14. CHAP. XIV. Of Felicity in General, and of the Chiefest Good; out of the commentaries upon Aristotle's Ethics.

14. CHAP. XIV. Of Felicity in General, and of the Chiefest Good; out of the commentaries upon Aristotle's Ethics.

CHAP. XIV. Of Felicity in General, and of the Chiefest Good; out of the commentaries upon Aristotle's Ethics.

Touching the name of Felicity, all men in a manner agree; which is manifest by the Latins, Greeks, and Hebrews: for none of them do contend about the name; but about the thing itself, and especially wherein the subject or matter is to be placed, they are at great dissention, For the vulgar sort differ from the wise men; yea and if thou wilt somewhat narrowly consider the matter, all the common sort agree not with themselves; and wise men do not a little differ from wise men. From this felicity did

Aristotle exclude all creatures void of reason, and this he did by virtue of the definition of felicity; which he affirmed to be the chief action of man's mind, arising of the most excellent virtue. If this be so, then brute creatures shall not be partakers thereof, seeing they be not capable of such an action.

Indeed it would not be denied, but that they have in their own nature or kind some good, proper to themselves, which to them is principal and chief; but yet we must not think that the same is blessedness, seeing it is of such a nature, as it cannot be without reason.

But before we come to the thing itself, I think it shall be good to know how this definition of Aristotle doth either agree or disagree with the holy scriptures. And first, where he appointed man's work in act to be felicity, he decreed no otherwise than do the holy scriptures, where it is said; Blessed are those which walk in the law of the Lord. Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord, and which doth meditate in the law of the Lord day and night. All these be most godly acts and exercises for this life. But it is objected;

Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins be covered.

Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth no sin: which things belong not to the work of men, but flow from the mere liberality of God. Hereunto we say, that Aristotle understood not, nor believed this justification through Christ, which the holy scriptures have revealed unto us; neither do we in the meantime speak of this felicity: but we speak only of that which followeth this first blessedness, and standeth in the right doing while we live here; and in the other world, in the contemplation and fruition of the sight of God's majesty. And yet nevertheless, if we will also regard the blessedness of justification, and lay that before our eyes, whereby it is applied unto us; then cometh the work of faith. For we be justified by believing, although we are not justified by the merit of that action, nor yet for the dignity thereof are received into grace: but of this felicity we do not now treat.

And that which we do speak of, although it be the work of man; yet doth it not break out from his strength, but is produced by the power of the spirit of God, and from the heavenly majesty. In the world to come this felicity shall be perfect, which shall never be interrupted, but shall be one, and a continual act. Whereas this blessedness of Aristotle, as his definition showeth, may many times between whiles break off. He would that this action, whereby a man is blessed, should flow from a most excellent virtue.

The same also do we think, who show that the actions of faithful men are not right and acceptable unto God, unless they be the branches of faith, hope, and charity, the which we esteem for the chiefest virtues. We agree with him also as touching the continuance; for we require a perseverance while we live here, and in the world to come we believe to have everlasting blessedness. Only in this, there is a disagreement between Aristotle and us, that he requireth the good things of the world, but we affirm that they are not of necessity here in this world unto a Christian to make him blessed.

2. The opinions of the philosophers concerning felicity, may thus be distinguished; so as we may say, that some of them were notable, having famous patrons; but others vile and obscure, because they came from men of no account, and be not confirmed by strong and evident reasons. And of this kind are found health, riches, and such like, whose defenders were no notable men. To the other kind belongeth pleasure, honesty, virtue, to live agreeable with the first gifts of nature, knowledge, &c. These indeed are the ends, which are accounted without mixture. And there be some that have other things joined with them: for some men unto virtue do join pleasure; others unto honesty join a freedom from sorrow; othersome with virtue do join the accomplishment of a perfect life. Augustine against Julianus

Scyllaeus blameth that good, which is compounded with pleasure; for in that honesty is placed therein, it representeth a show of man, the pleasure which is mingled, is a brutish thing. But he that will more fully understand of this matter, let him read Cicero as well in his second book De finibus, as in his Tusculans quest: and thou mayest also see, that sometimes some of them disagree with themselves; and that which they first judged to be the chiefest good, straightway they refuse it: for they which being whole, made small reckoning of health, afterward being destitute thereof, placed it in the

chiefest good, which also happeneth to them that be pressed with poverty: for such, not only make great account of riches, but above all things seek for the same. And these, whom we have spoken of, do appoint something that should be evident and manifest. For these things; namely, pleasure, riches, and honors be so plain and evident, that they are apparent, even to the senses. Yea and Epicurus said, that he therefore thought pleasure to be the chiefest good, because it was the most known, and most evident good thing. And he said, that pleasure was no less known to be the chiefest good, than snow to be white, or fire hot. Varro showeth, that the number of opinions concerning this matter, was very great, as Augustine declareth in his book De civitate Dei: for he saith, that there might be reckoned two hundred fourscore and eight opinions touching felicity.

Let us then seek the cause why there arose so many and so variable opinions thereof: which therefore we say came to pass, because men did not deliberate of this matter with the better part of their mind, but rather counseled with their own affections, which as they be diverse, and do diversely stir up the affections, they inclined men's minds unto so manifold and sundry ends. A man may see young men, which diverse ways being hot in love, think themselves blessed; others make their belly their God; some have given themselves like bondslaves to the seeking of honor. There be some such also, which think that nothing is to be preferred above riches: and the liberty of the Cynic philosophers very well pleased Diogenes and his like. But if that reason itself had been consulted withal in this matter, above the senses and affections, without doubt we should not have had so many and so contrary opinions.

Now since there be, or may be so many in number, to reckon all, much less to examine them, should be over-great labor. Wherefore, that we take

not a superfluous matter in hand, we will in this treatise choose those things which might easily deceive us, seeing a great likelihood of truth is discerned in them; which Eustratius showed by a very learned similitude; If one (saith he) see a stock-dove, he will soon think he seeth a pigeon, which will not happen unto him when he seeth an eagle, seeing the same is far unlike unto a pigeon. So we may judge, that there be some opinions of blessedness, so far from the truth, as very few or none can be deceived by them: and again, others in a manner so near joined unto the truth, as it is not in all men to discern or know them one from another: wherefore those that be of this sort, ought not to be passed over, but to diligently be examined.

Aristotle declareth, that men, as touching the chiefest good things, bent their opinions unto those kinds of life, which they had determined to follow, which indeed are reckoned to be three; namely, delightful, civil, and contemplative. But if thou shalt demand the causes why one will incline to this kind of life, another to that, many causes may be showed: for many in the execution of their affairs, and ordering of their actions, do follow the constitution of their body, wherein, if they be given to surfeiting, to drunkenness, to the flesh, to excellent and good arts, to revenging of injuries, then they specially think themselves happy, when they have obtained those things, whereunto they are moved by a certain natural provocation. Others are greatly desirous to attain this or that thing, being brought thereunto by education; and it doth not seldom happen, that they become like unto those men, with whom they be conversant, and be joined in friendship. Again, unto others, and those without doubt not a few, nor always evil men, it is argument and cause enough for them to prosecute anything; because they regard their authority, which govern either the common wealth, or church, or schools, or warfare. For look what princes,

grave and wise men, whose authority is very great, do choose unto themselves as an end and thing most to be desired, that doth a great part of men take in hand and wish, according to that worthy sentence of Plato, and of other wise men; Such as the kings and princes be, such are their people.

When England had king Edward who was a godly prince, and given to good learning, all the youth endeavored to imitate his labors. Causes indeed these be, but yet no just causes. We ought not to be moved by authors, nor by examples, nor yet by the force of bodily constitution, but by the suggestion of reason, and of the mind, and by the weight of the things themselves. But to follow Aristotle's similitude, herein the common people are like unto bond-slaves, and brute beasts. For this seems to be the manner of sheep, that if the ram, or that sheep which goeth foremost in the flock, depart unto any side, they do all follow: also bondslaves without any judgment or any choice do follow their masters. I would speak somewhat of Sardanapalus, saving that those things which Justin hath of him, are common unto all men: only that I will show, which they say he had always in his mouth; Eat, drink, and play. But Horace in his epistles reproveth those speeches; Thou hast plaid enough, thou hast drunk enough, and thou hast eaten enough, it is time for thee to be gone.

In the fifth book of Tusculans questions Cicero saith, that Sardanapalus willed to be written upon his tomb; These things I only have that I did eat,

Delighting most to cram my paunch with meat:

Whereas those things that were of better kind, As I them found, I left them all behind.

Cicero addeth that Aristotle said; What else wouldest thou write upon the tomb of an ox, not of a king? But what complain we only of Sardanapalus,

as though that Tiberius prince of the Romans were not so greatly given to these delights and wantonness, as he erected to himself even an office of pleasures. For even as unto kings and magistrates, there are some which be masters of requests, secretaries, and masters of the horses; so would he have a master of the pleasures. Also Heliogabalus, whom I cannot tell whether I should call an emperor, or a monster, appointed rewards to them which could devise strange kind of sauces, that he might the more provoke his appetite to eating and drinking. And not only did the Roman monarchs sin in this point, but also the great king of the Persians; even Xerxes, who appointed great rewards to the inventors of new pleasures.

Of Pleasure, and wherein it may concur with the chiefest good, and wherein it may not.

3. Now the place serveth to speak somewhat of pleasure; and that we may not think that all kind of pleasure is secluded from the chiefest good, or from felicity. For in very deed, felicity, whether we understand it for natural or theological, is either pleasure, or else is joined therewith; so as they cannot be plucked one from another. First I will show those things, which I have gathered thereof out of Platos doctrine; afterward I will briefly comprehend what Aristotle hath of the same. Plato divided our soul at the least into two parts; to wit, the mind, and the sense: of these parts, as the one is high and most excellent, and whereby we approach very near unto

God; so the other is gross, and in a manner brutish, and by it we communicate with beasts. This distinction of the mind being put and confirmed, he attributed unto the mind gladness and joy; but unto the sense, pleasure. But what the difference is between joy and gladness (as me thinks

I find by his opinion) I will declare. He will have it, that gladness is sometimes good and commendable; but sometimes, if it shall pass the

limits, he affirmeth it to be a vice, and that it is to be despised. Which will appear the more plain, if it be defined: for it is a certain haughtiness of the mind, because of the presentness of some good thing: but every man doth see that gladness is right, if we be lifted up by reason of some present good, that is neither less nor more than the thing it self deserveth. Wherefore they be foolish, which puff up themselves for false good things, or be too much elevated for the obtainment of vile and simple goods. But those men are to be detested, which rejoice at wickedness committed, which thorough the corruption of judgment seems good unto their minds. But on the other side, gladness is then praised and commended, when the mind is no more merrier nor puffed up, than agreeth with the good that is gotten. And Cicero in his second book De finibus, as he had learned of the Stoics, comprehended naughty gladness under these words, saying that the same is an exalting of the mind, which without reason thinks it enjoyeth a great good.

But I return to Plato, who also ascribeth joy unto the mind; but yet so, as there can no evil cleave thereunto, because he defineth the same to be a pleasantness, which floweth either from the contemplation of a wise man, or else from the actions of virtue. This pleasantness can suffer no evil access: for those things which be just, right, and as best becometh, cannot please any man too much. And he so commended joy, as in his book De pulchro, when he speaketh of heavenly and true blessed life, he affirmeth that thereby the minds of the faithful are nourished. And he will have it, that the poets did cunningly call that kind of meat Ambrosia and Nectar. But the pleasure, whereby the senses alone (as he thinketh) are replenished, is a sweet motion, which tickleth the senses. From which opinion Cicero nothing disagreeth, who in the second book De finibus saith, that All men think this to be pleasure, which the sense receiving is moved, and is

replenished with a certain pleasantness: and after a few words between, he misliked not to repeat the same. That pleasant motion, wherewith the senses is made merry, all men call in Greek ἡδονήν; in Latin Voluptatem; that is pleasure. By these things which I now show, ye must observe this, that as well Plato, as the Stoics, and other ancient writers judged pleasure to be a motion or action: for afterward we shall see what truth this may have in it.

Plato thinketh, that this pleasure of the senses riseth of the infirmity of nature: for the same if it be spent, beginneth to desire those things wherewith it judgeth that it may be restored and renewed; and while we satisfy the want of nature, the senses are tickled and tempered with pleasantness. And contrariwise, while nature cannot obtain those things that it hath need of, both it languisheth, and thorough want is marvelously grieved. Whereupon the same author in Phileto said, that pleasures are the avoiding of sorrows, and thereof concludeth, that the pleasures of them that be sick are greater and more vehement than of them that be in good health: for when they be greatly tormented with griefs, they do exceedingly burn with the desire of medicines, I mean with the desire of all pleasures; therefore when they obtain them, they are delighted above measure. As we may perceive in them which are sick of most sharp fevers, and be in a manner consumed with intolerable thirst, to whom when the physician giveth leave to satisfy themselves with cold, or some other kind of drink; it cannot be said what exceeding pleasure they take. Hereunto in that place he addeth, that these grosser sort of pleasures, which belong unto the senses, are not single but mixed; for they have always some sorrow joined with them: for (as we have said) the neediness of nature breedeth griefs. Neither are the pleasures of this kind brought forth any longer, when the natural want is satisfied: for meat liketh not them that be satisfied and have their

fill; neither is drink welcome to them which have drunk abundantly. But and if it happen to be otherwise, as otherwhile we see it doth to them which be drunkards and gluttons, there is another cause of the pleasure than natural want; namely an ill disposition, or else some other thing, which is not now fit time to declare, seeing we treat of natural pleasures.

4. Howbeit Aristotle put not these differences of words; but those delectations which as well belong unto the mind or reason, as those which be of the senses he called pleasures, that is, ἡδίονας. Yea, and in the seventh book the eleventh chapter, he will that μακάριος, that is, happy, is so called of χαίρειν, which is to rejoice; and he speaketh of pleasure, which he joineth with blessedness. Certainly he speaketh not of this pleasure, wherewith the sense and grosser part of the mind is possessed: for that is only joined with the felicity which shall be of the mind, which as I have said, of a mingled word, is named pleasure. And perhaps Aristotle would not change the name, because he thought to speak as most men did, although he agreed with Plato as touching the difference of the thing. But yet herein they differ one from another, that Aristotle thinketh not (as Plato and the old philosophers did) that pleasure is a motion or action; but rather an affect cleaving unto the motion or operation. Wherefore these differ after a sort, although in the subject they agree. And if at any time Aristotle himself, or any Peripatetike, called pleasure a motion; that proposition, which commonly in the Schools they call Identica, must be ascribed unto them: for as it hath been said, both the affect, and motion or action; are in subject all one. Wherefore the general word thereof is the Predicament of quality, and pleasure belongeth to the third kind thereof, and the same is called a passion; or passable quality. It is called in Greek πάθος; whereby we are sweetly affected with the presence of some good thing agreeing with

our nature. And as beauty is a quality which riseth of a just and right temperature of the body, of well-favoredness, and of a comely color; so pleasure ariseth of a convenient motion and action. Wherefore thus it shall be lawful to define the same.

Pleasure is an affect, wherewith we are sweetly moved, by reason of an action which proceedeth from a nature that is of good constitution, or else from a habit according to nature without impediment. For the actions both of eating, and drinking, and procreating, seeing they arise of nature, do always to him that is in health bring pleasure with them; for they be not hindered by sickness, nor weakness, nor yet by saturity and fullness. Even so contemplations, and the actions of virtues, since they spring from a habit of the mind, they be ready and easy, and are a present good thing, which agreeth with the nature of man; and therefore have pleasure always joined with them. Aristotle in the tenth book of Ethics proveth, that pleasure is not a motion, because it is all whole together, as is a vision: and pleasure hath no succession, except it be accidentally. For if it follow actions, which have success, the same in like manner is prolonged, as it happeneth in eating and drinking; but if the action be momentary, as is a vision, hearing and understanding, then is all the pleasure had at once: even as the whole vision is at once; if the virtue and power of seeing be perfect, if the thing that is seen be set before the eyesight all at once, if the light going between be not obscured, and a convenient distance come between. A motion is not perfect in his parts, but pleasure is whole all at once; therefore it is no motion.

Motion cannot be at one moment or instant, but pleasure may. The properties of motion be swiftness, and slowness; and these things are not answerable to pleasure. For while a man rejoiceth, he neither rejoiceth the

swifter, nor the slower; for if pleasure endure for an hour, it is all whole at once, while the hour lasteth.

5. Since we understand by the definition now brought, that the power must be perfect, and the habit firm; and that the action must be without impediment, and the object principal and excellent: it is gathered how long pleasure can endure. It so long abideth, as the object and ableness, or power of doing doth remain whole: for if the object fall from the excellency thereof, or that the faculty be not vehement and earnestly bent, delectation doth not follow. Hereof it cometh, that when in working men be tired, pleasures are oftentimes diminished. Which thing also happeneth, when anything is taken away from the excellency of the object. It appeareth also, why new things do so greatly delight; because the mind, so soon as any noble and excellent thing offereth itself to be beheld, doth behold the same earnestly and attentively; which, after it is known, the mind rebateth his earnestness, and so the pleasure ceaseth: but if any other new thing be put in place of the former object, then the understanding enforceth his study again in beholding of the same, and the pleasure returneth, and by this means we ever delight ourselves in new things. Besides this, it is showed hereby, that the actions which are done before we attain to a habit, breed not pleasure; because they be not easily and readily done, but with some difficulty and labor. These things are opened by that definition.

Now must we show what pleasure is by her forms and kinds. Neither is it any doubt, but that pleasures are divided among themselves in kind, seeing actions do differ. But pleasure (as we know) is the perfection of an action; and the thing which should be done, being changed, the perfection also thereof is changed. For these be of those sort of things, which be compared one with another. Neither is any man ignorant, that there is one perfection

of a chest, another of a house, another of a plant, and another of a man.

Wherefore since that actions be divided one from another, so shall the pleasures, whereby they are performed, differ. Furthermore, they strive one against another, and one extinguisheth or letteth another; whereof it cometh that they are distinguished. That pleasure, which shall come of music, will take away that which ariseth of speeches: and those, which be the grosser sort, do withstand and let the delights of the understanding and reason.

Again, of actions some be evil, some good, and some between both; whereby it is brought to pass, that the pleasures which follow them have variety and difference. The which also by this means cometh to pass, because the desires of actions are sundry: for if the desires be varied, much more be the pleasures, which are more joined with the actions, than be the desires: for desires are oftentimes plucked away from the work, whereas pleasures cannot be separated from their actions. No doubt but some pleasures there be of horses, some of lions, some of bears, and therefore also there be some of men: and not only have they them diverse from other living creatures, but even men themselves also have them not alike among them. For those pleasures, which be naughty, do please naughty men; and those which be honest, do delight good men.

6. Wherefore now (as I think) it is sufficiently confirmed, that pleasures must be distinguished. Let this then be the first distinction. Of pleasures some be pure, and some impure. And this division is taken from works and actions; so as of them some be about the objects more severed from matter, or more joined with the same. Which how true it is, Galen hath very well declared in his second book De causis symptomatum; There are found (saith he) griefs and pleasures in all the senses: griefs (as he saith) come hereupon, that the senses are removed from their own constitution and

natural state; but pleasures come, when they return to the same. And that this may the more plainly appear, he thus runneth thorough all the senses.

Feeling is removed from his own estate, if there happen too much heat, or too much cold; or else, if it incur those things which do strike, or gnaw, or break, &c. hereof do arise griefs unto it. Tasting is grieved with the selfsame things, which it doth communicate with feeling: but as it is taste, it is offended with tastes, which be too tart, sour, sharp, and bitter; for by these the natural constitution thereof is disturbed, and the continuance broken off.

Smelling is disturbed by the dissolution of over vehement vapors; for by them the continuance is broken off. Again, hearing is put from his state, by a voice too high, or too low, or too great, or too swift, and also by every violent noise. Finally, the sight is offended, when it happeneth upon most bright lights and colors; for these things do scatter and disperse the virtue thereof. With all these same things the senses are grieved, because through them they depart from their own measurable and quiet state. Again, they are delighted and take pleasure, when they are reduced to their proper and natural state. Whereof the sight hath trial, when it turneth itself to a brown color, whereby the power thereof is more gathered and knit together into one; or else when it beholdeth pleasant colors, as green, golden, blue, or sky colors. The hearing delighteth in a mild and treatable voice. The smelling, when those vapors be dissolved, which with a certain sweetness do strengthen and confirm the instruments of smelling. Unto tasting are fat and sweet relishes pleasant. And though we be sick, yet are we for a little while delighted with somewhat sharp and sour tastes. Feeling is delighted with qualities which be temperate, soft, and somewhat warm. Thus are the senses delighted, and do take pleasure, when they be reduced to their natural and proper constitution.

But it is to be understood, that those also may take pleasure, though they have not been first offended or removed from their natural state. For if there happen to come a pleasant color, or delightful sound, the sight and hearing is delighted, though it have not been first removed from the constitution thereof. Galen proceedeth in those things which he said, and showeth, that there is a degree of greater or less pureness in these actions of the senses, and in pleasures; and declareth that the same standeth in the means that the senses use. The sight worketh by light; hearing, by the air; smelling, by savor; these things be pure, and have little of the grosser and thicker kind of matter. Those things, wherein feeling is occupied, hold the lowest place; those be gross and terrestrial things. From thence we come to tasting; that also is exercised about watery humors, which be somewhat thick. Smelling is elevated unto vapors, far more pure than water. Unto hearing is the air, and that a pure air more near. Lastly, we come unto the light, which among those things that be perceived, is most fine, and hath a great deal of pureness. Howbeit, we are not there to rest, but after these things we come to imagination, cogitation, memory, and understanding, which are occupied about the similitudes and images of things far more pure. Wherefore by these things appeareth, that first distinction of pleasures, that one is purer, and another grosser, and out of Galen we have expounded the ground of the division.

7. After this division there followeth another, that some pleasures are bodily, others not bodily. Of the bodily, thus we affirm in general, that neither they be good, nor yet bad; as also are not the actions about meat, drink, and carnal pleasure. But as touching the kinds and parts, we must say, that if they exceed measure, they be evil; but if they contain themselves within just and due limits, they are indifferent, since that men may use them

both rightly, that is, according to virtue, and also unto good and laudable ends. They do also abuse them sometimes, namely, upon an ill determination and corruptly, as Catiline, when he tempered himself from delights and pleasures, to the intent he might destroy his country: but yet, if they shall be weighed in their own nature, they be rather good, according to civil goodness, than evil. We come now to a third distinction of pleasures.

There be some, wherein there is excess; but there be others, wherein it cannot be, as it also happeneth in actions. For who did ever rightly or justly more than is requisite? And so in contemplations of the truth, be it of things natural, or mathematical, or divine; no man can rejoice, or take pleasure of them more than is requisite; neither can he in like manner, as touching things rightly done, and of the works of justice. But in being angry, in ambitious desire of promotion, in giving, in hearing, we may exceed measure, no less than in eating, drinking, and procreation.

Finally, the fourth distinction is, that of pleasures, some be single, and by themselves; because they have no sorrows mingled with them, nor yet be sweet, in respect they fill and restore nature, being wasted and consumed.

Neither be they at one time pleasant, and at another time unpleasant, but are ever in their own nature to be wished and desired: and these pleasures are chiefly those, which are perceived in the mind; but others be mixed, namely with sorrows, and for that cause are pleasant, because they refresh and renew nature decaying, and therefore are not to be desired always and at all times.

8. These things being thus determined, let us go in hand with the pleasures which be impure, bodily, and which have excess, and which be mixed; and let this be the first proposition of them: If they exceed measure, they must be altogether avoided; for such do either arise of a corrupt nature (for some

men are even by a propriety of nature, fierce, wild, and cruel; and others be beastly, and altogether intemperate) or else these evil actions and pleasures do come from a vicious habit, brought in by a naughty custom, as we see it in drunkards, gluttons, and lascivious men: wherefore from such shameful and wicked causes, nothing can happen which (as we have said) must not be avoided. Furthermore, since that pleasures of this kind, as it hath been already said, have been invented to be as it were medicines unto us, when we suffer them to exceed measure; so far is it off that they be medicines, as they are even hurtful unto us, and that in all kind of good things, and especially those things which come of fortune. For how many riotous men be there, which having spent their great and ample patrimonies, are constrained miserably to live in want? I speak nothing of the goods of the body, seeing gluttony and fleshly pleasure killeth far more than the sword, or any ordinary sickness, or defect of nature. Yea, and Galen in his second book De semine wrote, that Pleasure is sometime by itself the cause of dissolving the force and strength which giveth life. And there have been many, which have yielded up the ghost thorough too much pleasure. But and if that all abuse of things must be avoided, such kind of immoderate pleasures as these must be utterly shunned, seeing by this means they cure not the body, but do exceedingly destroy it. I let pass the goods of the mind, since nothing doth more harm unto wisdom, nor anything more weaken the right judgment of doing things, than these immoderate pleasures.

The reason which I have brought, that by these gross and immoderate pleasures, all the kinds of good things belonging to man be destroyed, is written by Cicero in his book called Hortensius, which book is lost; yet will

I rehearse his words as they be recited of Augustine in his fourth book against Julian the 14th chapter; But are those pleasures of the body to be

desired, which truly and gravely are of Plato called the allurements and baits of evils? For what destroying (saith he) of health, what deforming of the color and the body, what foul loss, what dishonor is there, that is not called and brought forth by pleasure? Every motion whereof, the greater it is, the more is it enemy unto philosophy. For the pleasures of the body cannot agree with any great cogitation of the mind. For who is he, that when he useth the greatest pleasure he can, is able to apply his mind to make an account, or to think of any manner of thing? But who is so insatiable a person, that day and night, without any intermission of time, will have his senses so to be moved, as they be moved in the chiefest pleasures? What man endued with a good mind, had not rather that no pleasures at all should be given us of nature? Thus much said he. Under which sentence of his are comprehended the hurts, which are wont to be brought in through these pleasures of the body, which exceed measure. But thou wilt say, that If this reason were of force, it will condemn pleasures which spring of contemplation, and also that which ariseth of just actions; because both the body is hurt by too much study and contemplation: and that Socrates and also Aristides perished for their honesty sake. I answer, that this was accidentally; because Socrates lighted among evil men. Again, that the powers of the head, which do serve unto cogitation, are sometimes overmuch consumed. But some witty fellow will reply, that this also is accidental, as touching the pleasures of the body; which in very deed do arise of those actions, which destroy the body, and our good things, which the very pleasures by themselves would not do. Howbeit to this we answer, that it comes not always to pass, that a man perisheth for righteousness; nor yet that contemplation doth always harm. But these grosser and mixed

pleasures, so oft as they exceed the mean, it cannot be but they do hurt: and so the hurt is not to be accounted of both alike.

9. But this of some is counted a hard matter, that these pleasures must be shunned, seeing pleasure by itself is good, and to be desired. Wherefore to avoid this, they are wont to say, that They are not pleasures indeed, but only seem so to be; and although they seem so, yet that of wise men they ought not to be accounted pleasures. Even as those things are not said to be white, which so appear unto blear eyes; neither sweet or bitter, which those that are sick do so affirm. But me thinks it should not so be answered; because both Plato and Aristotle do call them pleasures, whereupon the definition before alleged doth truly agree unto them. Therefore would I rather say to the argument, that pleasure indeed is of his own nature good, and to be desired, but not to be taken of all things: even as we desire to satisfy hunger, yet not by every kind of meat. Just men also would become rich, but yet not by every kind of gain; we also desire health, but yet not by every kind of medicine; and so we would have pleasures, but yet not those which arise of actions that be dishonest and filthy, and which do hurt the body, and all the good things which we have. But seeing this kind of pleasures is both hurtful, and to be shunned, how happeneth it that it is desired of so many?

Because pleasure in his own nature hath some certain divine thing in it, and is desired of all men. Howbeit it comes to pass, that seeing nature in many is not yet full perfect and confirmed, as in children, or else when men be endued with naughty and lewd habits of mind, as be drunkards and fleshly persons, they be deceived, and seek for pleasures where they ought not.

Wherefore I marvel at Epicurus, which taketh his argument from children, whose nature is not yet become full perfect, neither are they endued with any virtue, and therefore may easily be deceived. Again, it must be

considered, that men do perpetually labor, and are wearied with sundry exercises; and therefore to be recreated and refreshed, they turn themselves to diverse pleasures; and when they cannot have honest, pure, and simple pleasures, they will be satisfied with those grosser and hurtful pleasures.

And men have a compounded nature, not simply one and unmixed; and thereof it coms, that they embrace sundry kinds of pleasures. Sometimes they take those which belong unto the mind, and sometime those which be of the body; since that they consist as well of the mind as of the body. Yea, and the body itself, because it hath many humors, and is endued with many senses, therefore are we sometimes moved to these pleasures, and sometimes to those, according as the humors stir them up, or as the sundry objects do fall into the senses. But God, since he is one and most pure, he enjoyeth one and the self-same pure and eternal pleasure.

But to those pleasures of the body, they that be young, and melancholic men are most inclined. In them, while their stature is increased, the humors are disturbed, and nature is wearied and hailed; and therefore do they fly unto pleasures, as unto a certain medicine and recreation. Likewise doth the melancholic humor disquiet and vex melancholic persons, and suffereth them not to rest; so as they being weary, return to pleasures, whereby they somewhat restore and exhilarate themselves. Whereupon it appeareth, that nature, yea God himself, did not unprofitably give unto mankind these pleasures, that the immoderate use of them might be avoided. For by them we lead the more commodious life, and we take more willingly in hand the necessary labors of life, and the preservation of mankind, and are the more readily healed of our daily infirmities. Moreover, young men, by certain honest and moderate pleasures, are stirred up unto honest duties, and excellent virtues; and by griefs they are terrified from sins and wickedness.

And Augustine addeth, that these base pleasures are certain steps of good, and as it were a little shadow of the nature of felicity, and of the chief good, whereby we may be stirred up to an earnest desire thereof: wherefore they be of force to awaken us, wherein nevertheless we are not to stay, but must rather rise up unto better things. And that we should not dwell in these things, God is so good, that he with these kinds of pleasures hath mingled many bitter things.

As touching those pure, unmixed, and no bodily pleasures, and which have no excess, let this be the proposition. They ought not to be refused, but since they are of the better sort, they draw not a little near unto the nature of the chiefest good: for they be desired; not for themselves, but for another thing. I said that they draw near to the nature of the chiefest good; because in very deed, the chiefest good is not in pleasure, no not of this kind: for that consisteth in the most perfect action, and unto it is pleasure joined, as a perpetual companion: wherefore it cannot be plucked from the chiefest good, so as it should not be comprehended in the nature thereof. We verily grant, that the same is wished for of all men, since there is none, but desireth both to live, and to live well. And as to live, is to work; so to live well, is to be occupied in a very good action: whereunto when excellent pleasure is joined, all men wish for the same, when they wish for that whereof it is a perpetual companion. But an excellent action it cannot be, unless it be conversant about the most noble object; whereof as of a fountain our perfection dependeth. Which that it may evidently be perceived, we must understand, that we are made perfect by a most excellent object, as by the efficient cause, whereby our mind and will is carried, or is allured unto it. Again, we are made perfect through pleasure, which is an affect and quality, that is instilled into our mind. But it is called

into doubt by some, whether pleasure must be wished for the life sake, or life for pleasure sake. And to omit those things which may be said on the other part, that which to me seemeth good, I thus set down; Pleasure is desired for the life sake, not the life for pleasures sake; because pleasure hereof ariseth, that the action agreeth with nature, and this we both feel and know. Wherefore that above all is to be wished, to the intent that the action may be counted most perfect. Neither is any man ignorant, that perfection is instituted for that thing sake, which doth make it perfect, especially when in his own nature it hath no stability. And all men see, that meat itself is better than the sauce thereof.

10. But how those things, which Aristotle bringeth, do agree with the holy scriptures, we may easily perceive. First he saith, that this opinion, as touching the grosser sort of pleasures, is the opinion of many, and that of the vulgar sort of men. Which also Christ taught, affirming that the way of perdition is large, and many do go that way. He addeth moreover, that they which judge this, are φορτικοτάτους, that is, most burdensome. And in Isaiah we know, that it was said to wicked Ahaz; Is it a small matter unto you to be grievous unto men? Aristotle calleth them bond-slaves. And the Lord said; He that doth sin, is the servant of sin. Also Peter said; Every man is his servant, of whom he is overcome. Aristotle saith, that they choose a beastly life. And we have it in the Psalms; Man, when he should be in honor, is compared unto the brute beasts, and is made like unto them. Also

Jeremiah; Every man neigheth at his neighbors wife. And again in the psalm; Be ye not like horse and mule, in whom there is no understanding.

They which so think (saith the philosopher) do defend themselves by the authority of princes, which live after the manner of Sardanapalus. Neither doth this disagree with the holy scriptures, wherein we read, that such in a

manner were the people, as were the kings whom they had. And in Hosea we read; Such people, such priest. In the Proverbs, the 29th chapter; When the wicked shall bear rule, transgression shall be multiplied. And in the Gospels as touching Herod, when the wise men came to Jerusalem, we find that not only he himself was troubled, but also the whole city with him.

Lastly, it is concluded, that in these grosser sort of pleasures cannot be reposed the chiefest good. Which also the Apostle confirmeth to the Corinthians; Meat for the belly, and the belly for meat, God shall destroy both the one and the other. And Christ himself speaking of the pleasure of procreation; In the regeneration they neither marry wives, nor are married, but they shall be like unto the angels.

11. Aristotle disputing yet further of pleasure saith, that the same must not be counted strange from felicity, and so proveth it, because it is of those kind of good things, which belong unto the mind, unless we will say, that stones, stocks, and metals rejoice and be glad. Let us first declare his general sentence; That is pleasant to every man, whereunto he is said to be, and thereof is named desirous. Hereby Aristotle meant, that pleasure seemeth to be of those kind of things, which have relation one to another.

And it is no marvel, for those things which be sweet, must of necessity be sweet to somebody. But what he is, to whom pleasure is referred, is declared by affection, while he saith; A horse, a show, just things, and virtues do delight those men, which have been desirous of horses, shows, a just thing, and of virtues. The manner of all Syllogisms is, that first should be brought forth the cause in general, and then it is wont to be applied unto that thing whereof it is spoken. So in this matter, the general cause is set forth for which anything is pleasant and sweet unto any man; namely, for because he loveth it. This general cause is here restrained unto him that is

happy, because he is a lover of honest and good actions, whereupon of necessity it followeth, that he is very much delighted with them.

For the confirmation of that general cause, he useth diverse and manifold examples; and first, he alledgeth the pleasure that men have in riding of horses, wherewith, how fondly and earnestly some men are otherwhile delighted, the young man Strepsiades in Aristophanes doth testify. He bringeth forth them also, which are desirous to behold shows, unto whom we may add those, which give their mind to philosophy, wine, and money: all which men (we see) are wonderfully delighted, when at any time they enjoy their desires. By these examples the form of the argument, which the Logicians call Induction, being the major proposition, which comprehendeth the general cause, is plainly confirmed and showed, which is straightway applied to the matter in hand, whereas he saith, that The like reason is to be had of those causes that are of a just thing, and of good actions, and are referred to good and happy men, to wit, that those things be loved of them, and that they rejoice not a little in them. Whereof it plainly cometh, that blessed and good men, if they either see or hear any to live well and honestly, they take great pleasure therein: but without doubt much more, while they themselves exercise themselves in just, good, and honest actions. By these things we now understand, that the life of happy men is not severed from pleasure; and we see, that they did not utterly stray from the right way, which joined themselves unto this felicity.

12. But the question is, whether all pleasures have fellowship with felicity, and if that all have not, as it should seem we must affirm, then, what pleasure shall we join therewith? To this we answer by distinction.

Some things are pleasant in their own nature, and by themselves; but some have it not of their own property to delight, but taketh delight by a certain

corruption or viciousness of him that is caught therewith. Wisdom, virtues, honest actions, remembrance of good deeds, prudent government of things, finding out of profitable counsels, doctrine, contemplation, and such like, are delightful even of their own goodness, which if other whiles they be not liked of some, that happeneth through their own unskillfulness and rudeness. But on the other side, immoderate wine, gorgeous sights, surfeiting's and lusts, are not in their own nature pleasant and sweet, but do only delight them which of themselves be caught by such things. It is the common sort, which hunt after things not pleasant in their own nature, which things are diverse and in sundry sort, and those repugnant one to another. No man doubteth, but that there is a great number of pleasures of the common sort; for there be many minds, and everyone hath his own delight, which certainly is then not lawful, when it passeth his bounds, and when it deteineth men too much therein, or doth stir up and disquiet their minds. These, and other pleasures of the senses, if they hold themselves within their bounds and limits, and do not pass them, are both natural, and by right cannot be condemned.

And what contrariety there is of pleasures between the vulgar sort, Eustratius thus showeth; One is delighted with salt meat, another with sweet, one with drink somewhat bitter, another with sour, which tastes be one contrary to another, and cannot be had together in one and the same thing. But here a man may say, that this also may be seen among the pleasures which ye call natural; some are delighted in the mathematical sciences, others in the knowledge of natural things, some in logic, others only in prudent actions.

Wherefore since there is a variety as well here as there, this difference of contrariety after that manner interpreted, seems not to put a distinction

between pleasures, seeing it is found alike on both parts. Unless thou wilt say, there is a great variety and multitude of vulgar pleasures, which are contraries; as sweet and sour, harsh and mild are one repugnant to another; which contrariety is not in the honest pleasures that we have now recited.

For the mathematical sciences are not against the knowledge of natural things; nor logic against prudence. But the difference is more truly declared, if we mark the repugnancy in the appetite of one and the self-same man: for even he that delighted in a thing, straightway hateth the same; and he that desired meat, doth by and by loath it. Whereupon Terence said; In love are all these faults, injuries, suspicions of enmity, truce, war, and peace again.

Here we see a contrariety of things among themselves, and against the mind. But those things are pleasant indeed, wherewith the lovers of honesty are delighted: for they which give credit to reason, and not to the senses, take counsel of the better judge. Thou shalt moreover perceive those to be constant, and of one mind; and that the right things which once liked them, will never mislike them: neither do they suffer the true opinion to be wrong from them. Again, they say all one thing with men of their own profession: for so many as be lovers of honesty, allow the self-same virtues, and the same actions.

13. Finally, this have we learned out of the holy scriptures to concur with Aristotle, that Paul exhorted the godly, as being happy men, to true and perfect gladness, when he wrote; Rejoice in the Lord always, and again I say rejoice. Also in the 21st chapter of the Proverbs; The just man delighteth to do judgment. And David doth many times stir up the just and godly to gladness, and rejoicing. And so true is this opinion, that even those good actions, which by the sense of nature, and judgment of the common sort seem to be repelled, do delight happy men. And therefore we read that

the Apostles went away merry and rejoicing from the sight of the council, because they were counted worthy of rebukes for the name of Christ. And we know, that not only many Christians suffered death with a joyful mind for the testimony of their faith, but that many Ethnics also, with great joy and cheerfulness, gave their life for the liberty of their country.

Of Honor, that it is not the chiefest good; but wherein it concurreth with it, and wherein not.

14. Now that we have disputed of pleasures, it followeth that we speak of honors; and for good cause are these joined together, seeing both of them do accompany actions, though after a diverse manner. For seeing that action agreeth with nature, and that we mark it, and are made glad with pleasure; even to those actions, when they shall be good, and just, and honest, honor is joined. And that it may be made the plainer, which we treat of; I will speak somewhat of the nature of honor, and of those things which belong unto the same. And first of all we will set forth the definition thereof.

Aristotle in his first book of Rhetoric's, will have it to be a signifying of the opinion, which is had of a man's honesty; and that consisteth of outward signs. To make this definition perfect, I think good to add thereunto the cause of the end, which since I cannot draw from the philosophers, I will borrow of our divinity. We therefore testify by manifest signs, that we judge well of honest men, to the intent that God, the author of all justice and goodness, may be honored in them: secondly, that the authority and example of them may profit others. Now do we comprehend all the causes of honor. The form is the signification, declaration, and testimony of our opinion touching good men. The efficient cause is touched, when we added thereto, the man's honesty: for by it are men stirred up to judge well. But the matter shall be in all those signs, whereby we give a testimony to good

and just men. And these things, since they be manifold, are mentioned in the book of Rhetoric's now alleged; namely, monuments, images, government, verses, sepulchers, a living of the public treasury, gifts; and we may ad thereto, the uncovering of our head, the giving of place, and rising up to our betters, &c.

And as all these things are many in number, so must we appoint as many parts, forms, or kinds of honor. And the difference of them is in respect of the matter of them. And we have also added the ends, that this testimony of ours may redound unto God, and that by our honors we may make the good examples of just men to be the more famous; or else that unto them which behave themselves well, there may be given an authority, and that thereby many others may be holpen. From the sense of this definition did Augustine not much vary, who saith, that Glory is a judgment of men, which have a good opinion of [other] men. Hereunto we have added certain outward testimonies of this judgment, and have expressed unto what men those testimonies must be given; that is to wit, unto honest men, and to those which order themselves aright. But this is wanting as well in Aristotle, as in Augustine, who should be those, that should signify their opinion.

Certainly, those ought to be (as we gather out of the first book of Ethics) wise men, and such as do know us well. Quintilian yet more briefly, and in a certain compendious manner, hath thus expounded the matter; Glory

(saith he) is the praise of good men consenting in one: where that word [of good men] may be joined both to them that are praised, and to them that do praise: for it behooveth them both to be good. Which to make more plain, we will thus divide honors; so that some of them we make to be of small importance, and but overshadowed, which all, only are raised by a brute of the people: and these, since they proceed not of a sound judgment, are

neither firm, nor yet yielded unto them, to whom they ought to be given.

But others (as said Quintilian) proceed of the consent of good men; wherefore they be sound, and good men only are honored with them. But we have experience, that those former are so light and inconstant, as thou mayest see that well-near in one day, some are both justified, and condemned of the people: wherefore he that likened this kind of good to a glass, because it is very brittle and frail, strayed not much from the truth.

15. But now there riseth a question, Whether honor (to speak of the same which is sincere and constant) be the good of him that doth give the honor, or of him to whom the honor is given? This did Seneca handle in his 103rd epistle to Lucillus. I affirm it to be the good of them both. Without doubt it is his that is the praiser, seeing that his action is just and right. Neither think

I it doubtful, that every good action is his good, whose action it is.

Furthermore, since he, who is honored, hath in himself honesty, justice, and goodness, whereby both good and wise men are allured and provoked to commend him; therefore is his good also called honor: for he hath the beginning and cause thereof in himself. Moreover, he himself reapeth fruit of that honor, when his authority increaseth, and he is made the abler to persuade others, what shall best become them, and the better to retain them in their duty. Thirdly, also it is his good for this cause, that while he perceiveth good, honest, and thankful judges, to judge rightly of those things which he hath very well done, he greatly rejoiceth. Wherefore I have showed the reason why I judge, that honor is the good, as well of him that is praised, as of him that praiseth. And yet for this cause am I not contrary to Aristotle, which saith, that the same is in him which doth the honor, not in him which receiveth the honor: because he (as it is now brought in the definition) saith, that honor is a signifying of a man's opinion and mind;

and therefore he judgeth rightly, seeing as well the opinion as signification thereof proceed from him that honoreth, and rest on him, as on a certain foundation and matter subject thereunto. But yet I have respect to the original, whereupon this opinion was raised, and this judgment is stirred up in the minds of the wise; and moreover, I note the fruits of this opinion, and I see all these things to be in the man that is praised, that is to say, a greater authority and gladness. Neither hath this my definition only place in honors; but it must be no otherwise esteemed of the lawful judgment of a judge, and of a just sentence, when he pronounceth the law. For these are the proper good things of him, which therewithal turn to his good, on whose side the matter is judged. And no otherwise should we say of justice; the same without doubt is his good that is just, but it is also good unto him, to whom, by the same justice, that which is due is rendered and paid. Now by these examples it plainly appeareth, how honor is a certain good thing, pertaining as well unto him which is had in estimation, as unto him which did give the same.

They doubt in like manner, whether the testimony of one honest and wise man be sufficient unto true and perfect honor; or rather that a signification from many is not required. I think it may be said, that according to the nature of true and sincere honor, the testimony of one wise and good man, and who knoweth us well, is sufficient; because in one which is of this sort, we have all others like unto him: for there is one mouth and one judgment of all wise and good men. Howbeit, to this end, that the example may be made manifest, and that the authority may grow and be confirmed to him that is praised, the testimony of one man is not of force; because a very great furtherance hereto is fame and good name, which things do require the testimonies of many. Now must this be seen, whether at any time honor be

severed from virtues and just deeds. Some say it is, and some say it is not.

Certainly the more common opinion among the learned is, that honor followeth virtue, as a shadow followeth the body, which similitude in my judgment, expoundeth the question. The shadow accompanieth the body, but yet not always after one manner; sometime it goeth before, sometime it is upon one side, and goeth together, but sometime it followeth after: so the virtue of some men is had in honor, straightway after the beginning; of others it is not regarded, till it be increased and made perfect. Finally, thou mayest see some, which are not honored, till they be quite gone: for then are men wont otherwhile to perceive, though over-late, how great a good they have forgone. Which we know happened in old time to the prophets and apostles, and also in our times to many most just princes, good pastors, and godly preachers. While there were plenty of them, they were contemned; but when they were now taken away, then did they stir up an incredible desire of them. Wherefore honor do accompany virtue, but not always in the same step: sometime before, otherwhile together, and oftentimes after. And besides this, the testimony and signification of wise men is never wanting unto true virtue, and just actions, except there be a want of the wise, and such as have seen and known these things.

16. Now at the length let us come nearer to the matter, and consider ye together with me, whether the desire of honor should be accounted among good things, or among evil things. Shall we not commend honor, seeing it is planted in us by God and by nature; seeing God promiseth it unto them that be his, and that not seldom; They that glorify me (saith he) I will glorify them? And The elders are by Paul pronounced worthy of double honor. And therefore it seems, that God planted this desire in men's minds, that we might be more and more stirred up to live well and justly. Neither is that

common proverb rashly to be rejected; Honor nourisheth arts. Again Virtue commended increaseth. Moreover, there is none which hath but a spark of godliness can deny, but that all our works must be so ordered, as they may be allowed both of God and of men; namely that men, by the seeing of them, should (as meet it is) glorify God. Wherefore seeing honor, for the things that be well done stayeth not in us, but redoundeth unto God himself, how many soever be desirous of his glory, as we ought all to be, we may, at the least-wise for this cause, desire honor. Over this, who ought not to wish, but that all the brethren should not fail of doing their duty and office? Verily this hath God commanded all men, that they should honor their parents, and by the same reason the magistrates. And by Paul he commandeth; In giving honor go one before another. Also in the first epistle to Timothy the fifth chapter; Honor widows, which be widows indeed. In the first of Peter, the second chapter; Honor all men, love brotherly fellowship. And of Epaphroditus he said in the epistle to the Philippians; And such as he is have ye in honor. Such places as these be I may bring many; but seeing these be sufficient, it appeareth that when any man hath honor given him, that is worthy of it, the commandments of God are obeyed. Which thing that it may be done, ought not they which be honest, and behave themselves well, commend it and be glad of it, and also wish that it may be done? Why do we pray; Let thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven?

Hereunto add, that in giving honor unto good men, we shall obtain rewards and benefits; That thou mayest (saith God) live long upon the earth.

And on the other side, in contemning of them, they procure destruction to themselves; as the children which derided the prophet Elisha were rent in sunder of bears. Which seeing it is thus, he loveth not his neighbor, which desireth not that he may avoid these punishments, and obtain these

commodities and rewards. Wherefore even as with the good favor of God we may wish for due honors; so are we driven to the very same thing by that charity wherewith we ought to love our neighbor. And this doth David very well confirm in the 15th Psalm, when he spake of him which should dwell in the house of God, and in the everlasting habitation, among other his virtues this he reckoneth; He that is lowly in his own eyes, and glorifieth them that fear God. Therefore since without controversy, eternal life is to be wished unto our neighbors; this is to be wished for with most ardent prayers; that the godly, and those which fear God may be had in honor: which is this kind of honor, namely to have them in estimation, to be delighted with their company, to maintain their good name, and cheerfully to relieve their necessities: all which things, since they be so coldly done in these days, they which be godly cannot choose but earnestly sorrow, and wish that at the length it may be done even as God hath commanded.

Augustine in his Soliloquies the first book, and eleventh chapter judgeth, that since of honors authority doth increase, and that authority doth much further to induce men unto honesty, and to drive men as well unto true opinions, as unto holiness of life, therefore honors are to be desired. Yea, and for their sakes, whom we ought by our ministry to help; if we see our authority to be despised, we ought for just and honest causes to defend the same, least in very deed it become unprofitable. To this belongeth that which Paul wrote unto Timothy; Let no man despise thy youth.

And when we do well, it doth not a little further to the confirming of us, if we have the commendation of good men. For even as we are in a manner all troubled with the disease of self-love, we are easily deceived in affairs and actions; and those things which we do least commendably, we make most account of them. And because this doth not seldom happen, it causeth the

more ignorant sort to become more doubtful and ambiguous in their doing, unto the which men, honor, praise, and approbation would do much good, if by outward signs the same were yielded: for by these things their mind and judgment is established. But those which be not doubtful, nay rather be assured, that those things which they do, be right, when they are adorned by wise and good men with a just kind of honor, they cannot choose but exceedingly rejoice and be glad in themselves, that they have gotten so good and just judges; wherefore honors do also profit these men. Neither do these things, which we have said, differ from the opinion of Aristotle. For albeit he deny honor to be the chiefest good, yet doth he not exclude it from the number of good things. Touching those things, which I have spoken of firm and perfect honor, there is nothing so agreeable, as that that shall be the chiefest, which the faithful in the last day of judgment shall have of Christ, when he shall say unto them; Come ye blessed of my father, &c. For that praise shall proceed from the most wise judge, to whom all justice is best known, neither can our doings any way be hidden from him.

17. Wherefore I think it is now sufficiently concluded, and made apparent, that the moderate desire of honors is not to be blamed: yet because many do soon over-reach themselves herein, and that the place is slippery, therefore must we declare some things, which we ought to take heed of, least in seeking for virtue, we shamefully fall into vices. To this must we have a special regard, that even Aristotle being an Ethnic saw, that we desire not honor for itself: for this were of a mean good, to make the principal good, and to enjoy those things which we ought but to use. Let the same desire therefore tend both to the glory of God, and to the edifying of our brethren.

Next of all let us beware, that we take not too much care for honor; for so would the mind be soon disquieted, which when many, who were accounted

civil, did not avoid, they with the desire of praise became in a manner mad.

We know with what a fury Alexander of Macedonia was carried in a manner through the world, seeking glory without measure and reason, who at length was brought to that pass, as he thought that there were other worlds to be conquered besides this; One world sufficeth not for young

Pellaeus. With the very which disease, Julius Caesar being infected, set upon his country, and rashly violated the laws and liberty thereof. So then let this desire be moderate, and let it be bounded within certain and just limits. And in receiving of honors, let us follow Augustine's counsel;

Neither receive thou (saith he) all that is offered, nor yet refuse thou all: for he that rejecteth all the honor, which is yielded unto him, for the things that he hath rightly and very well done, seems as it were to suppress the gifts of God, and that he would not have them acknowledged, which in very deed is against true godliness. And on the other side, he that embraceth whatsoever is offered him, doth many times pass the limits of modesty.

And here withal must heed be taken, that the kind of honor, which is brought, be not greater than the dignity of men can sustain; which when it happeneth, must not be abidden: for thereat is God angry, and doth severely take vengeance for his honors usurped by men. Herod was most grievously punished, when the people cried unto him with voices not fit for a man, but such as were meet for God. And for the same fault is Domitian, Nero, and many other most insolent Emperors justly condemned, which would not be worshipped as princes, but as God. Those things which belong to God, let them be rendered unto God; and let good men receive human honors rightly and moderately when they be offered. Also, let there be kept a just and right measure in obtaining of honors. There is only one way and mean commended, and that is by well bringing of things to effect, which the

Grecians call κατορθώματα, which things hypocrites do counterfeit, and while by outward signs they endeavor to declare themselves godly and holy, they be had in estimation of the people. But of them Christ said; They have received their reward. And there be others, which are carried so far forth, as they buy honors, which vice without doubt is condemned by all just laws, and of the Latins it is called Ambitus, that is, Ambition: for it is a most vile thing to crave the people's voices by great gifts. Hereof in the digests Ad legem Juliam, de ambitu, are many things extant. Those which were convicted, were condemned of infamy, and also in a payment of money.

And the punishments of this fault were many times in the commonweal of Rome increased; for the fault did grow on without measure. Yea, and the ecclesiastical Canons did imitate the Roman laws. And because this vice grew mightily in the church, and at this day reigneth everywhere, many laws were decreed, which are in the first cause, quest. 1. throughout the whole question: and in the fifth book of the decretals, in the title De

Simonia, and in another title, that the prelates should not grant their own places, or places of the church, for a yearly rent. They that sell ecclesiastical dignities, follow Gehazi the servant of Helizaeus, and they which buy them, are like unto Simon Magus. Neither is only money, but words, and every kind of flattery, if they be done only unto that end, to obtain ecclesiastical honors, to be esteemed as a price. And the fathers did so persecute this vice, as against those that commit Simony, they admitted any sort of accusers, even those that were infamous, dishonest persons, and harlots, and such other sort of men, which is not suffered in the complaint of other crimes.

Lastly, must be regarded, that we use honors well when they be gotten, which I therefore speak, because we may see some every-where, which abuse them, to obtain power to compass riches, and follow pleasures, unto

all which things they make the way easy to themselves by dignities and honors, as well civil, as ecclesiastical.

18. These things we thought good to be recited, as touching them which receive honors; now must we speak a few words of them, whose part is to yield honor unto others: for these also must be admonished, because herein men may sin diversely and manifoldly. I suppose there is none that doubteth, but they do greatly err, which deny just and meet honors to them, that well and rightly behave themselves, and yet we see that there be many such as deny this. And those men are a great deal worse than these, which in the stead of giving honor, do hate them, do diminish their deserts, be disquieted and grieved, if they shall see anything go well with them: these men without doubt are to be accounted unjust, and most ungrateful. Some indeed there be, which frankly enough do honor good men, but this they do, to reap in like manner some benefit, favor, or help of them: and these pass not much of the well doings of honest men, but only seek their own good; wherefore they rather sell their honor, than make it a reward of virtues.

Again we have known others, which are ready enough to give honors unto honest men, but in doing thereof, use a perverse judgment; for those good things which they ought to regard, they neglect, and do greatly esteem those things which be of less value. If a man do well over-see his church, bring sound doctrine, live godly, and showeth everywhere good examples, in this respect they make small account of him: but if the same man give crafty and expert counsel to increase wealth, or show some unknown thing in husbandry, or in physic, then they have him in admiration, and with praises extol him to heaven. There be also those which do flatter, and which adorn even foul vices with the names of virtues. Also, there be some, which in

giving of honors keep no mean, but either they give them sparingly, or else more than they should.

19. All these things, which I have rehearsed, must be diligently taken heed of; which since I have largely enough declared, now remaineth that we show how the doctrine of Aristotle agreeth with the holy scriptures, or else differeth from them. Indeed when he saith, that honor is not the chiefest good, he disagreeth not anything from the holy scriptures: for the chiefest good cannot be desired more than is meet; but in wishing for honors we must temper our desire. I would not have you (saith the Lord to his apostles) be called Rabbi, or masters, or fathers; but rather regard this, that ye serve one another, and that with a lowly and moderate mind. Besides this, our savior would not suffer his to be defrauded of the chiefest good, seeing he came purposely to make us happy. But he setteth us open in a manner unto rebukes, and he foreshowed that his children should have contumelies done unto them, whom he comforteth by his own example;

Who abased himself, and taking upon him the form of a servant, was made obedient even to the death of the cross. And whereas it is affirmed, that our chiefest good should be firm, proper, and not easy to be removed, it maketh with that which Paul saith; that therefore our salvation and justification doth consist of grace and faith, but not of works, that the promise may be firm.

That honors may soon be taken away, the holy scriptures do testify: for Christ said; that No prophet is without honor, save in his own country. And we see that the saints, having honor many-times done unto them, are within a while after accused and caught unto punishment. And finally, the holy scriptures teach, that honor is of the kind of those good things, which are referred to some other thing: because the Lord said; Let others see your good works, and glorify your father. Where we see, that glory and honor

ought not to rest only in us; but must be referred unto divine honors and praises.

Of certain good things attending upon Felicity; namely, riches, beauty, nobility, and such like: and how far men may use them without hindrance unto Felicity.

20. In the definition of Felicity, action of the mind was the general word under which it was contained; which very well agreeth with the old writers, who divided good things into three parts, and among those things gave the principal and chief place unto the goods of the mind. Wherefore, seeing felicity is the chiefest good, it is well assigned to belong unto the actions of the mind. That same distinction of good things, proceeded from the Academics, and before them from Socrates, as it may appear in Platos fifth book De legibus: albeit afterward followed the Stoics, which only made one kind of good things; though Aristotle made no mention of them, because they flourished after his time. The goods of the mind are distinguished; for either they are referred to that which is to be understood, or to that which is to be desired: unto the former part are referred sharpness of wit, quickness of spirit, speediness of perceiving, fast holding in the memory, prudence, wisdom, and also knowledges and right opinions: but as for the will and desire, all the moral virtues do adorn. The goods of the body are distinguished; for some of them are dispersed over all the body, as health, strength, and beauty: for these settle not in one part of the body, but generally in the whole. But there be other things which are proper unto some of the members; namely, swift running, unto the feet; to the hands, strength in holding fast, in driving in, in drawing to, and in casting from; volubility or readiness unto the tongue, and to all the senses. Outward good things are distributed into friends, nobility, honors, riches, and such like.

But why the goods of the mind have the first place, many reasons may be brought; but now it shall be sufficient to say, that in good right those are the better properties, which are of a better matter that is subject. But the argument of Aristotle may thus be gathered; Those be the chiefest good things, which belong to felicity; But the goods of the mind be the chiefest;

Justly therefore are they comprehended in the definition of blessedness.

Wherefore, since the actions of the mind obtain the first place among the good things thereof, they are rightly set down to be the general word, under which felicity is contained.

Many there were, and those not of the vulgar sort, which held riches in estimation, as the chiefest good; and therefore Aristotle for two causes removed those things from felicity, the first is, for that they belong unto violence; for that which is violent, hath no respect of felicity. But that the possession and obtaining of riches is a violent thing, use and experience doth teach us; for there is none that can get great and abundant riches, or can long keep them, unless there be a violence, and that no small violence used. Another reason is, because they tend to profit, and are referred to another thing; wherefore the state of them is servile. For we have them to this end, that they may help us to other things which we desire: neither would any man esteem them the value of an hear, unless he knew them to be profitable unto those things that he would have. And how strange this is from the nature of the chief good, all they are not ignorant, which know that the same should be desired for itself sake. Very much therefore are they deceived, which have riches in the greatest honor, because they be profitable unto all things. This if Midas had set before his eyes, he would not have so addicted himself to the study of heaping up riches, that he was justly called χρυσομανής, that is, even mad for the desire of gold. Neither is

he alone among princes and kings to be reproved, seeing now the greatest part of them is infected with this vice, who nevertheless might have been admonished, not only by these two reasons of Aristotle, but by many other reasons, to set down some moderation of their desire. For it is without reason, so greatly to esteem that kind of good, which is external, and in a manner pertaineth nothing to the mind; but is only reckoned among the instruments, whereby men are holpen to do those things which they have purposed. Also, this kind of good doth besot men, if it happen upon them that be unwise: they be very careful to attain unto riches, but have no care of their children, to whom they shall leave them; nor yet of themselves, who should use them. They are like unto him, which would have many shoes, and in the meantime went barefoot. Besides this, the nature of riches is doubtful, in so much as they serve no less to the accomplishing of lewd desires and wickedness, than of honest and just duties.

Moreover, if virtue be therefore not the chiefest good, because it may be with them which be asleep, and which be in misery, whom no man judging prudently would call happy; how shall felicity be attributed unto riches, seeing they be oftentimes possessed of most miserable men; yea rather, of them which be monsters and wonderments of the world, who hate all honest arts and all virtues? Unto honor it is denied, and that justly, that it should not be accounted blessedness; because it is not in their power which be had in honor. Which if we shall affirm, no doubt but we may judge the same of riches; seeing the possession of them is subject to infinite perils: they are gotten and lost well-near in an hour. One man boasted of exceeding great riches, which his ships had brought unto him: another hearing him, answered, that he made no account of goods which hung on gables and winds. And that they be not the chief good indeed, it seems they very well

knew, which termed riches a gilded felicity. Indeed I deny not, but that riches be good; but that they be the chiefest good, that we deny. That they be violent, and are referred to another thing, the holy scriptures in one word testify; Make ye friends of unrighteous Mammon. That they do hurt the unwise, it is said; The root of all evils is covetousness; They which will become rich fall into snares and temptation, &c. And as for the inconstancy of them, [ Paul saith to Timothy;] Command that they trust not in the uncertainty of riches; [and Christ said] This night will they fetch away thy soul from thee. Finally, they are a hindrance unto men, as in the gospel; And the young man being rich, went his ways: so as they be good things, but yet in their own degree.

Certainly this word συμπαραλαμβάνουσι, that is, do comprehend, must be diligently considered of; for we easily understand thereby, that the elder fathers thought not that the abundance of outward goods belonged to the nature of felicity: but only called the same a thing added for a help. Riches make not the nature of felicity, they are not placed in the definition thereof, they are not counted among the goods of the mind; wherein it is said, that felicity chiefly standeth. To what end are they then? First they are therefore added, to the intent they may further many actions of an happy man; for neither a liberal man, nor a man of valiant courage, nor he that is honorable can do anything of their own virtue; if they want money, if they lack store of things, and finally if they be needy and poor. And moreover, without riches, a happy man not only cannot help another man, but can be at no leisure to give himself to contemplation; because with his travel he must provide for his daily sustenance.

21. But some do not allow of it, that so excellent a thing as felicity is, should have need of goods far inferior unto it: howbeit this knot is undone

by our distinction. In itself and of his own nature it hath no need of them: for if in itself it should have need of these things, nothing might be happy, unless it abounded with these things: which must not be granted, seeing

God and the angels are blessed without the small help of these goods. This poor lack, which is of a corruptible and mortal man, is joined to this felicity.

Even as our power of understanding is not able, by consideration, to do anything at all, without the senses and similitudes which we contemplate: which in very deed happeneth unto it, not in respect it is a mind or understanding: for if it were on this wise, neither God nor angels should understand anything without senses and imagination. So then, the mind and understanding require those things, not by themselves, or their own nature; but in respect they belong unto men. It is to be noted moreover, that the matter which is subject, may be understood two ways: for either it representeth that matter, about which our actions are occupied; or else it is the matter wherein our mind is, namely the body, to the nourishing, sustaining and feeding whereof these outward goods are in any wise required; wherefore in these two respects felicity hath need of the outward good things.

Besides, we see in arts, that many things are done, not only by the art, which is placed in the mind of the artificers, and in the members of their body; but by the help also of outward instruments. The smith useth fire, tongs, a hammer, and an anvil: the carpenter a rule, a saw, an axe, and such other things, and that because of the matter which is subject: and so oftentimes it sufficeth not artificers to have art, and the members of the body. In like manner doth it come to pass touching felicity; although the mind be endued with excellent virtues, and that it will and can show forth excellent actions, and is not destitute of bodily power, yet hath it need of

friends, riches, and civil power. By civil power I understand honors, good will, favors, protection, and such like. As for riches, they are divided some into natural, and some into artificial: natural are counted whatsoever things do grow out of the earth, and which the breed of cattle produceth: but artificial consisteth on money, which in very deed was invented, that it should be indifferent to both parties in the exchange of things. And both these kinds being called faculties, we gather by the etymology of the word, that they are a great furtherance unto doing.

Aristotle, to the furtherance of a man's felicity, required a beautifulness of the body, nobility, store of children, and of true friends. Neither (as I suppose) doth he here mean a pleasant phisnomy, but that a man be not altogether deformed: and this is the meaning of πάναιχρης, as it is in Greek.

The reason of this saying (as Eustratius thinketh) may be, because men's minds are prone to love and esteem them, whom they perceive to excel other mortal men in some goodly form: of which inclination moreover ariseth, that they willingly obey and follow them, which are thus beautiful.

And a man, having the minds of the people thus affected towards him, doth undoubtedly help very much forward to the execution of excellent things: for the people bring many things to pass, when they be moved of their own accord, and when they fulfill the mind of one man with an earnest love and voluntary good will. And therefore that king, whom God first set over the Israelites; namely, Saul, was of so tall a stature, as he was higher than other of the Hebrews by the shoulder upward. And of David, whom he also commanded to be anointed king, it is written; that He was ruddy, and of an excellent beauty. Another thing moreover there is, whereby men are moved to love them that be beautiful; because the beauty of the body is a certain image of the mind: which mind, since above all things we must seek to have

it honest and good, and that it cannot be discerned by the eye, it remaineth that the common sort follow the form of the body: after which manner if they were led, which are the lovers of our bodies, they should not be blamed. But at this day there is in a manner nothing done with moderation, but all things are wrought with uncleanness and lust.

Also unto blessedness, he requireth nobility; because the people obey and reverence noble personages: for nobility is in that kind, out of which have proceeded many famous and excellent men: and virtues, which shined in the ancestors, are wont to be looked for in their posterity. I know indeed, that some do think, that nobility is but riches preserved of long time in some family: but the former opinion liketh me much better. Eustratius moreover addeth, that the nobleness of a stock is therefore available unto civil felicity: for the people are wont to esteem of new men, when they start up, not only according to their present virtues or excellent acts; but according to that which they were a little before. Wherefore the former baseness, while it is considered of, doth somewhat obscure the present glory; which cometh so much the more to pass, as men be exceedingly given unto backbiting. εὐτεκνία is a doubtful word, because it signifieth not so much a store of children, as it doth their goodness. And indeed as touching store of children, they which abound in them, are both grateful unto the city, and are feared of others: grateful truly they be, because they increase the Common-weal.

Wherefore among the Romans there was a privilege for those that had five or seven children. And a young man of the Lacedaemonians would not rise up unto an ancient, who otherwise had deserved well of the Commonwealth; Because (saith he) he leaveth not behind him, one that may rise and uncover his head unto me, when I shall be old. But then only children do further unto felicity, if they shall be well instructed: for otherwise they shall

be rotten impostoms and cankers; as Octauius Augustus spake of his daughter and niece, when they were unchaste. Also Tiberius sorrowed, that he did nourish in his house for the people of Rome Caligula, a most cruel snake.

22. Furthermore, how friendship doth fortify men with excellent helps, to the leading of a good life, may be gathered sufficiently by good writers, and by human custom. But he is far more to be reproved, which hath ill friends, than he which hath corrupt children. For sometimes it may so happen, that through an ill nature, what diligence so ever be used in education, we cannot have such children as we would: but there is no excuse, if we have ill friends; because we make a choice of them, and they may be forsaken.

Moreover, the loss of these (I mean of honest children and friends) Aristotle testifieth, may be a great hindrance unto blessedness; because their death cannot be without great sorrow and mourning. And although we suffer those calamities with an indifferent mind, if we be endued with the virtue of fortitude; yet are we subject thereunto not without detriment, which detriment no doubt doth not a little blemish our felicity.

Neither doth the holy scripture disagree touching the commendation of outward good things: for as concerning children, they be promised of God;

Thy children shall be like the olive branches. And among other blessings, this is reckoned up, that there should not be untimely births in Israel. And in many places there is promised abundance of children to them that fear him.

Which self-same thing we may easily know as touching riches. God enriched Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and the rest of their friends. He granted of his own accord riches unto Solomon, which desired wisdom. And he would that his people, if they behaved themselves well, should so abound in riches, that they might lend unto other nations; but not borrow of them.

Nobility was in such estimation with the people of God, as every family would have his own genealogies, wherein they reckoned up their ancestors among the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel. And the priests, which in the time of Esdras could not do this, were removed from their place and office. Yea, and the Evangelists Luke and Matthew rehearsed the genealogy of Christ, least he should seem to be of an unknown stock according to the flesh. Again, the apostle in the ninth chapter to the Romans described what nobility the Israelites were of; To whom pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and the law that was given, and the covenant, and the service of God; of whom are the fathers, of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came, which is above all things, &c.

A beauty of the body I showed before, was granted unto those two kings Saul and David. I showed also that the same was so requisite in the priests, as none that was lame, blind, crook-backed, or blemished with any notable deformity, might execute the room of high priest. Moreover, that friendship might increase among the Hebrews, God provided specially by his laws: all which, if they be narrowly considered, do serve very much for the joining of men together. Wherefore these things, which Aristotle hath rehearsed, must not be rejected; yet as touching felicity, there must be no more ascribed to them than is meet. It is said indeed in the book of Ecclesiastes, the tenth chapter, that Unto money all things are obedient. But that sentence is rehearsed as a common saying of the people, not as a true saying, but that thereby man's error might be reproved. Nay rather, the scriptures elsewhere do teach, namely, in the 17th chapter of the Proverbs; What do riches profit a fool, seeing he cannot buy wisdom for himself? These things then being some-what narrowly and diligently considered, we say that these gifts of God are not to be contemned, seeing they further very much to the good and

right execution of many civil duties belonging to blessedness; but we must not rely altogether upon them: yea rather, if at any time we want these good things, the true and perfect felicity, which we seek for, is not for this cause taken away. And if we, for the name of Christ, and confession of his faith, be deprived of these things; so far is it off, that true blessedness is blemished, as it is rather made a great deal the more excellent.

First that poverty is no let unto us, it appeareth, seeing not the least part of the saints was collected of poor men. And Christ commanded the young man, that he should sell that which he had, and give it to the poor; whom nevertheless he would without all doubt have made happy, which in very deed could not have been done [if poverty had been a hindrance unto felicity.] Yea, and Antisthenes and Crates the Theban, that they might in their philosophy be made the more happy, cast from them their money and treasure. And the Lord promised a hundredth fold, and eternal life to them, which for his sake should lose all things which are of this kind. What shall we say as touching nobility? Look to your calling (saith Paul) not many wise, not many mighty, not many noble are called, &c. Also, the lack of children is no let, for in the 56th chapter of Isaiah, the Eunuchs are said to have the better place in the house of God, not in respect they be Eunuchs, or lead a single life; but in as much as they shall more diligently keep the commandments of God than other men. In like manner, if friendships fail, they exclude not men from true felicity; seeing it cometh to pass sometime, that for the name of Christ, the godly are become hated of all men, which nevertheless is not against Aristotle, seeing he writeth but of a politic or civil blessedness.

Of contemplation, and what Felicity is therein.

23. Eustratius in expounding of Aristotle, (who in the tenth book of his Ethics affirmeth contemplation to be the chiefest perfection of our felicity) saith, that There be some which are not men exercised in civil and politic administration, but altogether given to contemplation, and these separate themselves from domestical and civil cares, and do fly from company and society; yea, and they study all that they can, to be severed even from their own flesh, whereof it comes to pass, that to the obtaining of felicity, there needeth not (as Aristotle would) the goods of the mind, for the teaching, counseling, and ruling of others; nor the goods of the body, for defending of their country; nor yet the goods of fortune, for relieving, succoring, and helping of the poor: and that only it is enough to apply the mind to understanding and contemplation. And he saith, that these men have a hard felicity, because they be as it were at war with nature, not seeking in deed to destroy the body or flesh; but provide this, that those things may be no impediment to their contemplation. And therefore, since this is a more private life, it needeth not many things. But he saith, that Aristotle spake not of these men, which he testified when he saith, that By nature a man is civil: and they which are of this sort, unless they minister to their elders and parents those things which be necessary, and also unto their posterity, wife, friends, and citizens, they have a maimed and imperfect felicity, although they be furnished with many good things. And the diminishing of their felicity is either more or less, according as they shall more or less want those good things which we have recited. It belongeth therefore unto a happy man, to have a care of all those things, which I have recited; which if he may commodiously do, he hath enough, and may be content; otherwise he shall not be counted happy.

These things I thought good to rehearse out of the doctrine of Eustratius; to whose opinion I subscribe not. For in that he will have any man so to live alone, that he should give himself only to contemplation, and be hidden from the company of other men, forsaking the duties of charity, and other virtues toward them, is both against philosophy and divinity. For the philosophers cry out generally, that men are not born to themselves; and declare that it is man's nature to help others, and in like manner to be holpen of others. Moreover, there wants no testimonies of the holy scriptures, whereby such a kind of life is condemned. Paul said; that None ought to seek their own, but that all should be done to the edification of our neighbors. And God commanded in the law, that the parents should be honored; which precept in very deed commandeth the maintenance of them.

And the parents are commanded, that they should diligently and earnestly instruct their children. Neither are there laws wanting of wedlock, of defending and preserving of friends, and of the poor. Yea and Paul unto

Timothy said; He that hath cast away the care of his own, and especially of his own household, hath denied his faith, and is worse than an infidel.

Wherefore it is not lawful for any man to choose to himself so solitary a life, as he will set apart the care of other men. True indeed it is, that Aristotle treateth severally of civil life and function, and also of life contemplative; but yet not for this purpose, that any man should wholly addict himself to one of these lives: but to the intent, that whosoever aspireth to felicity, may know, that he is not able to obtain the same, except in an excellent sort he be partaker of both these estates of life.

Two properties doubtless there be of our nature; for nature itself hath made us both men of understanding and civil. Wherefore in our actions we must answer to both conditions; namely, that when they happen unto us in

our actions, we may execute them as we ought, and according to virtue.

Again, that when any leisure serveth us, or that by any chance we are let from doing of things, then we to be occupied with great pleasure in the contemplation of divine and human things; that so these actions, which in kind seem to be diverse, may help one another. For if a man be exercised in moral and civil virtues, in governing of a family and common-weal, to the intent he may have the more ready and quiet mind in the helping and succoring of his friends, it so comes to pass, that he returneth the more apt to contemplation. And on the other side, when any man, by reason of his leisure, shall be in earnest contemplation of divine and human things, he is afterward thought to be much the readier to do other affairs. This we know did Tully, Cato, Pompeius, Lucullus, and such like singular men among the Ethnics. And we read in the holy scriptures, that Christ our savior did sometimes withdraw himself unto the mountains, and woods, that he might pray and meditate of divine things; but within awhile he returned to the people, and was all manner of ways a help unto mankind. The very same thing did John Baptist, Elias, and other the prophets. Yea, and the same

Jesus our Lord first taught his apostles in the wilderness; afterward he sent them out into Judea, to preach and to heal them that were sick. So then let there be two kinds of life, but yet not in such sort, that any man should perpetually be addicted to any one of them.

That virtue is not the chiefest good; and wherein the same agreeth with it.

24. Among some of the philosopher's virtue was taken to be the chiefest good, which Aristotle refelled on this wise; It behooveth that the chief good be perfect, But virtue is not perfect, Therefore it must not be counted the chiefest good. The major proposition appeareth: for if it be not a perfect

chief good, our desire resteth not therein, but will desire moreover some other chief good. The minor proposition; namely, that virtue is not perfect, is proved; because it is a habit, that is, a power not in act: and it may oftentimes be in the subject without the action thereof, as a thing that many ways may be stopped; as by sleep, and by taking away of the occasion, if matter be wanting, and when afflictions, sickness, and misfortunes do disquiet us. This opinion, which placeth the chiefest good in virtue itself, is of all other that we have heretofore recited most near unto truth, and therefore it hath had great and grave patrons. But how it draweth near unto the truth, hereby we easily gather; that there is none more certain nor surer preparation unto felicity than virtue: for from the habit of virtue proceedeth that action, which is affirmed by Aristotle to be very felicity: virtue therefore is the nearest power or faculty unto felicity. But why the same cannot be the chiefest good, and felicity itself, it is cause enough, that it is referred unto a further end. For to what purpose do we procure unto ourselves the habits of virtues, but that we may the more easily and readily do well? Wherefore, since that virtue is directed unto action, action shall be better and more to be desired than it.

I am not ignorant, that they which are wont to hold with the Stoics, have been accustomed to object against the Peripatetikes, saying that they, while they appoint virtue to be the chiefest good, do not understand it, as it is in the power, and lieth without act; but do take the same as it is joined with her action: and so laugh Aristotle to scorn, which objected not against them, but an idle virtue, and severed from right action. This answer at the first sight seems unto some to be just, and likely to be true: but if the thing be more narrowly considered, and that we shall more diligently look into the same, it is rather a shift, than a true dissolving of the argument; because whether

they will or no, action, and virtue, from whence it proceedeth, are distinguished [one from another:] for they be contained in sundry

Predicaments, and are many times severed one from another. For virtue, when it is a habit, belongeth unto quality; but the act which it worketh, is comprehended under the Predicament of action. But how they be severed one from another, I think no man that diligently considereth the matter, is ignorant: for he which is endued with knowledge or wisdom, doth neither contemplate always, nor yet is always occupied about those things which he knoweth. Whereupon it cometh to pass, that they which comprehend two for one, and distinguish them not, do easily swerve from the mark, whereunto they should have an aim; and instead of an absolute and perfect doctrine, do follow that which is confused and not plain. This Aristotle perceiving distinguished and severed one of them from another, and when he seeth that one of them is referred to the other, he denieth that that which tendeth to another end can be the chief: which reason of his opinion is so evident, as I think nothing can be more manifest than the same. But they which cannot confute the reason, do return the argument upon Aristotle himself, who denieth that felicity is therefore placed in virtue, because virtue may easily and many ways be hindered.

If this argument (say they) like thee so well, neither canst thou indeed defend the most perfect action to be the chiefest good; because the same also is as many ways subject to impediments, as thou didst object against virtue. For he which sleepeth doth not contemplate; neither can he do the same, which is vexed with grievous torments; and he cannot endure any perils, which liveth in quiet and peaceable common-wealth's. Wherefore thou that sayest that virtue, for these causes, is not the chiefest good; thou shalt also say, that the most perfect action must not be accounted for

felicity. A show indeed of truth this hath, which is objected, but it maketh no matter at all; because the Peripatetikes will easily grant, that the same most perfect action, which they say is felicity, is not continued so as it cannot be broken off; but so long as it is, they would not grant it to be no felicity, and much less will they yield that the same is referred to a better end. Both which things cannot be said of the habit which is virtue. For the same, as it is in a man that sleepeth, or is vexed with most painful griefs, can neither he called felicity, nor yet can make him blessed in whose mind it is: for the habit may remain, when the action is taken away; but an action being let from breaking forth, neither is it, nor yet remaineth it. And besides this, a habit, while it yet remaineth hindered, who seeth not that it is still referred unto action, when as it inclineth the mind and desire thereunto.

Moreover, that should be accounted our felicity, which approacheth most near unto the divine felicity; but God, seeing he is not only perfect, but even perfection itself, hath felicity in act, not in power; in very deed, not in habit; therefore our felicity also shall be an action: which notwithstanding is requisite to be less than the blessedness of God, which therefore happeneth; because his act cannot fail him, but ours is very oftentimes broken off.

25. After those things, which we have now spoken, must their cavil also be confuted, which laugh at the argument, brought as touching the impediments, whereby the action of virtue is repressed, that it cannot be effectual. Ye feign (say they) that the work of virtues pertaineth to the body; but it is not so: because the whole action of virtue is in the soul, and therein it standeth full and whole: the goods of the body, or instruments of fortune belong nothing thereunto. And without doubt, a poor man may be liberal, by wishing to give unto them to whom he thinketh meet to be given. Again, in the midst of torments, and in the very flames themselves, fear doth shine the

more, and becometh more glorious. According to which opinion Seneca unto Lucillus, the seventy epistle writeth many things, and among others saith; Virtue hath also place in the bed: overcome thou thy sickness with a valiant courage, because, if others that be present, shall perceive thee to be courageous, great, and upright in torments, they will wonder at the brightness of thy virtue; and thou, whilst thou art so vexed, shalt rightly instruct them, and thorough virtue shalt not only help thyself very much, but them also. What manner of things these be, now will we more narrowly consider. They declare, that the action of virtue is whole, full, and perfect in the mind: that we deny. For if we shall declare the nature of a habit, the same is nothing else, then a quality brought in by long exercise, by the benefit whereof the powers of the mind and body are made more ready and fit to occupy themselves. Neither doth virtue in the mind alone express her action. They which say that virtue doth bear rule in eating, drinking, fleshly desire, and such like; those also will say, that the action of that virtue is expressed in the body also, not in the soul only. So it may be lawful to say, as touching fortitude, liberality, and many other virtues; to show that the body and goods of fortune were not given by God unto mankind. Howbeit, these men perhaps persuade themselves, that the nature of man is fulfilled, and made perfect in the soul only: which how far it is from the truth, yourselves without me may perceive.

A poor man (say they) may be liberal, while he desireth to give unto them, to whom he thinketh it meet to be given. But I would fain learn of these

Stoics, whether they that be endued with virtue, and being hindered, do desire to work by it; for what cause they desire this? Doo they it not for blessedness sake? This if they shall deny, they will declare themselves to be unwise in desiring of those things which they refer not unto the chiefest

good. But if they will grant, that they wish those works for felicity sake, it shall be lawful to say that felicity is perfectly gotten, not in virtue, but in action. I will easily grant, that virtue shineth, and is more glorious in the midst of flames, and in most cruel torments; and him that with a valiant courage suffereth these things, I will extol with praises among good and wise men; but yet so, as I will deny him, in the meantime, to enjoy whole and perfect felicity. He shall very well by his example instruct and teach others, yet shall he not perfectly and all manner of ways be blessed. These things be so very true, as even they, which profess the Stoical discipline, must whether they will or no yield unto this opinion. For Cicero in his fifth book of Tusculane questions, at the beginning saith; If virtue be not of such strength, that it can defend itself, I fear me least we are not so much to lean to the hope of a blessed life, upon confidence of virtue, as it may seem that we have more need to pray for it. Verily I myself, when I consider those chances, wherein fortune hath exceedingly exercised me, I begin to mistrust this opinion, and other whiles also stand in great fear of man's weakness and frailty. For I fear least that when nature gave unto us weak bodies, and with them joined incurable diseases, and intolerable griefs; it also gave minds agreeable to the griefs of the bodies, and severally entangled with the vexations and troubles thereof. But herein I reform myself, that I judge of the strength of virtue according to other men's niceness, and peradventure according to mine own, not according to virtue itself, &c. How he doubted, and in a manner became of this opinion, he plainly expressed in these words: and it maketh no matter, that he saith he reformed himself, because that is uncertain: and, he addeth this word Peradventure, which is a token of doubting.

Moreover, what is so certain, as that Cicero himself in his fourth book De finibus disputed against Cato, who had before in the third book extolled the opinion of Zeno and the Stoics to the heavens? Yea and the Stoics as in virtue alone they boasted, that they were blessed, yet did they not repose themselves in that alone; but called the powers of the body, the pureness of the senses, dignities, riches and such like προηγμένα; that is, Things coming naturally without any other beginning: which Cicero calleth Things produced, promoted, principal, advanced above other. With the sense of which words if we would urge the Stoics, we shall say, that they attribute more unto this kind of things, than the Peripatetiks; as they which do name those things principal, and above others; whereas the Peripatetiks call them indeed good things, but yet of the lowest degree, and which are not of much account, being compared with just and honest things; and therefore, as the time serves, to be contemned, and not much to be desired. I know indeed that the Stoics do call these things principal and chief, while they be compared with their contraries; not when they be compared with virtues: but yet by these their new and made words they attribute very much to this order of things, when they call these things, Commodities, things to be preferred, and of chief regard; and their contraries ἀποπροηγμένα (ἀπό προηγμένα): as who should say Discommodities, and things rejected.

Wherefore, though the Stoics would contend with the Peripatetiks in talk, yet in reason and in the thing it self they agree with them. The Stoics delight in a magnifical kind of speech, and only in words bring in a unsensibleness of passion, which when they come afterward to the matter, all men feel by experience, that it is quite differing from our senses, and from our tried customs, and also very far from the strength of our human nature.

26. And I do not think, that I should lightly pass over those things, which I cited a little before, out of the fifth book of Tusculane questions; If (saith

Cicero) virtue had not help enough in itself, that then we must make our prayers for the same. What is this we hear? As though if virtue were sufficient in itself, is there nothing then to be wished for, or to be desired of God; as if we had all things consisting in our own selves? Shall Tully on this wise, in making more of virtue than is requisite, take away godliness, which is the chief virtue of all others, by abolishing the invocation of God?

Trulie even thus did the Stoics think. For Seneca writeth, that Jupiter can do no more than a good man. Wherefore the Stoics used no less magnifical kind of speech, than their doctrine was altogether differing from religion.

Which I do not therefore say, as though I endeavored to pronounce Aristotle's opinion to be godly and religious; but to give warning, that the Stoics are not so to be esteemed, as though in praising of their virtues, they drew very near (as some think) unto the Christian doctrine. Yet will I bear more in this behalf with the Stoics, than with the Epicures; because they speak in a manner always that which is agreeable to their own opinion, whereas the Epicures many times affirm things not agreeable to their own rules. Because Epicurus accounteth grief for the chiefest evil, he also placeth pleasure of the body, or voidness of sorrow to be the chiefest good.

If he be tormented, or descend into Phalaris bull, and tell me how sweet this is, as he boasteth that His wise man will say, without doubt he shall speak most inconstantly, and such things as no manner of way accord in themselves.

Let these words so glorious and worthy of memory be left unto the Stoics, which so boast of their virtues, as they think that a wise man endued with them, shall never be without happiness. Neither can they persuade their

mind, that seeing felicity doth evermore accompany virtues, it will then forsake them, and that it will stay upon the threshold, wherein they enter into the prison; as though it may not be lawful for it to enter into a sorrowful place, nor (as said Theophrastus) to ascend upon the rock or wheel of torment. Theophrastus, no doubt, was far wiser than Epicurus. For he which saw, that by the Peripatetiks doctrine, was required unto civil felicity, whereof we now entreat, both the goods of the body, and the goods external; the very same man understood, how impossible it was, that even the wisest man should be blessed in torments and misery. But Epicurus, who was delighted with such a chief good, as we have now declared, will speak things neither meet nor agreeable to his purpose, while he speaketh so magnifically, and useth such glorious sentences. But yet this is no marvel; for he contemned Logic, which is the right means of disputing: but of this thing we have spoken enough.

26. Let us now see what the holy scriptures say hereunto: truly they make no mention of virtues, when they show the felicity of man. In the psalm, wherein is rehearsed the opinion of the common sort, which thought him to be happy that hath abundance, and who is replenished with infinite store of the goods of this world; we are otherwise persuaded by the voice of God.

For it is added; Blessed is the people whose God is the Lord. Here an act is showed, not a power; Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord; blessed is the man that walketh in the law of the Lord. Further, that even the good habits of the mind may be sometime idle and unprofitable, hereby it is evident; that Paul warneth us to take heed, that we receive not the grace of God in vain. And Paul adviseth Timothy, To stir up the gifts of God, which were in him, by laying on of hands by authority of the eldership. Seeing then the gifts of the spirit, which are more excellent than moral virtues, are

referred unto action, that others may be holpen and instructed, (otherwise we should not become the better for them) this must be judged much truer, and more certain as touching human virtues. Where it is said of Aristotle, that Calamities and miseries do let, that men cannot be counted happy; if this should be considered by itself, as it is said without any distinction, it agreeth not with the holy scriptures. For they which suffer for Christ, are in great penury, and are troubled with grievous punishments; yet do they enjoy that blessedness, which in this life is possible to be attained unto: because their sins are not imputed unto them, and their soul and body are then exceedingly renewed toward the attainment of eternal life. Howbeit, seeing the felicity of this life is not yet full, but begun; therefore we will grant it, that the saints, which be so afflicted, are not in perfect and absolute blessedness; seeing they look shortly to have the same, wherein they shall feel none of these miseries. For the oracles of God say; God shall wipe away all tears from the eyes of his saints, neither shall there be mourning nor lamentation anymore: for these former things are parted away.

Wherefore we say with Aristotle, that between perfect and full felicity, and miseries and calamities there is no agreement, which nevertheless disagreeth not with that felicity, which we have here begun.

And Paul saw the displeasures of this life to be so repugnant unto perfect blessedness, and that they could not abide together, as he said unto the Corinthians; If the dead rise not again, we are more unhappy than all men.

And if that Christ pronounced them blessed, which mourn, and which suffer persecution for his name; that must not so be understood, as though we should be blessed, because we weep, and sigh, and suffer persecution; but because we wait for better things hereafter, and are saved by hope. Neither do I deny, but that in the midst of the troubles of the flesh, God will give

marvelous comforts to them that be his: which I persuade myself passeth all the delights of civil happiness. Yet cometh it not to pass thereby, that perfect felicity is joined with these calamities. After this manner did Paul comfort the soldiers of Christ; The things (saith he) which we suffer in this life, are not equal and of like value with those things, which at length shall be revealed in us, when we reign together with Christ. But Aristotle was constrained to judge as he said, because he was ignorant of the blessedness to come, and saw that the civil happiness, which he treated of, was obscured and diminished by adversities and afflictions. And unto him were unknown those heavenly comforts, which God, above the power of nature, bringeth to the confessors of the truth, even in the very torments. Wherefore, if as touching this matter, the Stoics seem somewhat to disagree from us, this they did unadvisedly; seeing they also knew nothing of the life to come, neither had they ever trial of the consolations of God in the midst of miseries and death.

Of the causes of Felicity.

27. Now that we have largely enough disputed as touching the nature of felicity, we will inquire of the cause thereof. Aristotle reckoneth up five causes, which may be gathered into two; for either they be inward, or outward. They are reckoned inward, because discipline, custom, and exercise do proceed from us. But the outward causes are thought to be God and fortune. Between custom and exercise this is the difference, that custom is referred unto virtues, which are bred by often and continual actions. But exercises and labors are to be applied to a sure obtaining and keeping of riches, honor, and health; in which things many (as it hath been said) have placed felicity. And first as touching discipline, it belongeth unto them, which have thought that virtues are learned by applying of doctrines.

Wherefore if there be need of discipline, it must be learned; if of custom, we must not desist from honest actions; if it be ascribed to exercise, there must of necessity be no labor spared; if it be expected of God, he must be prayed unto; but if of fortune, since we are able to do nothing concerning it, all must wholly be committed unto the same. The Stoics, and especially

Epictetus, distinguish all things which are found either to be in us, or not to be within us. By those things that are in us, they understand the things which we can rule by our counsel, and obtain by our strength: and those things that are said to be not within us, are the same that we have not in our power; as nobility, health, and riches.

Whether God be the cause of felicity, Aristotle in his first book of his Ethics speaketh very ambiguously, and bringeth a conditional proposition, but absolves not the argument. If any gift (saith he) be of God, felicity shall be given of him. And he showeth a reason of the conclusion, because the same hath the chiefest place among all human things. But to the making up of the argument, there may be added a double minor proposition: that the felicity of the godly, and ours is all one; But many things are given unto men by God, therefore must felicity be expected from him. And that many things are given unto men by God, we doubt nothing at all, who do also extol his providence in everything: and since from him, as from the chief good, and fountain of goodness, is derived whatsoever is good, we do not once imagine, that this doth flow without his pleasure, will, and election.

But there be some, and those indeed Peripatetiks, which do deem far otherwise of the providence of God: for they think that his providence, as touching particular things, stretcheth not lower than the moon; because so far, all things are done constantly, and in singular order. But, as touching the things which are beneath the moon, they make providence to be only of

general things, not of particular. Wherefore they should take this for the minor proposition; But no gifts are distributed by God unto men, neither therefore is felicity given. And they say, that gifts are not given by God unto men, not because they acknowledge him not to be the first efficient cause, from whence all good things do arise; but they take the word of giving or bestowing from election, will, and free choice. The good things, which we have, and felicity, they will grant do depend of God, and of the motion of the heaven, and that they cannot otherwise be had; but they think that those be not given by him, by a certain distribution which he considereth of, or which he giveth by a free disposition. For they think that God dealeth necessarily, and by a natural impulsion.

Wherefore we must note, that Aristotle in the place above mentioned, neither affirmeth nor denieth that felicity is given of God. He affirmeth it not, because he saith, that this work belongeth to another treatise; namely, to the metaphysics, or treatise of supernatural things, wherein is treated of the providence of God, without which doctrine, this question cannot be defined. Neither yet doth he deny felicity to be given of God, least he should fall into an absurdity. For it seems to be contrary to reason, that the rest of the gifts should be given by God, and felicity not to be given by him.

Wherefore he teacheth it under a condition, namely, If other things be had from God, felicity likewise doth proceed from him: but he affirmeth nothing at all. But I see not how fitly he putteth over this treatise to another place; for if this definition do depend of providence, might he not in the meantime have borrowed so much of his metaphysical treatise, as should have been sufficient for the explaining of his mind? This he did as touching the soul, and took from his treatise of natural things so much as served unto moral doctrine, and saith, that The soul as we shall shortly see, hath diverse parts.

So likewise might he here have written of this, although he had not here purposely proved it, but taken it from some other treatise; that God by his providence doth give many gifts unto men; than the which gifts seeing felicity is far more excellent, it is meet that the same also should belong unto it. Howbeit, dissembling this, he passed it over, and saith it belonged to another treatise. But I beseech you, what more convenient place had there been, seeing in that book he was to treat of manners and virtues, the understanding whereof dependeth altogether of the knowledge of felicity?

Now was it time to affirm thereof simply, that he might no less have expected the same of God, than other gifts. Now then, when he speaketh on this wise, he seemeth to shun the hatred of ungodliness, but deserved no praise for a plain and sincere confession. If he had meant well and honestly, he should not have used these ambiguities. But what should he have done?

He could not by philosophy know anything of the will of God towards men; for whatsoever we know thereof, we are all wholly beholding for it unto the holy scriptures, and especially to the gospel.

28. When Aristotle had after a sort denied, that felicity cometh from God, in that he would not confess it; this nevertheless he granteth, that it is a thing most divine, that is, most perfect, which also God enjoyeth. For he, although not as men be, yet after a certain manner of his own, is blessed. here Eustratius added [of his own] that God doth give felicity, but not without the means which we have rehearsed, I mean learning, custom and exercise. And undoubtedly, there be certain things given unto us by God, without any labor or endeavor of us. For when did ever any man labor that he might be born witty, noble, or of a sound body, or of a perfect complexion? Assuredly no man. As for other things, God so giveth them, as we should attain unto them by certain means. Howbeit this must be

diligently considered, that if we will think well and godly of the matter, even the very means are given unto us by God himself: for no man shall be moved to receive sound doctrine, nor to take in hand a good custom nor a profitable exercise, unless he be stirred up by God. If felicity have those three things, for causes and certain principles, it may soon be common unto many; except those which have not their senses perfect, which be feeble, and born lame, and for that cause cannot attain unto felicity. For there be some, which be born fools, and of an ill temperature of the body; and therefore they which be deaf, dumb, or which be overcome with great griefs and weakness, cannot learn good arts and literature, neither are they fit for exercises; nor yet to procure unto themselves good manners. And doctrine is not admitted for moral virtues sake; but because of the faculties and sciences which be contemplative, in which things for the most part felicity doth consist. And because it is said, that felicity is common unto many; hearers and readers be encouraged to think, that if they fall from it, it must be imputed to their own default which would not learn and accustom themselves to good actions, and painful exercises.

From felicity he in like manner exempted children; because they, in respect of their age, which in them is very young and tender, cannot execute that action to all intents and purposes. But the reason which he maketh, why they cannot be blessed, let us examine it as it is produced by Aristotle;

There is need (saith he) unto felicity, both virtue, and a perfect life.

Touching life, there is no controversy; because as one swallow maketh not the spring time, so one day maketh not a man happy. Wherefore, if one should become happy, it is requisite that his age be lengthened, and his time produced. There is also required a perfect virtue; for unless it shall take deep root, it will soon slip away, as having small fastening. Briefly,

Aristotle will that a happy man should be in such a state, as he cannot easily be removed therefrom; whereunto all men see, that a full age and perfect virtue is requisite. This opinion pleased the Pelagians, which placed righteousness, and the kingdom of heaven in the power of men. Also it pleased the schoolmen; for as the Pelagians denied grace, and said that nature doth suffice: so these men likewise affirming grace in bare name, have in very deed quite taken it away, as they which have made the same common and open to all men, as though it were in every man, either to receive it, or to put it from him. And when they be asked who doth give grace to them, which accept it, in such sort as they both desire it, and receive it, when it is offered to them; they fly unto free will: and of all these is Pighius the standard-bearer.

Wherefore, if either thou ask of Aristotle, or of them; Since felicity is thus common, as ye say, how comes it to pass, that so few obtain the same?

Because few (say they) will learn, few will labor, few will accustom themselves to honest and good exercises. But we will here note a general and a certain proposition; To every nature or kind there is a purposed end, the which all that be comprehended in it may attain. And surly, that which Aristotle answered, as touching them that have not their perfect senses, be lame, and feeble, why they cannot be partakers of felicity; namely, because of their natural defect; that proposition may be understood, when the powers shall be perfect: so do we answer, that men cannot now by themselves be perfect, because nature was corrupted even from the beginning, and that we have not the powers as well of the mind, as of the body perfect. So that now, when we hear these things, let us think that we hear Aristotle, not Paul, or Christ. Here have we three things that are spoken of felicity; It is a divine thing, it may be obtained by the three principal

things, which he have already rehearsed, and it is common in a manner to all men.

29. There remaineth fortune, which Aristotle removeth from the causes of felicity; because it is thought unworthy that it should be admitted to open so excellent a gift unto men. But before I show the reason brought by Aristotle,

I will endeavor to declare what fortune is. As it is written in the second book of natural philosophy; It is an accidental cause, and then it cometh in place, when anything is joined to any man, which is author of the effect following; unto the producing of which effect, that which is joined thereunto, worketh nothing, but only giveth sometimes an occasion; and the effect may well come to pass without it. This is made plain by a similitude;

If a man, by reason of an ague, become temperate, we will say that this fell out by fortune: for temperance cometh of the will as of her own proper cause, which will bridleth the affection of lust. The ague might have been the occasion whereby this came to pass, but the cause it could not be. And because these things, to wit, the will of temperate government, and the ague, meet by fortune in one and the same man; therefore doth temperance spring by fortune from the ague. But it appeareth plainly enough, that the fever is not by itself the cause of the temperance; otherwise, all that be grieved with a fever, would become temperate. According to this manner of speaking must the sentence of Paul be examined and understood;

Knowledge puffeth up. Pride, which immediately preferreth our own things above other men's, proceedeth from the will; hereby we become vain and puffed up. And because knowledge giveth an occasion unto some that this is done, therefore knowledge is said to puff up, but yet by fortune; because in one self man, are joined together by chance these two things, to wit, the desire of passing and excelling others, and also some knowledge of things.

And as these things be joined together at all adventures; so doth vain puffing up proceed by fortune from knowledge. Also it happeneth, that when unto that effect, which we desire by itself, and by our own advise, another effect by chance is joined therewith; then the same cometh of fortune, not purposely, whereas we in very deed sought for another thing.

As otherwhile it happeneth unto them that be diggers, that they in laboring do find treasure, when as they only intended the trimming of their vines and trees: this I say happeneth by fortune, when as the digger sought for another matter: neither is the digging the proper and true cause of finding out the treasure; for if a man should affirm this, he must of necessity avouch, that all diggers do find treasures. Add moreover, that all the effects of fortune do very seldom come to pass, and that contrariwise than falleth out in the true and proper causes, which very seldom are hindered from bringing forth their effects. Which things being so, it appeareth, and that manifestly, that fortune is repugnant to reason and counsel. Wherefore it is not meet to attribute unto it, that it bringeth forth felicity. And so Aristotle concludeth, that seeing felicity is better derived from the causes before mentioned, than from fortune, it is meet that we should determine it so to be; because it ought to be in the best manner that it can.

One reason, whereby Aristotle proveth fortune to be no cause of felicity is this; The chiefest good ought not to be referred unto a vile and abject cause;

Felicity is the chiefest good, and fortune is but vile among the causes; Wherefore blessedness ought not to be reduced unto fortune, being a cause less worthy than others. And hereof dependeth the force of this argument: for although a noble cause do otherwhile bring forth a vile effect (as we know that the sun doth not only breed a man, but also frogs, fleas, and flies) yet excellent effects cannot proceed but of noble causes. Here we see, that

by evident and most manifest words Aristotle excludeth fortune, as he that would not number the same among the causes of felicity, and taketh propositions as well out of his book of natural philosophy, as also out of his metaphysics: the very which certainly he might have done, in affirming God to be the cause of man's blessedness. So that he excludeth from this number both God and fortune: God, as over-worthy and too high; but fortune, as an unworthy and a more vile cause. For it is a most inconstant thing, and hath no substantial ground-work: which nevertheless is so excluded, as it can do nothing about the nature and substance of felicity; and yet undoubtedly it can do somewhat about those good things which help unto felicity, and be the instruments thereof. But if it be of power, concerning riches, and honors, and such like, which (as it hath been said) do not a little further unto felicity; why do they deny them to be the cause thereof? We grant indeed, that these things do accomplish, and do service unto felicity, and do such service, as it may not be without them; but we deny that it doth properly cause the same. For it so fareth not, that as the lack of these things may hinder blessedness; so if they be present, they can perform and bring the same to pass. For thou shalt see many men that be noble, rich, strong, and in honors, who nevertheless being wicked, thou wilt not call happy. Which assuredly should not come to pass, if these things were by themselves causes of happiness. But if these kinds of good things be taken away from honest and wise men, they suffer them not to be happy, although (as it hath been said) those things themselves are not the causes of blessedness. But if thou demand, whether the good things of the body do also come from fortune? I may easily deny it; because fortune is affirmed to be one of those causes, which rarely and seldom comes in action: for scarcely within a hundred year it happeneth, that a digger of vine trees, or a ploughman

chanceth upon a treasure. But it is very often given unto men even from their birth, to have a good constitution of their body, and have given them sound members, and sufficient strength to accomplish their actions.

30. Another argument is alleged, which is much stronger, and that is taken from the definition of blessedness. And the sense is; because felicity is an action, and that no small action of the mind, it ought not to be expected of fortune: for the nature of minds and of virtues is otherwise, then it is of fortune. But he saith not absolutely, that blessedness is an action of the mind; but he added, that it is a certain kind of action, that is to wit, a most absolute and most perfect action; because it proceedeth from a most excellent virtue. Hereof dependeth the force of the argument, that neither the mind of man, nor virtue do any action by fortune. He again confirmeth felicity not to be of fortune; because he said at the beginning, that the end of civil faculty is the chiefest good; but no man doubteth, but that the same faculty worketh not by chance, or by fortune. And he proveth, that therefore the chief end of man belongeth unto that faculty, because therein civil virtue doth very much labor, to the end it may make good citizens. Wherefore, if it use diligence, it cannot be said to deal by fortune. For counsel, industry, and diligence are altogether repugnant unto fortune: for the civil art endeavoreth to make good citizens, and to be of excellent conditions, and singular qualities; first by making of good laws, afterward by giving of honors and rewards to the keepers and faithful observers of them; and on the other side, by punishing, and keeping under those which do transgress them.

Let us now briefly examine these things by the holy scriptures, how much they agree with them, or how much they dissent from them. Aristotle speaketh doubtfully of God, whether he be the author of felicity or no. But we constantly affirm that he is; I will (saith God unto Abraham) be thine

exceeding great reward. And least we should suspect that this is naturally true, but not at the will and election of God himself, there followeth there the making of a covenant, whereby he chose to himself a certain people; and he covenanted that he would be the God of those that believe. And Moses, who very well understood, that felicity consisteth herein, that God might be understood and seen, desired this of God, when he said; Show me thy face, which also he obtained. And David sang; Pleasures are at thy right hand for evermore. And Christ our savior, who is our God; Come (saith he) unto me all that labor and are heavy loden, and I will refresh you. And he said speaking of his sheep; They hear my voice, and I give them eternal life.

Let this be a full persuasion to every one of us, that our felicity is to be expected and desired of God himself. As for the exercises, customs, and doctrines which Aristotle mentioneth, in our opinion also must not be contemned; nay rather they are commanded us in every place of the scriptures: yet not so, that they should be the causes of our felicity. For we be freely justified, not of works; and eternal life is granted freely unto us.

But there be certain means, whereby God doth lead us unto him, and to the felicity which we desire: and these means we have from God himself.

Wherefore it was upon good cause said by Paul; It is God which giveth unto us both to will and to perform. But as for fortune much less than Aristotle did, do we commit blessedness thereunto; as we that think, that all our doings are governed by the counsel and will of God, so as without his will, not so much as one hear can fall from our head. And we think this of all other to be most false, which is commonly said of the Ethnics, that Every wise man frameth to himself his own fortune. Aristotle denieth that children can be happy, but we on the other side affirm them to be happy, seeing

Christ said; Suffer them to come unto me, and he embraced them with great

favor, and with singular clemency. We know indeed, that they as yet cannot be workers of excellent actions, but yet by Christ both original sin is forgiven them, and a way unto eternal life is opened to them. Neither do we grant unto him, that they cannot be called happy, which are afflicted with great mischances; since it may be, that they which are truly blessed, do suffer grievous things for the name of Christ: neither do those hard and horrible things, which they endure, overthrow that blessedness, which we men may have while we live here.

Of felicity and blessedness, look more Part. 2. Cap. 16. Art. 26.

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