a diversity of action rather than in a diversity of effects.
13. Again, that which is completely simple does not perform operations simultaneously which are completely different and infinite, because when a simple being turns itself to something else, it does so totally,!2 and no power less than the infinite is sufficient to realize an infinite action. But God simultaneously creates the soul of one man and justifies the soul of another. These actions are distinct and infinite. Therefore, etc.
14. Again, that which is totally simple is not multiple in its idea nor in the cognitive assimilation thereof. But in the divine being, there is a plurality of ideal reasons, because ''a man is created by one reason and a horse by another.''!8 Therefore, the divine being is not supremely simple. If you say that a plurality of ideas is a plutality of relations, it is said in reply that the likeness among certain beings is sought not in their relations but in their form. Therefore, if the ideas are said to be likeness in the divine mind, and if one and the same being viewed under the same aspect cannot possess a likeness with diverse things, it is necessary that there be composition in the divine art and wisdom.
11 Aristotle, JJ De Generat. et Corrup., text. 56 (c. 10).
12 Aristotle, JJ De Anima, text. 36 (c. 7).
18 Augustine, Lib. 87 Qq., q. 46, n. 2.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
CONCLUSION
The Divine Being Is Supremely Simple.
Response. The divine being is most simple. For the evidence of this, we must study two things; namely, the perfection of the divine attributes and the ways in which we know.
If we consider the modes of the divine attributes, the divine being, in as far as it is first, is most simple. For in as far as it is the first being, all things flow from it; and in as far as they flow from it, they flow back and are reduced to it as to their final end. Thus,
God is alpha and omega, first and last, principle and end.!4 Since these qualities — which seem to be most distant from each other — concur in every way in one being, it is necessary that the divine being be most perfect and, as it were, like a certain intelligible circle.
It is also necessary that it be most simple.
A being can fail to realize the highest unity for three reasons: either because it is composed of different elements; or because it is a component part of another being; or because it has a capacity for entering into composition. In as far as the divine being is first, it is not composed of prior elements; for there is nothing that is prior to itself. In as far as it is most perfect, it cannot be a component part of another being, for that which is perfect does not enter into the constitution of another being. In as far as it is the ultimate being, all other beings are ordered to it as to that end in which they find repose. Thus it is most absolute; and hence it lacks not only actual composition but potential composition as well. Thus, the most simple being befits God truly and properly for none of these three qualities is found in any other being.
It befits Him perfectly by reason of the same three attributes.
Since He is most perfect, He has all the qualities of perfection: since He is the ultimate and the best being because of which all things exist, He possesses those properties in the highest degree. Since He is the first, in whom there is no diversity, it is necessary that all that is in Him should be one and most simple, excluding all composition and including all perfection. Therefore, in God there are all the qualities of perfection; namely, power, wisdom, will; goodness, truth and unity; being, life and understanding; and other similar qualities; all these are in God truly, perfectly, and in the highest degree, in their proper and perfect reality. Nonetheless, they are identical to such a degree that they involve no composition nor do they diminish His simplicity.
M4 Apoc. 1, 8.
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No one will see this truth clearly unless he understands in a similar way that in the divine being the highest simplicity coexists with supreme immensity. How this can be understood will be investigated in what follows,!® but now it must be supposed as certain and indubitable so that we might rightly understand the divine simplicity in accord with the requirements of the divine attributes.
We should also consider the different ways in which we know.
Since three elements concur for any knowledge; namely, a knower, a thing known, and medium or cause of knowing, knowledge can be viewed in three ways. It can be considered in terms of the object, and then knowledge is true if it discerns those things which are really there, as when it understands spiritual things in a spiritual way; or it can be considered in terms of the subject knowing, as when it understands abstractly things which are united with it, and this is not a falsehood, for — as the Philosopher says — "'abstraction is not a lie'';1® or it can be considered in terms of the cause through which the subject knows, as when it knows one being in many ways through a multiplicity of ideas.
It should be recognized, therefore, that our intellect resolves an object of knowledge totally when it reduces it into the understanding of that which exists and that by which it exists; and when it understands a composite thing, then it carries out that resolution in reference to itself as well as in reference to the object. But when it does this in relation to something that is totally simple, then it carries out the resolution in reference to itself but not in reference to the object, since otherwise it would not be able to understand.
Therefore, when our intellect knows God, it knows full well that in Him there is total simplicity, no composition and no concretion, yet it understands this in terms of that which is and that by which it is. And this is not false, since it does not posit that modality in reference to the object; nor is it pointless, for it truly refers to a reality on the part of God, even though these are not diverse realities in God. For in God there is truly essence and supposite, yet they are one reality; there is truly will and power, yet these do not constitute a plurality of entities but are known through a plurality of ideas.
And thus, as Augustine says, "God is truer than what we understand of Him; and what we understand of Him is truer than what
15 Q, 4, a. 1 below.
16 J] Phys., text. 18 (c. 2.).
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
we say of Him."!7 Therefore, every intellect is limited in its understanding of the divine being, and yet — nonetheless — the intellect that is faithfully turned to Him knows but one thing even though it understands that one thing in multiform ways. It knows the abstract concretely, the simple complexly, the immense finitely, the eternal temporally, because — as has been said — it does not attribute those modalities to the intelligible object itself, but only to itself or to the medium of its knowledge. Therefore a true intellect confesses the divine being to be entirely simple by means of its own proper light of reason. Therefore those arguments that prove this should be conceded.
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1. Concerning the first objection in favor of the contrary, that the divine being differs in the highest degree from created being, it must be said that this is true. But concerning what is inferred from this — namely, that it differs because of a great number of differing qualities — it can be said that this does not follow; for the first categories of being differ greatly, and nevertheless they differ of themselves.18
Also, the differences which immediately divide the genus itself differ of themselves, and yet their difference is very great.
But if you object that beings resemble one another to the degree that they share many qualities, and that therefore the difference between them would correspond to the number of qualities in which they differ; it can be said in response that the divine being differs from created being because of many differences which place the plurality and real difference on the side of the creature rather than on the side of God, since those qualities which are in the creature by way of multiformity and real difference are found in God even more perfectly in the form of the most simple identity, as is clear from what has already been said and from what will be said below.
2. To the objection that that being which is entirely abstracted from a supposite is more simple than a concrete being, it must be said that supposite is to be understood in two senses, one that adds something beyond nature and another that does not. In the case of the first understanding of supposite, that which adds beyond nature so as to limit and distinguish the being, the objection is true. But we do not affirm a supposite in God in this sense, because in Him
20 IDXY Winitay, NAM CR Cs ta, Th 18 This refers to the ten predicaments: substance, quantity, etc. Cf. Aristotle,
V Metapb., text. 17 & VIII text. 15, or IV, c. 12 and VI, c. 4.
III, SIMPLICITY AND TRINITY
eG, there is no distinction coming from any addition beyond nature, but only distinction by reason of origin of one person from another.
Hence in God there is no concretion through real inherence but only in terms of our understanding.
And if it is objected that either there is something in the object that corresponds to our understanding, or there is not, the response is clear that there is something that corresponds to our understanding.
For in God there is both true nature and true supposite; that is, there is deity and that which possesses deity. Whence, even though the intellect understands this after the manner of a difference, such an understanding is not false since the distinction is made either because of the mind or because of the medium of knowledge, and not because of the object known. Or, if it is attributed to the object, some real difference is affirmed between the supposite and the nature, but of such a sort that it involves no composition, as will become more clear in the following question.
3. To the objection that whatever perfection is found in the creature is to be attributed to the Creator, it must be said that there is perfection in an absolute sense and there is perfection in a qualified sense. Whatever in the creature bespeaks perfection in an absolute sense is to be attributed to the creative essence truly and properly.
But that which bespeaks perfection in a qualified sense is not fittingly attributed to God.!® When it is argued, therefore, that a greater composition in the creature leads to a greater perfection, as is clear in man, it must be said that this is a diminished perfection which arises from the aggregation of many because what a being cannot have in itself by reason of its oneness it can have through union with others. Therefore, such a perfection is not to be attributed to the divine being, which is the most noble and which stands at the summit of all perfection.
4. To the objection that among ordered forms, that form which arises from an addition is more actual, it must be said that there is actuality which is intrinsic to a particular genus and actuality that is extrinsic to any genus. Actuality intrinsic to a genus is an actuality mixed with potency, which potency resides in the nature of the genus and is reduced to act through the addition of the specific difference which distinguishes it. The proposition is true in the case of this sort of actuality. Beyond this, there is an actuality extrinsic to any genus which has no mixture of potency; and this is the actuality of pure act. In this case, therefore, there is no addition of one thing to another as act is added to a particular potency.
19 Anselm, Monolog., c. 15.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
Such actuality is affirmed of God. Therefore, it does not follow that any addition or composition is to be attributed to Him.
To the objection that the highest good results from adding to that which is good, it must be said that the addition exists only in the intellect since the concept of the good is included in the concept of the highest good. But there is no addition in the object, both because the created and uncreated good do not share any common nature, and because the highest good is of a greater simplicity than that common reality signified by the word good, and because the highest good exceeds every created good by an improportionate excess. Therefore when good is affirmed in reference to the created and to the uncreated good, this is done only by reason of a certain analogy because every created good flows from the uncreated good as from the first cause. Therefore, that which is posterior to the first cause, by that very fact, lacks the highest simplicity; but the first cause — by reason of the fact that it is first, is most simple.
Therefore, as the quality of simplicity, when added to being, does not involve any composition in being, as when I say simple being, neither does the term Aighest posit any composition when it is said of the good.
5. To the objection that the properties of the divine being are unity, truth, and goodness, it should be said that truth is a property of the divine being in as far as, of itself, it expresses a mode of being.
But since in the divine being there is no difference between essence and power,"° therefore there is no difference between the essence and its modalities because it is impossible that it exist in two different ways. And therefore, since essence and the modes of being are identical in God, there is no composition. Since a mode of being is a property of the essence itself, and not the contrary, it follows that unity, truth, or goodness are said to be properties of the divine essence; however, the divine essence cannot be said to be a property of truth or goodness because it does not designate a mode of being as the other terms do.
6. To the objection that either truth and goodness are identical in God or they are not, it must be said in reference to the principal significate or the object understood by these: terms that what they express is really one reality in the divine being, since God is not good because of one distinct reality and true because of another, but in as far as He is good, He is also true. But, in terms of the cause of knowledge by which the intellect ascends from creatures to an understanding of the Creator, there is a difference, because as un0 Aristotle, J/Z Phys., text. 32 (c. 4).
III, SIMPLICITY AND TRINITY
created truth and goodness is understood through the created truth and goodness, and as these differ in creatures in some way; therefore they are said to be different in some way with respect to the cause of knowledge, even though they are identical in reality.
This is not false, nor is it an error in understanding because these are found in God most truly and most perfectly even though in God they are not really distinct among themselves as they are in created being. And this is sufficiently clear if one understands what was said in the principle of the solution concerning the multiple modes of our knowledge.
7. To the objection that acts are distinct by reason of their objects, the response is already clear because even though those objects are really identical in God, they are said to be distinct in reference to our mode of knowledge. Therefore, just as distinct representative properties correspond to different acts in the created vestige which has a representative meaning, since goodness and truth are not identical in created nature, so there are distinct powers that correspond to these in the image that apprehends them. These consist in the intellective and the affective powers. This is the case because both in the vestige and in the image there are found certain distinct qualities that correspond to certain realities which are totally identical in God.
8. To the objection that power, wisdom, and will taken together either do or do not say more than one of them alone, it must be said that they say more explicitly, but implicitly each of these is included in the others. For there cannot be highest power where there is not will and wisdom. Therefore, if one is attributed to God without the other, it is attributed in a limited sense; not because they are really distinct, but because the same reason that makes it impossible for them to be separated makes it impossible for them to be distinct. Therefore, just as they cannot be distinct, neither can they be separated.
9. 'To the objection that power is either identical with knowledge or it is not, it must be said that we can speak of power and knowledge in two senses, either with reference to the principal signification or with reference to the connotation. In terms of the principal signification they are really identical, but in terms of the connotation they differ. For, to be knowable by God is not the same as to be possible, just as to be known is not the same as to be produced.
The term possible designates a thing in as far as it does emanate or can emanate. But the word Asowable refers to a thing in as far as it is present to the mind of the knower. And because there is not one reality in God by which He is powerful and another by which He is capable of knowledge — since both of these are properties of God
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
in Himself, therefore even though they are distinct in terms of connotation, they are identical in reality.
10. To the objection that the will places limits to its power, it must be said that we can speak about power and will in three ways: either in reference to affect, or in reference to effect, or in reference to relation. In the first sense, they are identical and equal, because whatever God does will He can will; or whatever He can do, He wills to be able to do. In the last sense, they are not equal, since power is predicated in relation to that which is possible whereas will refers to that which is willed; and more things are possible than are effectively willed. But in the second sense, they are equal, namely, in as far as they are related to the effect, since, even though power extends to more things than does will, nevertheless since
God produces nothing unless He wills it, power and will are said to be equal in relation to the effect. Therefore, will is said to be limited by power not by reason of their own nature, but by reason of that to which they are related.
11. To the objection that whatever is completely simple cannot be shared, neither to a greater nor to a lesser degree, it must be said that participation can be understood in two ways; namely, in terms of formal participation as the species participates in the genus," or in terms of influence, as effects participate in their cause. In the first sense, the objection is true. But the divine being is not said to be shared to a greater or lesser degree in this way, but only in the second way. But this does not imply diversity in that which is shared, but in that being by means of which participation arises, namely, in some created good.
12. To the objection that whatever is completely simple does not have a multiplicity of operations, it must be said that operation refers both to the action itself and to the work produced, or to the act in the active sense and to the effect produced. In the first way, the operation of God is identical with God Himself. Therefore it is not multiplied in itself by reason of itself, but it is multiplied on the part of the creature by reason of the effect produced. In the first sense, therefore, the proposition is true; but not in the second, for the more simple a being is, the more powerful it is, and hence the more it is the principle of a multiplicity of effects,22
13. To the objection that whatever is completely simple does not simultaneously perform operations which are distinct and infinite, it must be said that a being can be simple in two ways; in the first way simplicity excludes immensity; and in the second way
1 Aristotle, JV Topic., c. 1.
33 Lib. de Causis, prop. 17.
III. SIMPLICITY AND TRINITY
it includes immensity. In the first sense, the objection is true, but not in the second; for the infinite — in as far as it is the infinite divine being — is infinite in the fullest sense, and can turn itself simultaneously and without limit to all things however many and of whatever sort, since it admits of no limitation.
14. To the final objection that whatever is totally simple is not multiple in its idea nor in the cognitive assimilation thereof, it must be said that multiformity can be understood in terms of formal cause or in terms of expressive cause. In the first way, multiformity is found in that being which contains the natures of diverse forms within itself. Such multiformity is incompatible with highest simplicity. In the second way, multiformity is found in that being which contains the ideas of a multiplicity of forms in itself; and in this way, it is compatible with highest simplicity. Just as the most simple being, in its highest actuality, has the highest power by which it can effect all things distinctly and fully, so it possesses the highest truth by which it can represent all things eternally, as was made clear above in the question concerning the eternal reasons."
ARTICLE II
WHERE RIE TRINNY AND TAR AIGHEST
SIMPLICITY CAN EXIST SIMULTANEOUSLY
Next the question is raised whether trinity and highest simplicity can exist simultaneously. For many reasons, they seem to be incompatible.
OBJECTIONS
1. Abstract being is simpler than concrete being. Therefore a nature that has no supposite is simpler than a nature existing in several hypostases. But the trinity demands the existence of a nature in several hypostases; therefore the trinity entails a diminishment of the highest simplicity.
2. Again, that which is identical with itself is simpler than that which is diverse.1 Therefore any being in which there is identity in every respect is more simple than a being in which some sort of diversity is found. But the trinity is impossible without some sort
33 Cf. O. de Sci. Christi, q. 2 ff. (V, 6 ff.).
1 Aristotle, V Metaph., text. 16 (IV, c. 9).
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
of diversity. Therefore it cannot exist together with the highest simplicity. hae 3, Again, that which is common is simpler than that which is proper, as is clear because that which is proper contains within itself a common quality as well as some reality beyond this. But there can be no true trinity unless the distinct and incommunicable properties of the three persons are found there. Therefore, it is impossible to affirm the trinity without affirming some departure from the highest simplicity.
4. Again, whatever is absolute is simpler than that which is relative; since, as Augustine says, "Every relative being is a real entity even if the relationship is excluded.'
Hence, the relative includes the absolute; but there cannot be a trinity of persons without a plurality of relations; therefore, etc.
5. Again, the elements of a definition are simpler than the object defined, but the concept of nature is included in the concept of persons. Therefore nature is always simpler than person. Therefore, the concept of person cannot exist together with the highest simplicity. But the trinity cannot exist except in the persons; therefore the trinity is repugnant to the highest simplicity.
6. Again, the part is always simpler than the whole. But unity is part of the trinity, and one person is part of three persons. Therefore, if trinity implies true plurality and true plurality implies true totality, and true totality excludes the highest simplicity, it follows that the trinity cannot exist together with the highest simplicity.
7. Again, a point is always simpler than the continuum; therefore, unity is simpler than number; therefore a unity of persons is simpler than a trinity of persons. But any being which is excelled in simplicity by another is not the supremely simple being. Therefore, it is impossible that the trinity exist together with the highest simplicity.
8. Again, person is either just as simple as the essence, or it is not. If it is not, then either person does not exist in the divine, or the divine being is not the most simple. However, if person is just as simple as the essence then just as the essence — because of the highest simplicity — is not compatible with a plurality of divine essences, it follows for the same reason, that person is incompatible with a plurality of persons.
9. Again, person adds something over and above nature either in the real order as well as in the logical order, or in the logical order alone, or in neither way. If it is taken in the first way, then it
SeDemiain.. Vil. co len 2
III, SIMPLICITY AND TRINITY
lacks the highest simplicity; if it is taken in the second way, any concept which does not correspond to a reality is both empty and false; if it is taken in the third way, then as the nature is not multiplied, neither is the person.
10. Again, either everything that corresponds to person corresponds to nature and vice versa, or not. If such a correspondence is found, then when person is distinguished, nature also is distinguished; and this would not be the most simple being. If such a correspondence is not found, then as the affirmation and the negation of the same thing cannot be true under the same formality, therefore they can be true only under distinct formalities.? But any being that includes distinct formalities is composed. Therefore, etc.
11. Again, either one person differs totally from the other, or it corresponds totally with the other; or it differs partly and corresponds partly. If it corresponds totally, then it has nothing proper to itself, and therefore it is not distinguished from the other. If it differs totally and if one is God, then the other is not God. If it corresponds partly and differs partly, since this is not in the same respect, there is a composite being.
12. Again, when one person communicates with the other, it either communicates whatever it has or it does not. If it does not, then it gives something of itself and retains something. Therefore it is both composed and selfish. If it communicates itself totally, then it communicates its quiddity and thus its personality. If you say that personality is not communicable, it may be argued to the contrary that personality is as simple as nature, as you say. Therefore, just as nature is communicable, so, it seems, is person.
13. Again, that which is proper to a person is either something real or it is not. If it is not something real, then it adds nothing; and therefore it does not distinguish that in which it exists. If it is something real, it is either located in the essence or it is not. If it is located in the essence, since the property distinguishes that in which it is located, then the nature and essence are multiple, which is contrary to the trinity. If it is not located in the essence but in the person, then there is something real in the person that is not in the essence. Therefore a property necessarily introduces composition into the person.
14. Again, relation is a property of the person; either it falls under the concept of substance, as do the other predicaments, or it does not. If it does fall under the concept of substance, then just as substance neither distinguishes nor is distinguished, neither is the property. Therefore there is no trinity. If it does not fall under 3 Aristotle, JIJ Elench., c. 5 (c. 25).
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
substance, then it implies something more than substance; therefore it is lacking in simplicity. Consequently, if it is impossible for a person to exist without a property, then it is impossible for it to exist together with the highest simplicity. nth 15. Again, as a point is not composed of its relations, so it is not really multiple. Therefore if God is more simple than a point, then in no way is there any real distinction in Him.
16. Again, absolute being is prior to relative being. Therefore, a distinction based on an absolute property is prior to one based on a relative property. But the more prior a being is, the greater is its simplicity. Therefore if a distinction based on absolute properties is not compatible with the highest simplicity, then neither is a distinction based on relative properties.
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. It is possible to ascertain that one being is simple because it is united in one, and that another being is simpler because it is one being that is multiplied in many. This being is simpler, because
— like a universal — it is one in many, yet it is not absolutely simple, because it is numbered. Therefore, if something were to be one in many but not multiplied, that would be most simple. But the highest simplicity must be attributed to the divine being. Therefore the trinity does not destroy the simplicity of the divine essence.
2. Again, a plurality of natures is not repugnant to simplicity of person, as is clear in Christ. Therefore, if a diversity of natures contributes more to composition than does a plurality of person, it seems that, even more so, the plurality of person in no way diminishes the simplicity of nature. Therefore it stands, etc.
3. Again, God can create without any diminution of His simplicity. Therefore, if to generate and to spirate is an intrinsic act, all the more does He generate and spirate while doing no violence to His highest simplicity. But the trinity exists because He generates and spirates. Therefore, etc.
4, Again, to know is an act that in no way is opposed to simplicity, but rather is consonant with it and attests to it. But any mind in knowing itself generates a likeness of itself, which is said to be a word distinct from the mind that generates it.4 Therefore, as the act of knowledge can exist together with the highest simplicity, so also can generation, and for the same reason, the production of " Augustine, De Trin., IX, c. 11, n. 16.
III, SIMPLICITY AND TRINITY
the Holy Spirit. Therefore, it seems that the entire trinity exists simultaneously with the highest simplicity.
5. Again, as Augustine, says in the sixth book On the Ti rinity, "In spiritual matters, to be greater is the same as to be better.'
But in the blessed trinity, each person is supremely good. Therefore, three persons are neither better nor greater than one. But in every composition, some reality is added which in some way is an increase.
Therefore, the highest trinity does not involve composition in any way. Therefore in no way is it repugnant to simplicity.
6. Again, the highest simplicity does not exclude but rather includes the highest perfection. The highest perfection does not exclude but includes plurality. Therefore, the highest simplicity does not exclude but includes a plurality of persons. Therefore, it is not repugnant, but supremely fitting.
7. Again, the highest simplicity does not exclude, but rather includes the highest power and virtue, because as was proved above,® a power is infinite to the degree that it is united in itself. But the highest and most actual power implies the highest and most perfect communication and production; and this implies the trinity. Therefore, the trinity necessarily exists together with highest simplicity.
8. Again, light is predicated of spiritual substance both created and uncreated, and of corporal substance, in terms of a certain proportion and analogy. But the fact that material brightness is produced does not decrease the simplicity of material light. Neither does spiritual light, such as a thought or a word produced by the mind, decrease the simplicity of the intellectual substance by the mere fact that such light is produced. Therefore the production of the eternal brightness from the Father in no way diminishes the simplicity of the eternal light.
9. Again, the simplicity of a point or of a unity or of any created principle whatsoever does not exclude but includes a plurality of relations and respects; and this is not an imperfection but a perfection. But every perfection ought to be attributed to God. Therefore, the highest simplicity together with a plurality of relations are not contradictory in reference to God. But "relation unfolds trinity," as Boethius says; therefore, etc.' eG 10. Again, where there is neither matter nor position in space, there can be no separation. Therefore, a production that prescinds from matter and place does not imply any separation. Therefore it
5°; 8,0. 93
® A. 1, fund. 6 of this question. Also, Q. de Sci. Christi, q. 6, resp. (V, 34-35);
Lib. de Causis, prop. 17.
7 De Trin., c. 6.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
can exist together with total lack of division, and therefore with total simplicity. Therefore, if it is by such a production, that the persons of the trinity are produced, then the trinity can exist together with the highest simplicity.
CONCLUSION
The trinity of persons does not destroy the highest simplicity, nor does the highest simplicity exclude the trinity.
Response. The first principle is simultaneously a trinity and most simple in such a way that the trinity does not destroy the highest simplicity, nor does the highest simplicity exclude the trinity. This indeed we hold most certainly by faith.
But so that we might understand this to some degree, two things should be noted from the start; first, the different kinds of personal distinction, and second the different types of divine attributes.
Concerning the first, as Richard writes in his book On the Trinity,8 one person is distinguished from another person in three ways; namely, by origin alone, by quality alone, or by origin and quality together. The first mode is found in God, the second in the angelic spirits, and the third in man. Men are qualitatively distinct from each other because of the different accidents and properties by which one individual is distinguished from another.® And they are distinguished from each other in origin because one human being is born from another. Angels, however, are qualitatively different because they differ in substance and in formal properties. But they are not distinguished by reason of origin because no angel proceeds from another angel. But the divine persons, being entirely one in substance and in form and having no accidents, are not distinguished by reason of quality but only by reason of origin. And that origin, moreover, emerges not from something distinct from the person, but rather from the person itself; as God knows through Himself and is identical with His understanding, so the Father generates through Himself and is identical with generation. Likewise, the Son is identical with filiation. Therefore, if in God there is the truest sort of origin, then there is the truest personal distinction.
Furthermore, if the person is its own origin, then there is no composition whatever in the person; it is thus as simple as is the essence. There is, therefore, total lack of real distinction between SelVegceal3. ff.
® Porphyr., De praedicab., c. de specie.
III. SIMPLICITY AND TRINITY
person and essence as well as between person and property and essence. Therefore person truly is the essence and property, and the essence is the property and person, and the property is the person and the essence. But how can any composition be conceived where there is such lack of distinction ? Therefore, it is necessary to understand that supreme simplicity is found in such a distinction of persons. Consequently, since it is impossible to conceive of any composition here, the trinity of persons and the highest simplicity are not repugnant. It is very helpful for the sake of clarity to study the kinds of personal distinction, the ignorance of which has led heretics into error.
Also, we should consider the different kinds of divine attributes; for difference can be seen in terms of the essential modes of being, in terms of the modes of relation, and in terms of modalities of the intellect. Relative to being or essence, no diversity or difference can be found in God; because His being is one and most simple. The same is true with respect to His absolute mode of being, because just as in God essence is not distinct from existence, so in God being is not a reality distinct from mode of being. The reason for this is that in God essence and power are identical, and we cannot say that He could exist in various ways. And therefore, since the modes of being are identical with His essence, all predicates which signify the absolute mode of being fall under the concept of substance with the exception of relation, which refers to a relative mode of being; and this mode of speech passes into substance in relation to the subject so that the hypostasis is identical with its own property, and no composition is involved;!° but it continues to exist in relation to its term, so that a true distinction is preserved.
For a distinction between the relation and the subject would involve composition; but the difference between the relation and its term involves only distinction. Therefore in God no distinction is to be found relative to essence, existence, or the absolute modes of being; it is found, however, in the three modes described above. But the difference found in the modes of being is based on the persons as they relate to each other; because even though they all have the same being, they have it in different ways, since one has it from itself and the other has it from another. This is enough diversity to forbid the identification of one person with another. Those modes, as was shown above, while they do not involve composition, do create a true distinction.
10 Tn analyzing relation, Bonaventure distinguishes the esse in and the esse ad.
In the trinity, the esse in passes over into substance, while the esse ad remains in the persons.
St. Bonaventure, Disputed Questions
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
But the difference in the relative modes resides in the persons as they relate to the essence. Since "to proceed from" pertains to the person and not to the essence, it follows that the person refers to and is related to the other persons, but the essence does not. For this reason, person is distinguished while the essence is not. Now, from this difference it does not follow that one person is separated from the other, but it does mean that something can be predicated of the person which cannot be predicated of the essence, and vice versa. It is from this difference that the three modes of speaking about God arise: namely, what, who, and which one;! namely, notion, person, and essence. And from this it follows that, if we suppose person, notion is not supposed, and vice versa. The same can be said of essence. From the differences in the modes, a figure of speech emerges in speaking of God, as is clear to one who reflects on the matter.'
The difference which arises from the modalities of the intellect resides in the essential properties which are fully identical with each other, as are truth and goodness, but our mind understands them by means of diverse causes and under different concepts, and therefore it gives them different names. This is the smallest differentiation that can be found in reference to God because it exists in us rather than in God. Hence, the highest simplicity exists not only with personal distinction but also with multiple forms of attribution. Therefore the arguments for this position are to be conceded; it is easy enough to respond to the opposite arguments.
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1. Concerning the first argument to the contrary, that abstract being is simpler than concrete being, it should be said that this is true only in that being in which form and supposite are different and in which, therefore, the abstract and the concrete are real. But in regard to God, the concrete in the proper sense is not found in Him, but is attributed to Him by us. Similarly when it is argued that a nature which is not one in many supposites is simpler than one which is one in many supposites, it should be said that this is true relative to a reality that is more perfect when it is distributed
4 In quid; in quis; in quae.
™ Aristotle, J Elench., c. 3 (c. 4). This is a technical term used by Aristotle to designate a sophistical argument based on forms of expression. Such an argument is found when, because of a verbal similarity, a reality which is not the same as another is interpreted as though it were; e.g. when masculine is interpreted as feminine, or quantity as quality.
III, SIMPLICITY AND TRINITY
in many than it is in only one, as is the case in number. But this is not so in the position proposed here, because the divine essence and nature is as completely and perfectly in one of its hypostases as it is in the three.
2. To the objection that a being which is identical with itself is simpler than one which is diverse, etc., it should be said that there is a diversity or distinction that comes from addition, such as that which exists between different species which are distinct by reason of various differences added beyond the genus. And there is a distinction which comes not from addition but from origin such as the distinction which exists in the divine persons which are distinguished by the fact that one emanates from the other. And this involves no composition, as was explained in the principal argument.
3. To the objection that that which is common is simpler than that which is proper, it must be said that this is true when the common is limited and restricted by the proper, for such a case admits of both composition and distinction by reason of that which limits and restricts, as is clear in the case of the universal and the particular.
But this is not the way in which the common is found in God, since the essence — even though it is common in God — is not restricted nor limited nor distinguished in the persons.
4. To the objection that the absolute is simpler than the relative, it must be said that there are two sorts of relative being. In one sense, it implies a relation to something that is essentially different. In another sense, it implies a relation only to something which is consubstantial. In the first sense, relation includes a certain dependence, and for this reason it implies a lack of highest simplicity.
In the second sense, it involves no dependence and no lack of supreme simplicity, above all when the supposite itself is its own property, which serves as the basis of the relation. It is in this manner and not in the first manner that relation is affirmed in the properties of the divine persons; and thus no composition is introduced.
And if it is objected that "Every relative being is a real entity even if the relationship is excluded," it must be said that if this is understood with reference to the first sort of relative being, it is true not only with respect to the cause of our knowledge, but also with respect to the object. If it is understood in the second way, it is true with respect to the cause of our knowledge, because in addition to the reality of the relation, the Father includes an hypostasis, which — however — is not something distinct from His personal property.
5. To the objection that the elements of a definition are simpler than the object defined, it must be said that this is true in the case of a formal direct definition, in which the defining elements are
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
essential parts constituting the very thing defined. But such is not the case here, because — properly speaking — the divine persons are not defined; and because the nature does not directly fall under the definition of person; and because, furthermore, that definition is concerned with the meaning of the words person and nature with respect to the way they arise in our mind more than with respect to their own being, which can neither be comprehended nor defined because of the highest simplicity and immensity of the divine being.18
6. Again, to the objection that the part is always simpler than the whole, it must be said that this is true. But in assuming that one of the persons is a part of the trinity, it is false, because every whole involves something more than a part thereof. And as we have said often, no property is greater in the three persons than in one; for each of the persons is the supreme being, and supremely true and good. Therefore, though the trinity in God includes the reality of plurality, it does not for that reason include the reality of a true totality.
7. Again, to the objection that a point is always simpler than a continuum, and unity simpler than number, it must be said that this is true in the case of number in the strict sense, which is an aggregation of diverse unities. But number in this sense is not found in the trinity of divine persons, for this reason that there is here no aggregation of any unities, nor of entities nor of truths. But it is the repetition of the same unity in different subjects. And the very word implies this, for we say ¢rinity, that is the unity of three.!¢
8. Again, to the objection that person is as simple as the essence, Of it is not; it should be said that it is equally simple in reality.
And when it is objected further that, because of its highest simplicity, the essence does not allow of other essences, it must be said that there is no similarity, because if there were a plurality of divine essences, there would then be harmony and essential difference. I say there would be harmony because each of these would be God; I say there would be differentiation because there would be a plurality of beings, and this would not be possible without addition and composition.!® But such is not the case with a plurality of persons, since — as has been shown — they are not distinguished from each other by the addition of something real, but only by natural origin.
Therefore, simplicity of essence excludes a plurality of essence, and 18 Avicenna, Metaph., tr. 8, c. 4.
M4 Cf. above, Q. 2, a. 2, ad 16; O. de Sci. Christi, q. 3, ad 8(V, 15); Isidore,
VII Etymolog., c. 4, n. 1. pChrabove,@: 2.74, 1) fund. 7.
III. SIMPLICITY AND TRINITY
a plurality of person does not exclude the unity of the divine essence, nor does it exclude simplicity of person.
9. Again, to the objection that person adds something beyond the essence either in the real order as well as in the logical order, etc., it should be said that it does add something in the logical order, because the concept of nature and property and hypostasis is included in the concept of person. Hence, the concept of person is a composite concept, but in such a way that just as there is no real composition, so there is no real addition there.
And if it is objected that such a concept is false, it must be said in reply that the objection is false, for there is something real that corresponds to the concept since these three realities are truly found in God; namely, nature, property, and hypostasis, each distinct by reason of its property. But in themselves they are entirely one by reason of the highest simplicity. Since our understanding cannot arrive at such simplicity, it understands these realities by means of distinct concepts and names them with different terms thereby introducing a certain type of composition which it does not attribute to the object known, but to itself, as was shown in the preceding problem.
10. To the objection that the affirmation and the negation of the same thing cannot be true under the same formality, it must be said that not only does it not imply a contradiction when several things are predicated of the same object though not in the same formal sense, but also when they are not referred to the same subject.
And since person includes a relation to and a comparison with something else while the nature does not, it follows that something can be attributed to one and not to the other; yet it does not follow from this that there is any composition in these things nor any essential distinction. It is sufficient that this distinction be based on relation.1¢ 11. To the objection that either one person agrees totally with the other, or that it agrees partly and differs partly, it must be said that one person coincides with the other in essence but differs in property. But in relation to the essence, that property is only a mode of being which is really identical with the essence, for the essence is the property itself and differs from it only in a relative aspect.
Now since composition arises in terms of the essence, and distinction arises in terms of relation, it follows that the difference between property and essence is such that it suffices for distinction but introduces no composition.
16 Cf, above, Q: 2; a. 2, ad 5.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
12. To the objection that a person either communicates whatever it has to the other or it does not, it must be said that it communicates whatever it has that is communicable, and this is the essence or nature. But the personality, or that relation which constitutes the person, refers to that reality which distinguishes it rather than to a reality which can be communicated. Therefore, even though the person does not communicate this, there is nonetheless a perfect communication here because with the communication the distinction remains preserved.
13. To the objection that the property of a person is either something real or it is not, it must be said that, formally and properly speaking, the property of a person is a relation, which includes a relation to the divine essence and to the person which it distinguishes as well as to the person from which it is distinguished.
In terms of the relation to the person from which it is distinguished, it is a true reality because it really differs from the other person, as the Father is really distinguished from the Son by reason of paternity.
In terms of the relation to the person in which it is found, or also in terms of the relation to the essence itself, it is only a mode of being which involves no composition in God, because — as was shown earlier — there is no difference in God between His being and being-in-this-way, or the modes of being, just as there is no difference between "living and living in blessedness."2?
14, To the argument that the property of the person either falls under the concept of the substance or it does not, it must be said that a relation has two aspects, namely, the subject in which it is found and the term to which it relates the subject. In the first way, like the other categories, it falls under substance; but not in the second way. And since that property, more than the other categories, implies a comparison to another it follows that it does not pass into the category of substance even though all other things are said to do so, not because in some way it signifies a reality that is not the essence, but because it is fitting that relation be predicated of some reality to which essence is neither referred nor predicated. Whence, without doubt, the essence is the subject which is related but not the term to which it is related. Therefore, while distinction is preserved, there is no composition.
15. To the objection that a point, because of its simplicity, is neither composed of its relations nor numbered, it must be said that there is no comparison, because the relations of a point are extrinsic while the personal relations are intrinsic. Therefore, however much a point can be said to be principle and end with respect to diverse
17 Augustine, Confess. XIII, c. 3, n. 4.
III. SIMPLICITY AND TRINITY
lines, yet no one hypostasis can be called simultaneously Father and Son, because no person can be the principle of its own origin.
16. To the objection that absolute being is more prior than relative being, therefore a distinction based on an absolute property is prior to one based on a relative property, it should be said that this does not hold, since every distinction includes some relation.
And furthermore, that distinction which is closer to the first and highest unity is certainly prior. And that is the sort of distinction in which unity is not multiplied, and such a distinction cannot be essential, but relative. Whence, it can be said either that the argument is not conclusive, or that the proposition is true only of that sort of relation which implies some dependence. But this type of relation is not admitted in reference to the distinction of the eternal persons. Therefore this involves no contradiction with the fact that the divine being is most simple just as it is first and most absolute, as appears from the foregoing.
QUESTION IV
WHETHER THE TRINITY EXISTS TOGETHER
WITH THE HIGHEST INFINITY
-Next the question is raised whether the trinity exists together with the highest infinity. Two questions are asked about this. The first is, whether the divine being is infinite in the highest degree.
The second is, whether the trinity and the highest degree of infinity can exist together.
ARTICLE I
VHETHER THE DIVINE BEING
ISSINEFINITE IN THE HIGHhS? DEGREE
As to the first question, we can proceed to show that the divine being is infinite in the highest degree in the following way.
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. First, it is shown in the confession of faith contained in the Symbol: "Immense is the Father; immense the Son, immense the Holy Spirit, and yet there are not three immensities but one immense being."'! Therefore, there is one immensity in them. Therefore it is fitting for them by reason of their essence.
2. Again, Damascene writes: ""We must believe that the one God is immortal, eternal, and uncircumscribed."2 Therefore, if these attributes are fitting only for one who is absolutely infinite, it is clear, etc.
3. Again, III Kings 8 writes: "If heaven and the highest of heavens cannot contain you, how much less this house which I have built ?"' Therefore, if the being of God can be contained and 1 Athanasian Creed.
2 De Fide Orthod., 1, c. 8.
® Verse 27.
Iv. INFINITY AND TRINITY
circumscribed by nothing, it must be admitted that it contains the nature of the infinite in an unlimited degree.
4. Again, in the fourth chapter of the first book Damascene writes: "God is infinite and incomprehensible. And this alone is comprehensible about Him; namely, His infinity and incomprehensibility.'"4
5. Again, Augustine writes in the City of God, 11: "Every infinity terminates in God in a certain ineffable manner." But any being for whom the infinite is finite is absolutely infinite. If, therefore, the divine being is of this sort, then it is infinite in every way.
6. Again, in terms of reason, it is the common conception of the mind® that God is that being than which nothing greater can be thought, neither because of itself nor because of another. But one can think of something greater than any finite being. Therefore in a true and proper sense, the divine being has the quality of the infinite.
7. Again, it is possible to think of something as being equal to any finite being through duplication. But nothing can be equal to the divine being however much it is understood to be multiplied.
Therefore, it is necessary that the divine being be infinite with absolute infinity.
8. Again, every finite good can be multiplied by the addition of some other finite good. But the highest good cannot be multiplied
_ by the addition of anything, neither in reality nor in the order of knowledge." Therefore, it is not a finite good. And it must be either finite or infinite; therefore, etc.
9. Again, God's essence is identical with His eternity. But His eternity is infinite since it has neither beginning nor end.® Therefore
His essence is infinite. But, if His essence is infinite, so is His being.
Therefore, in view of the first statement, the divine being is entirely infinite, even in itself.
10. Again, in God being and power are identical because of His supreme simplicity. But the divine power is infinite since He is omnipotent and has power over extremes that are infinitely distant, as is clear in production from nothing. Therefore, the divine being is absolutely infinite.
11. Again, the power and wisdom of God are infinite, since there would not be so many things possible and knowable unless a plurality of beings could exist. In a similar way, since God would never
4 De Fide Orthod.
G78; ® Boethius, in lib. Quomodo Substantiae in eo, Quod Sint, Bonae Sint, etc.
7 Cf. Q. 3, a. 1, ad 4 above.
8 Rich. of St. Victor, De Trin. II, c. 4.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
actually be in so many creatures unless He were first able to be in a plurality, it is necessary that the divine being be infinite precisely as being.
12. Again, God is the most perfect cause of things in the order of efficiency, exemplarity, and finality. But because of His supreme perfection, He is efficient cause in such a way that He Himself is not an effect; and exemplary cause in such a way that He Himself is not a copy; therefore, He is final cause in such a way as to be infinite.
Therefore, as the divine being is not an effect, so also it is infinite.
13. Again, the principle of all limitation is matter or something material. But since the divine being is pure act, it is devoid of all material qualities; therefore it lacks limitation and finiteness. Therefore, it is absolutely infinite.
OBJECTIONS
1. Infinite is predicated by reason of a deficiency in the finite, as injust is predicated because of a deficiency in the just. But a habit, if it is truly a habit, is always more noble than its privation.
Therefore, the condition of the finite is more noble than the infinite. But that which is more noble ought always to be attributed to God. Therefore, etc.
2. Again, in created beings, infinity arises from matter, and finity arises from form. But, as Boethius says, ""God is form without matter."® Therefore, it seems that He has no trace of infinity, but that He is most finite in Himself.
3. Again, nothing that essentially pertains to a particular being can be truly separated from that being. But God is the end which satisfies and completes the desire of our mind. Therefore, in no way can the divine being be infinite, neither by the denial of the end, since He is the terminal point, nor in as far as He is our completion.
4. Again, "finite and infinite are properties of quantity.'2° But true quantity is not predicated of God; therefore, neither is true infinity. But if any quantity is affirmed, it is that of virtue, which corresponds to power and not to essence. Therefore, nothing leads us to say that the essence is infinite.
5. Again, the infinite is identical with the immense. But the immense is predicated through the denial of measure and mode.
Therefore the infinite lacks mode; it is without measure. But that which lacks mode also lacks form and beauty. Therefore, since this is not fitting for the divine being, it is clear, etc. oe Lrin., C2) 10 Averroes, I Phys. Aristot., text. 15 (c. 2).
IV. INFINITY AND TRINITY
6. Again, whatever is infinite is said to be so through opposition to and distance from that which is the least. But the least being is the simplest being in any genus.!! Therefore the infinite involves the negation of simplicity. But the divine being is most simple; therefore it is not infinite.
7. Again, no infinite being can be an end, because nothing is the cause of its opposite, and "'nothing gives to another what it does not possess.""!2 But God is the end of all beings as their most perfect end. Therefore, God is not infinite; neither in His being nor in any of His attributes.
8. Again, whatever is limited by the supreme truth which judges all things in their reality is not absolutely infinite. But God is limited with respect to Himself, otherwise He would exceed Himself.
Therefore, the divine being is not infinite in reality; therefore, etc.
9. Again, if God could produce only one being and no more, the divine power would be said to be finite. Therefore, since power and being are one in essence, and since the divine being is only one, it follows that the divine being is finite.
10. Again, unity in itself is finite in the highest degree, since it is the principle of all measure according to number. Therefore, if the divine being is one, therefore it is measured, and therefore it is finite.
11. Again, every being which can be said to be this determined thing is more finite than a being which is not specific but common and undetermined. But common being, in as far as it is universal being, is finite. Therefore, since the divine being is proper and determined, it is itself finite to the greatest degree.
12. Again, every being that is spatially separated from another is finite in terms of its existence in space. Similarly, whatever exists separately in being is finite according to its natural existence. But the divine being is separated in being from all others in the highest degree, since this is proper to the first and most perfect mover."
Therefore, in terms of its natural existence, the divine being 1s finite.
13. Again, in matters pertaining to God it is true that, because of His supreme simplicity, those things which are predicated abstractly are also predicated concretly, and vice versa. If, then, a being is said to be finite by reason of an end, and if it is true and proper that God is the end, then it is also true that God is finite. Therefore, it is false that He is infinite.
Aristotle, V Metaph., text. 12 and X, text. 3 ff.
12 Aristotle, JJ Elench., c. 3 (C. 22).
; 18 Aristotle, X/I Metaph., text. 41 (XI, c. 7), and Lib. de Causis, prop. 20.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
14. Again, any being that is comprehensible is finite. But whatever is simple is comprehensible. Therefore whatever is simple is finite. But the divine being is simple; therefore it is finite. The minor premise is proved since whatever is known in its totality is comptehended. But when the simple is known, it is known in its totality, since it has no parts, and it is necessarily finite not only in itself but also in relation to us.
15. Again, either there is something finite in God, or there is not. If nothing in God is finite, then since a finite being knows nothing except in a finite way it follows that we know nothing of God; therefore we will never find beatitude. But this is a most unfortunate inconsistency. Therefore, something in God is finite.
Therefore, either we must attribute parts to God, or we must say that there is nothing finite in God. Therefore, in no way should
God be said to be infinite.
CONCLUSION
Because God is supremely simple, the divine being and power are infinite in as far as the infinite denies any limit with respect to quantity of power.
Response. In order to understand the above, we must note that in this question, which includes .a multiplicity of terms, before anything is affirmed or denied, it is necessary to distinguish how a word is used.14 It must be understood, therefore, that infinite is used in two ways: namely, privatively and negatively. When it is used privatively, it negates the act while an aptitude for the act remains. In this sense, infinite refers to that which has a natural aptitude to reach a limit yet does not do so in actuality, and thus it designates incompletion.
When it is used negatively, however, it simply negates all limit and finitude. But this can be understood in two ways in accordance with the two meanings of end (= finis); for end designates both end-as-limit and end-as-completion. Consequently, infinite is predicated in two ways, either by negating end-as-completion, and thus an evil can be described as infinite; or by negating end-as-limit, and this can have two meanings according to the two meanings of limit.
Limit can be understood with reference to material quantity and with reference to spiritual quantity. The first refers to the quantity of weight, the second to the quantity of power. Therefore, when infinite is understood as the negation of a limit in the quantity of weight it always implies some degree of incompleteness — either
Me Anistoule, J! Elench., c. 2 (c. 17),
IV. INFINITY AND TRINITY
in act or in potency — because it indicates a lack of simplicity.
This type of quantity cannot exist together with simplicity in the same being and in the same respect. Such a being is never infinite in act but only in potency; in act it is always finite.5 But when infinite is understood as the negation of a limit in quantity of power, it implies not imperfection but rather the highest perfection since it is not contrary to simplicity. Indeed, it cannot exist except in a being which is supremely simple. And it is in this way that the authority of Scripture and the confession of faith attribute infinity or immensity to the most simple God Himself.
Therefore, the divine being — in as far as it is infinite — is supremely simple and absolutely highest.
Since it is supremely simple, it is supremely unified in itself and in its power. And since it is supremely unified in itself, it has nothing that contracts, limits, or determines it, or includes it in any category; and therefore it is beyond and above all other beings.!® Furthermore, because it is supremely unified in its power, therefore, being and power are identical in it in every way; and therefore wherever God's being is, there also is His power. And where His being is, there is the center and origin and fount of His power. And where the fount and origin and center of His power is, He can always produce a great number of effects. Therefore, wherever He is capable of acting, He is always able to do even more; and hence His power as well as His being necessarily possesses infinity. This conclusion agrees with what is said in the Liber de causis: "Every power is more infinite to the degree that it is more unified"';!" etc. Therefore, this sort of infinity is not repugnant to simplicity; indeed it is in harmony with it in a marvelous and inseparable concord.
Furthermore, since it is absolutely highest, it must be entirely immense. For this reason, nothing can equal it; neither in intensity nor by multiplication, as Augustine writes in the eighth book On the Trinity ® and it is necessary that He possess in Himself infinite nobility and goodness, for it befalls the finite good, however excellent it may be, at times to be exceeded or to be equaled through the multiplication of other finite goods, as Augustine says.
Also, since it is absolutely highest, nothing can be or be thought of as greater or better. But thought can exceed any finite thing; for if a thing is thought to have a limit, it is understood that something can be superior to it at least in thought. Therefore, if the 15 Aristotle, J/7 Phys., text. 56 ff. (c. 6).
16 Gregory, IJ Moral., c. 12, n. 20. aPtOpOsml ie HT Clg els 2h
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
divine being, since it is supremely simple, is at the same time absolutely highest, it follows that it is necessary to say that it is absolutely infinite, as the arguments show. It is not granted, as some affirm, that it is finite in essence and infinite in power; for in God these ate fully identical, and infinity in one necessarily implies and includes infinity in the other, since one can extend itself to nothing without the other. And, furthermore, since in spiritual realities, the greater is identical with the better, and since essence and power are of equal goodness, they will necessarily be equal with the infinite.
This may aid us in understanding how simplicity is not repugnant to immensity. For if, as Augustine says, "there the greater and the better are identical,""!® just as it is possible to understand that whatever is supremely simple is the best, so also it is possible to understand that it is the greatest; just as it is possible to understand that the supremely simple is supremely powerful, so it is possible to understand that what is most simple is most infinite. Just as it is possible to understand that it is present to all by its power, so also it is possible to understand that it is present by reason of its essence. And just as all beings are impotent, as it were, in comparison with the divine power, so also all beings are very small in comparison with the divine essence. Whence, compared to the divine being, the entire world is like a very small thing. This is what is said in Wisdom 11:?°
"In your sight the whole world is like a grain of dust that tips the scales, like a drop of morning dew falling on the ground;" and in Isaiah 40:71
"See, the nations are like a drop on the rim of the pail, they count as a grain of dust on the scales;" and later:
"All the nations are as nothing in his presence, for him they count as nothingness and emptiness."
Therefore, it must be conceded that not only is the divine power infinite, but so also is the divine being as the arguments given for this position show.
"OED Miah, NAG Ce £3, fas 20 Verse 23.
21 Verse 15 and 17.
IV. INFINITY AND TRINITY
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1. To the objection that the infinite is defined by a negation, it must be said, as has already been stated, that even though in the creature infinity implies a privation in the finite both in reality and in the verbal expression, yet in as far as it is posited in God, it implies a most true affirmation in reality and a greater completion than that which is found in the finite. It is not predicated because of the lack of some element which pertains to the completion of His being, as is already clear, but because of the lack of any limit and abridgement which would imply a deficiency with respect to the state of most perfect completion. Therefore, that argument does not hold.
2. To the objection that infinity arises from matter, it must be said that this is true according as infinity is based on the quantity of weight which, indeed, takes its origin from the material principle.
But the case is quite different when infinity is based on the quantity of strength because active power takes its origin from the form.
It is in this way and not in the former mode that infinity is affirmed of God. Therefore that objection does not hold.
3. To the objection that God is the end, therefore He is not infinite, it must be said that God is the end with respect to created beings but is Himself not limited, since He is end not as though
He were the intrinsic end of a being, but in as far as He is that end to which is directed the entire desire of any being which is capable of being beatified. Therefore infinity is not opposed to end understood as the goal of creatures, but only to end in the sense of an intrinsic limit. Therefore, that objection does not hold.
4. To the objection that finite and infinite are properties of quantity, it must be said that while in God there is no quantity of weight, yet there is quantity of power. And this quantity of power refers not only to that power operating without, but the quantity of power also refers to the excellence of strength, both with respect to the absolute and with respect to the relative. Therefore, it can be attributed to any being of which grades of excellence can be affirmed in comparison with other beings. Such is the case, however, not only with respect to the divine power, but also with respect to the divine being. Therefore, the concept of infinity is fitting in relation to both.
5. To the objection that the infinite and the immense lack measure and mode, it must be said that in a limited nature, the lack of measure and mode is a defect; but in a nature that is superior to every confining limit, it involves no defect; because according to Augustine,
"God is mode without mode;"?2 which means that His immensity 22 ib. de Natura Bont, c. 3.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
is His proper mode, which is not constrained by the limits of any measure. And in this sense, the lack of mode does not include lack of form or beauty, but rather it includes the excellence of both.
6. To the objection that the infinite is defined by opposition to that which is least, it must be said that this is true where infinity is based on a quantity that is repugnant to simplicity, as is the quantity of weight; but it is not true where infinity is based on the quantity of power, because this is harmonious in the highest degree, as has been said.
7. To the objection that no infinite being can be an end, it must be said that when infinite is understood as the negation of completion, it is not an end as something which brings to completion; and when infinite is understood as the negation of a terminus, it is not an end in the sense of being an intrinsic terminus; but it can be an end in the sense of that which fulfills and beatifies, since the desire of a being which is capable of beatitude is never satisfied except in a being that possesses immense goodness, where it can desire nothing further.
8. To the objection that whatever is limited by the supreme truth cannot be infinite, it must be said that the statement "Something is limited by the supreme truth" can be understood in two ways.
In the first way it means that the highest truth judges that this being is limited by the highest truth; and in this sense, the proposition is true. In the second way it means that it does not exceed the judgment of the highest truth, being immense in itself, to be capable of comprehending all immensity in itself. In this way, it does not follow that that which is finite in relation to it is finite in an absolute sense. Indeed, there is a sophism in the transition from the relative to the absolute.
9. To the objection that if God could produce only one being and no more, the divine power would be said to be finite, it must be said that there is no parallel; since His power is directed ad extra to created effects which are finite. Hence, if He could produce only one being, it would follow that His power extended only to the finite and therefore would itself be finite. But the case is different with the divine being in that it is absolute and, as it were, ad intra. And though it be only one, yet that one is immense, both because that being has no limitations within itself, and because it is the fount of all being, and because nothing can exist without the divine being.
Therefore, since the divine essence exists in all beings, so does the divine power; even on the impossible supposition that a plurality of infinite beings existed, God would exist in all of them. From this it follows that just as the divine being is infinite, so is the divine power.
IV. INFINITY AND TRINITY
10. To the objection that unity is finite in the highest degree, etc., it must be said that this is true of that sort of unity which enters into the constitution of a being or a number as a part, a term, or a completion. And this is a unity through addition; when it is united with another being, it produces a greater number. Such a unity takes its origin from the limitation which form introduces to matter. Therefore, it is the principle of measure in discrete quantity.5 But the divine unity is not of this sort, since it does not enter into the constitution of another part, for it is most perfect; nor does it take its origin from elsewhere, since it is first. Therefore it is neither limited nor measured, but rather, it is immense since it is neither limiting nor limited, neither by another nor by itself.
11. To the objection that every being which can be said to be this being is more finite, it must be said that shis being is said properly because of a distinction from a mere quality;24 and that being exists here and now because of determinations of space and time. In general, for the individuation of an existing being there must be a combination of accidental properties which are not found in this way in another being. But such is not the case with the divine being. Even though the divine being is said to be +his being because it is being in the fullest sense and is distinguished from every other being, yet it is not coniained in any category. Therefore it cannot be said to be individualized through any contraction or through any addition, whether of matter or of any essential or accidental property.
Therefore, it is this being in such a way that it is not limited by space or time, but exists always and everywhere in a more excellent manner than any universal, which depends on a particular being and for that reason admits of some contraction. Therefore, while a universal being is finite, yet nothing stands in the way of the divine being infinite.
12. To the objection that every being that is spatially separated from another is finite, it must be said that there is no parallel, since a being which is spatially separated from another is separated in such a way that it is not in the other; and for this reason, it is contracted, limited and finite. But that which is separated from another through an essential difference can nevertheless be in the other; as God is essentially distinguished from the creature and yet is nonetheless in every creature by power, presence and essence. Therefore, from this mode of formal separation, finitude and limitation cannot be inferred as it can be from the mode of local separation.
13. To the objection that abstract qualities are predicated con28 Aristotle, De Praedicam., c. De quanto.
*% Aristotle, De Praedicam., c. De substantia.
St. Bonaventure, Disputed Questions
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
cretely in God and vice versa, it must be said that the abstract term which corresponds to a concrete finite being and which is predicated in the concrete is finitude and not end. For, the concrete term derived from end is not finite but that which limits, jast as the term finite is taken from /finitude. Therefore the argument is not valid.
14. To the objection that any being that can be comprehended is finite, it must be said that the divine being cannot be comprehended by a finite power though it is simple, because its simplicity and immensity are rooted in the same property; namely, in that it possesses infinite power, as was shown earlier. And therefore, as it cannot be known in parts because it is supremely simple, neither can it be comprehended totally because of its supreme immensity.
15. To the final objection that either there is something finite in God or there is not, it must be said that whatever is proper to God, as something existing in Him, since it is identical with God and is not a part of God, necessarily partakes in the nature of the infinite; but because '"'everything that is received in another is received not after the manner of what is received but after the manner of the receiver,"*> and since the power of the created intellect is finite, for this reason, it knows Him in a finite way, and therefore it is capable of finding its beatitude in Him. This knowledge is not false since it attributes the finitude to the knower himself and to his knowledge but not to the God who is known, since it knows the infinite itself even though it cannot comprehend its infinity, as was fully shown in the question concerning the knowledge of the soul of Christ.?6
ARTICLE II
VABIMBER LAE TRINAY,
AND INFINITY CAN COEXIST
Next it is asked whether the trinity can exist together with infinity or immensity. That they are incompatible appears in the following way.
OBJECTIONS
1. Since the creature is finite, whatever is contained in the creature is finite. Therefore, since the divine being is immense, whatever exists in it is infinite in act. But in God there is number or *8 [Tib, de Causis, prop. 10, 20, 24.
6 QO. de Sci. Christi, q. 6 (V, 32-37).
Iv. INFINITY AND TRINITY
plurality of persons. Therefore, it is necessary that this be extended infinitely. Therefore, there is not a trinity of persons.
2. Again, since there is a two-fold infinity — namely, in power and in number — it is impossible that the divine being should lack infinity of power. If we affirm a true plurality in God for the same reason that we affirm true power in Him, it is necessary that this plurality be infinite.
3. Again, a power that is infinite in every way emanates infinitely when it emanates to the full extent of its infinite power. But the divine power is infinite in this way, and in the production of persons it emanates to the full extent of its infinity. Therefore the conclusion is the same as above.
4. Again, the person that produces the other two either can produce more persons or it cannot produce more. If it cannot, then it loses its power when it produces them; if it can, then either it is not of the supreme liberality, or it must necessarily produce without limit.
5. Again, if the light of the sun were immense, it would generate an infinity of rays from itself. Therefore, since the eternal light is immense, and the brightness proceeding from it is a true person,} it is necessary that an infinity of persons exist. Therefore the trinity and infinity do not exist together.
6. Again, either the production of the persons corresponds to the power, or not. If it does not, then it ought not be affirmed in that being which is supremely powerful. If it does, then a greater multiplicity corresponds to a greater power; and the greatest multiplicity corresponds to the greatest power; and an infinite multiplicity corresponds to an infinite power. Therefore, the trinity does not exist with infinity.
7. Again, if the divine power were engaged in its total actuality in the production of creatures, it would necessarily produce infinite creatures. Therefore, since it is thus engaged in the production of the persons, it is necessary — if the power is infinite — that it produce infinite persons.
8. Again, since the divine intellect is infinite, it must necessarily know infinite objects. Therefore, since the divine expression
1s infinite, it is necessary that it express infinite objects. But there are as many expressions as there are words; and there are as many persons as there are words. Therefore, there exists an infinity of persons.
9. Again, for an intellect to be perfect it is not sufficient that it know itself, but also that it knows that it knows. Therefore, if tv Elebrs 1) 3:
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
an intellect is to be of infinite perfection, it must necessarily reflect upon itself with infinite reflections. But in knowing itself, it generates a word; therefore, by the second reflection it generates a second word; and so on into infinity. Therefore, if infinity is to be attributed to God, trinity must be excluded.
10. Again, either God can know more than three persons, or He cannot. If He cannot, then His intellect is finite and limited.
If He can know more, since nothing can be known which is not in some way present either in itself or inits principle, whether proximate or remote, therefore it is necessary either to conclude that the divine knowledge is limited, or to affirm more than three persons in the divine being, either actually or potentially.
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. Supreme immensity does not stand in the way of the highest perfection of a productive power, neither for one producing by way of nature nor for one producing by reason of will or liberality; therefore it does not stand in the way of the highest perfection in the productive act. But a perfect productive act necessarily requires a point of repose both on the part of the principle and on the part of the term; but there would be no such point if one were to proceed to infinity. Therefore the supreme infinity of the divine being does not imply an infinity of persons.
2. Again, infinity in God does not exclude the perfection of order — for it does not follow from the fact that God is infinite that therefore He is lacking in order — but perfect order necessarily posits a first, a middle, and a last.2 Where these are present, there is found not number without limit, but only a trinity. Therefore, etc.
3. Again, infinity in God does not exclude the perfection of union, for this is necessary for supreme delight. But a perfect union cannot exist unless one person proceeds immediately from the other; otherwise there would not be the highest form of relationship.
But this relationship does not extend beyond the number three.® Therefore, etc.
4. Again, immensity in God does not exclude perfect beatitude; but knowledge of the person pertains to the essence of beatitude.
Therefore, if a creature cannot know an infinity of persons at one and the same time, it is impossible that any soul should ever find its beatitude in God. Therefore, if immensity exists together with perfect beatitude, it exists with a plurality of persons. But no plu- * Q. de Sci. Christi, gq. 1, ad 6 (V, 6).
8 Rich. of St. Victor, De Trin. IV, c. 2 ff.
IV. INFINITY AND TRINITY
tality is so fitting to the soul capable of beatitude as a trinity; therefore, etc.
5. Again, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude unity of essence, for God is both one and immense. Therefore, if unity is more distant from immensity than plurality is, however small; and if immensity can exist together with unity, even more so can it exist together with the trinity.
6. Again, the immensity of the divine being does not exclude simplicity of nature. Therefore, if absolute simplicity is more repugNant to immensity than is plurality of whatever degree, then if infinity can exist together with simplicity, all the more so can it exist together with the trinity.
7. Again, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude personal property, therefore it does not exclude true distinction of the persons; therefore it does not include confusion. But where number is infinite, there is confusion; and where there is confusion, there is lack of distinction. But if we are not to affirm this in the divine being, then the plurality of persons is finite in number. Therefore, infinity is not repugnant to the trinity in God.
8. Again, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude causality in accordance with the three types of causes: namely, efficient, formal, and final; nor does the infinity in God affirm other modes of causality. Therefore, if it is possible for the three types of causes to coexist, it is likewise possible for a trinity of persons to coexist, especially since there is a mutual correspondence between these in the appropriation of power, wisdom, and goodness, which correspond to the three persons and to the three types of causality.
9. Again, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude the conformity between the Creator and the creature according to a double representation; namely, that of vestige and that of image.
Therefore, if in the image there is a representation of the distinction and origin of the divine persons corresponding to the persons; if there were an infinite number of persons in the trinity, there ought to be an infinite number in the image. But if this is impossible, it follows that the trinity of persons is not repugnant to the divine immensity.
10. Again, the immensity of the divine being does not exclude the indwelling of God in the mind through the gift of the Holy
Spirit..But if there were an infinite number of persons producing and produced, since each of the productive persons sends and gives the person produced, then in the sanctification of each soul it would necessarily happen that an infinity of persons would stand between the sanctified soul and the person who first sends or sanctifies. Therefore, if it is impossible to traverse the infinite, it would be impossible
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
for the soul to return to the first principle through sanctification if there were an infinite number of persons. But since the immensity of God exists together with the indwelling by grace, in which the Son, who is the image of the Father, leads us back to the Father through the gift and bond of the Holy Spirit, the immensity of the divine being is compatible with the trinity of persons.
CONCLUSION
In God the supreme infinity exists together with the trinity of persons.
Response. Without doubt, supreme infinity exists together with a plurality of persons in God. This is clear from the following.
Infinity is affirmed in God not because of defect but because of excess. And, I say, it is an excess not of superfluity but of perfection and nobility.4 Because infinity in God does not include superfluity or diminution but highest perfection, therefore in the emanation of the divine persons we must affirm immensity in the one producing, as well as in the one produced and in the mode of production; but not an infinity in number. For if there were a numerical infinity of persons in God, this infinity would necessarily result either in a defect or in a superfluity. Since there are two perfect modes of emanating, one by nature and one by liberality, either the two persons emanating in these modes do not perfectly possess the full immensity of the producing power and thus they would be imperfect; or they do possess it, and others would be superfluous. But if it is impossible that there be anything superfluous or defective in the divine being because of its immensity, it is necessary to affirm that God is triune and immense.
Furthermore, since the infinity of the divine being includes immensity in the one producing, as well as in the one produced and in the mode of production, and since the divine being in its immensity cannot be duplicated but is only one, it follows necessarily that in God there is only one paternity, only one filiation, and only one procession; and thus there is only one Father only one
Son, and only one Holy Spirit. And therefore it is necessary to say that God is immense and a trinity. Just as if there were several gods, none would possess in himself the immensity of the whole divinity, but only part of omnipotence and perfection, so if there were several
Fathers, none would possess the immensity of paternity; if there were several Sons, none would possess the immensity of filiation, but only a part thereof. For if any one of them were to possess the 4 Cf. preceding question.
IV. INFINITY AND TRINITY
entire fullness and immensity of paternity, there could be only one paternity among them, just as there can be only one deity in several persons. It remains, therefore, that if there is true infinity and true plurality in the divine being, the plurality cannot be extended beyond the trinity to an infinity, in accordance with the statement of pious faith.
Finally, because infinity includes every form of completion, it does not exclude the perfection of power, order, union, beatitude, representation, and inhabitation. And since all of these necessarily lead to the understanding of the trinity in three persons, as is clear from the previous objections, it is evident that the supreme immensity is in no way repugnant to but rather in harmony with the eternal trinity. Therefore the arguments for this position are to be conceded.
REPLIES TO THE OBJECTIONS
1. To the contrary objection that just as whatever is contained in the finite creature is finite, so it is necessary in the case of God that whatever exists in Him is infinite, it must be said that — as has already been indicated — an infinity of power and dignity befits the divine being, but not an infinity of weight or number. And such an infinity is found both in the essence and in the persons, both in the ones producing and in the ones produced, both in the persons as such and in their emanations. And this is found totally and integrally in three persons. Therefore it is not necessary to extend the persons to numerical infinity because of the infinity of the divine being.
2. To the objection that God cannot lack infinity of power, etc., it must be said that there is no parallel between these two modes of infinity, for while the greatness of power includes a proximity to simplicity rather than distance from it, a numerical multitude includes distance from unity and simplicity. And God, the divine being, is immense in such a way that at the same time He is supremely simple and one; from this it follows that an infinity of power is proper to the divine being while an infinite number of persons is not.
3. To the objection that a completely infinite power emanates infinitely when it emanates to the full extent of its power, it must be said that since in God perfection and infinity are inseparable, the objection is true concerning each mode of emanation and diffusion which corresponds to supreme perfection. This is the case with the two perfect modes of production; namely, that of nature and that
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
of liberality; and each of these is necessarily unique in itself, and is neither doubled nor tripled; nor do they extend to infinity because this would imply superfluity and defect, as was shown above.
4. To the objection that the person who produces the other two either can produce more or He cannot, it must be said that to be unable to produce more than two persons does not imply a lack of power but rather the fullness of power; for in those two productions the productive power manifests itself most perfectly and infinitely, both as to the immensity of the persons produced and as to the actuality of the productions; for the generative and spirative power in the Father has its actuality in generating and spirating in the same way in which it exists eternally and in no other way. Thus, as splendor emanates continually from the sun, so the Son, who is the "splendor of the Father" emanates continually from the Father in an even more excellent way.
5 & 6. To the objection that if the light of the sun were immense, it would generate an infinite number of rays from itself, it must be said that there is no parallel. For the light emanating from the sun is not absolutely perfect nor is it equal to its origin. Therefore, from one production alone it does not contain within itself the full power and clarity of the light from which it radiates. Indeed, it receives and shares in the fullness of the fontal light to a greater or lesser degree according as it is nearer to or more distant from its source. But it is very different in the case of the Son, who is the Word of the Father and the most perfect splendor, in all things equal to the Father, receiving from the Father everything that the Father Himself has; and therefore as the infinity of the eternal light does not exclude equality with the eternal ray emanating from it, neither does it include an infinite multiplication of rays since one ray alone contains within itself that total immensity.
7. To the objection that if the divine power were engaged in its total actuality in the production of creatures, then it would produce infinite creatures, etc., it must be said that there is no parallel for two reasons; first, because the creature is finite and therefore does not correspond fully to the productive power, and second, because the creature is distinguished essentially from the being that produces it as well as from other creatures because of the distinction in their intrinsic principles and in the accompanying accidents. But such is not the case in God, both because the person produced is as infinite as the person that produces it, and because the distinction is not one of essence but one of origin.® Therefore, since there are only two distinct and distinctive origins, only two emanating persons
§ Rich. of St. Victor, De Trin. IV, c. 13 ff.
IV. INFINITY AND TRINITY
can exist and can be conceived of, in whom the immensity of the fontal productive power shines forth most perfectly.
8. To the objection that since the divine intellect is infinite it knows infinite objects, it must be said that even though God knows infinite objects, He comprehends all things in Himself alone because in knowing Himself, He knows all things; so also, though He expresses many things, yet He expresses all things in one Word.
For in the very same Word in which the Father expresses Himself, He expresses all other things. For in knowing Himself in one, most perfect act of knowledge in which there is perfect correspondence between the act of understanding and the subject of the act, and vice versa, the Father generates a Word which is the similitude of the Father and equal to Him in all things. Whence, as the Father, in knowing Himself, knows whatever can be known, so in speaking the Word, He expresses everything that He can express and everything that can be expressed in the deity. Whence, neither He nor any other person in the trinity can speak another word, since whatever can be said is said in Him.
But if you object that just as God has infinite ideas with respect to intelligible beings, so also He ought to have an infinity of words; it must be said that there is no parallel, because the reason and the idea include a relation to and a similitude of intelligible beings to be created and produced, or capable of being produced, and such possible beings can be multiplied in innumerable and diverse ways.
On the other hand, the Word includes a relation to the speaker and to the first intellect and highest principle of which the Word is the hypostatic similitude. Therefore, in no way can multiplicity be attributed to it, neither in reality nor in our understanding, just as multiplicity can not be attributed to the first principle that knows itself first of all and principally through itself.'
9. To the objection that an intellect of infinite fullness must reflect upon itself with infinite reflections, etc., it must be said that in the case of the divine intellect to Anow and to know that one knows ate identical even if the act of knowledge is repeated a thousand times or an infinite number of times, since in God, the subject, the object, and the act of knowing are one and the same. Therefore, the very first act in which God the Father knows Himself is the most actual and most perfect act, just as is the Word that corresponds to it. Therefore, it is not necessary to introduce a plurality of words in God. But the case is different with the created intellect whose act and operation is distinct from the subject and the object of know6 Augustine, Confessions XI, c. 7, n. 9.
7 QO. de Sci. Christi, q. 3, ad 19 (V, 16).
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
ledge; for which reason it can'be multiplied and repeated and numbered many times as often as the mind reflects upon itself as subject, or upon the act of knowing or upon other objects distinct from itself.
10. To the final objection that either God can know more than three persons or He cannot, it must be said that to be unable to know more persons can be understood in two ways; either because of a limitation of the mind in the act of knowing, or because of the correctness of judgment and the impossibility of departing from the way of truth. In the first way, it is not fitting for the divine intellect since it is immense, but in the second way, it is fitting. Therefore, it follows that He cannot know more persons, because such knowledge — even though it would appear to be perfect — in reality would be a departure from truth and a falling into error. Whence, as the immensity of truth is in no way mixed with falsehood, so the immensity of intellectual light renders the divine intellect totally free of any error. For this reason, the divine intellect does not know any being greater than itself, nor another God, nor a plurality of persons beyond the number three, not because it is limited, but because it is most perfectly infinite.
And from these arguments the solution to the whole question is clear.
QUESTION V
WHETHER THE TRINITY OF PERSONS
CAN EXIST TOGETHER WITH HIGHEST ETERNITY
Next it is asked whether the trinity of persons can exist together with the highest eternity. Two questions are raised about this. The first is whether the divine being is eternal. The second is whether trinity and eternity can exist together.
ARTICLE I
WHETHER THE DIVINE BEING IS ETERNAL
Concerning the first question, we can proceed as follows. That the divine being is eternal.
ARGUMENTS IN AGREEMENT
1. The authority of Scripture shows this in Exodus 15: "The Lord will reign forever and ever,"! and in Romans 1: "His everlasting power and divinity.'
2. Truth of faith shows this also: '"The Father is eternal; the Son is eternal; the Holy Spirit is eternal" it says in the Athanasian
Creed.
3. Again, the same conclusion may be derived from arguments of necessity. For Richard (of St. Victor) argues as follows: Whatever exists of itself is eternal.? But the divine being exists of itself since it is first; therefore, etc. The major is clear; for if it were not eternal, then at some time it would not have existed, and it would not have given being to itself nor to others; and hence it would never have been. The minor is self-evident.
1 Verse 18.
2 Verse 20.
3 De Trin. I, c. 6, 8 and 11.
THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS
4. Again, whatever is its own being is eternal, for being cannot not be; therefore it cannot begin or cease to be; therefore it has neither a beginning nor an end. Therefore if God, being supremely simple, is His own being, He is being in an absolute sense.* Therefore
He is fully eternal.
5. Again, that which is truth itself is eternal. But the divine being is truth itself, therefore, etc. The minor is clear. Augustine proves the major in the Soliloquies: Truth can neither be thought nor said not to exist.5 Indeed, it follows that if there is no truth then some truth exists, because if no truth exists then it is true that no truth exists, or there is no truth. Therefore, being cannot be dissociated from truth in any way; therefore it always was, is, and will be.
6. Again, that being which is supremely infinite is eternal, for if it were to have a beginning, its duration would be finite. But the divine being is infinite.6 Therefore, it is necessarily eternal; otherwise, if it were not eternal, neither would it be immense.
7. Again, that being in which there is supreme immortality is eternal; "that which comes into being through change tends toward change."? But supreme immortality resides in the divine being which is, of its very essence, life itself, or the very act of living.
Therefore, the divine being necessarily possesses eternity.
8. Again, every being in which there resides supreme happiness is eternal. But since the divine being is most perfect, it is of this sort; therefore, etc. The major is proved since that happiness which has neither beginning nor end is greater than that which begins at a particular moment of time. Therefore, if the divine being is suptemely happy, it necessarily follows that it is eternal.
And again, all happiness includes the lack of an end.® Therefore, the most perfect happiness includes the lack of a beginning.
9. Again, every being in which supreme simplicity exists is eternal. And the divine being is of this sort; therefore, etc. The minor is evident. The major is proved because in any being which possesses supreme simplicity, there is no difference between beginning, middle, and end; and no such being has a past and future,
4 Boethius, Quomodo Substantiae in eo, Quod Sint, Bonae Sint.
5 I,c. 15, n. 27 ff, & Il, c. 2, n. 2; c. 15, n. 28; and Rich. of St. Victor, De
Tring cae.
6 Cf. Q. 4, a. 1 above. i 7 ee De Fide Orthod. 1, c. 3 & Il, c. 7; Aristotle, X/J Metaph. text. 39
TS €291)3
§ Augustine, De Beata Vita, c. 2, n. 11; De Civ. Dei, XI, c. 11; XIV, c. 25.