7. CHAP. VII. Whether Young and Incompetent Men, and finally any other sort are to be Excluded from Hearing of the Word
CHAP. VII. Whether Young and Incompetent Men, and finally any other sort are to be Excluded from Hearing of the Word of God.
It should seem that Aristotle may for just cause be blamed, when he would exclude a young man from hearing of moral philosophy: for thus he saith; He will hear in vain, and without fruit, because he hath not experience: and that although he have his right reason, yet is he overcome with lusts and affections, and so overcome, as he cannot do those things that he would: and therefore (he saith) that as his reason is overcome, so is this learning understood of him overcome, and that since he is not able to produce the same into act, his labor in hearing will be frustrate. Howbeit hereof is gathered an argument of the contrary, to wit; that they by this faculty are very greatly holpen, which do suffer their affections to be ruled by reason. Again, it belongeth to those that be perfect men, to subdue the affections of their mind to reason: and young and incompetent men, which have most need of amendment, are not judged meet for these things. These being plucked away from hearing, there will be no kind of men left, unto whom these things will bring any commodity. Whereupon Aristotle shall hardly avoid it, but that this will become superfluous. Eustratius answereth,
that there be some men, and those not a few, which are led only by custom to become good; but they cannot proceed therein by an order and way prescribed, seeing they are destitute of infallible rules, which when they have afterward procured to themselves by this doctrine, they are most of all established in just and honest actions, not being now anymore led by customs, but thoroughly persuaded by a full assurance of their mind. And there be some, which of a certain natural inclination do fly from wickedness, and desire goodness; but how those things do differ one from another, or by what means they may, of the good things, which without doubt are manifold, follow the better, they are ignorant by themselves: neither is there any doubt, but that they which be so framed, may thereby obtain great helps. And therefore we are not to think that the incompetent, and they which be subject to their affections, shall (as we have heard of Aristotle ) be altogether unprofitable hearers: for unless they be wholly without sense, they, when these things are set before them, will at the leastwise know, whither they are brought by their lusts, and will perceive how far off they are now distant from the right course: and it cannot possibly be, but that some manner of way they will be stirred up unto better things; whereupon they may by little and little both be healed and reap commodity; as we read that it happened at Athens to the most desperate young man Polemon, when he had heard Xenocrates dispute many things of temperance.
Wherefore these things which are here spoken, must not be understood without exception. For some time there be young men so framed by nature, and so amended only by discipline and education, that even by this kind of learning they are able to profit much, as touching outward justice and civil conversation, which I think doth most take place in them, which being
instructed from their youth in the Christian faith, do embrace godliness from their heart. And this, by a most manifest example did Edward the sixth, king of England, testify, who without doubt being a young man, was even in his first age most prompt to the exercise of all virtue. The very which thing also will happen to you, if ye follow the doctrine of the gospel with that endeavor which you have begun. Wherefore Aristotle meant not to exclude all young men universally; but this did he most regard, to put away the objections which might hurt the worthiness or estimation of this faculty.
And this he did, least if thou shalt see young men trained up in learning to become at any time nothing the better, thou shouldest ascribe that unto the fault of this faculty, as though it were of no estimation, and served to no use: wherefore he layeth the fault in the want of age, because it is destitute of experience, and is troubled with perturbations of the mind. These, he saith, be the impediments, for which the proceedings of doctrine and approved fruits of the same have no good success. And neither was Aristotle alone of this mind, but Pindarus also, who saith; κουφότεροι γαρ ἀπειράτω φρινύες, that is, For light wits or young heads want experience: and Homer, ἀει γάρ τε νεότεροι ἀφραδέουσιν, that is to say, For young folk are always rash and unstayed. Moreover Horace, pronounceth thus of a young man, that, Youth unto vice, like wax is soon applied,
And fierce to those that warning them do chide.
And how wanton they commonly are, and kindled in their affections, the Comedy giveth a most evident testimony. Also the histories do declare, how
Cicero was deceived in Octavius; and how little, Aristotle himself could bring to pass towards the reformation of manners in his scholar Alexander of Macedonia, who being always inflamed with exceeding great ambition,
did most insolently bear himself in prosperous fortune, most foolishly desired to be a god, and so gave himself to wine, as being drunk he slue his most loving friend, and at the desire of an harlot burned the most noble, populous, and large city Persepolis, which was the head city of the kingdom, in such sort as it was utterly extinct. The like things doth Plato in his dialogue Gorgias speak, when he said, that There be two passages, whereby good studies do flow out of our minds; namely Oblivion, and Incredulity: for by Oblivion is taken away the skill, and experience which are gathered in the memory; and by the other, to wit Incredulity, it comes to pass, that we give no credit to those that admonish us. But young men do soon forget those things that they have once or twice seen and had experience of: wherefore they hardly get to themselves general sentences and rules. For we cannot obtain those, but by long and continual observation, which young men cannot gather by a short time of their life, neither do they willingly give credit to those that admonish them, because they are carried away by the blind sway of their affections.
2. And say not unto me that young men do protest, and have in their mouth, and do keep in memory special and honest sentences of philosophy: for although they speak many things truly, yet do they not think as they speak; and sometime they perceive and are moved with those things that be uttered, not much better than Laies do understand men's words, which they are wont to prattle; yea and drunken and intemperate men do oftentimes jangle and tell a fair tale, where nevertheless, either they judge the contrary, or else they cannot tell what they speak: and briefly, their speech is not according to their mind, but they have one thing in their mind, and another in their heart: which is then most of all perceived, when they get liberty, and have a full freedom of their choice. Then albeit they were first modest and
chaste, they bewray their mind that lurked, and their nature that lay hidden.
Who was a more commendable prince than Nero himself, in the first year (of his reign) while he was yet governed by the direction of Seneca? Of whom was there greater hope than of Commodus, who as he was of an excellent wit from his youth, so afterward he became a monstrous beast?
And do we not remember Joash in the holy history, which governed himself rightly in the beginning of his dominion, so long as he governed by the counsels of Johiada the faithful high priest; whose authority when he afterward despised, he became straightway corrupt, and by the liberty which he claimed to himself made manifest the shameful desires of his mind? But yet for all these reasons were never our forefathers lead, nor at this day are wise men lead; but that they bring their children, when they become to young men's state, unto philosophers to be instructed by their learning and wisdom. They send them also unto lawyers, that they may understand those things which be just and honest. And all this we learn out of Platos Axioms, and out of the philosopher's lives, and we also observe the custom of our times. Which was therefore so done in old time, and is also done at this day; for those words which Aristotle here writeth of, have not that sense, as though young men by this philosophy shall receive no profit; but because they are not able to proceed so well forward as they can judge in their mind what is here, and forthwith to direct their actions according to virtue, and to procure unto themselves good and honest habits of the mind: since these things require a mind fully persuaded and truly assenting thereunto. But in perceiving of other faculties, it is enough if the wit be applied, which whosoever shall have it but dull and blockish, shall not become skillful.
But in this our philosophy two things are to be performed; one, that the precepts should be understood; the other, that they be put in practice. As touching that first, there is no let, but that young and intemperate men, which live dissolutely, may attain unto. For if they be anything prompt and witty, they will easily understand those things which be taught; but to express the precepts of this faculty in this life, they will not be brought, partly because they want experience, as Aristotle saith; and partly for that they are carried away with evil affections. Perhaps thou wilt demand what manner of experience it is, that we require of them which should be fit hearers? I will show it by examples; namely, by abstinence to overcome lusts. By valiant and temperate actions, if they be often practiced, men at the length become valiant and temperate; so as without any grief, yea rather with singular pleasure they exercise themselves in the duties belonging to these virtues. And to conclude, we must understand, that there are two kinds of ends of this art; one that we understand what is spoken; the other and that the chief and principal, that what we have learned, we should perform: of which latter end, since Aristotle saw, that as well young as incompetent do fail, therefore he pronounced this kind of hearers to be unfit, if they be compared with others, which have now subdued their affections and motions of their mind to the rule of reason. For these may not only understand what is said, but are able also to judge rightly thereof: which as it is manifest, this philosopher did most respect, since all his whole reason leaneth to this principle, that young and incompetent men cannot rightly judge of these things. Also let us distinguish mankind, that some be sound, and some be altogether incurable, and that there be others in a mean between both: and they that be sound, we think have no need of these doctrines, since they be faultless and live perfectly. The incurable and
intemperate, and they which have utterly given themselves to filthy pleasures, shall not be holpen, until they have laid away this mind: but they which be in the mean, shall take great fruit hereby. Trulie this distinction is well to be liked; so nevertheless, as there be added thereunto, as touching them whose recovery is despaired of; that they must never be so despaired of, but that good counsels and wholesome admonishments may at one time or other do them good. For as the power of physic is not only to maintain the health which is gotten, and to finish that which is begun; but also to heal those that be destitute thereof: so admonitions and good doctrines, which be the medicines of the mind, have power not only to retain good habits, and to make perfect the virtues begun; but also to reduce to the health of mind those men which have quite lost the same, especially if we pass not the bounds of civil justice and outward conversation.
3. Now remaineth, that we pass not over a very necessary disputation, the same is, how it cometh to pass, that since Aristotle said, that Yoong and incompetent men are no fit hearers; he did not also reckon them which be endued with such a constitution, temperature, or nature, as they cannot be made better, and are altogether unapt to receive virtues. And that such there be, Galen showeth in sundry places, and especially in the book wherein he treateth of the mutual consequence of the manners of the mind, and temperature of the body, where he saith, that They which think that all men have a mind apt unto virtues; or on the other side, that there be none at all; do measure mankind but by the one half, neither have they known and perceived the whole nature of man. For all men (saith he) are not by the complexion of their body born enemies of virtue, neither do all men love and desire the same by the power of their own nature. Afterward he removeth this sentence or definition of his by a certain objection; for that
we see some so well allowed and praised for their excellent virtues, and contrariwise others to be condemned and dispraised, because they be corrupted and infected with vices. Neither is it meet, that for those things which be naturally within us, we should either be commended or dispraised.
Yea, and the one sort, where a Common weal is well governed, are punished; and the other sort have rewards given them. Hereunto he saith, that This is the natural judgment of men, to allow, succor, help, and praise those things which be good, profitable and comely; howsoever they come, whether of nature, or of industry; and those things which be evil, damnable, and full of shame, they dispraise, keep under, and take away (so much as in them lieth) not regarding the cause from which they proceed: which he endeavoreth to declare plainly by examples. We kill spiders, asps, and adders; neither do we first deliberate with ourselves whether venom be naturally planted in those things, or whether they got the same by their own endeavor and will. Also we do love and worship God, not weighing with ourselves whether he hath attained to his own goodness by endeavor and his own proper will; or whether the same have been grafted in him by nature from everlasting.
We might also add, that beautiful bodies are had in admiration of all men, and are celebrated with singular praise, although that beauty hath come by nature: and gifts freely given (as the Divines speak) ought to be praised.
And briefly, this he seemeth to affirm, that Evil men are condemned and dispraised; and contrariwise good men are allowed and praised; although it be not known for a certainty, whether that naughtiness or goodness came to them by industry, or by nature; or by any other means. And in this respect he blamed the Stoics, for that they judged that all men were by nature made apt unto virtue; whereunto though by nature and strength they be inclined,
yet by the ill example of other men, by perverse opinions, and by the talk and conversation of corrupt men, they are revoked from the same. But if it should be granted them, what I beseech you could they allege concerning those first men; such as they cannot deny, but that now and then yea oftentimes there have been in the world? When as at sundry and certain times appointed they deem that the world hath perished, either by the overflowing of waters, or by the consuming of all things with fire; and that again it hath been renewed. Whom I say will they affirm to have corrupted either with ill examples, or ill doctrine, or with pleasures found out, or with corrupt inventions, these first men brought forth again into light? Certainly this reason is of force against the Stoics. But against the Peripatetiks and others, which think that the world never began, they use in very deed another kind of argument: and that is; Put the case there be certain brethren which are begotten of the self-same parents, which use the self-same meats, live all under one school-master, and have no conversation with strangers; who (I beseech you) shall be assigned the author, that some be of corrupt and lewd manners, and that others do continually show an honest and chaste disposition? And if we will grant that, which for the most part happeneth, we will affirm, that there be very few children, yea in a manner none at all, that of nature have a disposition inclined to virtue; as those which must continually be stirred up thereunto by threats chastisements, and admonishments of school-masters. For immediately, even in their first age, either they be too fearful, or else more bold than is meet, insatiable, sluggish, wanton, soon angry, and envious. Wherefore it is a marvel how the Stoics can descend their opinion, namely, that All men are by nature apt to receive virtue.
4. And no less likely things to be true, do they think they speak, which have affirmed, that Mankind is so drawn away, that it cannot proceed in the swift course to virtue, by reason of the pleasure that riseth up unto it. For they which so say, doth Possidonius notably reprehend, who affirmeth, that we from our first conception have certain sparks, which kindle us up unto vices; wherefore it comes to pass, that we cannot beware of ourselves, but that we be inwardly vicious; when as notwithstanding we may provide that such ill seed and vicious sparks shall not break forth into open wickedness, and increase so far as they can be no more restrained. And finally, by the judgment of these men, the evil is far greater and more grievous, that we in ourselves do bear about us, than that which by outward contagion is procured. Indeed they grant, that a wicked custom, when it happens, maketh us wicked; and that a great deal worse than we were before by nature. But as touching the power whereby we understand, this they teach: first, that it may be, that by schoolmasters, or by wise men, or by unlearned men, we may perceive true or false opinions: but the sharpness of wit, foolishness, blockishness, and such like, which belong to the understanding, we obtain according to the quality of the temperature, which we in our mother's womb do take, even of the substance whereof we are begotten; whereunto afterward do come many and marvelous increases, as well by means of the meats, which do breed good or evil juice; as of the qualities of the air, and sundry chances that do happen. And there he citeth Aristotle, who treating of the parts of living creatures, saith that men do also follow the complexion of their mother. And in the first book of the history that he writeth of living creatures, he affirmeth, that the proportion of the instrumental parts are made correspondent to the manners of the mind, and that therefore those parts being well considered, many things as touching
the manners and inward affections may be showed by them that are skillful in the art of physiognomy. These be the arguments for the which Aristotle in his first book of Ethics may seem not to have spoken circumspectly; that those which in nature are procreated δύσκρατοι; that is, with an ill temperature of the body, he said would not become fit hearers of this doctrine. Howbeit we will after this manner defend him, that although the greater part of men, yea in a manner all of us come into the world infected with the sparks of vices and lusts, prone unto filthiness and wickedness; yet that these things are not so strong and firm, but that either they may be utterly overcome, or at the leastwise qualified and mitigated; whereby either men, as touching moral virtues and outward conversation, may become excellent; or at the leastwise be less molested with these evil affections.
And because while they lack experience of things of the mind, as in young men it happeneth; and that with the violence of a disturbed mind, some are plucked away, and are subject to incontinency; it is impossible they should be adorned with virtues, and perform in deed those things which in this faculty they have heard: therefore I say did Aristotle pronounce, that young and incompetent men would not become meet hearers.
But forsomuch as men (of ripe age) may profit much, although by the violence of ill humors and by nature they be stirred up unto vices; therefore doth not the philosopher remove them from the number of those that should be hearers: for that which is wanting to nature, we may supply by our diligence and study, so as provocations and ill motions may be restrained and kept under. Neither to the obtaining of virtues is it required, that we should altogether put off those engrafted evils; only it is required of us, that (as much as in us lieth) we should endeavor ourselves to the weakening of them: which if by diligence and exercise we shall perform, the possession
of virtues shall not be hindered; which because we are never able to challenge, unless there come an experience of things which is necessary, and unless there be a help of the weakness of reason, wherewith incompetent men are troubled; therefore doth Aristotle in a manner reject those hearers, and thought that of these there should be no mention made.
And he himself unto that which Galen objected, would have answered somewhat otherwise, as touching praise and dispraise. For he would have said, that the lovers of virtues are therefore praised, not because they are led thereunto by the force of nature; but because they have striven against the ill inclination thereof, and in that fight have had an excellent victory: and on the other side, that the wicked are dispraised, because they being overcome and made weak by the power of natural violence, are thereby drawn to suffer shameful things.
5. Neither was Galen against this opinion, though at the first sight he may seem to mislike the same. For in his little book which treateth of the knowing and curing the affects of the mind, he testifieth, that No man ought to be discouraged from the endeavor of making himself better; yea, although he were three score years of age. And moreover he saith, that If any man certainly know, that he could never obtain wisdom; yet should he at the leastwise endeavor this, to wit, that he have not a mind utterly deformed, as the body of Thersites was to be cured, although otherwise it were most ill-favored. But and if it happen, that we be not able with excellent and most wise men to occupy the first places; yet this nevertheless must we endeavor, that we may be received into the second, third, or fourth places. And he adviseth us by what means and by what reason this may be done; saying, that by reason, and by earnest exercise whosoever will, may obtain it. And to encourage men's minds, he saith; Thou laborest very much
to become a Grammarian, and refusest no pains to become an excellent Musician: why then dost thou not suffer thyself to be made a good man?
Then in the same book he compareth this diligence of obtaining a good life, with the industry which husbandmen use about plants. I grant indeed (saith he) that a husbandman cannot by his labor and industry change a bramble, and take away his nature, or to make it bear fruit: but yet vines within their own nature are ordained to bear fruits; if they be neglected, if they be left only to the government and fertility of the soil, they will bear either worse fruit, or in a manner none at all: even so good wits, though they be otherwise capable of good manners, if they shall want their tilth, do soon become either wicked or slothful. But although that in young men this exercise of moderating their affections from their tender age, may seem a difficult thing; yet in process of time the pains will be lessened. For by these laudable exercises, reason will be more confirmed, which being made strong, it will be better obeyed of the inferior powers of the mind.
And from these things doth not Plutarch disagree, who writing of the increase of good manners doth also confess, that there is settled in our minds a certain infinite and unspeakable naughtiness, which nevertheless by access thereunto may be increased, and by some forsaking of it be diminished. And the same Plutarch treating of the education of children saith; There are three things required to the making of a man perfect, nature, discipline, and exercise. What thou mayest understand by nature, it hath been already showed; a temperature (I say) of the body, and a natural inclination. And there needs no labor to expound what is exercise; the doubt only seems to be as touching discipline. Therefore we say, that the same is a certain faculty, which applieth the actions and choices of men unto reason, and this it worketh by doctrine, corrections, admonitions, and (when need
shall require) by punishments. And whatsoever of these things any man wanteth, he cannot be made perfect as touching civil manners and virtues.
Unto this his doctrine he compareth husbandry, unto the good success whereof is required a fertile soil; secondly, a painful and convenient husbanding of the ground; lastly, good and profitable seed: and if any of these three things be wanting, we fail of the fruits that we look for. Unto nature answereth the soil, unto discipline the tilth, and the seed unto exercise. And if the drops of water by a continual fall do make stones hollow; if iron and brass, be they never so hard, be worn with use: so are bodies by sloth and sluggishness made feeble, and feeble bodies by wholesome diet and just exercise brought to an incredible strength. A barren land well husbanded is not utterly without fruit, and a fertile soil neglected waxeth wild, and bringeth forth thorns and weeds both hurtful and unprofitable. Also the most fierce wild beasts, by man's labor and industry are made tame: yea and those beasts, which in their own nature would be mild and tractable, if they be so let alone, use to become wild, as we see it comes to pass in horses and bulls.
But what shall I say more? Did not the two whelps coming both of one dam and fire, which Lycurgus brought forth into the open assembly of the Lacedaemonians declare by their running unto things most contrary, what the diversity of education is able to do? But what shall we say unto Plato in his Protagoras, who seemeth there to affirm that virtues cannot be taught?
For Pericles (saith he) and other excellent men, although they caused their children to be instructed in learning, music, and such like good arts, wherein their children did greatly profit, yet did they not make them to be adorned with virtues, which undoubtedly we must believe, that they would have desired most, if they could have obtained the same by learning and
industry. Whereupon it seems to be proved, that there be some of nature so estranged from virtues, as they are not able to attain unto them; and that others shall labor in vain, when they endeavor to train them up to virtue.
Howbeit, this also doth nothing at all weaken those things which we determine; because either their parents labored not so much as they should in bringing of them up, or else if they did use sufficient diligence, and that the nature of the children (by reason of the temperature of their body) was not given to virtues, yet did they by their labor and industry bring somewhat to pass. For although, if they should be compared with the chiefest, perfect, and most absolute citizens, they might seem to be utterly destitute of virtue; yet nevertheless being compared with rude and savage men, which are altogether trained up without discipline, they might be counted civil, gentle, and adorned with some show of virtues. Wherefore we conclude, that endeavor, discipline, and study are not altogether in vain, even as touching them which by natural inclination be enemies unto virtues.
6. Now let us see how those things, which Aristotle hath said, do agree or disagree with the holy scriptures. Yoong and incompetent men in the holy scriptures are not excepted; neither be any removed from hearing the word of God, in this respect, that they be as yet disquieted and overcome with troubles of the mind; neither for this cause, that they want experience, and the use of things. Thou mayest see that Publicans, and harlots, and also thieves were admitted by Christ unto his discipline; and that not only young men, but young children were called. And we might allege many out of histories, which before time having lived shamefully and most wickedly, were straight-way so reformed and amended by the doctrine of Christ, as afterward they not only attained to a singular innocence of life; but also with an incredible fortitude did suffer themselves to be put to death with
great torments, least they should violate the decrees of our faith, and the godliness which they had attained unto, when as there was both deliverance and great rewards offered them, if they would have forsaken their determination. And we see, that not only men have fallen into this kind of conflict; but we are not ignorant that women being otherwise but weak, yea boys and girls have with great courage endured these things.
Neither let any man say, that those which sin against the holy Ghost take no profit at all by the word of God, and that it may therefore seem that they should be driven from hearing of the same. We grant indeed, that they which so sin, do hear the word of God in vain; howbeit, since those can by no usual means be known from others, they are not excluded. God very well knoweth who they be which are wrapped in this kind of sin; but men seeing they know not, who are by nature fallen into so great a wickedness, may not remove them from the holy doctrine. It is requisite (no doubt) that those which are sinners against the holy Ghost, be not such as fall by ignorance, or infirmity, but that they be such as are led thereunto by a hatred of the truth to strive against the same, so that willingly and wittingly they oppose themselves against the truth, resist it, and to the uttermost of their power hinder the course thereof; which nevertheless they will know to be the truth.
How are men able to understand this thing, seeing they cannot attain to the secretness of any man's mind and will? Wherefore those which be thus ill affected, do hear the word of God without fruit; although they be not excluded from the hearing thereof; even for this cause, that they cannot be perceived: howbeit, that which they hear, doth increase their greater condemnation. For of such force is the word of God, as either it saveth the hearers, or becometh a destruction unto them. And so great heed doth the church take, that it driveth not away any from the word of God; and it
admitteth thereunto even those which be excommunicate, and them which do not yet believe, whom otherwise it driveth both from the sacraments and from public prayers. Perhaps thou wilt demand: How cometh this difference between the word of God, and the doctrine of the philosophers? Hereof assuredly it cometh, that men's sayings, although they be famous and commendable; yet are they not endued with that strength and power, as they be able to change or correct unprofitable and corrupt minds. But the power and strength of the word of God, to call men unto God, is incredible. Not as though even those things which the philosophers also taught or put in writing, be without their strength. For we deny not that most ancient common saying, wherein it is said, that Whatsoever is true, of what author soever it was spoken, proceedeth from the holy Ghost. But those things, which be spoken by the motion of the holy Ghost, cannot be altogether void of some effect, although it be of much less effect than the vehemency, wherewith the holy scriptures are furnished. Who will deny that the common sort of stones are adorned with their own strength and proper power, and the same not unprofitable to our life, although they may not be compared with the strength of precious stones?
But I return to the matter. I find only one kind of men, unto whom the holy doctrine must not be imparted; and they be such as deride and openly slander the doctrine of Christ. For he commanded his apostles, that they should not commit the heavenly doctrine to dogs and hogs: which in very deed must be understood of contempt and outward derision; that is, when with slanders and contumelies they rail upon true godliness. Which if they do secretly to themselves, so that they will hear quietly, and will suffer themselves to be admonished and taught, they must not be put back from hearing the same. Neither must public preaching be left off for their sakes,
which are open scoffers, railers, and reproachful persons, when such cannot be driven away, because perhaps they be over mighty; lest for one or two men's causes the whole people should be defrauded of the food of their soul. Ye see therefore that only these are to be removed from the holy doctrine, from whence other men, of what condition soever they be, must not be forbidden; nay rather they must be exhorted to come very often thereunto. Those things, which I have spoken, belong to the usual and received ordinance of the church, since I know that the spirit hath sometime forbidden the apostles, and may now restrain some, that they preach not in some places to those, to whom otherwise they had determined to preach: which because it is a work of God, not of men; therefore it serveth not to this purpose.