15. CHAP. XV. Whether any Man can be Counted Happy, while he liveth in this world.
CHAP. XV. Whether any Man can be Counted Happy, while he liveth in this world.
Aristotle in his first book of Ethics, disputing whither a man may be accounted happy in this life, saith; that Since unto all men, though they live justly and well, may happen the same things that happened unto Priamus, there is left a doubt, whether any man, while he liveth, being subject to so many alterations, can rightly be called happy. And having secluded brute beasts and children, it seemeth for good cause to be doubted, whether any man should be accounted partaker of that blessedness: which as it might seem, is not rashly to be affirmed; because of the manifold alterations. For what sea or river is there, that can be tossed with so many storms, that can be disquieted with so many troublesome tossing's, as is the life of men, which though it be wholly well settled; one day, or one unfortunate night doth not a little cast it under foot, yea ofttimes utterly bring it to naught?
And not only the body is changed, which after a sort would be tolerable; but also the mind, whereby we now learn precepts, and now forget them; now receive counsels, now reject them; what within a while we decreed, we overthrow; what a little before pleased us, is now earnestly refused. These
things Eustratius considering with himself, and perceiving the cause of alteration of all these things to be derived from the body, saith; that Our soul, when it is joined with it, is as if it should be let down into a water troubled and most swiftly running, whose whirlpools our mind is so far unable to resist, as it is rather most vehemently drawn by them. By which saying we may perceive the great infirmity of man's mind, wherewith he is so holden, as he is not able to rule the violent course of worldly alterations.
Aristotle indeed might have named the variable and inconstant state, as well of the body, as of the mind, but he set forth that manifold diversity of things, which is perpetually seen in outward things. And that the thing which he said might be the more plain, he showed an example very well known even unto children, which had heard the fables of the Poets, namely
Priamus the most rich king of Asia, who had abundance of posterity, as he that was father of fifty children, whereof seventeen were born to him of lawful wives, he had great store of friends, he was famous in warfare. But the more that fortune flattered him continually all his life long, the more did she at the end of his life, take all things most miserably from him.
Wherefore justly and for good cause doth Aristotle demand, whether any man is to be counted happy while he liveth? And this may be called a question as touching the time; for he had before inquired of the causes of blessedness, and afterward he disputed of the matter, the subject, or persons which should be capable thereof; and now he searcheth out, at what time a man may be blessed, or so called. Whether (saith he) shall this be attributed unto him while he liveth, or after his death? The question hath two parts, and Aristotle treateth of either part. In the first place he dealeth with their opinion, which would have us to expect until the time of death, because that opinion is false, neither doth he follow the same; and he always placeth the
false things before the true, that those being confuted, that which is true may be the better confirmed.
The opinion seems to be proved by the authority of Solon, who was both one of the seven wise men of all Greece, and also a famous lawmaker: for he said, That none is blessed, or ought so to be called, before his death. This sentence was spoken by him unto the king of the Lydians, whose name was
Croesus, who outrageously boasting of his substance, riches, power of his kingdom, pleasures, and other good things which he enjoyed; And doest not thou (saith he) count me happy? In speaking hereof, he seemed to glory over the philosophers, who with their doctrines and sciences, in some manner of sort were in need; whereas he having no philosophy, seemed unto himself to be full fraught with felicity. Solon hearing these words, repressed with a wise answer the insolency of the proud king; No man
(saith he) is happy before his death, admonishing him, in a free philosophical manner, that by ill fortune, all those things might be easily taken from him, in such wise, that notwithstanding so great things, he might be cast down to extreme calamity. Wherein he was not deceived; for Croesus being overcome by Cyrus, he saw all that ever he had, quite overthrown. This sentence of this Philosopher did Ovid thus express;
Of every man we must expect, the last and fatal day:
Nor any person happy call, till time of death we may.
2. The saying of Solon may be understood two manner of ways. The first sense is, that it should be meant of the thing itself, and should be signified, that no man is blessed before death, but that now at length after death men be called happy. In this respect first this sentence is reproved as absurd, and most repugnant to the definition alleged of felicity. For if felicity be an action, and that a perfect action, it ought not to be given to the dead; who,
since they have no longer being, are able to do nothing. This is a special place to testify, that Aristotle thought the soul to be mortal: for if it remain safe after death, assuredly it can work, and that much more readily than being joined with the body. Wherefore he should neither rightly nor orderly withdraw action from it, as he doth when he bringeth forth such a reason, as cannot be firm; unless it shall be granted, that they which depart do nothing.
He seemeth to say, that this would be so absurd, as the self-same men, at one and the self-same time, both do and not do. If they shall be counted happy, then they do; but if they be dead, they do not. Neither is it convenient, that they which be not happy, should be called happy. I know indeed, that some so defend Aristotle, that he speaketh in this place of civil felicity, such as is not to be expected of us in another life. But what felicity soever it be, whether civil, or perfect, and eternal, it must needs be an action. Besides, if he had judged rightly, he might in one word have signified the same, by testifying that there is another felicity to be looked for after this life, of which he did not presently speak. Again, when he showeth a little after, that the dead as yet are subject unto good and evil, he turneth all his disputation to the good and evil things of this life. Thus did not Plato speak, in his last book of the common-weal, where he showeth, that then chiefly do remain pure and happy actions for us, when we be called away from this life. And in his book of the immortality of the soul, he appointeth philosophy to be a sound and sincere meditation of death; namely, that we should always seek to remove the mind from the body, the plucking away whereof from the senses, we shall then at the last attain, when we shall be departed from hence. But Aristotle, so far as I know, never spake one word of the blessedness thereof.
The other sense of Solon, Aristotle showeth: for he saith; If we shall say that he, which is dead, is not blessed, seeing now he hath no being, and is dead, then will some man in defense of Solon make exception to this that we say; This was not Solons meaning in his sentence. For he will grant thus much, that a man is happy in very deed, even while he liveth here; but that he ought not to be pronounced happy of us, till he be dead; because then in very truth a man may safely say it, when he is now out of dangers and evils.
There is a difference between κακά, δυστυχήματα, and ἄλλοτε μητρύιη ἡμέρᾳ, ἄλλοτε μήτηρ; the first signifieth the vices, which we of our own choice and judgment do join unto us: but the other signifieth the mischances which happen unto us against our wills. Unto this exception of these defenders of Solon; Aristotle opposeth himself, and saith; That which is affirmed is doubtful, namely that the dead are now out of evils and calamities: for even the dead are yet subject to evil things, and to good.
Neither must we think, that Aristotle here speaketh of purgatory and of hell; but of the good and unfortunate things of this life. Let us thus set down his argument; They which be not past the good and evil things of this life are not yet in safety, nor cannot be called blessed; But the dead are not yet exempted from these things, but are subject unto them; Therefore they be not in safety. The major proposition is manifest, the minor appeareth by a similitude: for if a man, while he is alive, be absent, he may have some evil and good things done unto him, though he perceive it not; as if some certain honor be decreed unto him without his knowledge, if there happen unto him some great inheritance, if there be a fair child born unto him, and such like things. These things, although he knew not of them, and be far off; yet are they his good things. And on the other side, there may evils happen; to wit, that he may be defamed, he may be punished, he may be banished, his
goods utterly lost, &c. Wherefore, although the dead be absent from hence, and perceive them not; yet may they be partakers of the good and evil things which here are done.
3. But let us see, how any good or evil things may be said to belong unto them, which are absent, and have no perceiving of them: neither do I think, that this is otherwise done, but because they be referred unto those men, and that they which do see those things, say and judge that they belong unto them; because they perceive that some of those commodities or discommodities, which are done, do come unto them, or be taken away from them. But without doubt, there is a far other respect of them that be alive. Although they be absent, and perceive not, yet have they a possibility to be present and perceive; and sometimes it will be told them what is done: but none of the dead can either be present again, or feel what is done in this life. Aristotle alleged against these Solonists, If we will regard the alterations and changes of fortune, the very dead indeed cannot be called happy; because they also may be subject to such alterations, at the leastwise for their posterity sake which be alive. Which he proved by a similitude of the living; for although being absent they feel not, yet may they have both good and evil things done unto them. Now we see the small strength of this reason; he seemeth to reject the same by this argument, which nevertheless, seeing the changes of the posterity are diverse and manifold, it should be said that the dead are never at rest. Which that he may the better lay before our eyes, he bringeth in a certain man which lived happily, until the end of his old age, and in the very same state of life died; this man's state shall now be oftentimes changed diverse and sundry ways for this variableness of his posterity, and of a happy man shall become miserable, and rise again from misery to happiness. And not without cause
said Aristotle [Until his old age] to show, that while he lived, he wanted no constantness towards the perfection of felicity. Which how greatly it is required unto blessedness, both it is showed before, and here Eustratius declareth by the example of Achilles, who notwithstanding he greatly flourished in that same expedition of Troy, and that he was upholden with all kind of good things; yet could he not be called blessed, since he died a young man. And that many changes of things shall fall out in the posterity,
Aristotle understood as a most manifest thing. For Hesiodus saith; Sometime the day is a stepmother, and sometime a mother.
Furthermore, by this word ἀποστήμασι he understandeth nothing else, then a space or distance of time, that endeth by the revolution either of years or months. Hereof he will have it to follow, that such a man as he described, should by infinite interchanges become sometimes happy, and sometimes miserable. These things are spoken to show, that those things which are done here, pertain not to the dead: when as nevertheless he seemed before to affirm this by a similitude. Now he denieth the same by an argument that leadeth to an absurdity, and the absurdity will therefore become the more manifest, because then, neither in life, nor after death, any man can for the self-same cause be called happy; to wit, because of the alterations which be imminent, which will hinder as well him that is alive as dead, from being happy.
4. Neither could he rest himself in that which he last declared; For (saith he) it seemeth very absurd, that the matters of the posterity should not at any time belong unto their parents: but wherein this is absurd he showeth not. He leaveth it, as a thing known well enough, and so known, as the common sort were of that mind: for all men (in a manner) thought that the dead are careful about those things that we do. Hence came the fables of the
poets, as touching Palinurus and Achilles, which would have their ghosts to be pacified by the chiefest sacrifice. And why he said [Not at any time] the reason is, because they might have made exception to the former reason; namely, that they did not affirm an infinite proceeding, so that all the alteration of things of all posterities should come unto the dead, but of near kinsfolk only; as if you should say, even to the fourth generation. Therefore
Aristotle said, that it would seem absurd, if the matters of the living should not once at any time belong to them that be dead: he declareth not the reason of the absurdity. But Eustratius saith, that this seemeth to be against the nature of man, and without all affection, as though all communion between us and the dead were quite broken off. But let us return (saith he) to the doubt that was set down at the beginning; namely, Whether any man may be called happy while he liveth, or else after his death. For by the dissolving of that question, this perhaps that we now search will appear.
They which deny this, say, that they do it, because of the alteration and change of things: howbeit they be deceived, because the alterations, which be imminent, may bring it to pass, that the felicity which is present may cease; but this shall they never cause, but that while it is present, it may be affirmed of him with whom it was present. And whereas they affirm, that a man may be called happy, because he was so; they ought much more to grant the same, while actually he is so. For according unto their saying, he might be called happy, even in that respect that he was happy, much more therefore while he was happy; because that for which anything is like, that is affirmed to be much more like. And as the Logicians say; No proposition can be true of a time past, unless that which answereth thereunto have sometime been true of the time present. The opinion of these men is grounded upon two principles; first, that felicity is a certain firm and stable
thing; secondly, that the same dependeth of fortune. The first is true; for blessedness is not easily changed, and therefore it dependeth of virtues, which are confirmed habits of the mind, and not easy to be moved. And therefore Cicero in his second book De finibus, said, that Therefore felicity dependeth of wisdom, because the same cleaveth fast and steadfastly to the mind. That fortunes are oftentimes changed and altered, no man doubteth; whereupon appeareth, how far these be out of the way, as touching the other point; because they think, that fortune must be followed in the placing of blessedness. But how far these err, he showeth herby; that they are fain to make a happy man changeable and unstable, like the chameleon; which must needs fall out, if we shall follow fortune, in the which there is no constantness nor stability: for such are the goods of the world, as they never continue in one state.
Moreover Aristotle saith, that we must not regard fortune when we treat of felicity; seeing the good and evil of man is not placed therein. A very grave sentence truly is this, that the good and evil of man standeth not in casual things. What (saith Eustratius) would it profit to have any being at all, if to be happy and in good plight depend of fortune, and not of ourselves? And yet of these, which we call the goods of fortune, the life of man hath need.
For some man might say; Since thou sayest that felicity is not put in these casual goods of man, why do we desire them? Why didst thou seek those things? Because (saith he) man's life hath need of them. But virtues, in very deed, and the actions of them, obtain the dominion and chief place in felicity. And a reason may be brought, why blessedness dependeth not of these things which be not in us, such as fortune is; but hath the originals thereof placed in our own selves. And as the actions, which proceed of virtue, are the beginnings of felicity; so the contraries, namely those which
come of vices be of a contrary effect; to wit, the originals of calamity and misery: so as it is concluded, that felicity is not of fortune, because there we do not choose or deliberate of those things; but in these actions which proceed of virtue, both our choice and deliberation have place. But and if that the common sort do think, that felicity is to be placed in good things, they must not be heard, seeing they err in many other things. And this only will we receive of Solon, that felicity stayeth itself upon a stable and firm matter, and since it is so perfect, and so absolute a thing, it must be sought from causes which are of themselves, and not from those which are called accidental causes.
5. To confirm, that fortune is not to be followed in obtaining of felicity, Aristotle bringeth the question moved a little before: for it is much doubted of this, whether any man may be called happy in this life; because there was a respect had to the alterations and changes of fortune. Then if we shall set aside fortune, that doubt will become apparent. So that the philosopher was moved to determine this sentence, to wit, that Nothing may seem more unstable than fortune. Wherefore it may be proved by Solon himself, that felicity must not be placed therein; because he judgeth, that in any wise it must be steadfast. But there is nothing more firm and constant in this life, than be the actions which proceed of virtue: which by an argument brought of comparison, he showeth; More steadfast (saith he) be virtues than sciences, whereas notwithstanding sciences among human things seem to be very constant. The foundation of the reason is; Because those things that be more constant than others, which seem to be very constant, are in that kind specially to be accounted for steadfast. And truly knowledges, if thou have respect whereabout they be exercised, namely, about things necessary, and which cannot otherwise be; and about the appearance of an assent,
which is most firmly gotten by demonstrations; they seem among human things to have most steadfastness. And yet notwithstanding it is not so in sciences, because that sciences break not out so often into their actions, as virtues do. If we should always be in contemplation, as we must always be doing something so long as we live, without doubt sciences should be as firm as virtues be: but contemplation is many times left off. And those which profess the mathematical sciences, while they leave off their study, they forget many demonstrations. Indeed, as well these as those are habits of the mind; and the nature of habits is, that they are hardly abolished: but yet those habits are sooner abolished, about which we are not often exercised. Both sorts of habits in their own nature may by discontinuance fall away: but discontinuance cannot happen alike to virtues and to knowledge's; for in all actions there is need of wisdom. In perils, fortitude; in bargaining, justice; in meat, drink, and carnal pleasure temperance; in conversation with men, friendship and courtesy; and finally, in every work a measure and mean is needful. Seeing therefore to all blessed men, the use of virtues is open, but not of sciences; it is manifest, that there may sooner happen a forgetfulness of sciences, than of virtues. For sciences oftentimes for the most part be of those things, whereof we have no doing: but virtues be of those things, wherein the blessed are conversant. And that which is spoken of sciences, we may also affirm of arts; for if any man, though he be a noble artificer, do rest a long while from his work, he will easily become ignorant and unlearned. All this reason cleaveth unto this ground, that it is not lawful of a sound and constant thing to assign a mutable cause; which certainly would be, if of blessedness, which should be stable, we would make fortune to be the cause, the same being variable and in a manner never abiding in one state.
6. Here will some man say; How doth this doctrine agree with those things which were before set down, that where it was affirmed, that felicity is the cause of virtues and honest actions, and therefore we should above all things, have determined of it, as of the chief and principal cause of all moral things. But here it is said, that therefore blessedness doth not depend of fortune, but is produced by virtues and good deeds, because these be firm and constant; but fortune is uncertain and variable. Indeed there seems but small agreement between these things; namely, blessedness to be the cause of virtues, and just actions; and on the other side, that felicity cometh from them. Howbeit, this disagreement will easily be reconciled, if thou wilt distinguish of the causes. Of outward causes, we must make two kinds, and the final causes must be severed from the efficient; and then it will be granted, that among the final causes, felicity is the chief: which nevertheless to be brought to pass by those things, whereof felicity itself is the end, no man must marvel; since between the end, and the efficient, this change or course is always perceived: for as the end is brought forth by the efficient, so the efficient is moved by the end. But which shall be those principal among moral virtues, which Aristotle pronounced to be most steadfast, and in a manner immovable? No others, in my judgment, but those four virtues commonly commended; wisdom, justice, fortitude, and temperance: for these do comprehend almost all the actions of man's life; therefore of a happy man they cannot be forgotten.
Another thing in this place is called into doubt; namely, that there may be found some man, which will both set aside the care of household affairs, and which hath decreed never to deal with matters of the common-weal, but to live only alone, and to exercise himself in sundry sciences which he hath learned. He, because nature is contented with a little, will be occupied in
very few actions, and will altogether give himself to contemplations and sciences; whereof it will come, that he will soon forget virtues, or else will sooner be without them, than forgetfulness can abolish sciences: or else that he doth not with great endeavor provide to have them. Wherefore, as touching this man, that will not hold, which Aristotle said; to wit, that sciences are easilier forgotten, then virtues. Hereunto will I say, that such a man shall seldom and hardly be found, who yet if he can at any time be found, is not so greatly to be accounted of, as for his sake the common condition of men should be changed. That which is taught here, happeneth among the most sort of men; neither can there be a science had of those things which rarely happen. And let us add, that such manners are not agreeable to the nature of man, that any should so lead his life in solitariness, that he would do in a manner nothing, but be occupied altogether in contemplation and learning.
When Aristotle had now discovered and taken away the cause of the error, he affirmeth, that a blessed man may have happiness in himself, even while he yet liveth; and by it may be called happy: and that changeable events and mishaps do nothing hinder it. And this reason he giveth of his opinion; namely, that a blessed man will always, or above all other things, both do his actions, and contemplate according to virtue. After he had said, Always, he added, Or above all other things; because it cannot be, that a man can always be in action or in contemplation. Sometimes men must sleep: and they that be awake, do many times for their mind sake, set apart the cogitations of learning, and endeavor of doing. Fitly he did rehearse as well action as contemplation; because the whole life of man is distributed into these twain. But here if one should reply: You speak nothing as touching misfortunes. What if any great mischance should befall unto your happy
man? He answereth, that this blessed man will very well, and as shall best beseem him, sustain these misfortunes. For it fareth not with him, as with the vulgar sort, who, if they be pressed with calamity, are discouraged, and have their mind troubled, so as they can see in a manner nothing: in like manner, as when fortune favoreth them, they be puffed up, they give over their accustomed study, and become in a manner negligent. Thus will not the happy man do, but will in a manner always keep one and the same estate of mind.
7. Moreover, those things which happen unto us are either prosperous, or hurtful; and as well hurtful things, as prosperous, be either great or small.
The small things as well in the kind of hurtful, as of happy, doth Aristotle take, and saith; that those are of no moment, either to change the condition of life, or to drive it from the former estate. Which without doubt we are to understand, as touching the blessed, and them that be endued with virtue: otherwise, the common sort of men, and they which be of no account, are easily and in a manner for the smallest causes of all, troubled and disquieted, which good and grave men will not in like sort do. Then he taketh the other member; But admit they be great things which do happen; those, if they be prosperous, will without doubt increase the blessedness of life: because they be made for adorning of the same. Felicity beyond his own proper bounds cannot be increased, seeing it is the chiefest good of all.
But in the blessedness of his own kind it may be greater, and it may be less.
But since that Aristotle saith, that blessedness may be adorned, it seemeth the same may be compared with a singular form or beauty; which though by itself it be delightful, yet is it more sweet, if there be any ornament decently joined thereunto. And the art of handicraft, when it obtaineth instruments more fit, doth express a greater cunning, than when grosser tools are
applied thereunto. But if on the contrary part, the misfortunes which befall are grievous and many, I say that they press down, and blemish felicity.
And Aristotle showeth what manner of oppression or blemish it is; Griefs (saith he) do bring in these things, and are a hindrance unto excellent actions. Hindrance riseth of two causes; first, they which be sore grieved become unapt to bring things to pass. And when the instruments be lost, we cannot without them do as we would: thus doth the loss of outward good things hinder him that is happy. Yet doth he mitigate this oppression or blemish; For an honest man (saith he) doth shine even in these adversities, as bright things do in obscure places. Wherefore the darkness of adverse fortune extinguisheth not felicity so, but that it spreadeth out his bright beams, even in that state; which is a token that honesty is still retained, which in blessedness beareth the chief sway: otherwise it might not give forth her brightness. And not to go far from the example already set forth:
Even as if a man, or a most beautiful woman bereaved of her ornaments, should be constrained to go in rags and vile clothes, assuredly it could not be, but that same beauty would after some manner show itself even in that attire. Neither doth Aristotle conceal wherein that brightness doth consist; to wit, in enduring patiently and with a quiet mind those hard chances: indeed not Stoically, by a certain insensibleness of grief; but of a nobleness of mind and excellent courage. These things may suffice to resolve this question; whether that we may affirm that a man can be blessed in this life.
And hereby may we fitly answer those things, which were before alleged, as touching the dead.
And briefly we gather, that outward good things, or prosperous fortune, do not fall indeed into the proper and natural definition of felicity; but are only applied as certain instruments and helps. Even as neither a handy craft
ought to be defined by the instruments which it useth, although without them it cannot do anything. By adverse fortune therefore is felicity straitened and stopped, in such wise, as it can but smally break out into act: for by the grief which it bringeth therewith, the mind is darkened, and the powers do as it were faint. But Aristotle removeth ἀναλγησίαν, the Insensibleness of grief, because therein is no virtue, but rather a certain kind of astonishment. And men must not be either stocks or stones, which while they be assailed with grievous strokes, should feel nothing. But herein is virtue, that those things which we feel, we should so moderate and govern, as they disturb us not from the right state of our mind. I know here that the Stoics do cry out on Aristotle, who think that felicity and virtue are not hindered or blemished by any adversities; but that perfect blessedness may be still retained even in Phalaris bull. And the Epicures, as it were out of their apothecaries shops, drew out that same notable consolation of theirs, as Cicero hath in his book De finibus bonorum and malorum; namely; In griefs, if long, easy; if grievous, short. These things nevertheless are easilier said than proved, and they be very contrary to the nature of man. Those things which Aristotle teacheth, are not only agreeable unto reason and to our nature; but also do very well consent with practice and experience.
Against the saying of Solon did he affirm, that felicity, while we live here, is not subject to alteration; because it dependeth upon a stable and sure thing, namely, of that action which is just, and according to virtue, against which fortune being most inconstant is able to do nothing. Some alteration indeed may happen unto a blessed man; but yet not such, as thereby he should be made miserable. For unhappiness doth grow by evil actions, as we said before, of which actions the blessed man shall not be author.
Unhonest and filthy deeds doth Aristotle call μισητά και φαῦλα; that is,
odious and frivolous: for frivolous they be, and of no value, because they turn a man from the just and true end: and odious they are justly called, because they be hurtful as well to others, as to those that commit them.
8. After this he teacheth, what a happy man should do, when by chance he falleth into adversities; Of those things (saith he) which are appointed unto him, he will do the best, and will omit none of those things which may be done. This indeed is the part of excellent artificers, that although they have not always meet instruments, and fit matter; yet do they never so deal, as they will suffer those things which are granted unto them, to perish without any profit. And without doubt, in this lack of matter and instruments, this industry of theirs doth exceedingly shine, which also we taught before as touching the happy man: the virtue which remaineth in him will appear, even in the midst of calamities. Here if thou wilt say; Why then are not adversities rather said to make felicity more renowned, than to blemish it?
To this we answer; Because though calamities do not altogether overwhelm felicity; yet after some manner they overpress it and obscure it. And whereas virtue doth somewhat shine in them, that comes not by any vigor of calamities; neither for that they conspire not herein, that the same virtue may be hindered; but because they be not of such strength, that they should utterly extinguish the same. Neither when any good actions do there shine, are those commended, as perfect in all respects; but in comparison and respect of the present state. And to draw an example even from arts; If any men which wanting their hands, as otherwhile it happeneth, do sow or write with their feet, all men will marvel, and will commend their writing and sowing; not as perfect and in all respects absolute, but in respect of the instrument. Wherefore Aristotle in his Rhetoric's, when he teacheth to amplify and commend anything, showeth that there must be a consideration
had; not only of the time, place, society, and such like; but especially of the instruments. Whereupon the devil perceiving this, and thinking that Job would not do such deeds that should be meet and decent, if the outward instruments of felicity were taken from him by God, desired leave, that it might be permitted him at his own pleasure to take away those instruments from him.
Two examples are so set down for explaining of the foresaid opinion, as one of them belongeth to the instruments, and the other to the matter, and these are not a little joined one with another: yea and when the instrument doth not appoint a peculiar kind of cause, it may be referred to the matter.
Albeit I am not ignorant, that some do reduce the same unto the efficient cause. But it seems, that we should rather yield to the former opinion; because as in motion the matter receiveth the form; so the instruments themselves sustain the motion and working proceeding from the efficient cause, and by them the action passeth into the matter of the efficient. And as the matter is to the instruments, so the instruments be towards the efficient cause, by which they are immediately moved. A chief captain after a warlike manner, useth his army, such as it is; when he prudently setteth his host in array, when he beforehand possesseth the places of greater advantage, and when he letteth slip no occasion of getting the victory, and well and wisely considereth such other like things. He is said to use well the army which is present with him, because it behooveth him well to know that army which he hath, as well touching number as strength, and the same howsoever it be, to use well, and not to desire a better. When it is come to the stroke of the battle: if he could not have a better or more copious army, now it is not required of him, but that he use that well which he hath already. Those things which are spoken of a chief captain, be also agreeable
unto a shoemaker: the difference only between them is, that in the one there is a reason had of the instrument; but in the other, of the matter. For even as the skins and leather of the shoemaker, are the matter of his handy-craft; so the chief captain hath his army for an instrument of victory. But between these things this is the difference: the matter is made, the instruments are not made, when anything is wrought. Again, that which is wrought, standeth of the matter; not so of the instruments, seeing they have no ingrediency into the effect. Finally, the matter is in power to receive form, and before it obtain the same, it is subject to the privation thereof. All which things do so agree to the matter, as they cannot be attributed to the instruments. It is proved by that, which hath been said, that the works of every artificer are not simply to be regarded; but according to the commodity and proportion either of the matter, or of the instruments. Which must no otherwise be thought of, as touching the actions of a happy man, that now falleth into adversities: for those are to be judged of according to the present state of him that is author of them. And then that followeth, which was said before; namely, that those things have their certain beauty, even in calamities themselves. For if a happy man, that is afflicted with ill fortune, shall always do good deeds of such things as he hath, he cannot become miserable. When that change therefore of fortune shall happen unto him, what shall this happy man be? What shall he be called? Here hath Aristotle somewhat to do, and while he is urged too sore, at the last he affirmeth, that partly he is happy, and partly not; because he hath not full felicity, though he have not fully lost the same.
9. At the last he appointeth a certain mean between a blessed and a miserable man, and in that place accounteth that man happy, which is overwhelmed with grievous afflictions. Trulie there have been some which
thought, that a blessed man doth differ from a happy man; because he is called blessed, which fully and all manner of ways is absolute and perfect; but a happy man, who having virtue and good actions, yet wanteth outward good things, and helps, and riches. Howbeit I dispute not of that matter; this nevertheless I say, that this distinction cannot be applied to the words of Aristotle: for he saith afterward, that a man cannot easily so plunge out from Priamus miseries, as he can be again a happy man. Where it appears, that he puts no difference between blessed and happy; but useth these two words for one signification. Wherefore he shall be in a mean; neither can he be judged miserable, since he still retaineth the root of that same blessedness. But since that a blessed man may be subject to some alteration, how can he then be said to be firm and stable? Because he will not be changed, unless there happen many and great mischances. Therefore did
Aristotle fitly make mention of Priamus mishaps, which both in number and greatness oppressed that king. Again, he is called firm and stable; because he is not so changed, as he falleth into the contrary, and becometh miserable. But it is demanded, whether it can by any means be, that at length a happy man should become miserable? Trulie there have been some found, which being oppressed with calamities, have in like manner been so much changed with fortune, that at the length also they have yielded to slothfulness, and to very great vices; and have quite fallen from the virtues which they had before. But I would rather think, that those, while they flourished with outward wealth, did rather seem to be honest, than that they were so indeed. For it oftentimes cometh to pass, that in these mighty and famous men, there is a certain show of virtue, but no sound and sincere honesty; and vices, under the renown of honor and riches, were easily hidden, which afterward when prosperity is gone, are discovered.
But why true virtues do not easily turn into vices, hereby it appeareth; because they be habits: and habits (as they be defined by Aristotle in his
Categories) are hardly removed. Finally, he is constant, seeing even in misfortunes themselves, he hath virtue, being the root and foundation of felicity, and thereby hath a most excellent action. At the last Aristotle concludeth of this property of him that is happy, and saith, that he is not variable or easy to be changed; as Solon did imagine, who for this cause thought that no man in his life time is to be called happy. He is not changed, saith Aristotle, by every kind of fortune. Which very well agreeth with that which was said before; Those things, which be easy, as well adversities as felicities, have small or no moment at all unto the life of a happy man.
Howbeit he granteth, that he is to be changed, if calamities be many and great. Whereby it appeareth, that that perfect action is not sufficient unto a full felicity, especially if we speak of the same according to a civil sense.
And some do marvel how it cometh to pass, that if vile actions and vices do suffice unto misery; why virtue and honest actions are not sufficient unto felicity, since it seemeth that there should be one and the same respect had of contraries. But hereunto is answered, that the argument doth not always hold in contraries; because every man is able to kill himself, but no man can call himself again from death. Moreover, unto health is required a temperature and equality of all the humors; whereas unto sickness it is enough, that even one humor depart from his natural constitution.
10. Aristotle having spoken of the one kind of alteration; namely, when one from a happy state is thrown down, not into misery, but to such a point as he is neither miserable nor happy; then likewise he dealeth with the other change, seeking whether any man, plunging out of these infinite and manifold misfortunes, can return again to his former felicity. Where first
note, that he speaketh here of a happy man, as of one that is absolutely and perfectly blessed. For it is demanded, whether from those miseries and grievous mishaps a return is to be granted unto the former felicity, from whence being blessed he fell; as Priamus or Croesus, or such other, which before were happy? Aristotle answereth to the question, that this indeed may be done, but not in any short time. For there is need of many things, which cannot straightway be gotten and obtained, especially of them which be oppressed with the injuries of fortune. And as a blessed man, like a square stone, cannot easily be removed; so being thrown down he cannot easily be set up again. We read not in histories, that such things did commonly happen; neither do I know of any notable personage, which being utterly confounded, did return to his former state. The holy scriptures set forth unto us only Job, which was indeed a pointing stock, and by the singular providence of God was restored: and if there happen any such things, truly they may be accounted wonderful and rare works. And how hard this is to be done, the example of Priamus now set forth may plainly show. Admit he could sometime have risen from so great evils; but when could he ever have renewed his city overthrown? When could he have restored his kingdom to the ancient form and glory? When could he have put away the sorrow for so many children slain, for so many kinsfolk which were now led away captive, and served the Grecians? The perfect time, which Aristotle speaketh of, signifieth nothing else, but all the course of life. And that in the same time (he meaneth the residue of time, until the end) it should be needful for him to possess very many great and good things, otherwise he shall not become happy again. If we would yield anything unto Solon, or gratify him, we might thus say; that blessed they be, and so called in this life, but with a condition withal; to wit, that they so
remain hereafter. Neither doth Aristotle seem to deny it, but granteth this, so as the time to come may agree with the time present. It is not granted to Solon, that a man cannot be happy, nor so be called, while he liveth, as though death were to be looked for. But perhaps when he is called happy, we must add a condition therewith. For it is to be noted, that he saith not, that they are blessed absolutely, but as men; signifying thereby, that there is a certain other most perfect blessedness, which cannot be changed by any means, and hath no need of adding a condition of the time to come; and this blessedness is of God, not of men: men are blessed, and yet they are but blessed men.
11. Now remaineth to show, how these things, which have been showed in this matter, may agree with the holy scriptures, or dissent from them. First we made a distinction of blessedness, so as one should be of this life, and another should be expected in the world to come. As touching that which is to come, we make with Solon; for we agree, that it is not to be had in this world. But the other, which standeth in the forgiveness of sins, and renewing of life by good manners, may be had here. But how a man may be called happy by it, we affirm, that every man is persuaded thereof in his own self; for every man can tell whether he believe or believe not. And this is that which is said; Let every man examine himself, and so let him eat of this bread, and drink of this cup. And we have the spirit to bear witness;
Who testifieth to our spirit, that we be the sons of God: he is present as a testimony of our conscience and good life. Of others we can know nothing, seeing their mind and grace is not known unto us: but so long as they profess the right faith, and live tolerably in the church, we are to hope well of them. And to affirm felicity to be an action, doth nothing hinder, but that after death, those which be departed, may enjoy the same; since our actions
shall then be more ready than now they are. And that our felicity may be firm and stable, let us, as Aristotle did of his, weight it by the principles thereof. Our felicity dependeth of predestination, of the spirit, and of faith; which are far more excellent things, than any human virtues or actions are.
And of much less force is fortune in these, than in those principles of Aristotle. Moreover, whatsoever Aristotle appointeth in his felicity, we have in ours: for both we would, that they which be justified, should live rightly, and renew themselves with true and perfect virtues. And besides these, we say, that there be high principles, which excel nature; namely, divine election, the spirit, and faith. And no less do we agree with him in this, that we affirm, there be principles of misery contrary unto these; namely, the reprobation of God, the want of gods spirit, and infidelity. He that is subject unto these evils, is to be counted altogether miserable and unhappy.
Touching the comparison between virtues and sciences, we by no means disagree from him: yea, and we grant, that virtues are more constant and firm than human knowledge is. And so great a steadfastness there is of blessedness, as Paul said touching predestination; The foundation standeth sure, the Lord knoweth who be his. And by faith and grace, the Lord would have us to be justified; not by works, that the promise might be firm, and that we might not stumble at those things, having respect to our infirmity.
Again, Paul saith; I know whom I have believed upon, and I am assured, &c. And he that enjoyeth this our blessedness, sustaineth very well the strokes of fortune; yea, though they be grievous. Paul said, that He knew how to humble himself, and how to excel, to hunger and to thirst, to abound, and to suffer penury. Our happy man in like manner is, as the foursquare stone; Who (saith Paul) shall separate us from the love of God? Shall tribulation, or anguish, or persecution, or famine, or sword, or danger, or
nakedness? &c. And he addeth, that He is most assured, that neither life, nor death, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, &c. Our happy man is not hindered by casual things, but All things proceed happily to them that love
God. Yea, and he will most of all shine in adversities; Tribulation worketh patience; patience experience; experience hope; and hope maketh not ashamed. And as Aristotle misliketh of unsensibleness of grief, so we also do not admit the same. Yea rather Christ, next the prophets and the saints did weep, and we are commanded to sorrow with them that sorrow.
Aristotle saith, that his happy man will never commit vile and naughty things. This do not we pronounce of ours; for David fell grievously, and Peter grievously. Those happy men of his cannot soon be repaired, but we have the most ready medicine of repentance, and that always at hand. In like manner, our happy man, of those things which are ministered unto him, is able to do most excellent things, according to the state and condition which he hath obtained. Wherefore that little mite, which the widow offered, was so well pleasing, so grateful and acceptable to God, as it excelled the oblations of the rich men. Lastly, temporal chances and misfortunes, whatsoever they be, do the more drive godly men unto God, and do draw them from the world. For our men cannot be blessed, unless they be poor in spirit.