1. CHAP. I. Of the Ends of Good and Evil among the Christians.
CHAP. I. Of the Ends of Good and Evil among the Christians.
Augustine, in his 19th book De Civitate Dei, the fourth Chapter, very well declareth, how Christian hope is carried unto those good things, which cannot be seen. For if thou askest (saith he) a faithful man, what he maketh to be the end of good and evil things, he will answer; Life and death everlasting: which things cannot be seen, nor comprehended by man's reason. And therefore the wise men among the Ethnics being puffed up with pride, would not settle their hope upon those things. For which cause, some held, that the ends of good things, are the goods of the mind; some the goods of the body, and some, either virtue, pleasure, or both joined together.
But God laughed them to scorn, and saw how vain their cogitations were.
For they would rather account those things for the chief good, which be tempered with many miseries and calamities, than to receive those sincere, perfect, and most firm things, which are offered by the word of God. For who can worthily express, unto what miserable and horrible mischances this body of ours is cast out? It is sick, it is wounded, it is dissolved, made crooked, torn, and maimed. Oftentimes men become blind, oftentimes deaf.
And as touching the mind, they are oftentimes mad, oftentimes frantic, and they that most labor about the truth, cannot attain to the knowledge of the same, without intermingling of infinite errors. How could the Ethnics boast of virtues, as the chief good things, seeing we have them as witnesses of our calamities? To what purpose serveth temperance, which is therefore given, to bridle drunkenness, gluttony, lusts, and the foul and shameful motions of the mind? For these things declare, that it hath no place, but in minds, which be yet subject to corruption. The which corruption, the more inward it is, the more miserable it maketh us: and, as a domestical enemy, violently assaileth the secret parts of our hearts. These affections (saith Augustine) are vices: because (as Paul saith) they hinder us, that we cannot do those things which we would. Besides, what is the part of wisdom, but to foresee, that by error we be not deceived in the choice of good things, and avoiding of evil? Certainly, if we were not bewrapped in errors and darkness, we should not need of this remedy. But seeing it is used, it argueth, that men are not yet happy; but are folded in great and grievous errors, unless wisdom do help on every side. Also justice, whereby every man cometh by his own, is necessary for none other cause, but to suppress robberies, extortions, and violent dealings. And yet, neither can that so prevail among men, but that just and honest men oftentimes suffer many things, both shamefully and unjustly. Now what shall we speak of fortitude? The same doubtless armeth men patiently to abide all sorrows, dangers, torments; yea and death itself, if necessity shall require. Among those so great evils, these wise fellows durst appoint the chief goodness. Which evils nevertheless, they said might sometime be so increased, as a man may kill himself. Oh happy life (crieth Augustine) that seeketh the help of death to finish it! For if it be happy, why do they cut it off, and shun it? But if it be miserable,
why do they place in it the chief goodness? Thus are they derided of God, because they despised that hope, which is neither seen, nor attained unto by man's reason. And because they mocked it, when they heard it preached in the word, therefore hath God, by his heavenly doctrine, condemned them, as fools and ridiculous persons.
2. Another sort doubtless, perceiving the often fallings into wickedness, and that of very excellent men, thought by their religious procurements; yea rather by their superstitions, and worshipping's devised of themselves, to cause God to be favorable unto them; of whom afterward they might obtain all good things. And this for the most part was the opinion of the common people: who after a sort judged not so evil as did the Philosophers. For these men were so puffed up in the pride of their virtues, and civil duties, and with the knowledges of natural things, that they thought these things to be sufficient unto themselves for the obtaining of felicity. But the common people were not ignorant both of the filthiness of sins, and of the daily offending's of the Majesty of God. Wherefore they thought it good to fly unto religions, the which since they had them not pure and uncorrupt, they fell into idolatry. And here came in the Hebrew people among them, and took part with both. For by reason of the ten commandments, they boasted that they had the sum of all virtues among them: and that if they fell at any time from them, they had ceremonies prepared for them, whereby they might make satisfaction. Against these things Paul disputeth in his Epistle to the Romans, and showeth, that it cannot be, that we should obtain righteousness by moral or natural duties: because as well the Jews, as the Gentiles, do not in their life and manners express so much, as they acknowledge that the law of nature, or Moses law requireth. Neither must we grant, that we can fully and perfectly observe the law. For then might we
attain unto perfect righteousness by works: which would be a plain absurdity. For herein standeth our righteousness, that our sins shall not be imputed unto us; but the righteousness of Christ shall be imputed to the believers. No doubt but there happeneth some renewing, when we being justified do work rightly: but yet this is not through perfect. Also grace is given to the regenerate, but yet not such, as removeth all the lets which do hinder the perfect keeping of God's law. Neither do we, in the teaching hereof affirm paradoxes or strange opinions, or set forth things that be contrary unto Paul; but we chiefly maintain those things which are most agreeable to the apostolical doctrine. But as for the rites and ceremonies, which on the other side the Jews brag of, when they be without Christ and faith, they are accounted detestable before God: as Jeremiah, Isaiah, and the prophets, which were interpreters of the law, have most plainly taught. By all these things it is easily gathered, that whereas all men, of all ages, professed themselves to seek for the chiefest good, yet that they which wanted the true and perfect knowledge of God, did as it were, but grope after it in the deep darkness, and wearied themselves in bootless labors.
These things being on this wise declared, I will now more largely and particularly treat of human ends, following specially the course of Aristotle: and will show between-whiles wherein he, as touching this matter agreeth, or disagreeth with the holy scriptures.
3. Aristotle in his first book of Ethics, endeavoreth to prove, that before human things there is set forth some certain end, because all human things desire some good thing: and that good thing whereunto they tend, hath the consideration of an end, and so human things have a prescribed end. And therefore doth he make mention of good, because it is the chiefest thing whereof felicity hath his name, and because the respects of good and end be
very near alike: in so much as some have thought that good and end are all one. And therefore Aristotle commendeth the old proverb, that All things do covet good: which may not be understood of any one thing; for it cannot be, that there should be someone certain end of all things, but everything requires his own proper end. For a horse desireth not the chiefest good of a man; neither doth a dog wish for the perfection of a horse, but everyone his own perfection. To bring the reason of Aristotle to a plain syllogism, thus it is. What soever things desire good, they have an end set before them:
Human things desire good, Therefore they have an end set before them. The Major proposition is manifest: for in desiring of good, they rest when they are come unto the same. And seeing the motion and action is there finished, there we say is the end. The Minor is proved, because all human things are comprehended under art, method, action, and choice. And I wonder much at them, which by the good that Aristotle speaketh of, do here understand, not only the chiefest good, but also think that God himself is described, which only good they say is desired of all things. And this reason they bring; that it is God himself which offereth all the good things of anything desired, and all those things are most perfectly contained in God, therefore no man can desire them, but he desireth God himself. But who seeth not that this is accidentally, which is utterly removed from sciences, seeing they do not teach the things that happen accidentally. And if this reason were of force, we should by this means prove, that unchaste men, when they be delighted with any form or beauty, should wish for God: which thing would be ridiculous. We grant in deed willingly, that in God are most perfectly comprehended all good things, even as the number of seven comprehendeth all the former numbers: which also the holy scriptures do testify. For in Exodus, God saith unto Moses, which desired the sight of God's
countenance: I will show thee all my good. But Aristotle had no desires of this conjunction with God: the prophet David knew them, who said in the Psalms, It is good for me to cleave unto God. But that this is the sense of this place; which we have expressed, the sequel doth show. For the philosopher treateth of blessedness, which although that all men wish for, yet for so much as they have placed the same in diverse things; to wit, in riches, honors, pleasures, and virtues, hereof it cometh, that diverse men desire diverse kinds of good things, all which things nevertheless would participate with the nature and form of a general good. Yea, and the philosophers having respect to the very same thing, wrote sometimes of the ends of good and evil.
4. But let us weigh how those things agree with the holy scriptures. First, that all things do desire good, it seems to be a certain imitation of God almighty the author of creatures. For he while he made every particular thing, had respect unto a good end. According as it is said in the book of Genesis, that God saw the light, the great lights of heaven, the stars, herbs, and plants, and other things, that they were good. Finally, he rested the seventh day, perceiving that all things, which he had made were exceeding good. Wherefore this endeavor of good things, is in all things the step and impression of the divine property. As touching arts and doctrines, we will easily grant that they desire good by themselves, and of their own nature, albeit that the same turn to evil and some unto them which be not regenerate in Christ: and therefore it comes oftentimes to pass, that the secrets of salvation are hidden from men, which be furnished and adorned with good arts and sciences, and are open to them that be simple, according to that saying: Thou hast hidden these things from the wise, and hast revealed them unto babes. And Paul unto the Corinthians the first Epistle:
Take heed to your calling (my brethren) how that God hath chosen not many wise men, but the foolish things of the world, that he might make the wise men ashamed. Which words would have no place, if arts and doctrine might attain to the leave good things, and unto that which might make us acceptable unto God. Howbeit these things, although they be good in their own kind and nature, yet to us, if we be unbelievers and arrogant, they are turned to evil. As touching choices and actions, the scripture saith in the book of Genesis, that The heart of man is inclined to wickedness, even from his first childhood. And Paul well near in the same sense said unto the Romans; For I know, that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing.
Wherefore we must say, that it is a fault of nature procured by Adam, that men not regenerate by Christ, are prone unto those things, which are in very deed wicked, unjust, and filthy, and which are exceedingly repugnant to the law of God: and that if afterward they be instructed by the discipline of precepts, and by moral virtues, or else that they be endued with an excellent wit, true it is that they overcome the fouler sort of appetites, and of their own choice are carried unto certain civil and moral things; but yet unto those (as we said before) which both be sins, and turn to destruction.
Wherefore we must constantly affirm, that the choices and actions of them which be not regenerate, are prone unto evil, as it is written in Genesis.
Which nevertheless is not against Aristotle, because those evils are apprehended under the consideration of good things. Yea, and we that be regenerate, are in a manner perpetually, whether we will or no, drawn unto sins, and those we most earnestly desire; yet by grace and the spirit we resist those desires, that at the length through faith in Christ we may become conquerors. But as for the rest of the creatures of God, we doubt not but that they seek for good, because they are governed by the laws of
God, and whatsoever they do, they do it by the law of nature: albeit that even they, for the sin of man, are compelled to be subject unto vanity. But of faith, hope, and charity, and else of the grace and impulsion of the spirit of God, Aristotle made no mention, because he knew not those things, which nevertheless do desire the most true good things.
5. Also human things have not only a prescribed end, as we have taught, but that end is manifold, and in that diversity of ends some be more excellent than others, for so much as this manifoldness is of those kind of things which have an order in themselves. And Aristotle speaketh of them for no other cause, but that he would of many ends choose the most excellent, which he showeth to be man's felicity. Wherefore to this effect doth Aristotle reason: Human ends are many, and one is to be preferred above another. A proof of the former part is: Because of ends, some be actions, and others beside actions, are works; and of sundry arts and doctrines there is not one end: so is the multitude of ends showed, partly by their sundry natures, and partly by the diversity of their beginnings, according as they are desired by other arts and sciences. The other part of the proposition was, that one end is better than another: which is proved, in that the ends of the principal arts and sciences, which Aristotle calleth ἀρχιτέκτονας, be much more noble than the ends of other faculties which be ordained unto them. Whereupon may be made two syllogisms: The first;
Whatsoever things have a sundry nature, and belong to diverse faculties, be not one and the self-same things; Human things have a sundry nature, for some of them are actions, and some works, and do belong unto diverse faculties (for arts, actions, and sciences are diverse.) Therefore the end is not one. The other syllogism is conditional: If faculties have an order among themselves, that one is better than another, the ends also of them
must be so ordered, as one is better than another: But faculties are so in themselves, as one is preferred above another; Therefore ends shall have the same order. Aristotle showeth that this faculty hath action for her end, and that an excellent action; and therefore (as Eustrathius saith) would have it to be understood, that those be not the perfecter sort of actions, which have a work remaining when they be ceased, but that very often-times the contrary doth rather happen. And truly if a man shall rather think that the faculties are better which leave some work after the actions, than those which are spent only in the action; such a one would think that the felicity of man is more imperfect than his works, seeing it standeth only in action. Wherefore ye must understand, that sometime the one happeneth, and sometime the other: to wit, that sometime the work which remaineth is more excellent, and sometime the action. For the end of the physician is a work, namely health, which is remaining in a man when he is cured: which end if it be compared with a dance, which is the end of the art of dancing, it is much better. On the other side, the end of the art of building ships, is the ship itself, the work (I mean) which is left after the building: but this end being compared with navigation, which is the action and end of shipman's craft, is more imperfect. So that as touching worthiness, it maketh no matter, whether the end be a work or an action: for sometime one is better, and sometime another. But this is certain, as saith Aristotle, that wheresoever the works are the ends, the actions which go before those works, and for which they are made, are excelled in worthiness, and the reason is, because they are ordained to another thing. And it is no marvel that Aristotle in his book of Ethics writeth so diligently as touching ends, since that manners, virtues, choices, affections, and other human things be so plucked a sunder, and be of diverse natures and kinds, that unless they be joined together by
some science or method, they cannot be taught, neither are they ordered and joined together by any other thing, than by the ends. And in the foresaid book of Aristotle we have only one general and steadfast rule. Every work that remaineth after anything brought to pass, is more worthy than the same; wherefore it behooveth that a work be not employed to any other actions, than unto that only action whereby it is brought to pass. And that we may the better perceive the matter, we must understand, that after the works already brought to pass, do follow other actions. For when a house is built, it is inhabited; and when health is restored unto him that is sick, he beginneth to be diligently occupied according to his nature: so when the work shall be referred unto these latter things, it is more unworthy than they, because it is ordained unto them. But there be certain most noble actions, which cunning works do neither go before, nor yet follow: such be the actions of virtues. Unless thou wilt say, that frequented actions, which be right and just, do at the length leave a work behind them, that is to say, a habit in the mind, after which do follow actions of virtues: which if thou say, I will not much contend; although I know that Aristotle hath another meaning, neither did he at any time, so far as I remember, call a habit, a work.
6. But since we speak so much of ends, it shall be good in my judgment to define what an end is. The etymology of the word is showed two manner of ways, one is of the Greek word τελέω, or τελεύω, which is, I make perfect, or I finish: whereof is derived τέλος, which is a certain perfection of those things, which are referred to itself. It is also taken for the term and uttermost limit of anything. Wherefore death also is called an end, not that we wish for the same, or that we be made perfect thereby; but because it is the term and uttermost time of our life. The other etymology is, that it
comes of τέλλειν, that is to say, to spring or arise up, because before every action or thing brought to pass, it doth shine forth like the sun that ariseth; and it is defined of Aristotle to be that for the which another thing is, and it self is not for any other thing. And Aristotle said because there be many arts, actions, and sciences, there be many ends. And first he showed the diversity of ends by their natures, and then in respect that they be of diverse faculties. He saith that riches, according to the vulgar opinion, are the ends of household government, whereas in household and politic government, he saith that riches are rather an instrument for the obtaining of some other good thing. I might interpret that other part, how ends are so ordered, as one is more excellent than another: but first shall be showed of certain doubts, that are against those things which we have spoken. For if you shall hear these things while the matter is fresh, ye shall sooner understand them, than if we defer them any further.
It is called into doubt, by what reason Aristotle appointed two kinds of ends; namely, action and work. For he seemeth to leave out την θεωρίαν, that is, contemplation, which nevertheless in his Topics he reckoned up as an end. And Quintilian in dividing of arts, the second book, and 19th chapter, assigned three sorts of ends; work, action, and contemplation. Yea and Aristotle himself in his Ethics, at the end of the book treateth of contemplation, and teacheth that the same without doubt is a great part of man's felicity. Wherefore this distinction shall seem to be maimed, when the third part is omitted. But hereunto we will answer, that under the name of ἐνέργεια, contemplation itself is contained. And it is diligently to be noted, that Aristotle said not πρᾶξις, but ἐνέργεια, because under the name of πρᾶξις, he had not comprehended contemplation: so as the division is not imperfect, neither Aristotle contrary to himself, nor yet is he against
Quintilian: for although these three are rehearsed in the end, yet is there two of them comprehended under one word.
7. But the holy scriptures are herein more excellent than Philosophy, that of men they appoint two sorts of ends: whereof the one may be obtained while we live here, but the other is waited for when we shall at the length be loosed from hence: which because it is the more perfect, we will declare the same in the first place. And such it is, as we shall see God present, and shall fully and most perfectly enjoy his sight, which Paul writing to the Philippians did most earnestly wish to obtain; I desire to be loosed from hence, and to be with Christ. And the same Apostle said: Now we see as through a glass, and in a dark speech; then shall we see face to face. Again;
Now we know in part, and prophesy in part, but when that which is perfect shall come, then that which is in part shall be abolished. And this excellent reward do the gospels set forth unto us, which after many labors and miseries of this life we shall have laid before us in heaven. But the chief end and principal good of this life, is, that we be justified by Christ, that we be received into grace by the eternal Father, unto whose wrath we were thrall from our nativity. Wherefore justly said David: Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered: blessed is the man unto whom the Lord hath not imputed sin. Which place did Paul for good cause cite so diligently unto the Romans. And to conclude, those are here blessed, which have Jehovah for their God, and do trust and believe in him with all their heart: and those not in vain did Paul call blessed. Neither is the blessedness of this life altogether distant from the end and principal good, which with a constant faith and invincible hope we look for in the world to come. For even the chief good of this life is none other thing, but
the self-same, which at the length we shall have. Only a difference of degrees and perfection passeth between them.
8. It is demanded moreover, that because we brought a reason why the work is more excellent than that workmanship, whereby it is brought to pass; to wit, because it is ordained to the work, whether this be generally true; that whatsoever is directed to another thing, as to an end, is of less estimation than the same, which, as it may seem, is not to be granted. For it is the duty of a shepherd to look to his sheep, that they may be in good plight. This he endevoreth to bring to pass by his cunning: where nevertheless he far excelleth his sheep. For who doubteth whither a man ought to be preferred above sheep. Yea and the angels, as it is said unto the Hebrews, are ministering spirits, for the salvation of the elect; whereas nevertheless their worthiness and nature excelleth men. And finally,
Aristotle writing of generation and corruption said, that the end of the celestial bodies is, that men should be begotten, whereas yet none of the Peripatetics doubt, but that the heavens are of more excellent nature than men. Some thought to have escaped the doubt, by saying that the ends are mentioned to be only of actions, but not of those actions that are efficient, to wit, of heaven, of angels, and of a shepherd. Howbeit this availeth nothing.
For things efficient attain not to their ends, but by actions, wherefore the self-same end is to be assigned unto the thing efficient, and to the work thereof. But we must understand, that as it is in Aristotle's 2nd book De anima, the 35th and 37th chapters: there is two sorts of ends, one end called that, for whose cause the thing is done; and the other end is called that, to the which a thing is directed.
The Grecians thus describe them οὗ, and ὧ. That is to say, whereof, and to which. As for example, a creature which doth engender hath the end,
Wherefore, to wit, that eternal and divine end, namely, perpetuity, which it would attain; which since it cannot absolutely have, yet at the leastwise it claimeth the same by generation. The end Whereunto, is the thing which is begotten: and the end of nature which is in plants, is to bring forth fruits and flowers: and this is the end, Wherefore. But the use of men is the end
Whereunto. It may then well be, that the end Whereunto is of less honor, and so is referred unto that end, which is Wherefore. And the end which is
Wherefore, is the more worthy, as matter which is directed to the form. And no man is ignorant of this, that the form is better than the matter. But it happeneth otherwise, when a thing is directed unto that which is the end
Whereunto, not that it should be made perfect thereby, but that the same should make it perfect. For then the end Whereunto is less worthy, because it is unto such an end. So of the angels and of heaven. The end of heaven
Wherefore, is to be resembled unto God, and to make other things perfect, which is the better end. For heaven in the doing of these things is better than if it did them not. Likewise in angels, the end is to obtain God, and to keep us: in doing whereof, they be more worthy than themselves, if so be they did it not. And the shepherd hath an end Wherefore, even his own wealth and increase, wherewith he is better than if he were destitute thereof, and of the wealth of his family and city. But the end Whereunto, are the sheep themselves, over whom he is ordained, to keep them safe and sound.
And that one thing is ordained for another, that it should preserve the same, and withal be more worthy than it, we have an example; When as by kings and monarchs, some are appointed to be chief rulers or deputies, and are directed unto the people, that they should govern and take care of them.
Unto which end they are not sent to be less honorable than the people, but that they should be obeyed and honored of them: and yet in these rulers, the
end is Whereunto. Howbeit, if we have regard wherefor these things be done, we will always acknowledge that there is a more excellent end. And by this distinction are dissolved the instances now alleged touching celestial bodies, the angels, and shepherds. For these things though they be more worthy than the end Whereunto, yet not more worthy than the end
Wherefore. For the shepherd is more worthy than the sheep, but yet not worthier than his own self, or than his lord, if he be a hired servant, or than his family or city. For he looks to the sheep, either for his own sake, or else for his lord, family, or cities sake. In like manner do the angels and celestial bodies. For they minister unto us, not for our sake, but partly to please God, and partly to exercise their own perfection. But the work when it is referred to the actions which went before, and hath no further respect, is the end
Wherefore. Whereupon the actions which went before, are, as Aristotle saith, more unworthy than it; but if afterward a further end be regarded, to wit, the use of the work, the same shall be more worthy than the work, as we said before touching the habitation of a house, when it is referred to the dwelling. And the reason is, because the dwelling is then the end
Wherefore, and the house the end Whereunto.
9. Also the holy scriptures do decree and appoint, that there is a certain principal end, whereunto men direct all their actions: whereupon Solomon, at the end of Ecclesiastes, when he had in many words treated first of ends, according to the common sort of men's opinions (speaking of the fear of God, which in the Hebrew phrase signifieth true and sound godliness) added; And this toucheth all men: because men are hereunto ordained and made, that they should worship and honor God. And David: One thing have
I desired of the Lord, and this will I seek for, that I may dwell in the house of God. And Christ saith: This is life eternal, that they know thee to be the
only very God, and whom thou hast sent Jesus Christ. But that seems to be repugnant which Solomon said: All is most vain, and but plain vanity. But this is not in respect, it is the appointed end; but because that men either know not the same, or else refuse it, and seek for the chief good elsewhere.
Wherefore their desires have an infinite scope, neither do they at any time rest. The ungodly walk their circuit. Psal. 12. And this is the difference between us and the Philosophers, that they set forth their end, as it should be attained by their own proper strength and industry: but we decree out of the holy scriptures, that the chiefest good cannot be obtained, unless we be holpen by the spirit and grace of Christ.
10. Again it is doubted, when Aristotle saith; because there be many arts, actions, and knowledges, there be many ends also, whether the proposition may be turned both ways; namely, that wheresoever there shall be many ends, there be many things also referred unto the same ends. We answer to the question, that this is not of necessity: because nature hath oftentimes ordained many ends of one and the self-same thing. For example sake: the tongue is not only directed unto speech, but unto the relish of tastes: also the teeth do chew and grind the meat, and do help the speech. And by the force of Logic, we not only confirm true things, but we also confute false.
Wherefore since there be many faculties and arts, we will grant that there be many ends; and yet by the number of ends the number of things cannot be gathered. Likewise we doubt, because Aristotle saith, that the end of physic is health; of the art of war, is victory, &c. (Against which opinion he himself writeth in the first book of his Topics the 2nd chapter, and Quintilian in his 2nd book and 12th chapter) seeing the end of physic is, not health, but to apply all things, and to omit none of those things which may further unto health. And if that the sick man, either by the intemperance of
his diet, or by too much weakness of nature, or by the fierce and intolerable violence of his disease, be not healed, the physician swerveth not from the end of his art. The like is to be said of an orator, whose end is to speak all things which may serve to persuade, and to omit nothing that belongeth thereunto: wherefor though he shall not be able to persuade, yet if he have a regard thereunto, he doth not stray from his end. The same may we say of the governor of a house, and of a chief captain. Howbeit in dissolving of this question, we are not to take any great pain. For Aristotle in bringing of examples showeth the matter after somewhat a gross manner, and was not very careful that examples should always agree in all points, but alleged them as they are used of the common people. Moreover, although that to heal, to persuade, and to overcome, do not always follow the actions of physicians, rhetoricians, and soldiers; yet can it not be denied of any man, but that these faculties have respect unto these things, and endeavor as much as they can to attain unto them.
Lastly, because we are in hand with ends, there is a doubt how any work is the end of an action, or of an art. For if the thing be considered which is made by the artificer, the same is the effect, and therefore not the cause. For it behooveth that the cause be before the effect, and nothing can be before itself. Here do some answer, that the thing made, is the end, not in respect it is extant and now perfect, but in that it was first comprehended in the artificers mind. And a thing may be before itself in a sundry respect; for it is first pondered in the mind of the artificer, before it be in act. But I stay not myself with this answer: for that same known form which is conversant in the mind of the artificer, hath a respect of him that is the efficient thereof: for as an object it moveth his mind. Besides this, it is not the artificers desire to have such a form as he hath conceived in his mind, but would have
it to be expressed in the thing, and directeth it thereunto, as to the end.
Wherefore the outward thing itself is the final cause, not in that it is extant or brought to pass, but in that it hath a respect of good, and that either the efficient party, or else his action is made perfect thereby. I grant that these things ought first to be understood and known of the efficient party, but I deny that these things have the nature of an end, in that they be forms and shapes conceived in the mind, but in respect of those things which they signify and represent unto the understanding of the artificer.
11. Moreover, there be many arts joined together unto one, and many ends also unto one certain end, that they may reach unto that, for the which man hath his being. And it must be understood, that as faculties are more excellent among themselves, so are also their ends. The examples of Aristotle are drawn from the art of those that make bits for horses, and of other arts, of trappers and saddles for horses, all which he affirmeth to be contained under the faculty of riding of horses. Also of the same art of riding of horses, and of all other warlike actions, as to ride, to shoot, to throw a dart, to wear shields, there is one architectonical or principal art.
Whereupon he saith, that under the art of war, are contained all these things: and it is to be understood, that the same principal art, or architectonical faculty, doth command and prescribe unto those inferior sorts which it hath under it, and that the end thereof doth govern the ends of them. Aristotle in his book of Ethics calleth art, power, respecting (saith Eustratius) the matter. For even as the matter is power, and by power is known: even so arts are in power to attain, or not to attain their end. A physician doth sometime heal, and sometime he loseth his labor: an orator otherwhile persuadeth, and otherwhile bringeth not this to pass. Also they are in power
unto contraries: as a physician both may heal, and may also hurt the health: an orator may persuade and dissuade: a Logician may prove and confute.
Again Aristotle affirmeth, that there is no difference between the worthiness of faculties, whether they have work for their end, or whether they have action. For if a faculty should in that respect be counted more noble, because after the act it would leave a work: then would carpenters art be better than the art of civil profession, whereas felicity is ordained to be the end of civil profession, which felicity is no work, but an action: which would be most absurd, since nothing can be found better or more happy than felicity. And this also we showed before: neither is this doctrine weakened by that former distinction of ends, that otherwhile some are actions, and that other are sometime works.
But herein is a doubt, that when Aristotle gathereth a worthiness of every end by the nobleness of the faculty, what kind of demonstration this is. And we answer, that it is of the effects, or (as they commonly call it) of that which followeth. For in very deed faculties do draw their excellency and worthiness from their ends. Wherefore since they be made excellent by them, to try the excellency of the ends by the worthiness of the faculties, is to proceed from the effects to the causes, although this proposition is true, which way soever ye turn it. For as we say that the end of the better faculty is the better; so likewise we may say, that it is the nobler faculty which shall have the worthier end.
12. Now since the matter is on this wise, let us see how these things agree with the holy scriptures. First, we will grant, that a Christian man in working hath many ends. For sometimes he hath hereunto respect, that he may call upon God himself, that he may celebrate his name, that he may give thanks, and such like, where he hath respect unto God without any
mean. But sometime he laboreth to restore himself, and by virtues and excellent actions to recover the image of God, whereunto he was created.
Sometimes also, yea, and that very often, he is occupied in the helping of other men, either by his riches, or by doctrine, or by counsel. Wherefore it is manifest, that even of a Christian life there be many ends, which ends nevertheless, as we say, have degrees and order among themselves. But whereas Aristotle saith, that where the work remaineth after the act, the work itself is better than the working thereof going before, it seems not to have place in our ends, if we speak universally. For when a man being moved with charity, shall cloth a poor man, nourish, heal, and instruct him; it is certain that after the act, he leaveth a work behind, namely, health, nourishment, or raiment, or instruction in the poor man: in which kind of works, the action which goeth before, namely obedience towards God, and the use of charity, are far more pleasing unto God, and more to be esteemed, than the work remaining after the act, seeing that is transitory, and shall perish. But how in him that professeth himself a Christian, the ends which be many, may have an order among themselves; it may be perceived in faith, hope, and charity. For as the faith is greater, and God more known by it, the more is charity inflamed about the end thereof: in such sort that the end, and as they say, the object of faith doth prescribe unto charity: and so much as the confidence is towards God, so much is the love towards our neighbor. Wherefore the end of charity, which is the good of our neighbor, is thus contained under the end of faith, and so it causeth that the power of faith as touching this matter, excelleth and is better than the power of charity. And thirdly, as the faith is firm, and the charity active; so the hope is more constant, and with a stronger patience and fortitude, we expect the performance of God's promises, in how much we apprehend those things
with a greater faith, and have more fruitfully exercised ourselves by charity.
And so these three powers, namely faith, hope, and charity, should be sufficient unto that which we would show. But when the order of the table of the ten commandments is set before us, we may manifestly in them declare the self-same thing. For the first table hath respect unto God without any mean, but the other is directed unto our neighbor. And we must understand that there is a greater dignity of the first table, and that the end thereof is more noble, because it containeth the other, and hath them under it, as it were the chief builder, because the end of the latter table is ruled and governed of the first. Whereupon Luther in his Catechism did in every precept of the later table, most prudently repeat the end of the first table.
For example: Because God is to be loved with all the heart, and with all the soul; therefore thou shalt not kill. Again, because God is to be loved with all the heart, and with all the soul, thou shalt not commit adultery.
13. When Aristotle had set down that there is a certain principal end prescribed unto men, he then exhorteth us to search the knowledge thereof.
Then in searching out of the same, he pronounceth that he would treat of two things; namely, to expound what it is, then, unto what science or faculty it belongeth. As touching the first, let this be the proposition: The knowledge of the principal end is to be sought for. He bringeth a reason from profitableness. That which profiteth our life is to be sought for, The knowledge of this end is of great importance unto life, Therefore we must obtain the same. He proveth the Minor proposition by a similitude of archers. Aristotle preceedeth very artificially. For because, if there were no such end, who would labor to attain thereunto? Again, if there were such an end, and should bring no profit unto us, the knowledge thereof would be unprofitable. Lastly, if it should profit, and yet not much, we would give
over the study of knowing the same. But now, since there is such an end, and that it profiteth, and is of great importance to the whole life, we are most earnestly stirred up to search out the same. The example of archers hath respect unto this, that even as they, if they have not the mark in their eye, do hit at all adventures; but having the mark fixed, they do it with effect and artificially: so we likewise, having fixed in our mind the principal good, shall not deal by chance, but by reason. And certainly he walketh not rightly in his journey, which knoweth not the end of his way.
Neither do the holy scriptures dissent from this opinion, that the knowledge of the chief end is profitable. For why did Christ so long teach in the earth? Why did he send his Apostles into the world to preach? Why did he bid men to follow him, but that they might at the length know the principal end? For the not knowing whereof he complained, that the people did stray like unto sheep without a shepherd.
As touching the science or faculty, whereto this principal end belongeth, Aristotle said is the civil knowledges, seeing it is that which ruleth other arts, and hath them subject unto it; and doth use them. Let this be the proposition: It belongeth unto the civil power to take order as touching the last or chief end. Whereupon the argument is framed in this form. This matter belongeth unto that science which is most architectonical, Such is the civil science, wherefor it belongeth thereunto to treat of the principal end. The Major proposition was declared before, when it was said, that of the better faculty is the better end. The Minor is proved, namely, that the civil faculty is the highest and most architectonical.
14. But (whatsoever Aristotle saith) that property of principal power, or (as he calleth it) architectonical, must be assigned to the power of the divine scriptures; for therein is contained the chief and principal knowledge of the
most perfect good. Wherefore God said unto the Israelites, that the same should be their chiefest wisdom, whereby they should at the length he had in admiration of all nations. Which if it were then true, when they had received only the law, what shall we afterward judge, when the writings of the prophets, and volumes of the New Testament, were added? Here without doubt is the science and faculty which beareth rule over all others, and which hath all others under it, how excellent soever they be, and useth all things under her end. For that which was said of the civil knowledge, that it may decree what arts and sciences the common weal should admit, and which it ought to refuse, that we find is most exquisitely done in the holy scriptures. For those allow magistrates, they will there should be pastors, bishops, and teachers; also that there should be handy crafts, that poor men might labor, and by their endeavor provide necessaries, not only for themselves, but for others also, whom otherwhile it behooveth to help.
And contrariwise, they exclude sorcerers, witches, and soothsayers, and also the art of harlots and brothers. And as that civil faculty forbad to appoint what arts everyone should addict themselves unto, because all men are not apt to all things: so the holy scriptures command, that we confound not vocations, and that no one man intrude himself into another man's calling. Let every man (saith the apostle) abide in the vocation wherein he was called. For if thou shalt be in matrimony, set not aside household affairs, the care I mean of wife, children, and family, so as thou wouldest preposterously take to thyself sole life. But if, on the other side, thou livest a sole life, and therein doest more promote the glory of God, and hast strength given thee from the holy Ghost, there hold thee. Again, since that all cannot be teachers, prophets, or pastors, let every man content himself with his own gift, and let him use the same with all diligence. Also the holy
scriptures do prescribe how far forth we should proceed in faculties and functions. The primitive church in deed did grant that Christians should use the old ceremonies, but yet for a little while only. Also it commendeth obedience towards magistrates, but yet so far forth as God's law doth permit. It willeth that a prophet do instruct the people, but yet no longer than it be revealed to another, Which when it is done (saith Paul) let the former hold his peace. Also it commendeth and alloweth godly and Christian liberty in meats, and other outward and civil things, but yet so far forth as the offenses of the weak be avoided. It teacheth in like manner a moderation which we should apply to the infirmities of the simple, but yet so far forth as by our dissembling we confirm no abuses. Also it prescribeth number, as policy and order: for Paul would that there should be two or three prophets which should speak by course, and appointed that the gift of tongues should give place to more profitable gifts. Also the holy scripture hath under it most noble functions; for it commandeth kings, magistrates, governors of households, and orators. For there is none of all these faculties, which hath not special precepts appointed unto it in the holy scriptures, and doth use all these magistrates and princes, for the defense of godliness, and for the true worshipping of God: eloquence, that it may persuade profitable and godly things: government of household, that new offspring's may always grow up unto Christ: and finally, all Arts, as well to the glory of Christ, as to the profit of our neighbors.
15. And now, as I think, it may appear, how the ministers of churches which profess these holy scriptures, should behave themselves towards magistrates, and magistrates towards them. They out of the holy scriptures draw precepts and rules of the prince's function: those precepts ought the magistrate to hear, which also if he otherwhile transgress, must suffer
admonishers, and must not be offended, if modestly, and with just reverence he be corrected. And on the other side, when ministers shall behave themselves either negligently in their office, or against the rules of God's law, they may be kept in their duty by the magistrate: and if they will not amend their faults, they may be removed from their place. And thus let the ministry of the church help the civil power; and again, the civil power oversee the ministry, that it may be pure, and profitable to the Christian
Commonwealth.
And in that we attribute the chief power unto that wisdom, which we have in the holy scriptures, it must not be thought that anything is plucked away or diminished from civil administration; for that authority remaineth still unto princes and magistrates: but we would only show, from whence they themselves ought to take the rules and principles of their authority, that they should not so esteem of the doctrines of the philosophers, and laws of men, as they would stray from the most pure fountains of justice and honesty, which flow in the holy scriptures. And they shall be able to get unto themselves this knowledge, either be diligent reading of the holy scriptures by themselves, which God commanded kings to do: or else they may be instructed by ministers of the church. And whereas it is said, that it belongs to the civil power to have authority over those professions which are to be retained in a city, and over those which are to be rejected from thence: let princes and magistrates understand, that the regard of divine worship belongeth unto them; namely, that they preserve, promote, and defend that which is lawful, and that they prohibit, and utterly root out that which is impure and forbidden.