Chapter 8 of 16

3. Where Are They Now? Religious Affiliation, Beliefs, and Practices

3. Where Are They Now? Religious Affiliation, Beliefs, and Practices

the story about emerging adults and religion that everyone expects—the one that is by now unsurprising—is that emerging adults are becoming less religious. This story is, of course, true, and evidence for it has been outlined in several different reports. And among the emerging adults we have been studying, we see rather significant declines in religious identity, commitment, and practice across the board. In some cases the Wave 4 results continue a long, steady decline in religious affiliation from when this study began in 2002, while in other areas there is a more precipitous drop. In either case, the overarching story is one of decline; emerging adults are leaving religious institutions and commitments behind as they move into adulthood.

In this chapter, we focus on the survey data from Wave 4, with comparisons to the Wave 1 and Wave 3 surveys to tell the story of decline as it is exemplified by these emerging adults. But we also dig deeper for a closer look at what is going on under the surface of the decline. What other stories do we miss by focusing primarily on the aggregate loss in religious service attendance or religious affiliation? We won’t ignore the story of decline, but we hope to bring more nuance to narratives of how young people are encountering religion in their lives.

The story of general religious decline among emerging adults has multiple facets. The first is a story of religious affiliation, which can also be understood as a measure of religious market share. In other words, which groups are gaining and which groups are losing numbers in the overall distribution of how young people are affiliated or not affiliated with religion? We look at changes in religious affiliation among emerging adults and examine the patterns of religious conversion, religious switching, and disaffiliation among our respondents.

Moving beyond the focus on religious affiliation, we then turn to an examination of a variety of individual measures of religious beliefs, practices, and levels of religious salience. Looking back over the 10 years of the National Study of Youth and Religion (NSYR), we see how young people have changed religiously, including how much they pray, attend religious services, and feel close to God, as well as other indicators of religious engagement. In the general assessment, we consider the broad story of religious decline in the lives of emerging adults: lower levels of religious attendance, fewer young people who believe in God, less importance placed on the role of faith in daily life. But after examining all emerging adults as one group, we also find that there are different patterns of involvement with religion within different religious groups.

In the next section of the chapter, we take a closer look at how religious change is playing out among those who are not leaving their faith, and we see a parallel story emerge. While general religious decline is taking place at multiple levels, there are those who have remained committed to their religious tradition. And, in some cases, this religious commitment is growing stronger, rather than weaker. In the final section of this chapter, we turn the tables, and rather than examining the religious lives of emerging adults, we ask what they think of organized religion. How do young people perceive the value of religious institutions, including whether those institutions have any potential relevance for the lives of emerging adults, and in what ways have their perspectives changed since we last spoke with them?

Religious Tradition Gains and Losses

We start by showing the identification with different major religious traditions for emerging adults at ages 23 to 28, with comparisons to when they were between the ages of 13 and 17. This categorization follows the general model established by Steensland and colleagues and includes Conservative Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Latter-day Saints (Mormon), and Not Religious. Respondents affiliated with a minority religious group that is not large enough for meaningful analysis are categorized together as Other Religion. The final category is called Indeterminate and includes respondents from whom we did not receive enough information to determine their religious tradition. This measure of religious affiliation prioritizes the tradition of the congregation where they attend services, in the few cases where this is different from the general religious affiliation that was reported.

The overall story is one of loss for all religious traditions and increase in the number of those claiming no identification with a religious tradition or whose religious identity is indeterminate. shows the percentage of emerging adults in our study who identify with a particular religious tradition at three different points in time: Wave 1 when they are ages 13 to 17, Wave 3 when they are ages 18 to 23, and Wave 4 when they are ages 23 to 28. The final column shows the percentage increase or decrease for that particular tradition over the 10 years covered by this study. This is a type of “market share” measure that shows us the distribution of religious affiliation among emerging adults at three different points in time, with the most current being the numbers at ages 23 to 28.

Table 3.1 Religious Traditions

Wave 1 Ages 13–17 (%)

Wave 3 Ages 18–23 (%)

Wave 4 Ages 23–28 (%)

Net Change Waves 1–4 (%)

Conservative Protestant

30.6

27.6

19.1

–11.5

Mainline Protestant

11.3

10.8

5.7

–5.6

Black Protestant

10.3

7.2

5.3

–5

Catholic

26.6

19.5

15.3

–11.3

Jewish

1.7

1.1

1.2

–0.5

Latter-day Saints

3.9

3

3

–0.9

Not Religious

11

24.1

35

24

Other

2.4

2.6

3

0.6

Indeterminate

2.3

4.1

12.5

10.2

Source: National Study of Youth and Religion surveys 2002, 2008, 2013.

Emerging adults identifying as Not Religious show the largest change, having increased by 24 percentage points, from 11 percent when they were teens to 35 percent in the final survey. This group of Not Religious emerging adults is what has been popularly described as the “religious nones” in many research and news reports. This grouping includes a diverse set of people who say that they are not religious and thus do not affiliate with any religious tradition or identity. This includes atheists and agnostics as well as those who simply say that they are not religious, without further identifying themselves religiously. We discuss irreligious emerging adults in detail in , but for now, it is important to remember that this is the group of young people that has grown most significantly over the course of this project, and that while they all claim no religious identification or affiliation, within this group there is variation in how that actually plays out in their lives.

The other category that gained numbers of emerging adults is the Indeterminate category, which increased from 2.3 percent when they were teens to 12.4 percent as emerging adults. Indeterminate means that we did not have enough information from the respondents to determine their specific religious tradition. Almost all of these respondents provided an answer like “just Christian.” Thus, while we can’t locate them within a specific sect or denomination, they nonetheless identify as Christian. We suspect that many of them are in fact Mainline or Conservative Protestants who are either not familiar with, or decline to identify, the particular denominational affiliation of their place of worship. If this is the case, it means that the losses among Protestants are not as large as they appear. However, it is also telling that these young people do not select any particular identity beyond “just Christian.” While they identify as Christian, they are either not aware of or not invested in a particular denominational identity or tradition. It seems that “Christian” is the extent of what they can offer by way of describing their own faith and the place where they attend religious services.

All of the other categories show varying degrees of loss among emerging adults who identify with them. Conservative Protestant and Catholic were the two largest religious traditions when our respondents were between the ages of 13 and 17: 30 and 27 percent of the sample, respectively. It is these two large groups that have declined the most over the course of the study. By the time our respondents reached the ages of 23 to 28, 19 percent of them are identified as Conservative Protestant and 15 percent identified as Catholic, a total decline of just more than 11 percentage points for each group. The remaining groups had smaller market share to begin with and show correspondingly smaller declines in their percentages at Wave 4. Mainline Protestants decreased from 11.3 percent among teens to 5.7 percent at ages 23 to 28. Similarly, Black Protestants were 10.3 percent of the sample in the first survey and are just 5.3 percent of the final sample. The Latter-day Saints and Jewish traditions are small minority groups and remained relatively stable across the study, each with slight drops in their representation. The Other Religion category changed very little, from 2.4 percent of teens identifying with a religion categorized as Other to three percent when they were ages 23 to 28.

No matter how these gains or losses are counted—whether as a percentage of the total sample of emerging adults or as a proportion of those who identify with the tradition at ages 23 to 28, compared with when they were ages 13 to 17—the numbers show that significant change has taken place in terms of how these young people identify religiously. Another way to think about gains and losses in religious affiliation is to consider the pathways of religious movement, or what social researchers call religious switching. That is, based on what we know about how these emerging adults identified religiously as teenagers, what identity had they moved to when we asked them at ages 23 to 28? shows a cross-tabulation of religious identity when the respondents were teens and then at ages 23 to 28. Each column includes all those who were identified with a particular tradition as teens and shows what percentage are now affiliated either with the same tradition or with other traditions.

Table 3.2 Transition between Religious Traditions, Waves 1 to 4

Religious Tradition Wave 4 (Ages 23–28)

Religious Tradition Wave 1, Ages 13–17 (%)

CP

MP

BP

RC

J

LDS

NR

OR

IND

Conservative Protestant (CP)

46

10

12

6

~

5

4

7

6

Mainline Protestant (MP)

5

23

3

2

~

5

1

~

9

Black Protestant (BP)

2

1

41

2

~

~

4

1

4

Catholic (RC)

2

4

1

53

4

~

5

6

2

Jewish (J)

~

1

1

~

42

2

~

3

~

Latter-day Saints (LDS)

~

~

~

~

2

61

1

~

~

Not Religious (NR)

24

41

16

30

52

25

74

39

70

Other Religion (OR)

1

1

3

2

~

~

4

42

~

Indeterminate (IND)

19

17

23

6

~

2

7

2

10

Total

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

Note: Bold numbers indicate the percentage of emerging adults remaining in each tradition based on their Wave 1 religious identification.

Source: National Study of Youth and Religion surveys 2002, 2013.

For example, looking at the first column for Conservative Protestant, we see that, of those teens identified as Conservative Protestants as teenagers, 46 percent can still be categorized as affiliated with the Conservative Protestant tradition. Continuing down the column we see the current religious tradition for those who are no longer identified as Conservative Protestant: five percent are now Mainline Protestants, two percent Black Protestants, and two percent Catholic. Similarly, we see that 53 percent of teens who identified as Catholic have maintained their Catholic identity, which means that almost one-half have switched to some other religious—or not religious—identity. Thus, we see that six percent of Catholics are now identified as Conservative Protestant, two percent as Mainline Protestant, and about two percent as part of Black Protestant denominations.

Among most religious groups, retaining the same religious identity is the most common response. Just less than half of all respondents (47 percent) retained the religious identity from their teenage years, with the Catholic and Latter-day Saints traditions having the highest retention rates. However, there are still significant numbers of emerging adults who have switched their religious identity from what it was when they were teens to something else. About one-fourth of the respondents switched from one religious tradition to another religious tradition. But across the religious traditions, the most common path of religious switching was to go from affiliating with a religious tradition to being not religious. More than one-fourth of all emerging adults moved from a religious identity to the Not Religious category. The only religious group for whom Not Religious is not the largest receiving category is Black Protestant. One-fourth of Conservative Protestants and 30 percent of Catholics have moved into the Not Religious category over the course of the study. Mainline Protestant is the one group for whom becoming not religious outpaces religious stability; 23 percent of Wave 1 respondents remain Mainline Protestants, while 41 percent now identify as Not Religious. Among those who were classified as Other Religion, the numbers are fairly even, with 40 percent now reporting that they are not religious, compared with the 42 percent who have remained in the Other Religion category.

The pathway from a given religious tradition to Indeterminate was the second most common category of switching. However, it is interesting to note that this switch was common among the Protestant groups and not the other religious traditions, with Conservative, Mainline, and Black Protestants most likely to shift into the Indeterminate category. The majority of individuals in this category are identified as such because their survey responses suggest that they still view themselves as religiously affiliated. However, that affiliation is generally not more specific than “just Christian” and is not connected to a particular denomination or group. Most of these indeterminate “Christians” are likely affiliated with some form of Protestant church, whether Conservative or Mainline. We do not see a similar trend among Catholics, perhaps because Catholicism is in itself a specific Christian identity. When Catholics drift away from a religious congregation, many continue to identify themselves as Catholic. However, when Protestants do the same, their identification is more likely to shift away from a specific religious tradition to a “just Christian” identity.

Examining the movement of the previously Indeterminate teenagers is also instructive. About 15 percent of those who were Indeterminate as teenagers moved into Conservative or Mainline Protestant categories at the final survey. Perhaps, as these young people got older, they were better able to identify and locate themselves within a particular tradition. On the other hand, 70 percent of those who were Indeterminate at Wave 1 are classified as Not Religious in Wave 4. We have suggested previously that classification as Indeterminate can be interpreted as signifying some degree of disconnection from religion. These are young people who still profess some level of religious identification; however, they are not engaged enough to be able to identify their particular religious tradition beyond the generic response of “Christian.” This disconnection from religious particularism appears to have been a step in the process toward more complete disengagement. At least for this subgroup, while they were “just Christian” in Wave 1, they now identify themselves as Not Religious—that is, having no religious affiliation.

This suggests that those emerging adults who we currently classify as Indeterminate in their religious identity may be in the process of moving further away from religious involvement and commitment. That is, the pathways of the majority of those who were categorized as Indeterminate when they were teens—from their indeterminate religious identity to now being not religious—suggests that many of those who are now Indeterminate will eventually move into the Not Religious category as well.

There are multiple ways to analyze the patterns of religious affiliation. Again, regardless of which method we use, the general story appears to be one of aggregate religious decline. When we look at those young people whose religious affiliation has changed over the 10-year period of the NSYR, we see that while some have changed to a different religious affiliation, many more have moved further out of mainstream religious traditions, with more and more young people identifying themselves as not religious. Yet, there is another way to look at the data, one that has not been emphasized in all the talk about the increase in religious “nones.” Taking into account all of the movement we see in , 26 percent of all the emerging adults in our study moved from a religious identity (including Indeterminate) to Not Religious. However, there is a larger contingent of young people who have maintained their religious affiliation. Fifty-nine percent of respondents continued to describe themselves as religious, whether in their original tradition or another tradition, and three percent moved from not religious to identifying with some religion. Thus, while the number of emerging adults who moved from being religious to being not religious is significant, the 59 percent who remained religious—and the three percent who became religious—have a story that also deserves attention.

Orientation to Tables and Religion Measures

Religious affiliation and identity is but one facet of religiosity, one way of understanding the religious lives of the young people we followed over the course of the project. We also have measures that tap into a wide range of religious dimensions, such as beliefs, practices, salience, and attitudes toward religious organizations. Readers who have been following the NSYR since the publication of Soul Searching will be familiar with these measures. And we know that many have been waiting with keen interest to see how our sample of young people would respond to these questions 10 years after they were first asked to consider them when they were teenagers.

There are many possible ways to present these data, with different comparisons that can be drawn and multiple stories that can be told. Each reader will come to the data with their own questions of interest and their own perspective that informs how they interpret and understand the numbers presented here. We offer a full table for each religion measure, closely mirroring the measures used in the previous three books (Soul Searching, A Faith of Their Own, and Souls in Transition). Rather than discuss each religious measure table in detail, however, we will instead focus on a few of the story lines that emerge when we consider them as a whole package. Readers with a specific interest in prayer, for example, can study that table at their leisure. For our purposes, we are less interested in each particular measure and more interested in the larger stories that these individual measures help us weave together about the patterns of religious engagement among emerging adults. Further consideration of the measures will follow in .

In the tables for this chapter, we look at a wide range of survey questions measuring different facets of religiosity and examine how the responses to these questions vary by religious tradition. The longitudinal nature of our survey data allows us to map these responses over time in various ways. In each table we present four columns of percentages. The responses are sorted according to the main religious traditions in the United States: Conservative Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Latter-day Saints, and Not Religious. The first three columns report the responses to each question at Wave 1, Wave 3, and Wave 4, grouped by the religious tradition that the respondents were affiliated with as teenagers at the time of the first survey (ages 13 to 17). Examining the responses based on the Wave 1 religious identity tells us something about changes in the religious lives of individuals who were raised in a particular religious tradition, regardless of their current religious identity. For example, if we consider all of the respondents who at Wave 1 were identified as Conservative Protestant, how many of them believed in God then, and how many of those same young people still believe in God at Wave 4? This tells us something about how this group of individuals has changed over time, regardless of current religious identity. A significant portion of those respondents continue to be identified as Conservative Protestants. However, as noted earlier in this chapter, a substantial number of them are no longer a part of the Conservative Protestant tradition. Their responses are also included in the third column of these tables.

The final column in each table limits the responses to only those individuals who are identified with a particular religious tradition at the time of the Wave 4 survey, and excludes those who affiliated in the past but are no longer identified with the religious tradition. This final column provides a sense of the current composition of the different religious traditions and the level of particular religious measures within that religious tradition.

For example, what is the level of religious salience among those emerging adults who currently identify as Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish? This allows us to compare, for example, the current religiosity of all the individuals who are Mainline Protestant today (column 4) with the religiosity of all the individuals who were Mainline Protestant as teenagers (column 3). Column 4 also includes those who have moved into the tradition since they were teenagers. It does not include responses from individuals who started in the religious tradition as teenagers but have since moved out of the tradition. A comparison of columns 4 and 1 will highlight any changes in the composition of each religious tradition at the time of the respective surveys.

The first row in each table provides the total percentages for the entire sample. Since there is no division by religious tradition for the total sample, Wave 4 percentages are only displayed in the first Wave 4 column (column 3). This first row of percentages provides us with several important pieces of information. First, the Wave 4 columns give us a sense of where emerging adults are today as a group in relation to each of these religious measures. Comparing the Wave 4 and Wave 3 percentages tells us how much change has taken place since the last survey five years previously, when respondents were between the ages of 18 and 23. Finally, we have included the responses from the original Wave 1 survey to allow for a general sense of the total change across each religion measure over the 10 years between the first and last surveys of this group of young people.

Overall Change in Emerging Adult Religion

As was noted in the introduction to this chapter, when we look at the responses for the full sample across a wide range of religious measures, the story that emerges is one of general religious decline. On almost every measure, our sample of young people reported lower levels of religious engagement as emerging adults than they did as teenagers. In most cases this change is modest, while for a few variables it is quite dramatic. Notably, it appears that the overall decline in traditional religiosity was underway between the first and third waves of the survey, while the change that has taken place in the most recent five years, during the later years of emerging adult life, reflects a modest continuation of this trend.

The most dramatic change among the emerging adults in our study was in attendance at religious services (. Over the course of the study, attending religious services weekly or more often has dropped from 40 percent to 19 percent of respondents. Reports of never attending religious services has increased 33 percentage points over 10 years, from 18 percent of the sample in 2003 to 51 percent of the sample in 2013. While there has been a significant drop in attendance at religious services, the other measures of religion have seen more modest aggregate declines. Over the life of the project, the percentage of those who believe in God has dropped 10 points, from 84 percent to 74 percent (. In addition to the decline in those who believe in God, there was also a shift among those who do believe in God in how they describe their view of God (. Up through the time the respondents were 18 to 23, almost two-thirds of those who believed in God reported that they believed in a personal God who was involved in the lives of individuals. At the time of the final survey, when respondents are between the ages of 23 and 28, those who believe in a personal God make up just more than one-half of those who said they believe in God.

Measures of private religious salience include reports about the importance of faith in daily life and feelings of closeness to God. Reporting that faith is very or extremely important in daily life declined 5 percentage points since 2008 and 12 percentage points over the course of the 10-year study (. The percentage who said they feel very or extremely close to God increased slightly from the Wave 3 survey and is just five percent lower than it was in the original survey in 2003 (. More than one-third of respondents reported praying daily, a slight increase from the previous survey. At the same time, however, the percentage who reported that they never pray increased from 15 percent in 2003 to one-fourth of respondents in the current survey (.

In our final inquiry about how the salience of religion has changed in the lives of emerging adults, we turn to a question that asks them to assess this change for themselves. Respondents were asked whether, over the course of the past five years, they had become more religious, had become less religious, or had stayed about the same. These responses look very similar to the information we received when we asked the same question five years earlier (. Fifty-six percent of emerging adults in our study said that they had remained about the same, while 24 percent said they had become more religious, and 19 percent said that they had become less religious.

Regardless of their responses to individual religious measures, in their overall assessment of their own religiousness, the majority of respondents did not report any religious change. When they did report change, it was more likely to be an increase in religiosity than a decrease. This seemingly paradoxical finding in relation to the aggregate declines we see across the majority of the other religion measures was also present in the second and third waves of the study and has been discussed in detail elsewhere. However, it highlights a few points to keep in mind. First, while aggregate numbers reflect overall religious decline, there is movement going on in both directions—both toward and away from religion—as well as a fair amount of stability, reflecting the experience of people whose religious lives have not really changed dramatically over the past five years. These nuances of change can be lost in the aggregate summaries of the data.

A second point to consider is that religiousness is more than just the sum of its parts. The measurement of individual facets of religion—practices, beliefs, experience—does not always paint the same picture as a holistic assessment of an individual’s religious life. People are complex, combining and compartmentalizing their lives in unique ways. When we ask people for their self-perceptions of their own religious vitality, we have to keep in mind that each person is drawing on a complex assortment of facts and feelings about their religious lives. Their own perceptions may not always match up with the reported behaviors and beliefs of other survey questions. In the case of the young people in our study, they are each assessing their own religious lives through particular social lenses. The specific nuances of these social lenses merit future research into the dynamics of how they are assessing their own religiousness. At present, however, it is worth noting that more of them than we would expect, based on other religion measures, perceive themselves to have become more religious in recent years.

Table 3.3 Religious Service Attendance

1

2

3

4

Religious Tradition, Ages 13–17

Religious Tradition, Ages 23–28

Wave 1 (%)

Wave 3 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Total

Once a Week or More

40

20

19

Never

18

35

51

Conservative Protestant

Once a Week or More

55

28

29

45

Never

4

24

39

5

Mainline Protestant

Once a Week or More

44

12

9

18

Never

9

38

58

17

Black Protestant

Once a Week or More

41

25

18

29

Never

7

18

29

4

Catholic

Once a Week or More

40

15

12

16

Never

11

38

53

36

Jewish

Once a Week or More

8

10

9

13

Never

22

62

82

53

Latter-day Saints

Once a Week or More

71

60

50

79

Never

4

22

34

10

Not Religious

Once a Week or More

~

5

4

~

Never

95

73

81

99

Source: National Study of Youth and Religion surveys 2002, 2008, 2013.

Table 3.4 Belief in God

1

2

3

4

Religious Tradition, Ages 13–17

Religious Tradition, Ages 23–28

Wave 1 (%)

Wave 3 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Total

Yes

84

78

74

No

3

6

12

Unsure

12

16

14

Conservative Protestant

Yes

94

87

84

95

No

1

2

7

1

Unsure

5

11

9

3

Mainline Protestant

Yes

86

68

66

95

No

2

7

13

1

Unsure

13

25

21

4

Black Protestant

Yes

97

97

97

98

No

~

0

2

~

Unsure

2

3

1

2

Catholic

Yes

85

80

76

89

No

1

5

9

2

Unsure

14

14

15

10

Jewish

Yes

72

50

55

76

No

5

19

22

0

Unsure

23

31

22

24

Latter-day Saints

Yes

84

83

84

99

No

~

4

6

0

Unsure

13

13

10

1

Not Religious

Yes

49

47

41

40

No

17

17

33

30

Unsure

34

35

26

30

Source: National Study of Youth and Religion surveys 2002, 2008, 2013.

Table 3.5 Views of God

1

2

3

4

Religious Tradition, Ages 13–17

Religious Tradition, Ages 23–28

Wave 1 (%)

Wave 3 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Total

A personal being involved in the lives of people today

65

63

51

Created the world, but is not involved in the world today

13

10

4

Not personal, something like a cosmic life force

14

17

13

None of these views

5

1

20

Does not believe in God

3

6

12

Conservative Protestant

A personal being

77

74

68

84

Created the world

10

9

3

2

Cosmic force

8

11

8

3

None of these views

4

<1

15

10

Does not believe in God

1

2

7

1

Mainline Protestant

A personal being

69

57

42

67

Created the world

13

9

2

5

Cosmic force

13

24

20

13

None of these views

3

2

22

15

Does not believe in God

2

7

13

1

Black Protestant

A personal being

74

78

63

78

Created the world

13

9

11

5

Cosmic force

7

9

4

2

None of these views

5

2

20

14

Does not believe in God

~

<1

2

<1

Catholic

A personal being

64

62

47

59

Created the world

17

13

6

6

Cosmic force

14

17

14

14

None of these views

4

1

24

20

Does not believe in God

1

5

9

2

Jewish

A personal being

44

32

16

42

Created the world

12

11

1

5

Cosmic force

33

32

24

22

None of these views

5

2

38

32

Does not believe in God

5

19

22

0

Latter-day Saints

A personal being

76

78

71

88

Created the world

7

5

0

0

Cosmic force

9

14

12

5

None of these views

8

0

11

7

Does not believe in God

~

4

6

0

Not Religious

A personal being

30

36

24

17

Created the world

15

9

6

5

Cosmic force

31

34

17

21

None of these views

7

2

20

27

Does not believe in God

17

17

33

30

Source: National Study of Youth and Religion surveys 2002, 2008, 2013.

Table 3.6 Importance of Faith

1

2

3

4

Religious Tradition, Ages 13–17

Religious Tradition, Ages 23–28

Wave 1 (%)

Wave 3 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Total

Very/extremely important

51

44

39

Not at all/not very important

18

27

30

Conservative Protestant

Very/extremely important

67

57

51

76

Not at all/not very important

7

15

18

2

Mainline Protestant

Very/extremely important

50

33

30

50

Not at all/not very important

16

37

42

9

Black Protestant

Very/extremely important

73

72

63

69

Not at all/not very important

5

6

8

~

Catholic

Very/extremely important

41

34

34

37

Not at all/not very important

18

28

30

17

Jewish

Very/extremely important

13

16

16

40

Not at all/not very important

37

61

62

21

Latter-day Saints

Very/extremely important

68

59

58

85

Not at all/not very important

15

23

16

3

Not Religious

Very/extremely important

14

17

14

5

Not at all/not very important

57

57

62

71

Source: National Study of Youth and Religion surveys 2002, 2008, 2013.

Table 3.7 Feeling Distant or Close to God

1

2

3

4

Religious Tradition, Ages 13–17

Religious Tradition, Ages 23–28

Wave 1 (%)

Wave 3 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Total

Extremely close/very close

36

29

31

Very distant/extremely distant

8

12

8

Conservative Protestant

Extremely close/very close

48

35

39

52

Very distant/extremely distant

4

8

5

3

Mainline Protestant

Extremely close/very close

40

22

25

32

Very distant/extremely distant

6

17

13

3

Black Protestant

Extremely close/very close

49

45

59

65

Very distant/extremely distant

5

6

2

1

Catholic

Extremely close/very close

31

23

24

27

Very distant/extremely distant

5

10

6

8

Jewish

Extremely close/very close

10

7

12

34

Very distant/extremely distant

21

17

21

19

Latter-day Saints

Extremely close/very close

44

55

51

68

Very distant/extremely distant

6

10

5

1

Not Religious

Extremely close/very close

9

12

15

9

Very distant/extremely distant

24

23

11

13

Source: National Study of Youth and Religion surveys 2002, 2008, 2013.

Table 3.8 Private Prayer

1

2

3

4

Religious Tradition, Ages 13–17

Religious Tradition, Ages 23–28

Wave 1 (%)

Wave 3 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Total

Once a day or more

38

30

34

Never

15

20

25

Conservative Protestant

Once a day or more

49

42

48

64

Never

5

10

12

1

Mainline Protestant

Once a day or more

32

24

24

36

Never

11

23

32

6

Black Protestant

Once a day or more

55

43

55

61

Never

5

6

9

3

Catholic

Once a day or more

33

22

26

29

Never

13

20

24

8

Jewish

Once a day or more

9

8

9

26

Never

34

45

59

42

Latter-day Saints

Once a day or more

57

54

53

71

Never

12

23

24

6

Not Religious

Once a day or more

11

18

14

8

Never

51

48

56

60

Source: National Study of Youth and Religion surveys 2002, 2008, 2013.

Table 3.9 Self-Reported Religious Change over the Past Five Years

1

2

3

4

Religious Tradition, Ages 13–17

Religious Tradition, Ages 23–28

Wave 1 (%)

Wave 3 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Total

Became more religious

24

25

Became less religious

17

19

Stayed about the same

59

56

Conservative Protestant

Became more religious

27

29

43

Became less religious

20

19

11

Stayed about the same

53

52

46

Mainline Protestant

Became more religious

16

19

27

Became less religious

23

24

18

Stayed about the same

60

57

55

Black Protestant

Became more religious

37

40

42

Became less religious

13

14

14

Stayed about the same

49

45

44

Catholic

Became more religious

16

24

24

Became less religious

17

24

18

Stayed about the same

66

52

58

Jewish

Became more religious

15

8

19

Became less religious

19

12

6

Stayed about the same

66

80

76

Latter-day Saints

Became more religious

51

22

32

Became less religious

13

16

8

Stayed about the same

33

62

60

Not Religious

Became more religious

20

15

7

Became less religious

7

10

28

Stayed about the same

73

75

65

Source: National Study of Youth and Religion surveys 2002, 2008, 2013.

Tradition-Specific Change

Up to this point we have been painting with a broad brush the general patterns of change among the emerging adults in our study. Moving forward, we look more closely at the individual religious traditions and examine the ways in which the tradition-specific changes align with or diverge from the larger trends.

Continued Decline

The general decline that we see in the aggregate sample is reflected most clearly among Catholic emerging adults. As we saw in the larger sample, the greatest decline in religious engagement was highlighted by the measure of religious service attendance. At the time of the first survey, Catholic teenagers reported weekly attendance of 40 percent, the same as the full sample. By the time of the final survey, weekly attendance had declined even more than among the full sample of emerging adults. Among those who identified as Catholic as teenagers, regardless of their current identity, just 12 percent continued to report attending services weekly. Yet, even if we narrow the focus to only those who currently identify as Catholic, the weekly attendance rate is just 16 percent, lower than the average for the total group of our respondents.

The rest of the religion measures show less dramatic decline among Catholics, but the overall pattern is consistent with movement away from religious engagement. As discussed earlier in the chapter, there are two potential comparisons to draw when examining religious change over time. The first is to examine the group of individuals who were a part of the religious tradition as teenagers and compare their reports from that point in time to their present reports of the various religious measures. The second is to compare the levels of religious engagement among the group of religious adherents from the first survey to the levels of religious engagement among the current adherents at the time of the final survey. By either measure, Catholic young people are reporting lower levels of religious engagement at the time of the Wave 4 survey.

While none of the other measures decline as much as religious service attendance, Catholic emerging adults at Wave 4 are less likely, compared with their responses as teenagers, to report feeling close to God or to say that their faith is important to them. At the time of the first survey, 85 percent of Catholic youth said that they believed in God. When we asked those same young people this question again in Wave 4, only 76 percent still said they believe in God. However, if we limit the responses to only those who have maintained their Catholic identity as emerging adults, belief in God increased to 89 percent. At the time of the first survey, 41 percent of Catholic teenagers reported that their faith was very or extremely important to them. Ten years later, 34 percent of those respondents identified faith as being important to them. Narrowing the responses to those who continue to identify as Catholic, we see that 37 percent said that faith is important in their life.

These findings are consistent with the previous waves of the survey and with the more detailed discussions about Catholic young people found in other books from the NSYR. Although the beliefs and practices of Catholic youth and emerging adults cause them to appear to be more disengaged than Conservative or Mainline Protestants, Catholic religious identity retention is greater. Fifty-three percent of the young people who identified as Catholic as teenagers are still classified as Catholic in our final survey. This is higher than the 46 percent of Conservative Protestants and the 23 percent of Mainline Protestants who retained the same religious identity over the course of the study. This group of emerging adults appears to be maintaining some connection to Catholicism, even as they distance themselves from the beliefs and practices of their faith tradition.

Solidifying Religion

While the main story is one of decline, there is a parallel story about those who are not experiencing religious decline. Among certain groups, we find evidence of increased religious commitment and participation. Comparing the Wave 1 and Wave 4 responses tells a story about what is happening within particular religious traditions. Among the Conservative Protestant, Latter-day Saints, and Jewish traditions, there is a general pattern of higher religious engagement among the affiliates of the tradition at Wave 4 compared with Wave 1 (column 4 compared with column 1). At the aggregate level, these religious traditions show increased religious engagement among current adherents. In the context of the overall religious decline that we examined earlier, what might explain these increases?

There are two ways to understand what may be going on here. First, attrition or a winnowing process is operating. Within any religious group, there are individuals who, although affiliated, have relatively lower levels of commitment. Over the time period of this study, these individuals might have moved from the fringes of a group to outside of the group entirely. Thus, those individuals who were originally somewhat marginal in their commitment move from religious affiliation to identifying as Not Religious. While this attrition is an important story in and of itself, another way to understand this is through what happens within these religious traditions after this attrition takes place. As less committed individuals move out of the group, the religiosity of the group gets stronger, and we see higher levels of commitment and engagement when measuring those remaining in the religious tradition.

A second explanation is that those who remain committed to their religious tradition over the course of the study may experience a strengthening of their own religiosity. This sample was originally collected while the respondents were teenagers living with their parents. For many who identified at that time as belonging to a particular religious tradition, that identification was as much about their family upbringing as it was about their own election of faith. In A Faith of Their Own, we heard from youth who expressed the desire to make their faith something of their own choosing, and not just something imposed on them by their parents. As these young people get older, they have increasing autonomy about their religious lives.

Now, as emerging adults, those who continue to identify with a religious tradition are more likely to remain in the tradition of their own accord. Being old enough to make these decisions for themselves, they have had to confront their own beliefs and perspectives about religion and choose for themselves the religious identity they will carry into adulthood. As they move into adulthood, those for whom faith “sticks” are committing more wholeheartedly to this faith that they have chosen not to abandon. Therefore, rather than a unilateral decline across the board, it seems that those on the high end of religious engagement may, in some ways, be reaching deeper or firmer levels of commitment.

Among the Conservative Protestant, Latter-day Saints, and Jewish traditions, most of the religious measures strengthened within the group over time. Although there has been attrition and a general decline among those who started out in these traditions as teenagers, reports of religious engagement are generally higher for those who identified with these faith traditions at the final survey than for people in these groups at Wave 1. For example, the percentage of respondents within all three groups who said that faith is very or extremely important is higher at Wave 4 than it was at Wave 1. The most significant change was among Jewish respondents. At Wave 1, only 13 percent of Jewish teenagers thought faith was very or extremely important. Among emerging adults, 32 percent of those who are Jewish reported that faith is very or extremely important. At Wave 1, 68 percent of teenage Mormons said that their faith is very or extremely important, while 79 percent of the Mormon emerging adults at Wave 4 reported this level of religiosity. Though the change in importance of faith is smaller for Conservative Protestants, the pattern is the same, with a shift from 67 to 77 percent.

A similar pattern holds for reports of how close respondents feel to God. When comparing Conservative Protestants at Wave 1 with those who are identified as Conservative Protestant at Wave 4, there is a modest increase in the percentage who said they are very or extremely close to God. Larger increases are seen among Jewish respondents (from 10 to 28 percent) and Latter-day Saints (from 44 to 61 percent). These increases in the percentage of those within the religious tradition identifying faith as important or saying that they feel close to God suggest that there is a kind of strengthening of the core of these religious adherents, while those who were on the periphery to begin with may have moved out of the religious traditions altogether.

Black Protestants are a special case within this trend. The main pattern for Black Protestants is that most of the religious measures remained stable over the course of the study. For example, the percentage of Black Protestants who said they believe in God at Wave 1 is similar to the percentage who said they believe in God at Wave 4. There are a few measures where we see the same types of increases we saw among the Conservative Protestants. However, these increases are not as common. One reason for this is that, as a group, Black Protestants often have the greatest level of religious engagement across a wide range of religious measures. At each wave of the survey, they reported relatively high levels of religious belief and salience. Given that they are already highly religious, there is a ceiling effect: They have less room for increasing the aggregate levels of religiosity.

Therefore, while we do not see as much religious intensification at Wave 4, this is in part because Black Protestants are already the most religiously engaged group. The religious measure that taps into levels of religious salience provides evidence that, even with the already high levels of engagement, there is a similar process of religious strengthening happening among Black Protestants. Across all four waves of the survey, we asked respondents, “How close do you feel to God?” At the time of the first survey, 49 percent of Black Protestant teenagers told us that they felt very or extremely close to God. In the final survey, 64 percent of emerging adult Black Protestants said that they feel very or extremely close to God. In addition, 41 percent of Black Protestants between the ages of 23 and 28 reported having become more religious over the previous five years. Black Protestants and Conservative Protestants (42 percent) are the two groups with the highest rate of self-reported increase in religiosity.

A solidifying of religious salience was also taking place among the Not Religious, although in the opposite direction. At the time of the first survey, 14 percent of the irreligious teens still said faith was important in their daily life. But as emerging adults, only five percent continued to say that faith is very or extremely important in their life. The percentage of those who said they believe in God also declined, from 49 percent of the Not Religious teenagers to 40 percent of the emerging adults who identified as Not Religious. As has been argued elsewhere, being religiously unaffiliated does not necessarily mean having no religious sentiments or beliefs, and that is true among our respondents as well. However, we do see that over the course of the study, not only is there a growing number of individuals who are religiously unaffiliated, but also those religious “nones” appear to be more comfortable with their distance from religion and more confident in their nonreligious identity. As a group, the not religious also seem to be embracing their identity and are more willing to say that faith is not at all important in their lives and that they do not believe in God.

The increased number of emerging adults who are embracing their lack of religion mirrors those emerging adults who exhibit an increased commitment to religion. Emerging adults who no longer identify with any religious tradition seem to be exercising their personal autonomy and disaffiliating from whatever religious identification they formerly had.

Thus, there appears to be polarization, with young people moving more definitively toward the two ends of the continuum of religious engagement. This trend may be linked to some of the developments we saw in , where there is an aversion to judgment of others exhibited by young people. That is, the cultural landscape within which emerging adults live provides a context where one can believe—or not believe—whatever they want, without much fear of disapproval. The solidification of a religious or nonreligious identity may also be linked to the greater level of polarization being experienced in society at large, where we are also witnessing a hollowing out of the middle in politics and culture, as people cling more tightly to their left- or right-of-center ideology. It is within this larger context that emerging adults are evaluating their own religious allegiances, and the results seem to mirror the larger cultural movement away from the middle of a variety of societal spectrums.

Attrition or Holding Steady?

The final religious tradition to which we now turn our attention is Mainline Protestants. This group occupies a middle ground between the clear religious decline of the Catholics and the religious solidification of the other traditions. The first story we see among Mainline Protestants is one of marked attrition. Mainline Protestants have the lowest retention rate of any of the major religious traditions. Just 23 percent of the youth who identified as Mainline Protestant in 2003 are still affiliated with that religious tradition at the time of the final survey. Among those youth identified as Mainline Protestants as teenagers, more than 40 percent now identify as Not Religious. This shift in affiliation is reflected in declines across each measure of religious engagement when we compare the Wave 1 and Wave 4 responses of those who were Mainline Protestants as teenagers. While 44 percent of Mainline Protestant teenagers attended services weekly, just 18 percent of this group attend weekly as emerging adults. Belief in God and reporting that faith is very or extremely important also declined by 20 percentage points for Mainline Protestants as they transitioned from teenagers into emerging adults. And young people who were Mainline Protestants in their youth were the most likely to report having become less religious over the past five years, providing further evidence that there is clear movement away from religion as they move into adulthood.

Yet, there is another story to be gleaned by focusing on the group of emerging adults who are currently identified as part of the Mainline Protestant tradition. Less than half of the individuals in this group were Mainline Protestant as teenagers. The other half of the current Mainliners consists of young people who have moved into the Mainline Protestant tradition over time. Most notably, 29 percent of current Mainline Protestants identified as Conservative Protestant during the Wave 1 survey. Given the considerable shift in the membership of this religious tradition, we examine the religiosity of current Mainline Protestants and how this compares with the religious engagement of this group 10 years earlier (column 4 compared with column 1).

In doing so, we see that there is not a clear-cut story of either religious decline or religious strengthening. The percentage of Mainline Protestants who reported that faith is very or extremely important is the same in Wave 4 as it was in Wave 1. As a group, current Mainliners are somewhat more likely to report that they believe in God, yet they are less likely than those in the earlier cohort to report feeling very or extremely close to God. On most other measures, the current group of Mainline Protestants reported engaging in religious beliefs and practices at similar rates or slightly higher rates than the group of Mainline teenagers at Wave 1.

Finally, when asked to report on their own perceptions of religious change in their lives, 27 percent said they have become more religious in the past five years, and 18 percent reported becoming less religious—numbers that closely mirror the larger sample. Taken as a whole, the story for the current Mainline Protestants is one of holding steady. The religious beliefs and the salience of faith for Mainline adherents in Wave 4 has shifted a bit across measures but overall is not significantly different from the level of engagement that we saw among Mainline Protestants in 2003.

Mainline Protestant beliefs and religious salience may be holding steady in part because of the influx of former Conservative Protestants who now make up nearly one-third of this group. There is evidence that some younger Conservative Protestants are shifting into Mainline congregations because they are seeking religious communities that provide a greater connection to Christian history than is available in evangelical churches. Although they compose a group that is not particularly large, these former Conservative Protestants may bring with them the relatively higher rates of religious commitment and practice that are characteristic of Conservative Protestant traditions and, in doing so, may provide new buoyancy to the otherwise sinking ship of Mainline Protestantism. This raises the question of whether Conservative Protestants moving into Mainline Protestant congregations will remain and contribute to the revitalization of these congregations they join, or whether this migration is simply a stop on their way out of religion altogether. Given the larger trends we see, the former possibility seems less likely than the latter.

Attendance

Regardless of what is happening with all the other religion measures, one thing that almost every group shares in common is a decline in the reports of religious service attendance. Understanding attendance patterns requires that we pay attention at both ends of the attendance spectrum. On the one hand, there was very little change in the percentage of respondents who reported regular weekly service attendance between Waves 3 and 4; most of the drop-off in weekly attendance happened before Wave 3. At the time of the Wave 1 survey, 40 percent of teenagers reported weekly service attendance. By the time they were interviewed five years later at Wave 3, just 20 percent were attending regularly. After five more years, at Wave 4, this number had dropped just one percent—to 19 percent attending weekly.

The most dramatic change uncovered in the fourth survey was not in regular attendance but in the percentage of the young people who have stopped attending altogether. Five years earlier, 35 percent of the young people we surveyed said that they never attend religious services. At the final survey, this number had jumped to 51 percent; more than half of all of the emerging adults in our study reported that they never attend religious services. When we look at column 3—those who were in each religious tradition as teenagers—we see that every group has a substantial increase in those who never attend when comparing the Wave 1 and Wave 4 responses. Jumps in the numbers of those who never attend are less dramatic when we limit the analysis to only those who are currently affiliated with each religious tradition (column 4). Yet, even among current adherents, there are increases in nonattendance for all groups except Conservative Protestants and Black Protestants.

The fact that religious service attendance shifted more than any other religion measure is noteworthy and raises questions about the relationship that these emerging adults have with the institution of religion and the congregations that represent this institution. This move away from congregational involvement may signal a deeper distrust of organized religion. We examine this in the next section.

Attitudes about Organized Religion

To this point in the chapter, we have been examining the religious lives of emerging adults, assessing the general decline in the importance of religion in their lives and the shifts and changes in their religious beliefs, experiences, and practices. We now turn the tables and allow these young people an opportunity to assess mainstream or organized religion, such as churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples. What do they think about religious institutions in our society?

Emerging adults’ views about organized religion are less positive than they were when our interviewees responded to the same questions five years earlier. The next series of tables shows this decline across several different questions. When asked to respond to the statement, “I have a lot of respect for organized religion in this country,” those responding that they agree or strongly agree declined from 79 percent in Wave 3 to 55 percent in Wave 4 (. Conversely, there was an increase in those who said that they disagreed or strongly disagreed that they had a lot of respect for organized religion, from 21 to 33 percent. This increasingly negative view of organized religion was mirrored across emerging adults in every religious tradition as well as among the Not Religious. Young people who began our study as Catholic or Not Religious showed the greatest decline in their respect for organized religion, while Mormon and Black Protestant emerging adults showed the least decline, with only 14 percent fewer saying that they had a lot of respect for organized religion.

The questions about organized religion were not asked in the original survey, so we are not able to make comparisons to the Wave 1 data. However, when we limit the results to those emerging adults who currently identify with a religious tradition, we see that among those who are still religiously affiliated, regardless of the tradition, support for organized religion is higher than among the larger group of those who were affiliated with each tradition as teenagers. For example, only 53 percent of those who were Catholics and 48 percent of those who were Mainline Protestants as teenagers currently have a lot of respect for organized religion. Yet, of those who still identity as Catholic or Mainline Protestant, 68 and 73 percent, respectively, reported having respect for organized religion. There is even stronger support among those who currently identify as Mormon or Black Protestant. Interestingly, among current Conservative Protestants, only 70 percent said they have a lot of respect for organized religion. This result, however, should be understood in the context that, in general, Conservative Protestants tend to think of “organized religion” in negative terms, viewing it as not sufficiently spiritual. Regardless, this does suggest that there are a number of Conservative Protestant emerging adults who are not particularly pleased with organized religion as they understand and experience it.

Similar changes are evident in other responses to questions about religious institutions. When asked if they view organized religion as “a big turnoff,” 38 percent of all Wave 4 respondents said that they agree or strongly agree, up from 29 percent in Wave 3 (. In general, across each of the different religious traditions, the same pattern characterizes the responses: an increase in the number of emerging adults who said that organized religion is a turnoff, and a decrease in the number who disagreed with that statement. Once again, if we look at the responses among those who are currently affiliated with a religious tradition (column 4), the negativity toward religion is, not surprisingly, lower across the board. However, even among those who are affiliated with a religious tradition, we see at least some level of disapproval for religious organizations in general.

Emerging adults responded in somewhat different fashion when asked whether they agree with the statement: “Mainstream religion is irrelevant to the needs and concerns of most people my age” (. For this item, there was actually a decrease in the percentage of those who agreed that mainstream religion is irrelevant, and this pattern was generally repeated across the different religious traditions. However, there were also fewer young people who said that they disagree with the statement. Instead, there was an increase in the percentages who elected “I don’t know” as their response, reflecting emerging adults’ increasing ambivalence about the importance of organized religion.

The final question regarding how emerging adults view organized religion asked them to respond to the statement, “I have very positive feelings about the religious tradition in which I was raised.” This item was asked only of respondents who were raised in a religious tradition and asked about their specific experience, rather than the more abstract concept of organized religion in general. Over the five years since the previous survey, positive regard for the religious tradition they were raised in has declined. As a whole, agreeing or strongly agreeing with this statement dropped from 80 percent to 62 percent of the sample (. Those who were raised Catholic showed the biggest declines in agreement that they have positive feelings about the religion they grew up in, followed by Mainline and Conservative Protestants. Jewish, Black Protestant, and Mormon emerging adults reported a somewhat smaller decline in positive feelings about the religion in which they were raised. Although positive feelings have declined among those who were raised Conservative Protestant, it should be noted that this tradition still has one of the highest rates of respondents who feel positive about the religion of their youth; they rank just behind Latter-day Saints, with 72 percent agreeing with this statement.

When we focus on those young people who remain affiliated with the religious tradition of their upbringing, the affirmative response to this question is even greater. Among those who currently identify as Conservative Protestant, Black Protestant, or Mormon, more than 85 percent reported positive feelings about the religion in which they grew up. And for Jewish, Catholic, and Mainline Protestant respondents, agreement was just under 80 percent. These higher percentages among the currently affiliated provide support for the larger story of a divide among respondents. While there are significant numbers of emerging adults who are disaffiliating and disengaging from organized religion, there are also young people who remain religious and are continuing to strengthen their commitment to and regard for religion and religious institutions.

In sum, emerging adults are fairly divided on how they view organized religion. For those who are still involved, more said that religious organizations are important and can be relevant to young people. For those who have left, or are on their way out, organized religion is less likely to be viewed positively. Yet, even within the group of less religious emerging adults, religious institutions have not been rejected completely because there are still some who maintain a positive view of religious organizations.

Table 3.10 Respect for Organized Religion

1

2

3

4

Religious Tradition, Ages 13–17

Religious Tradition, Ages 23–28

Wave 1 (%)

Wave 3 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Total

Strongly agree/agree

79

55

Strongly disagree/disagree

21

33

Conservative Protestant

Strongly agree/agree

84

60

70

Strongly disagree/disagree

16

28

16

Mainline Protestant

Strongly agree/agree

73

48

73

Strongly disagree/disagree

27

43

21

Black Protestant

Strongly agree/agree

89

75

79

Strongly disagree/disagree

11

14

12

Catholic

Strongly agree/agree

81

53

68

Strongly disagree/disagree

19

32

18

Jewish

Strongly agree/agree

58

36

51

Strongly disagree/disagree

42

58

41

Latter-day Saints

Strongly agree/agree

91

77

96

Strongly disagree/disagree

9

19

3

Not Religious

Strongly agree/agree

60

34

25

Strongly disagree/disagree

40

54

63

Note: Survey question wording was, “How strongly do you agree with the following statement: I have a lot of respect for organized religion in this country?”

Source: National Study of Youth and Religion surveys 2002, 2008, 2013.

Table 3.11 Organized Religion is a Turnoff

1

2

3

4

Religious Tradition, Ages 13–17

Religious Tradition, Ages 23–28

Wave 1 (%)

Wave 3 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Total

Strongly agree/agree

29

38

Strongly disagree/disagree

70

52

Conservative Protestant

Strongly agree/agree

23

30

15

Strongly disagree/disagree

76

60

72

Mainline Protestant

Strongly agree/agree

36

45

25

Strongly disagree/disagree

63

46

72

Black Protestant

Strongly agree/agree

14

19

12

Strongly disagree/disagree

85

7

80

Catholic

Strongly agree/agree

26

38

26

Strongly disagree/disagree

72

51

63

Jewish

Strongly agree/agree

52

65

38

Strongly disagree/disagree

48

29

53

Latter-day Saints

Strongly agree/agree

21

29

9

Strongly disagree/disagree

79

67

90

Not Religious

Strongly agree/agree

51

63

71

Strongly disagree/disagree

49

28

20

Note: Survey question wording was, “How strongly do you agree with the following statement: Organized religion is usually a big turnoff for me?”

Source: National Study of Youth and Religion surveys 2002, 2008, 2013.

Table 3.12 Irrelevance of Mainstream Religion

1

2

3

4

Religious Tradition, Ages 13–17

Religious Tradition, Ages 23–28

Wave 1 (%)

Wave 3 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Total

Strongly agree/agree

42

34

Strongly disagree/disagree

56

47

Conservative Protestant

Strongly agree/agree

38

28

21

Strongly disagree/disagree

60

56

63

Mainline Protestant

Strongly agree/agree

40

36

25

Strongly disagree/disagree

59

45

62

Black Protestant

Strongly agree/agree

43

30

24

Strongly disagree/disagree

54

56

68

Catholic

Strongly agree/agree

42

36

29

Strongly disagree/disagree

55

45

52

Jewish

Strongly agree/agree

55

37

37

Strongly disagree/disagree

42

31

39

Latter-day Saints

Strongly agree/agree

28

21

7

Strongly disagree/disagree

72

68

87

Not Religious

Strongly agree/agree

48

45

50

Strongly disagree/disagree

50

30

27

Note: Survey question wording was, “How strongly do you agree with the following statement: Most mainstream religion is irrelevant to the needs and concerns of most people my age?”

Source: National Study of Youth and Religion surveys 2002, 2008, 2013.

Table 3.13 Positive Feelings about Religious Tradition

1

2

3

4

Religious Tradition, Ages 13–17

Religious Tradition, Ages 23–28

Wave 1 (%)

Wave 3 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Wave 4 (%)

Total

Strongly agree/agree

80

62

Strongly disagree/disagree

19

18

Conservative Protestant

Strongly agree/agree

84

72

86

Strongly disagree/disagree

15

8

Mainline Protestant

Strongly agree/agree

76

61

78

Strongly disagree/disagree

23

13

Black Protestant

Strongly agree/agree

90

82

87

Strongly disagree/disagree

9

10

Catholic

Strongly agree/agree

77

57

78

Strongly disagree/disagree

22

9

Jewish

Strongly agree/agree

76

68

79

Strongly disagree/disagree

19

6

Latter-day Saints

Strongly agree/agree

84

74

90

Strongly disagree/disagree

16

8

Not Religious

Strongly agree/agree

~

32

28

Strongly disagree/disagree

~

33

Note: Survey question wording was, “How strongly do you agree with the following statement: I have very positive feelings about the religious tradition in which I was raised?”

Source: National Study of Youth and Religion surveys 2002, 2008, 2013.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have told two different stories of emerging adults and their religious lives. The first story is one of emerging adults’ disaffiliation from the religious institutions of their teenage years and an increase in those saying that they are not religious, accompanied by a decline in religious practice and the importance of religion in their lives. The second story describes those who continue to identify with a religious tradition and appear to have solidified their religious commitment. These young people are more likely to consider religion an important part of their lives, to attend religious services, and to pursue other religious and spiritual practices. In general, they are more interested in and committed to their religion and its place in their lives.

In the first story, we see emerging adults who are leaving the religious traditions in which they were raised, continuing a trend we saw in Wave 3. There is a distinct decline in religious affiliation among emerging adults, paralleling declines in religious practice and belief in the relative importance of spirituality in their lives. If there is a “winner” in this story, it is the Not Religious category, which reflects a significant increase in the percentage of emerging adults who no longer identify with any religious tradition. A less obvious part of this trend is that there has been an increase in the number of emerging adults in our Indeterminate category of religious identity. This could be for a number of reasons, and although this uptick in the number of religiously indeterminate young adults is a much smaller increase than in those who now claim that they are not religious, it is likely an indicator of increasing religious ambivalence, decreasing particularism, and the more general state of transition that characterizes the lives of young people. It remains to be seen whether this religiously indeterminate status represents an intermediate location as our respondents make their way out of religion altogether. However, a large percentage of those who were religiously indeterminate as teenagers are now not religious, suggesting that the “exit door” is perhaps the most likely trajectory for these emerging adults.

All of the major religious traditions are losing emerging adults, mostly as these young people begin to identify themselves as not religious. The general decline also shows up in other key areas of the lives of young people. For example, fewer emerging adults said that religious faith is important in their lives or that they are interested in learning more about their religion. Similarly, slightly fewer said that they believe in God, and there is a definite shift from belief in a personal God to some other version of God. Fewer believe in the afterlife or that heaven is a real place. Many still seem to want to believe in God as well as the notion that there might be more to reality than just the physical world, but they are just less certain of who or what that “something else” might be. It follows, then, that with this shift to being less formally religious, regardless of what they said they believe, emerging adults as a whole place less importance on the formal aspects of religious and spiritual practice, such as prayer or attendance at religious services.

Finally, emerging adult views about organized religion are not entirely what we might expect, given the story of religious decline. We might have expected that, owing to the increasing numbers of young adults who are “checking out” of religious institutions, there would be increased animosity toward organized religion. On the contrary, there seems to be a lingering soft spot on their part for organized religion. Certainly, there are those who have no use for religion and see it in negative terms, and support for religious institutions is declining overall. Yet, there are larger numbers of emerging adults who continue to say that they have respect for organized religion and that it is not irrelevant for people their age. Despite the large increase in the number of emerging adults who say that they are not religious, they remain generally supportive of religious organizations, although their involvement with organized religion is decreasing.

In the second story, we saw that those who still identify with particular religious traditions seem in general to be more committed to and interested in their religion. Compared with those who say they are not religious, these emerging adults are much more likely to attend religious services regularly, pursue other religious and spiritual practices, say that religion is important in their everyday lives, assent to more conventional religious beliefs, and have more positive views of organized religion.

There are, however, interesting similarities between those emerging adults who still identify with a religious tradition and those who are not religious. For example, while religiously affiliated emerging adults are more likely to positively view the religion in which they were raised, many nonreligious emerging adults also reported similar feelings. The two groups are also similar in their generally positive views of organized religion and in some of their beliefs about God and the supernatural.

This chapter has focused on the trends shown in the survey results, both overall for the emerging adults in our study and within different religious traditions. What is missing are the voices of the emerging adults themselves. How do they articulate their understanding of their own religious commitments and involvements? Are there other ways that emerging adults are both similar to and different from each other in how they approach religion? We turn to these questions in .

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